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ELEMENTS  OF  PHILOSOPHY, 


COMPRISING 


LOGIC  AND  ONTOLOGY, 


GENERAL  METAPHYSICS. 


BY 

Rev.  WALTER  H.  HILL,  S.  J, 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  St.  Louis  University. 


FIFTH    REVISED    EDITION. 


BALTIMORE: 

Published  by  John  Murphy  &  Co. 

Philadelphia:   Claxton,  Remsen  &  Haffelfinger. 

London:  Washbourne,  i 8  Paternoster  PvOW. 

1879. 


PUBLISHERS'  PREFACE 
To  THE  Second  Revised  Edition. 

It  is  not  yet  one  month  since  we  issued  the  first  Edition  of 
*'  Hill's  Philosophy,"  and  such  has  been  the  demand  for  the  work, 
that  a  second  Edition  is  required.  Very  favorable  notices  have 
already  been  given  of  the  work  by  several  periodicals,  and  able 
judges,  whose  verdict  we  know  to  be  of  the  highest  authority,  have 
pronounced  the  book  a  true  and  trusty  friend  through  the  intrica- 
cies of  Philosophy. 

We  rejoice  at  this  success,  because  it  ensures  the  completion  of 
the  whole  work,  including  Ethics,  and  gives  us  every  reason  to 
believe  that  we  shall  soon  have,  in  our  language,  a  Manual  of 
Philosophy,  for  students  and  for  the  general  reader,  equal  to  the 
admirable  Latin  works,  which  have  hitherto  been  almost  the  only 
pure  sources  of  Philosophical  knowledge. 

The  Author  has  taken^  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered  by 
the  preparation  of  this  Edition,  to  revise  his  work  and  thus  render 
it  more  acceptable  to  the  student. 

The  Publishers. 
Baltimore,  Maj^  19,  1873. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1873,  by 

John  Murphy, 

in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


^  PREFACE. 

So 


The  following  elementary  work,  though  primarily  intended 
for  learners,  will,  it  is  believed,  be  found  by  the  general  reader 
of  philosophy  to   contain   things  which  are   new,   as  regards 

'^^     works  of  the  kind  published  in  the  English  language. 

^  In  order  to  render  the  Logic  more  easy  and  more  practical, 
J*'irs^,  the  author  has  omitted  the  perplexed,  undiscussed  and  in- 
determinate Greek  derivatives,  which  give  vagueness  or  obscu- 
rity to  the  matter  contained  in  many  popular  text  books  on 
Logic;  and  he  has  aimed  to  use  in  their  stead  the  most  plain 
and  simple  terminology.  This  perpetual  multiplication  of  in- 
J,  definite  and  unintelligible  technicalities,  which  are  devised  as 

^  Y  if  to  embody  new  forms  of  thought,  helps  much  to  render  the 
study  of  Logic  and  Philosophy  discouraging,  and  their  very 
names  repulsive,  even  to  the  most  ambitious  and  the  most  in- 
telligent young  minds  that  attempt  to  master  the  established 
^  elementary  principles  of  these  all-important  branches  of  a  good 

f^  education.      The  introduction  of  a  new  term  into  a  book  on 

'H      ■. 

U)  Philosophy,  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  actual  discovery  of 

-^ 

a   new  truth.     It   is   a  significant  fact  that,  while  eccentric 

iii 


IV  PKEFACE. 

thought  and  novel  phraseology  possess  a  peculiar  charm  foi 
ill-educated,  rambling  and  superficial  minds ;  yet,  the  lan- 
guage which  remains  in  prevailing  use,  is  the  embodiment 
of  deep  and  true  philosophy  ;  and  the  words  as  well  as  the  con- 
clusions, which  convey  what  is  absurd  or  preposterous,  it  must 
necessarily  repudiate,  by  the  general  law  of  human  thought. 

Second:  It  was  judged  best,  also,  for  the  interests  of  learn- 
ers in  general,  to  omit  the  discussion  of  the  modes  and  figures 
of  the  syllogism;  for,  in  practice  they  are  not  attended  to, 
even  by  those  who  actually  argue  in  form,  the  simple  rules  of 
demonstration  sufficing  for  all  practical  purposes,  and  being  all 
that  is  even  really  useful  in  the  strictest  argumentation.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  was  deemed  expedient  to  introduce  some 
matters  that  pertain  to  branches  of  Philosophy,  whose  full 
treatment  is  appropriate  to  another  volume ;  e.  g.,  certain  sub- 
jects which  strictly  belong  to  Psychology,  Cosmology  and 
Natural  Theology. 

The  author  derived  much  help  from  notes  taken  in  private 
study  years  ago,  but  which  were  prepared  with  no  thought  of 
ever  employing  them  for  any  other  purpose  than  his  own  in- 
struction. It  is  hoped  that  the  acknowledgment  of  having 
made  a  free  use  of  what  was  then  obtained  from  the  best 
works  within  his  reach,  will  excuse  the  omission  .of  more  fre- 
quent reference  to  them  in  the  margin. 

In  disposing  the  matter,  the  method  employed  in  the  most 
approved  text  books  used  in  the  schools  of  Philosophy  is 
generally  followed.     In  such  works  the  definitions  of  terms, 


PREFACE.  V 

many  important  propositions  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics, 
even  with  the  chief  arguments  for  them,  are  treated  as  com- 
mon property;  as  happens,  for  example,  with  certain  defini- 
tions" and  theorems  of  geometry,  originally  from  Euclid,  but 
which  are  now  the  recognized  property  of  all  geometricians. 

In  order  to  secure  brevity,  after  having  indicated  succinctly, 
but,  as  he  trusts,  clearly  and  comprehensively,  the  theories  and 
the  salient  points  of  the  matters  treated,  he  has  been  com- 
pelled, in  many  instances,  to  leave  their  development  to  the 
instructor,  or  to  the  reader  for  himself. 

The  writer  flatters  himself  that  the  treatises  on  certainty, 
and  its  motives  and  principles;  on  sensible  and  intellectual  cog- 
nition ;  the  objective  reality  of  ideas ;  the  principle  of  causa- 
tion ;  will,  perhaps,  be  found  to  possess  special  value,  more, 
particularly  for  those  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  language 
of  the  schools. 

It  was  deemed  expedient  to  insert  on  the  margin,  here  and 
there,  some  suggestive  axioms,  brief  distinctions  and  explana- 
tions, taken  from  the  Latin  authors,  among  whom  they  pass  for 
established  doctrine,  and  are  usually  enunciated  nearly  in  the 
same  terms.  The  Lati?i  of  the  schools,  besides  being  brief,  is 
also  peculiarly  capable  of  expressing  precisely,  clearly,  and  com- 
prehensively, matters  which  it  is  difficult  to  utter  through  the 
less  accurate  vernacular,  in  terms  that  are  neither  obscure  nor 
ambiguous.  Though  they  are  not  essential  to  the  text  of  the 
work,  yet,  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader  who  is  not  famiUar 
with  the  Latin  language,  the  translation  is  subjoined  to  these 


VI  PREFACE. 

citations.  It  was,  however,  found  no  easy  task,  in  some  in« 
otances,  to  reproduce  them  with  fidehty  in  EngHsh  phraseology, 
as  the  classic  scholar  will  readily  see  from  the  result,  and  know 
how  to  judge  benignantly. 

If  the  offering  which  is  herewith  respectfully  made  to  the 
cause  of  education  meet  with  public  favor,  it  is  designed  to 
complete  the  philosophical  course  by  adding  to  the  present 
work  treatises  on  Cosmology,  Psychology,  Theodicea,  and 
Ethics  or  Moral  Philosophy.  Whether  this  part  of  the  under- 
taking be  well  or  ill  done — and,  doubtless,  many  errors  and 
imperfections  have  escaped  notice — it  may,  nevertheless,  fairly 
be  taken  as  a  specimen  of  what  the  whole  is  likely  to  be ;  and, 
even  if  it  prove  to  possess  but  indifferent  merit,  still  it  is  the 
fruit  of  much  toil,  and  the  result  of  the  writer's  best  possible 
effort,  done,  as  it  was,  during  intervals  between  various  daily 
duties.  With  this  candid  statement,  the  work  is  sent  forth 
with  the  hope  that  kind  suggestions  and  ingenuous  criticism 
may  contribute  to  improve,  and  perfect  it  for  the  object  in- 
tended;   i.  e.,  an  aid  for  the  study  of  Philosophy. 

St.    L0UI6   University, 
Febiuary  10th,  1873. 


INTRODUCTION. 


PHILOSOPHY;    ITS    OBJECT. 

The  word  Philosophy,  according  to  the  sense  in  which  Pytha- 
goras applied  it  to  his  school,  means  the  love,  desire  and  pur- 
suit of  wisdom.  Philosophy,  as  a  science,  is  the  knowledge 
of  things  in  their  highest  and  most  universal  causes,  so  far  as 
such  knowledge  is  attainable  by  the  light  of  natural  reason. 
Its  object,  therefore,  includes  the  world  or  universe,  man,  God, 
in  their  most  essential  relations  to  each  other.* 

It  is  not  without  propriety,  then,  that  Philosophy,  when 
compared  to  the  whole  collection  of  human  sciences,  is  pro- 
nounced to  be,  "as  the  sun  in  the  planetary  system,  the  light 
of  all."  'Without  some  adequate  acquaintance, ,  at  least  with 
the  body  of  its  established  doctrine,  even  a  liberal  education 
is  incomplete  or  partial,  if,  indeed,  it  be  not  superficial  or  un- 
sound. 

The  knowledge  of  a  thing,  even  when  it  is  scientific,  stops 
with  the  immediate  or  proximate  causes  of  that  thing;  but 
wisdom,  which  is  philosophical  knowledge,  refers  the  same  thing 

*  "  Rerum  divinarum  atque  humanarum  causarumque  quibus  continentur  cognitio." 
The  knowledge  of  human  and  divine  things,  and  of  the  causes  by  which  they  are  related 
to  each  other.  — Cicero  de  Offic.  lib. 


2.  C.    II. 


VIII  INTRODUCTION. 

to  its  still  higher  and  more  universal  causes;  that  is,  it  seeks 
to  understand  and  explain  it  in  its  essence  as  it  absolutely  is, 
and  must  be.  Other  science  acquaints  us  with  things  as  they 
are  directly  and  extrinsically  known  through  the  senses,  or 
other  powers  of  cognition;  but  philosophy,  by  means  of 
higher  scientific  knowledge,  proceeds  further,  and  explains  the 
intrinsic  nature  ot  those  things,  and  their  relation  to  still  more 
universal  truths.  For  example:  Physiology,  as  a  science,  ex- 
plains the  whole  economy  of  the  living  human  body,  its 
organism,  the  functions  of  its  tissues,  the  relations  and  con- 
nexions of  its  members,  and  the  like ;  and  that  science  is 
wholly  limited  to  this  positive  object,  to  this  view  of  organic 
beings.  Philosophy  proceeds  much  farther;  it  explains  the 
nature  of  man  as  a  rational  animal,  or  as  consisting  of  an  or- 
ganized body  and  a  living  soul  in  union  by  composition ;  and 
it  answers  the  questions,  "what  is  life?  what  is  the  nature  of 
the  soul?  what  essentially  constitutes  the  union  of  the  soul 
and  body?  can  materiaV  organs,  by  any  possibility,  elicit  acts 
of  intelligence  ?  "  etc. 

It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  Philosophy  is  superior  in  its 
aim  and  objects  to  all  other  human  sciences.  It  treats  of  its 
matter  on  metaphysical  principles;  that  is,  it  explains  objects  in 
their  essence,  employing  for  that  purpose  ftecessary,  inwiutable 
and  absolute  truths;  which  preserve  the  understanding  from 
error,  not  only  in  these  elevated  matters,  but  also  in  the  study 
of  facts,  no  less  than  the  conclusions  from  those  facts. 

The  subjects  that  are  now  usually  treated  in  a  course  of 


INTRODUCTION.  IX 

Philosophy,  are  Logic,  Ontology,  Cosmology,  Psychology, 
Natural  Theology,  and  Moral  Philosophy  or  Ethics. 

Logic  explains  the  laws  of  right  reasoning ;  it  is,  when  con- 
sidered under  different  respects,  both  a  natural  gift,  and  the 
result  of  art.  Artificial  Logic  derives  its  value  from  the  natu- 
ral, whose  principles  it  aims  to  express  in  a  few  clear  and  inva- 
.riable  formulae.  Logic,  considered  as  practically  directing  the 
mind  in  reasoning,  is  an  art;  but  inasmuch  as  it  explains  and 
proves  the  precepts  of  correct  argument  by  their  reasons,  fur- 
nishes the  means  and  the  criteria  of  certainty,  or  propounds 
the  truth  of  cognition,  it  is  a  science. 

Ontology,  or  General  Metaphysics,  has  for  its  object  the 
essential  predicates  of  all  things ;  and  it,  therefore,  deals  with 
truths  which  are  strictly  absolute  and  universal.  It  is  the  most 
completely  generalized  system  of  knowledge  which  it  is  possi- 
ble for  the  human  intellect  to  form  by  its  highest  power  of 
analysis. 

Cosmology  treats  of  the  visible  world;  its  origin  by  creation, 
the  nature  of  the  material  substance  of  which  it  is  made,  of 
what  constitutes  the  essence  of  inorganic,  organic,  and  living 
forms  of  material  substance. 

Psychology  has  for  its  end  to  explain  the  human  soul,  con- 
sidered both  as  the  vital  principle  in  the  human  compound, 
and  as  a  spiritual  substance  capable  of  existing /<?r  se^  or  separ- 
ate from  the  body,  together  with  its  nature,  operations,  its  essen- 
tial immateriality,  and  indestructibility. 

Natural  Theology  treats  of  God  as  the  first  and  unproduced 


X  INTRODUCTION. 

cause  of  all  that  exists  out  of  him;  his  nature,  attributes  or 
perfections,  so  far  as  they  can  be  known  by  mere  reason. 

Moral  Philosophy  or  Ethics  has  for  its  object  moral  good; 
and  man  as  a  moral  being,  his  relation  to  the  natural  law  of 
right  and  wrong,  the  ultimate  end  of  his  being,  what  consti- 
tutes his  chief  good,  summiim  bonum.  When  limited  rigor- 
ously to  its  sphere,  Moral  Philosophy  prescinds  from  Revela- 
tion ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  presents  its  subject  matter  only  in 
a  philosophical  light.  But,  because  there  can  be  no  disagree- 
ment between  natural  and  supernatural  truth,  God  being  the 
author  of  both  ;*  and,  also,  since  the  light  of  revelation  perfects 
even  the  knowledge  which  is  acquired  by  the  Hght  of  natural 
reason,  it  is  not  wonderful  that  much  of  the  matter  which  is 
usually  contained  in  works  on  Moral  Philosophy  should  really 
be  derived,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  revelation ;  for,  indeed, 
all  human  science  has  been  benefited,  in  one  respect  or  an- 
other, by  supernatural  truth. 

*  ' '  Principiorum  naturaliter  notoriim  cognitio  nobis  divinitus  indita  est, 
cum  ipse  Deus  sit  auctor  nostrse  natiu-ae.  Quidquid  igitur  principiis  hiijusmodi 
conti-ariiun  est,  divinag  sapientiae  conti-arium  est,  non  igitur  a  Deo  esse  potest.  Ea 
igitur  quae  ex  revelatioae  divina  per  fidera  tenentur,  non  possunt  natnrali  cog- 
nitioni  esse  contraria."  (Div.  Th.,  contr.  gent.  lib.  I.  c.  7.)  The  knowledge 
of  principles  known  naturally  is  divinelj'  put  into  us,  since  God  himself  is  the 
author  of  our  nature.  Wliatever,  therefore,  is  contrary  to  'these  principles,  ia 
contrary  to  the  Divine  wisdom,  and  on  that  account  cannot  be  from  God.  Thosie 
things,  therefore,  from  Divine  revehition,  which  are  held  by  faith,  cannot  be 
contrary  to  natural  knowledge. 


CONTENTS. 


LOGIC:  FIEST  PAKT. 

CHAPTER    I. 

PAGE. 

Article  I :  Simple  Apprehension i6 

— -  Article  2  :   Definition  of  Terms  ;  Comprehension  and  Extension l8 

"^"^^-Article  3  :   Ideas  or  Concepts ;  Their  Objects 19 

Article  4 :   Genus,  Species,  Difference,  Attribute,  Accident 22 

Article  5  :   Division;   Rules  of 26 

Article  6:  Definition;   Rules  of. 28 

CHAPTER     II. 

Article  I :  Judgment 30 

Article  2 :   Propositions 31 

Article  3 :   Opposition 33 

CHAPTER     III. 

Article  I :   Reasoning;   Specific  Act  of 35 

Article  2:  The  Syllogism  ;   Its  Canons  Explained 36 

Article  3 :   Hypothetical  Syllogisms  ;   Rule  of 43 

Article  4:  Other  Forms  of  Argument;  The  Dilemma 45 

CHAPTERIV. 
Article  i :   Scientific  Method ;    Analysis  and  Synthesis  in  their  Rela- 
tion both  to  Particular  Scientific  Cognitions,  and  to  Systems  of  such 

Cognitions 48 

Article  2 :   Demonstration;   Kinds  of 50 

Article  3:   Induction;  Essentially  Syllogistic 52 

Article  4:   Probable  Argument 53 

Article  5 :   Fallacies  or  Sophisms 55 


LOGIC:  SECOND  PAET;  OE,  LOGIC  APPLIED. 

CHAPTER    I. 

Article  i :  Truth,  Error,  Falsehood 6l 

Article  2 :   States  of  the  Mind  in  Relation  to  Truth 65 

Article  3:  Certainty;  Evidence 67 

Article  4:   Criterion  of  Certainty 78 

Article  5 :   Primitive  Truths  not  Demonstrable 80 

xi 


XII  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    II. 

MEANS    OR   SOURCES    OF   CERTAINTY. 

PAOE, 

Article  I :   Consciousness 82 

Article  2:  The  Senses,  Internal  and  External;  Their  Objects ;   Brute 
Soul  Material;  Human  Soul  Immaterial ;  Imagmation  an  Organic 

Power .* 85 

A.rticle  3 :  Apprehension,  Judgment,    Reasoning ;  Connatural  Object 

of  Intellect 103 

Article  4:  Objective  Reality  of  Ideas 112 

Articles:   Universals;  Their  Objects 115 

Article  6:   Memory,  Organic  and  Intellectual;  When  it  Affords  Cer- 
tainty   125 

Article  7 :  Testimony  Affords  Certainty 1 29 

Article  8:   Scientific  Knowledge  ;   In  What  it  Specifically  Consists 132 

APPENDIX. 

Disputation,  or  Practical  Exercise  in  Reasoning ;  The  Foi-m  or  Man- 
ner of  Conducting  it ;   Its  Advantages 141 


ONTOLOGY;  OE,  GENERAL  METAPHYSICS. 

Introduction 149 

CHAPTER!. 

Article  I:  Notion  of  Being;  What  it  Includes 151 

Article  2  :  Truth,  Metaphysical  Truth 164 

Article  3  :  Good  and  Evil 165 

Article  4:  Beauty;  In  What  it  consists 173 

CHAPTER     II. 

Article  i :   Substance  and  Accident  Defined 1 78 

Article  2:  Quantity,  Quality,  Habit;   Relation 184 

CHAPTER     III. 

Article  i :  Principle  of  Causation 199 

Article  2 : '  Different  Kinds  of  Causes  ;  Efficient,  Final 200 

Article  3 :   Material  Cause  ;   Formal  Cause  Explained 206 

Article  4:   Perfection  of  Beings  ;  The  Finite  and  Infinite  ;  The  Knowl- 
edge of  the  Infinite  is  Logically  Derived  from  that  of  the  Finite..  212 

Articles:  The  Necessary;  The  Contingent;  Order 222 

Alphabetical  Index 229 


LOGIC:  FIRST  PART 


OR 


DIALECTICS. 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 

THEORETICAL  AND  APPLIED. 


CHAPTER  I. 

As  the  end  of  Logic  is  to  direct  the  mind  in  reasoning,  it 
has  for  its  object:  ist.  To  explain  the  operations  of  the  mind 
so  far  as  they  are  directly  related  to  that  end;  2d.  The  rules 
and  precepts  that  govern  these  operations. 

Some  of  its  principles  prevertt  error  in  the  process  of  reason- 
ing, that  is,  in  the  for?n  of  argument ;  others  guard  against 
deception  in  the  subject  ??iafler,  that  is,  in  the  truths  or  facts 
that  are  compared. 

Hence,  Logic  may  be  conveniently  divided  into  two  parts : 
into  Theoretical  Logic  or  Dialectics,  and  AppUed  Logic. 

In  the  first,  the  operations  of  the  mind  in  right  reasoning  are 
described,  and  the  rules  are  given  which  direct  it  in  \\\^form  of 
reasoning.  In  the  second  part  of  Logic,  those  principles  are 
considered  in  their  practical  application  to  the  objects  of  rea- 
soning, that  is,  to  tlie  matter  or  the  logical  truth  of  propositions. 

Observe,  then,  that  Logic  is  not  limited  in  its  scope  or  gen- 
eral aim  to  the  mere  form  of  arguments ;  for  this  is,  in  fact, 
only  a  part  of  its  proper  object.  It  teaches  also  the  means  of 
attaining  truth  of  cognition,  since  it  lays  down  principles  that 
preserve  the  mind  from  error  in  judging  and  assenting  to  the 
motives  of  certainty.  By  explaining  and  prescribing  the  rules 
of  definition,  division  and  ratiocination,  it  gives  light  and 
method  to  all  the  sciences;  and,  because  its  true  and  proper 
end  is  to  expound  and  direct  the  acts  of  reason,  it  is  itself 
correctiy  styled  by  philosophers  the  science  of  reasoft. 

IS 


16  LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 

ARTICLE     I. 

SIMPLE      APPREHENSION. 

There  are  three  acts  or  operations  of  the  mind  which  are  to 
be  treated  in  the  first  part  of  Logic,  namely,  simple  app7-ehen' 
sion,  judgment^  and  reasoning. 

Apprehe?ision,  fi-om  the  Latin  word,  apprehendere,  to  take 
hold  of,  as  with  the  hand,  in  its  widest  sense,  includes  all  those 
acts  of  cognition  which  precede  Judgment.  Hence,  even  the 
se?ises  may  be  said  to  apprehend  \\\t\x  objects;  the  fancy  appre- 
hends by  means  of  its  images;  the  intellect  apprehends  the 
intelligible  esse?tce,  after  the  concrete  or  singular  realities  of  the 
objects  which  are  presented  by  the  sensible  organs  are  dropped. 
The  intellect  expresses  what  it  thus  apprehends  or  conceives  in 
the  verbiim  mentis,  or  coiicept,  or  by  these  acts  it  forms  its  idea 
of  the  object.  All  these  acts  of  simple  hiowledge  are  included 
under  the  general  name,  simple  apprehension.  We  may  regard 
the  idea,  or  concept,  as  the  term  of  all  these  apprehensive  acts, 
since  it  is  their  last  immediate  result.  It  is  manifest  that  the 
object  conceived  or  apprehended  may  be  either  co??iplex  or 
incomplex;  v.  g.,  "learned  man,  man,"  "stone  house,  stone;" 
but  so  long  as  there  is^no  judgment  affirmed  by  the  mind,  the 
acts  all  pertain  to  apprehensive  k?iowledge,  or  they  are  acts  of 
simple  apprehension.  When  the  mind  actually  co77ipoujids  or 
divides  two  concepts,  as  predicate  and  subject,  \t  Judges  or  form- 
ally and  explicitly  affirms  truth,  and  this  judgment  or  explicit 
affirmation,  being  enunciated  or  expressed  in  language,  is  a 
propositioti.  The  truth  contained  in  this  judgment  is  implicitly 
contained  in  the  acts  of  simple  apprehension,  but  it  is  explicitly 
in  the  judgment  alone,  for,  as  is  manifest,  it  is  only  judgment 
that  can  properly  be  said  to  affirm  truth. 

Simple  apprehension,  in  the  more  special  sense  in  which  the 
expression  is  generally  used,  is  an  act  of  the  intellect,  by  which 
it  takes  notice  of  an  object  and  acquires  some  knowledge  of 
it,  but  without  any  judgment  or  explicit  affirmation;  or,  in  other 
words,  by  this  act  it  merely  perceives  or  sees  the  object,  with- 
out proceeding  to  form  a  judgment. 


LOGIC  :    FIEST   PART.  17 

The  object  of  the  apprehension  may  be  either  a  singular  anc? 
individual  thing,  or  a  relation  between  two  or  more  things. 

The  knowledge  or  cognition  acquired  by  this  act  is  called, 
indiscriminately,  a  coiuept  or  an  idea^  and  it  is  the  result  or 
fruit  of  the  simple  apprehension.  The  concept  is  so  called  on 
account  of  its  being,  as  it  were,  the  offspri?ig  of  the  intellect 
and  the  object.  Take  care  not  to  confound  idea^  which  is  men- 
tal, with  the  image  or  phantas7na  in  the  imagination,  which  is 
organic,  and  which  we  have  in  common  with  the  brute.  The 
thing  apprehended,  as  it  is  in  itself,  with  its  qualities  and  attri- 
butes, is  the  7naterial  object;"^  the  object,  with  its  constituent 
marks  or  properties  as  expressed  ifi  the  mind,  is  the  formal  object 
of  the  apprehension ;  this  formal  object  is  also  called  the  mental 
term  of  the  apprehension,  and  verbu7?i  mentis,  or  mental  word. 
The  oral  term  is  the  word  which  is  employed  in  language  to 
express  orally  the  name  of  the  7?tental  ter7n,  co7icept,  or  idea. 

A  little  attention  to  what  is  daily  occurring  in  the  formation 
of  ideas  or  concepts  by  the  mind,  will  render  this  subject  clear; 
V.  g.,  we  see  an  object;  now,  the  act  of  seeing  that  object 
puts  an  idea  of  it  into  the  mind,  though  we  may  not  at  the 
time  form  any  judgment  concerning  it;  the  act  of  the  mind 
by  which  it  merely  perceives  the  object,  is  a  simple  apprehen- 
sion. The  idea  or  concept  of  the  object  resulting  in  the  mind 
from  the  apprehension,  may  be  reflected  on,  even  for  a  con- 
siderable time,  before  the  mind  positively  affirms  or  denies 
anything  in  regard  to  the  object.  Reflection  serves  to  perfect 
the  idea  or  concept  which  is  the  result  of  the  simple  appre- 
hension; but  the  operation  of  the  mind  does  not  become  a 
judgment  till  an  affirmation  is  really  made. 

*  "  Objectum  est  determinans;  intellectus,  determinabile  adconcipiendum." 
The  object  is  that  which  determines;  and  the  intellect  is  that  which  can  b« 
determined  to  conceive  an  object. 


18  LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 


ARTICLE    II. 

terms;  comprehension  and  extension  of  terms;  defini 
tion  of  other  terms. 

Oral  terms  are  the  names  in  language  for  ideas  or  concepts, 
and,  therefore,  represent  them,  or  stand  for  them. 

A  term  may  be  considered  in  connexion  with  the  constituent 
marks  or  properties  contained  in  its  object;  v.  g.,  7na7i,  as  ex- 
pressing intelHgence,  mortahty,  stature,  complexion,  etc.;  in  this 
case  the  comprehe?ision  of  the  term  ina?i  is  attended  to.  The 
comprehension  of  a  term,  therefore,  expresses  all  the  marks  or 
constituent  properties  of  the  object  for  which  that  term  stands. 

If  we  consider  the  number  of  individuals  to  which  the  term 
may  be  applied,  we  then  regard  the  exfensio?i  of  that  term ;  v. 
g.,  i?itelligence,  extends  to  more  individuals  than  the  term  jnan^ 
for  it  belongs,  also,  to  angels.  Hence,  the  extension  of  a  term 
expresses  the  greater  or  less  number  of  individuals  to  which  it 
applies. 

The  comprehe7ision  of  a  term  decreases  as  its  extension  in- 
creases ;  and,  vice  versa,  the  co7nprehe?ision  increases  as  the  ex- 
te?tsio?i  decreases;  v.  g.,  the  term  substance  expresses  but  one 
mark  or  attribute  of  beings,  for  its  comprehension;  but  its  ex- 
tension is  very  great.  Now,  if  another  property  or  mark  be 
added  to  it  its  comprehension  is  increased,  but  its  exteiision  is 
diminished;  v.  g.,  corporeal  substance  has  greater  cojnprehensiony 
but  less  extension,  than  substafice  without  any  mark  or  property 
added  to  it. 

Attention  is  an  act  of  the  mind  by  which  it  is  directed  to 
some  object  or  objects,  to  which  it  adheres,  for  a  time.  This 
act  is  either  vohmtary  or  spontaneous.  There  is  some  degree 
of  spontaneous  attention  in  every  act  of  cognition  which  the 
understanding  elicits.  Voluntary  attention  may  last  for  a  greater 
or  a  less  time,  and  may  consist  of  one  or  more  acts. 

Absti'actioft  is  a  species  of  Attention  by  which  the  mind 
separates  (withdraws)  one  thing  from  others  with  which  it  is 
connected,  and  contemplates  that,  to    the    exclusion   of  the 


LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART.  19 

Others;  v.  g.,  to  think  of  the  eye  without  attending  to  the  other 
parts  of  man.* 

Reflexion  is  also  an  exercise  of  attention,  by  which  the  mind 
contemplates  its  own  acts,  or  considers  its  concepts  or  ideas  of 
objects. 


ARTICLE    III. 

THE    OBJECTS    OF  IDEAS    OR    CONCEPTS;    DEFINITION  OF  OTHER 

TERMS. 

In  reference  to  their  objects,  ideas  are  divided  into  concrete 
diXi^  abstract^  universal  2,XiA  particular,  ^tc.  Concrete  ideas  are 
those  whose  objects  are  conceived  as  actually  or  physically 
existing ;  as  Peter,  those  books,  etc.  The  abstract  idea  has  for 
its  object  a  form  or  quality  separated  from  its  subject;  as  white- 
ness^ roundness^  wisdom,  etc.  A  universal  idea  is  one  whose 
object  is  a  mark  or  property  which  is  common  to  a  whole  class 
of  objects  and  can  be  affirmed  of  each  one;  as  "man,  animal," 
etc.  The  objects  included  under  it  are  called  its  subjects  or 
inferiors,  A  particular  idea  has  for  its  object  only  a  part  of 
the  objects  to  which  a  universal  is  applicable,  or  it  is  a  com- 
mon or  universal  limited  to  a  part  only  of  its  extension;  as  ''a 
soldier,  some  men,  some  trees,"  etc. 

A  term  is  singular  when  it  applies  to  but  one  concrete  and 
actual  individual;  as  "Caesar,  this  apple,"  etc.  A  term  is  co77i' 
mon  when  it  may  be  applied  to  many;  as  "father,  substance, 
just,"  etc. 

*  "  Abstrahentium  non  est  mendaciiim. ' '    Absti-action  is  not  falsehood. 

**  Id  cognoscitur  abstractive  quod  non  cognoscitur  proven*;  intuitive,  quando 
cognoscitur  praesens.  Sen  coguitio  abstractiva  est  coguitio  rei  in  alio  tanquam 
in  itiedio  prius  cognito  lit  quod  seu  in  quo:  e.  gr.  Videre  partem  in  toto;  parie- 
tern  in  domo,  objectum  repr^esentatiim  in  speciilo,  causara  in  effectu,  etc.  Cog- 
nitio  intuitiva  est  coguitio  i»»werfia<a  seu  a  tali  medio  independens."  That  is 
known  abstractly  which  is  not  known  as  present  ;  it  is  known  intuitively  when 
known  as  present ;  or,  abstract  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  one  thing  in  an- 
other as  in  a  medium  previously  known;  v.  g. ,  to  see  a  part  in  the  whole,  a  wall 
in  the  house,  an  object  imaged  in  the  mirror,  cause  in  the  effect,  etc.  Intuitivi 
knowledge  is  immediate  knowledge,  or  it  is  independent  of  such  medium. 


20  LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART. 

Transcendental  ideas  are  those  whose  objects  transcend  all 
classification  of  genus  and  species,  being^the  common  attributes 
of  all  things;  as  ^^  being,  essence,  ofie,  true,  goodT 

The  idea,  considered  as  expressing  its  object,  is  either  ade- 
quate or  i7iadequate ;  the  adequate  includes  not  only  all  that 
is  of  the  essence,  but  all  accidents  and  relations  of  its  object; 
it  is  inadequate  when  it  does  not  include  all,  absolutely,  that 
is  true  of  its  object. 

A  real  term,  or  as  it  is  also  called,  a  term  of  \\\^  first  inten- 
tion, stands  for  a  concept  which  is  formed  in  the  mind  when  it 
first  comes  to  know  what  an  object  is,  by  its  real  predicates ; 
V.  g.,  ^' man  is  mortal;"  '' Socrates  is  wise."  The  terms 
*^man"  and  ^'  Socrates"  are  here  terms  oi  i\\Q  first  intention. 
A  logical  term,  or  a  term  of  the  second  intention,  stands  for 
another  concept,  which  the  reason  forms  by  a  second  and 
reflex  view  of  the  first  concept  and  its  object,  founding  on 
them  a  second  concept,  which  expresses  something  that  is  not 
really  in  the  object;  v.  g.,  ''man  is  a  species;  Socrates  is 
the  minor  term."  In  these  examples  "man  "  and  ''  Socrates" 
have  an  artificial  and  second  meaning  devised  by  reason, 
according  to  which  they  express  only  a  logical  sense,  and 
receive  a  new  order  of  predicates.  Similarly  when  it  is  said 
in  grammar,  ''  man  is  a  noun  ;"  ''  Socrates  is  the  nominative 
case ;"  the  terms  "  man  "  and  '*  Socrates  "  are  again  subject 
to  the  second  intention ;  they  do  not  here  express  what  is  real 
in  '*  man  "  and  '*  Socrates,"  as  subject  to  the  first  intention, 
but  something  capable  of  predicates  that  are  altogether  differ- 
ent in  species  from  the  real  ones. 

A  term  is  absolute  when  there  is  not  directly  implied  in  the 
idea  of  its  object  any  depe?idence  on,  or  relation  to,  another 
object;  e.  g.,  such  substaiitives  as  gold,  apples,  etc.;  also,  adjec- 
tives used  absolutely;   as  the  good,  the  true,  etc. 

The  connotative  term  stands  for  an  object,  in  the  very  idea 
of  which  is  directly  implied  an  adjacent  object  on  which  it 
depends  or  to  which  it  is  related;  as  white,  heavy,  living,  rapid ^ 
and  all  adjectives  and  adjunctives,  as  also  such  substantives  as 
professor,  musiciaii,  artist,  etc. 

Signs  are  either  natural,  as  sighs,  grdans,  laughter ;  or  sup' 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART.  21 

positive^  as  articulate  sounds  forming  words  or  terms,  which 
are  conventional  signs  for  things.  Siippositio7i  here  mean& 
merely  the  conventional  use  of  a  ter?n  or  sign  for  a  thing.  Aris- 
totle observes  (Elench.  lib.  i.,  c:  i.),  that  since  we  cannot  have 
all  objects  physically  in  our  presence  when  arguing,  we  employ 
in  their  stead  ?iames  as  signs  for  them.  In  the  well  known 
saying,  "  words  are  the  counters  of  wise  men;  they  are  the  fno?tey 
of  fools,"  it  is  meant  that  words  suppose  or  stand  for  different 
objects  with  two  classes  of  men. 

Terms  are  u?iivocal  or  equivocal;  a  term  is  univocal  which, 
being  applied  to  different  objects,  has  the  same  signification  or 
expresses  the  same  quality  or  essence;  thus,  atiimal  is  univocal 
when  applied  to  man  and  brute^  because,  in  each  case,  its 
meaning  is  the  same. 

A  term  is  equivocal  when,  being  applied  to  different  objects, 
it  does  not  express  the  same  quality  or  essence  in  each ;  thus 
'■^  light  is  the  opposite  of  darkness;  feathers  are  light''  Equiv- 
ocal terms  often  subserve  the  designs  of  sophistry;  they  are 
also  frequently  employed  for  comparison  and  metaphor,  giving 
to  style  one  of  its  chief  ornaments. 

A  term  is  used  in  a  ^naterial  sense,  or  the  supposition  is 
material,  when  the  word  is  used  merely  as  a  word;  as  ^^ Cicero 
is  a  word  of  three  syllables."  It  has  a  formal  supposition,  or 
is  used  in  its  formal  sense,  when  it  is  employed  to  express  the 
object  for  which  it  staiids,  as  ^^ Cicero  was  an  orator." 

Analogy  is  a  certain  agreement  or  remote  relation  that  one 
object  bears  to  another.  Analogy  is  either  that  of  attribution^ 
or  that  oi  proportion. 

In  the  afialogy  of  attribution  a  predicate  that  belongs  pri- 
marily 3ind  properly  to  one  object  is  attributed  to  another,  owing 
to  some  relation  between  them  or  aptitude  of  one  for  the  other; 
thus  healthy  '\s  primarily  ^nd  properly  a  predicate  of  the  animal 
body ;  but  we  say  healthy  food,  healthy  complexion,  healthy  cli- 
mate, from  the  relation  which  these  things  have  to  health  in 
its  primary  meaning. 

Analogy  of  proportion  is  founded  on  a  resemblance  of  pro- 
portion which  is  in  the  substance  or  in  a  quality  of  objects  that 


22  LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 

are  of  a  different  specjes.  It  imports  a  certain  agreement  iii 
the  effects  produced  by  causes  which  are  otherwise  quite  dis- 
similar, or  it  is  a  certain  agreement  in  the  manner  in  which 
objects  are  related  to  or  referred  to  other  objects.  Owing  to 
this  agreement,  the  term  that  expresses  the  relation  in  one  set 
of  objects  is  applied  to  the  other  related  objects;  v.  g.,  "bread 
is  the  staff  of  life ;"  "  the  Scipios  were  thunderbolts  of  war." 
The  terms  "staff"  and  "thunderbolts"  here  have  an  analogical 
sense;  they  are  not  used  either  in  a  tmivocal  or  an  equivocal 
sense,  but  in  a  sense  that  is  between  them  as  extremes.  This 
analogy  of  proportion  is  the  basis  of  tropes  and  metaphors ; 
"  Cicero  was  a  pillar  of  the  state ; "  "  voice  of  the  waters ; " 
"  music  of  the  spheres,"  etc. 

Analogy  must  not  be  confounded  with  parity  or  equality  of 
ratios  in  proportion;  v,  g.,  "  a  mile  is  the  third  part  of  a  league," 
"  four  months  are  the  third  part  of  a  year;"  in  real  parity  of  the 
kind  the  terms  expressing  it  are  used  univocally  ;  ^^  third  part  ^* 
is  univocal  in  the  examples  given. 


ARTICLE     IV. 

GENUS,    SPECIES,    DIFFERENCE,    ATTRIBUTE,    ACCIDENT. 

Species  includes  all  that  is  necessary  to  constitute  the  essence*  of 
many  individuals ;  but  the  essence  includes  the  intrinsic  requisites 
for  a  thing  to  exist ;  those  without  which  it  cannot  be  conceived 

♦"Est  essentia  in  ordine  art  esse;  7iatura,  }^vo\\t  principium  operaiionis." 
What  we  term  essence  in  respect  to  nxUtence  is  called  nature,  when  it  is  regarded 
as  operative. 

"  Species  immediate  subjicitiir  generi,  individuum,  mediante  specie;  genus  de 
specie  immediate  praedicatur,  et  ea  mediante  de  individuo. ' '  Species  is  imme- 
diately subject  to  genus;  the  individual  is  subject  to  genus  through  the  medium 
of  species;  genus  is  predicated  immediately  of  species,  and  mediately  through 
species  of  the  individual. 

' '  Est  differentia  per  quam  species  excedit  suum  genus.  Plus  continetur  aciu 
in  specie  quam  in  genere;  plus  autem  continetur  potentia  in  gouere  quam  in 
specie,  quia  genus  potentia  omnem  continet  iuferiorcm  diflerentiam.  "  Differ' 
ence  is  that  by  which  the  species  exceeds  its  genus;  more  is  actually  contained 
in  species  than  in  genus;  but  more  is  potentially  in  genus  than  in  species,  foj 
genus  potentially  contains  every  inferior  difference  in  its  extension. 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART.  23 

by  the  mind.  Now,  that  cannot  be  conceived  by  the  mi?id  which 
is  absolutely  false,  absurd,  or  impossible,  and  the  mind  can 
really  and  properly  conceive  nothing  but  truth,  or  that  which 
is,  and  it  can  form  some  concept  of  any  real  object  that  is 
presented  to  it.  Therefore,  that  which  cannot  be  conceived 
by  the  mind  is,  more  strictly,  nothing.  Hence,  essence  is  all 
that^  without  which  a  thing  cannot  exist,  cannot  be  the  object 
of  a  concept*  or  is  nothing.  The  species  is  the  answer  to  the 
question,  "  what  is  it  ?  "  "  what  is  man  ?  "  "  Man  is  a  rational 
animal ; "  this  is  an  answer  which  assigns  the  species  of  man  by 
its  essential  constituents. 

Genus  expresses  an  attribute  or  essential  property  which  is 
common  to  many  species ;  v.  g.,  material^  animal,  which  are 
common  to  many  species  of  bodies  and  living  things.  Genus 
does  not  express  determinately  the  whole  essence  of  its  inferiors  ; 
while  species  does  express  the  whole  essence  of  its  individuals. 

Difference  is  an  attribute  or  essential  property  which,  when 
added  to  the  genus,  along  with  it  constitutes  a  species ;  v.  g., 
ratiofial,  being  added  to  animal,  constitutes  the  species  man. 
It  is  here  properly  called  difference,  because  aiiimal  in  general, 
and  maji  in  particular,  differ  by  the  essential  constituent, 
rational. 

The  extension  of  an  idea  increases  as  we  ascend  from  indi- 
viduals to  their  species,  or  from  species  to  its  genus ;  while  the 
comprehension  decreases;  but  the  cofnpre /tension  increases  as  we 
pass  from  genus  to  species,  or  species  to  individuals;  while  the 
extension  decreases.  A  genus  has  more  extension  than  any  of 
its  species,  but  the  species  have  more  comprehension;  that  is, 
more  essential  properties. 

In  respect  to  genera,  the  species  may  be  treated  as  individ- 
uals; and  similarly  genera  for  still  higher  genera. 

Aristotle's  ten  categories,  or  ten  highest  genera,  that  include 
all  real  things,  are  "substance,  quantity,  relation,  quality,  action, 
passion  (action  received),  place,  time,  posture,  habihment  (cov- 

*Do  not  confound  concept  in  the  understanding  with  image  in  the  imagination  j 
there  are  many  concepts  in  the  intellect  of  whose  objects  no  real  images  can  be 
formed  by  the  fancy. 


24 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 


ering  or  clothing,  ornament,  armor,  etc.)"  The  categories  are 
the  classification  into  genera  and  species  of  all  things,  accord- 
ing to  their  mode  of  existence;  "sunt  modi  existendi."* 

The  five  universals  or  predicables,  genus,  "difference,  species, 
property  or  attribute,  and  accident,  are  capable  of  being 
aflBrmed,  or  predicated,  of  individual  inferiors,  in  all  those 
supreme  genera. 

The  following  table,  figured  as  the  Porphyrian  Tree,  exhibits 
to  the  eye,  genus,  species  and  individuals,  as  they  are  respect- 
ively related  to  each  other. 


THE  PORPHYRIAN  TREE. 

*  "  Categoriae  seu  prjedicamenta  sunt  ordo  seu  series  generum,  specierum  et 
maividuorum."  "Res  pra3dicamentales  seu  pra;dicamenta  considerantur  a 
Logico,  in-oiit  secundis intentionibus  subiiicent;  spectantur  aMetaphysico,  quatenus 
reales. ' '  Tlie  categories  or  predicaments  are  the  order  or  series  of  the  genera, 
species  and  individuals.  The  things  in  those  categories  are  considered  by  the 
Logician  as  subject  to  the  second  intention:  by  th^  Metaphysician  they  are  re- 
garded as  rer,Z ,     (Vid.  p.  20.) 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART.  25 

In  like  manner,  each  of  the  ten  genera  may  be  resolved  into 
its  subjects  by  adding  the  respective  specific  differe7ices  ;  v.  g., 

QUANTITY. 

DISCRETE CONTINUOUS. 

CONTINUOUS. 

SURFACE ■«. LINE. 

SURFACE. 

CURVED PLANE. 

ETC. 

Attributes  or  properties,  and  accidents,  are  found  in  all  the 
species  which  are  formed  out  of  the  genera ;  and  hence,  since 
the  five  universals  are  predicables  of  all  the  categories,  they  are 
properly  denominated  universals ;  and,  as^there  is  no  other 
predicable  that  applies  univocally  to  all  the  categories,  they 
are  the  only  U7iiversals. 

Siipre?ne,  ov  ultiniate  genera^  are  those  which  are  the  highest, 
and,  therefore,  cannot  be  made  the  species  of  other  genera ; 
V.  g.,  sul?sta?ice,  which  has  no  superior  genus.  Being  [ens)  is  a 
transcendental;  it  is  not  a  genus,  but  it  is  common  to  every 
genus,  species,  and  difference;  it  is,  therefore,  a  common 
predicate  of  all  things,  and  for  that  reason  can  have  no  sub- 
species, for  it  is  not  univocally  predicated  of  its  inferiors,  as  is 
required  for  gefius  or  species. 

As  above  indicated,  the  ultimate  genera  are  usually  called  the 
categories^  or  predica7nents. 

The  proximate^  or  lowest  genus .^  is  that  which  contains  species 
whose  subjects  or  inferiors  are  individuals ;  v.  g.,  animal  in 
respect  to  man,  for  fnan  is  one  species,  whose  subjects  or  in- 
feriors are  individtml  men. 

Attribute*  is  a  property  that  necessarily  results  from  the 
essence  of  the  object  to  which  it  belongs;  as  "the  power  of 
rational  speech,  laughter;"  or,  what  is  still  more  intrinsic,  "intel- 
ligence, liberty,"  etc. 

*'*Proprinm  est  quod  prasdicatur  de  pluvibus  in  quale  quid  seu  in  quale 
necessario. ' '     Property  is  tliat  whith  is  predicated  of  many  in  what  is  essential. 

"  Proprium  seu  attributiun  est  quod  convenit  speciei  omui,  soli  et  semper." 
Property  or  attribute  is  what  pertains  always  and  exclusively  to  the  inferiors  ol 
the  whole  species. 


26  LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART. 

Esse7itial  attributei,^  or  such  as  necessarily  and  always  follow 
the  essence  of  every  individual  belonging  to  the  species  of 
objects,  are  absolutely  inseparable  from  the  objects  to  whose 
essence  they  belong.  All  other  properties  or  quahties,  though 
they  may  be  necessary  in  different  degrees  for  the  integrity  or 
perfection  of  the  objects  in  which  they  inhere  or  to  which  they 
pertain,  are  absolutely  separable  from  them,  as  will  be  explained 
in  another  part  of  this  work. 

Accident*  is  anything  whose  presence  in  the  object,  or  absence 
from,  it,  does  not  destroy,  or  even  change  the  essence  of  the 
object ;  as  learning  in  man,  roundness  in  marble :  the  essence 
of  man  is  not  intrinsically  changed  by  the  possession  or  the 
want  of  learm?ig,  nor  that  of  marble  by  any  particular  shape 
of  it. 


ARTICLE     V. 

DIVISION. 

Division  t  and  Definition  are  employed  to  facilitate  clear- 
ness of  matter  and  distinctness  of  thought,  by  preventing  all 
confusion  arising  from  multiplicity  in  the  objects  of  thought 
and  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  terms. 

Division  is  the  separation  of  a  whole  into  its  component  parts ; 
a  whole  is  that  which  is  one,  and  yet  is  capable  of  this  resolu- 
tion into  parts.  A  ivhole  is  either  actual  or  logical;  in  the  first, 
the  parts  are  physical  or  real;  as  "  man's  soul  and  body;  "  in  the 
second,  they  are  metaphysical ;  v.  g.,  the  species  and  differe7ice 
of  objects  are  only  metaphysically  distinct. 

Again,  parts  are  essential;  as  body  and  soul  in  man;  or 
integral;  as  hands  and  feet  in  man.     All  ujiiversals,  in  respect 

*' ^Acc^dem  estquod  prjedicatur  de  pluribus  in  quale  contingenter.  Quod  adest 
et  abest  sine  interitu  subject!. ' '  Accident  is  that  which  is  jjredicated  of  many  in 
what  is  contingent ;  it  is  what  may  be  present  or  absent  without  destroying  its 
subject. 

t "  Bene  docet  qui  bene  distinguit."  He  teaches  well,  who  distinguishes 
Well, 

.    * '  Per  id  res  constituitur  per  quod  et  distinguitur. ' '    That  which  constitutwi 
a  thing,  is  that  by  which  it  is  also  distinguished. 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART.  27 

to  their  extension,  may  be  regarded  as  logical  wholes;  as  v,  g. 
gefit/s  in  respect  to  the  species,  which  it  includes ;  and  species 
in  respect  to  its  individuals.  Hence,  division  is  also  either 
physical  or  jnetaphysical. 

Logical  divisions  are,  first,  of  genus  into  its  species;  as 
animal  into  rational  and  irrational;  second,  species  into  its 
individuals;  as  Peter,  John,  Greeks,  Romans,  etc.;  third,  of 
substance  into  essential  constituents,  attributes,  accidents;  or 
into  essential  properties,  and  qualities  which  are  not  essential. 

An  attribute,  as  already  observed,  is  a  property  or  power 
that  flows  immediately  from  the  essence  of  a  thing ;  as,  intelli- 
gence in  man,  freedom,  risibility ;  an  accident  is  that  which 
may  or  may  not  exist  in  the  subject,  and  whose  presence  or 
absence  does  not  change  the  essence  of  its  subject,  as  this 
color,  size,  etc. 

RULES    OF    DIVISION. 

First — The  division  must  be  adequate,  that  is,  the  sum  of  the 
members  or  parts  must  be  equal  to  the  whole.  This  rule  may 
be  violated  by  excess,  or  by  defect;  by  excess,  as,  v.  g.,  when  the 
ancient  philosophers  divided  souls  into  *'  rational,  irrational  and 
vegetable ; "  by  defect,  v,  g.,  if  we  divide  the  motives  of  human 
action  into  "  love  of  glory  and  love  of  money." 

Second — No  member  of  a  division  must  equal  the  whole; 
still  less  must  it  exceed  the  whole  ;  for  example,  to  divide  ani- 
mals into  '■'■  those  endowed  with  reason,  and  those  endowed 
with  senses,"  is  a  violation  of  this  rule ;  and  still  more  faulty 
would  be  a  division  of  trees  into  "  fruit-bearing,  and  those  that 
are  not  fruit-bearing,  and  trees  that  vegetate." 

Third — One  member  of  the  division  must  not  include  an- 
other ;  as,  to  divide  animals  into  "  rational,  irrational  and  mor- 
tal," which  is  also  a  violation  of  the  preceding  rule. 

Fourth — Division  should  be  made,  first,  into  the  proximate 
or  immediate  members ;  then,  if  necessary,  into  others  by  sub- 
division; as  in  the  "  porphyrian  tree,"  viz.,  substance  into  cor- 
poreal and  incorporeal ;  then  corporeal  into  organic  and  inor- 
ganic ;  organic  into  vegetable  and  animal,  etc.  Any  other 
method  would  produce  confusion  rather  than  clearness. 


28.  LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 

ARTICLE    VI. 

DEFINITION. 

Division  gives  the  extension  of  an  idea ;  definition  its  com- 
prehension. Definition,  then,  is  a  true  and  complete  notion  of 
a  thing  expressed  in  words.  But  definition  is.  twofold — first, 
nomifial,  that  is,  of  a  word ;  second,  real,  that  is,  of  a  thing. 
Definition  of  a  word  is  either  by  its  synonym,  or  by  its  deri- 
vatives or  components,  or  by  a  periphrasis  of  its  import.  Gen- 
eral usage  determines  the  signification  of  words ;  but  when 
they  are  equivocal  a  distinct  meaning  may  be  attributed  to 
them  arbitrarily. 

A  definition  is  real,  first,  when  it  is  essential,  that  is,  when  it 
expresses  the  essence  or  nature  of  tlie  thing  defined ;  this  is 
done  by  enumerating  the  attributes  or  essential  properties  of 
the  thing.  The  essential  parts  of  a  thing  are  €\\S\&[ physical  or 
metaphysical;  v.  g.,  man  may  be  defined  by  his  physical  essence 
"  a  beifig  composed  of  a  rational  soul  a?id  an  orga7iized  body;  " 
and,  again,  he  may  be  defined  by  his  essence,  metaphysically 
considered,  to  be  a  rational  animal.  A  logical  definition  is 
one  in  which  the  proximate  or  nearest  genus  and  the  specific 
difference  are  given  ;  v.  g.,  «  brute  is  an  irratiojial  animal. 
Here  brute  is  the  thing  defined ;  animal  is  the  proximate  or 
immediate  genus  ;  and  irrational  is  the  specific  difference. 

A  descriptive  definition  is  one  in  which  no  genus  or  species  is 
assigned,  but  only  some  accidental  circumstances  with  a  gene- 
ral term  as  a  quasi  genus ;  this  is  resorted  to  when  the  object 
defined  transcends  all  the  genera  or  categories;  v.  g.,  being, 
goodness,  unity;  etc. 

A  genetic  definition  is  one  in  which  an  effect  is  explained  by 
its  cause ;  v.  g.,  "  a  hmar  eclipse  is  an  occupation  of  the  moon, 
which  is  caused  by  the  earth  directly  intervening  between  the 
moon  and  the  sun ; "  '-  brass  is  a  metal  produced  by  the  fusion 
of  copper  and  zinc  together." 

RULES    OF    A    GOOD    DEFINITION.* 

First — It  must  not  be  more  nor  less  extensive  than  the  thing 

•  ' '  Una  unias  definitio  est. ' ' — Of  one  thing  ^.iiere  is  but  one  dejlnition. 


logic:   first  paet.  29 

defined;  v.  g.,  if  man  be  defined,  "an  intelligent  being;"  the 
definition  is  too  general,  for  it  includes  angel;  if  he  be  defined, 
*'  a  rational  being  who  knows  how  to  read,"  the  definition  is 
faulty,  for  it  is  applicable  to  some  men  onl)\ 

Second:  The  definition  must  be  clearer  than  the  thing 
defined  ;  hence,  the  definition  must  contain  no  vague,  obscure 
or  equivocal  words;  v.  g.,  "logwood  is  a  species  of  wood; 
life  is  vitality,"  are  offenses  against  this  rule. 

Third:  A  definition  must  not  be  negative ;  for  in  such  a 
case  the  definition  would  not  declare  what  the  thing  defined 
is,  but  only  what  it  is  not;  v.  g.,  "a  bird  is  a  creature  that  is 
not  rational."  But  if  two  contraries,  between  which  there  is 
no  medium,  are  to  be  defined,  when  one  is  positively  defined 
the  other  may  be  given  as  its  negative  or  opposite;  v.  g.,  "a 
compound  is  that  which  consists  of  parts;  a  simple  substance 
is  that  which  does  not  consist  of  parts." 

•  Fourth:  A  substance  must  be  defined  in  itself;  accidents 
may  be  defined  by  the  substance  in  which  they  adhere ;  v.  g., 
"  man  is  a  rational  animal ;  motion  is  change  of  place  by  a 
body." 

Fifth :  Habits  and  powers  must  be  defined  by  their  acts,  or 
by  the  objects  of  those  acts ;  v.  g.,  "  Meekness  is  the  virtue  by 
which  we  restrain  the  motions  of  anger;  the  will  is  the  power 
of  choosing  between  things  that  are  judged  to  be  good;  sight, 
the  power  of  distinguishing  objects  by  figure  and  color." 

Sixth :  A  species  must  be  defined  by  its  proximate  genus 
and  the  specific  difference.  Observe,  that  no  i?idividuating 
principle,  nor  accident,  falls  within  the  definition  of  a  species ; 
V.  g.,  "  man  is  a  rational  being,  having  a  determinate  stature 
and  complexion,"  is  a  faulty  definition.* 

•  "Materia  individual  is  cum  accidentibus  earn  individuantibus  non  cadit  in 
defiuitione  speciei;  unde,  in  definitione  hominis,  non  cadunt  hse  cai-nes  et  haec 
ossa."  (1  p.,  qu.  3,  a  3  inC.)  Individual  matter,  with  the  accidents  that  indi- 
viduate it,  does  not  fall  within  the  definition  of  a  species;  hence,  this  iiesb, 
these  bones,  and  the  like,  do  not  fall  within  the  definition  of  man. 


CHAPTER  II. 


ARTICLE     I . 

JUDGMENT. 

Judgment  is  an  act  of  the  mind,  by  which  it  affirms  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  concepts  or  ideas.  .When 
they  are  affirmed  to  agree,  the  judgment  is  affif77iative;  when  they 
are  affirmed  to  disagree,  the  judgment  is  fiegative;  v.  g.,  "  The 
soul  is  a  spirit ;  God  is  not  a  creature." 

These  two  judgments  by  which  the  mind  affirms  the  identity 
or  diversity  of  two  ideas  by  conjoining  or  separating  them  are 
termed  respectively  compositio?i  and  division  iri  respect  to  the 
ideas,  which  are  the  matter  or  elements ;  and  they  are  also 
affirmation  or  ?iegation,  in  respect  to  the  identity  or  diversity  of 
the  things  compared. 

When  the  identity  or  diversity  of  the  ideas  is  self-evident,  or 
one  is  seen  to  be  necessarily  included  in  the  other,  it  is  2.judg- 
7fie?i/  a  priori;  v.  g.,  "  the  sum  of  the  parts  is  equal  to  the 
whole ;  a  part  is  not  equal  to  the  whole."  Such  judgments 
are  also  often  termed  necessary^  7neiaphysical,  pure  or  analytical 
judgments.  But  when  the  identity  or  diversity  in  the  objects 
of  those  ideas  is  learned  solely  by  experience,  then  it  is  a 
judgment  a  posteriori;  v.  g.,  "fire  gives  pain  when  it  burns." 
These  judgments  are  also  termed  contingent,  physical,  empyrical 
or  synthetical. 

Judgments,  both  a  priori  and  a  posteriori,  are  sometimes 
7nediate,  sometimes  i77i7nediate,  according  as  they  are  formed 
with  or  without  the  medium  of  reasoning.  ^/rz>n  judgments 
suppose  a  necessary  identity  or  diversity  in  the  objects  com- 
pared; a  posteriori  judgments  suppose  a  mere  contingent  rela- 
tion or  connexion,  learned  only  by  expenence. 
30 


LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART.  31 

ARTICLE     II. 

PROPOSITIONS. 

A  proposition  is  a  judgment  expressed  in  words;  v.  g.,  "man 
is  mortal;  prudence  is  a  virtue."  A  proposition  consists  of 
three  parts  :  the  subject^  copula^  and  predicate  or  attribute.  The 
subject  is  that  of  which  something  is  affirmed ;  the  predicate  is 
that  which  is  affirmed ;  and  the  copula  is  the  term  that  con- 
nects or  couples  the  subject  and  predicate.  For  example,  in  the 
proposition,  ''diligence  is  praiseworthy^''  the  subject  is  '' diligence '^ 
the  copula  is  the  verb  "/.f,"  and  the  predicate  is  '' praiseworthy T 

Logic  recognizes  but  one  verb,  and  but  one  mood  and  tense, 
viz. :  the  verb  to  be  in  the  indicative  mood  and  in  the  present 
tense.  The  reason  of  this  is,  the  affirmation  is  always  indica- 
tive and  present;  v,  g.,  "Caesar  conquered;  James  writes," 
are  equivalent  to  the  affirmation ;  that  which  is  expressed  by 
'•'  conquered''  is  predicated  of  Caesar,  etc.  All  that  is  not  ex- 
pressed by  this  verb  belongs  to  the  predicate,  for  it  is  attributed 
to  the  subject. 

Propositions  may  be  considered  in  respect  to  their  quality 
and  their  quantity  or  extension.  The  two  concepts  com- 
pared to  each  other  are  the  matter;  the  perceivifig  of  their 
agreement  or  disagreement  is  the  form  of  the  proposition; 
since  the  copula  either  affirms  or  denies  agreement,  the  quality 
and  fon?t  of  a  proposition  are  indeed  the  same. 

Propositions  as  to  their /^rw  or  quality  are  ^\\ki^x  affirmative  ox 
negative.  In  an  affirmative  proposition  the  predicate  is  declared 
to  agree  with  the  subject.  In  the  negative  proposition  the  pre- 
dicate is  denied  or  declared  not  to  agree  with  the  subject. 

In  an  affirmative  proposition  the  predicate  is  taken  accord- 
ing to  the  whole  of  its  comprehension ;  but  not  according  to 
the  whole  of  its  extension.  In  the  proposition,  "-air  is  a  body,'' 
the  predicate  "  body  "  is  taken  according  to  the  whole  of  its 
comprehension  ;  that  is,  all  the  attributes  or  essential  properties 
included  in  body,  as  such,  are  predicated  of  ctir,  or  said  to  be 
verified  in  air;  but,  as  there  are  many  objects  besides  air 
which  are  body   the  predicate,  body,  is  not  taken  in  its  whole 


82  LOGIC  :   FIEST    PART. 

extension;  and  it  is,  therefore,  said  to  be  particular  in  affirma« 
tive  propositions. 

In  such  propositions  as  this,  "  man  is  a  rational  animal,"  the 
predicate  is  commensurate  in  its  extension  with  the  subject; 
not,  however,  in  virtue  of  the  form,  but  by  accidental  coin- 
cidence.    Good  definitions  are  thus  convertible  and  true. 

In  a  negative  proposition  the  predicate  is  taken  according 
to  the  whcile  of  its  extension;  v.  g.,  "matter  is  not  intelligent;" 
that  is,  matter  is  not  one  of  those  objects  of  which  ijitelligence 
can  ever  be  predicated. 

When  any  term  is  thus  taken,  according  to  the  whole  of  its 
extension,  or  universally,  it  is  said  to  be  distributed.  Therefore, 
in  a  negative  proposition  the  predicate  is  always  distributed; 
that  is,  is  taken  as  universal,  or  in  all  its  extent. 

In  an  affirmative  proposition,  the  predicate  is  particular^  as 
already  observed.  The  subject  of  a  proposition  is  distributed 
if  taken  as  a  universal ;  as  "  every  man  is  mortal ;  "  "  no  metal 
has  sensation." 

Quantity  or  extension  of  propositions  :  quantity  or  exten- 
sion regards  the  extent  of  the  propositions;  that  is,  as  being 
universal  or  particular ;  when  universal,  the  subject  of  the 
proposition  is  taken  according  to  its  entire  extension;  v.  g., 
"all  men  are  mortal."  It  is  particular  when  the  subject  is 
taken  according  to  a  part  only  of  its  extension;  v.  g.,  "some 
men  are  learned." 

Universality,  in  reference  to  the  matter  of  the  proposition, 
may  be,  first,  metaphysical^  as  when  the  proposition  expresses 
a  judgment  a  priori;  v.  g.,  "a  part  is  less  than  the  whole;" 
second,  it  may  he  physical,  as  when  it  is  according  to  the  laws 
of  nature,  which,  however,  are  contingent;  v.  g,  "the  dead 
do  not  return  to  life ; "  third,  it  may  be  a  j?wral  universality, 
that  is,  when  it  is  taken  according  to  the  ordinary  action  of 
moral  causes;  v.  g.,  "a  mother  loves  her  child."  In  respect 
to  the  last  two,  exception  is  not  absolutely  impossible. 

A  proposition  is  either  categorical  or  hypothetical.  It  is  caie' 
gorical  when  it  positively  and  unconditionally  affirms  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  the  predicate  with  the  subject. 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PAET.  33 

A  hypothetical  proposition  affirms  conditionally ;  v.  g.,  "if  you 
are  virtuous,  you  will  be  rewarded."  This  species  of  enunciation 
implies  an  argtimeiit;  and  under  that  respect  it  may  be  regarded 
as  pertaining  to  the  third  operation  of  the  intellect;  i.  e.,  to 
reasoning.  It  consists  of  two  propositions  ;  the  first,  or  ante- 
cedent^ which  affirms  the  condition;  the  second  is  the  co7ise- 
quent,  whose  truth  depends  on  the  verification  of  the  antecedent. 
A  hypothetical  proposition  is  true,  if  the  connexion  between  the 
antecedent  and  consequent  be  true.  It  is-  sometimes  disjunc- 
tive in  form;  "every  body  is  either  in  motion,  or  at  rest." 
Such  a  disjunctive  is  not  true  when  there  is  a  medium;  v.  g., 
"John  must  either  write  or  come  to  see  me."  It  is  possible 
that  he  may  do  neither. 

A  term,  or  a  proposition,  is  taken  reduplicatively,  or  by 
reduplication,  when  any  particles  or  clauses  are  annexed  to  it 
which  have  the  effect  6{  doubling  or  repeating  \\.,  in  order  "that 
the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  may  be  rigorously  defined;  v.  g., 
"all  substance  as  substance,  is  good;"  "a  being,  so  far  forth 
as  it  is  free,  is  necessarily  intelligent;"  "water,  as  such,  is 
composed  of  eight  parts  of  oxygen  with  one  part  of  hydrogen." 
When  a  term  is  used  reduplicatively,  it  is  restricted  to  a  precise 
signification ;  the  limiting  words  and  phrases  are,  as  such,  as^ 
so  far  forth,  precisely  taken,  and  the  like. 


ARTICLE     III. 

OPPOSITION. 

For  opposition*  between  two. propositions,  first,  they  must 
have  the  same  subject;  secondly,  they  must  have  the  same 
predicate;  thirdly,  one  must,  in  some  sense  of  the  terms,  affirm 
what  the  other  denies.  Hence,  opposition  is  a  mutual  repug- 
nance between  two  propositions,  arising  from  the  affirmation 
and  negation  of  the  same  thing  in  the  same  respect. 

*  ' '  Oppositio  est  affirmatio  et  negatio  ejusdem  de  eodem. ' '    Opposition  is  the 
affirmation  and  negation  of  the  same  thing  in  regard  to  the  same  object. 

3 


34  LOGIC  :     FIRST    PART. 

This  opposition  is  twofold,  first,  of  cojitradiction;  second,  of 
contrariety;  in  contradictory  propositions,  one  simply  denies 
the  other;  v.  g.,  "all  souls  are  substance;"  the  contradictory, 
"  not  all  souls  are  substance."  A  negative  prefixed  to  any 
affirmative  proposition  forms  its  contradictory,  because  any 
particular  and  negative  proposition  is  the  contradictory  of  the 
opposite  universal  proposition. 

Contrary  *  propositions  are  both  of  them  extreme ;  that  is, 
what  one  of  them  affirms  as  universal,  the  other  denies  with 
equal  universality;  v.  g.,  "«^  miser  is  happy;"  the  contrary, 
"  all  misers  are  happy." 

Hence,  a  contradictory  merely  denies  its  opposite,  while  the 
contrary  goes  further,  and  affirms  its  equally  general  opposite. 

Of  two  contradictories,  one  is  necessarily  true  and  the  other 
false ;  two  contraries  cannot,  at  the  same  time,  be  true  ;  but 
both  of  them  may  be  false;  v.  g.,  "all  good  men  are  prosper- 
ous in  this  world;  no  good  man  is  prosperous  in  this  world;" 
these  propositions  are  both  false. 

Subcontrary  propositions  are  hoi\\  particular,  and  they  differ 
in  quality;  that  is,  one  is  affirmative  and  the  other  negative ; 
as,  "some  men  are  honored;"  "some  men  are  not  honored." 
Subcontraries  may  both  be  true,  but  they  cannot  both  be  false; 
for,  if  both  were  false,  they  would  make  two  contradictories 
to  be  both  false,  which  cannot  be;  v.  g.,  "some  men  are 
learned;"  "some  men  are  not  learned."  It  is  evident  that 
both  of  these  propositions  cannot  be  false. 

Locke,  and  they  who  accept  his  authority  in  philosophy, 
deny  that  the  syllogism  is  a  means  of  discovering  truth  ;  but  a 
careful  analysis  of  the  act  of  reasoning,  will  show  this  denial 
to  be  erroneous.  Reasoning  will  be  explained  with  sufficient 
minuteness  in  the  following  chapter. 


*  "Contraria  juxta  se  posita  magis  lucescunt."     When  contraries  are  jnit 
near  to  each  other  they  become  clearer. 

♦  'Contraria  vcrsantur  circa  idem. ' '     Contraries  legard  the  same  thing. 


CHAPTER  III. 


ARTI  C  L  E     I. 

REASONING. 

The  power  in  the  soul  by  which  it  perceives^  Judges,  reasons.; 
is  termed  the  understanding,  i\\Q  judg?ne?it,  the  reason,  accord- 
ing to  the  act  which  it  performs ;  yet,  it  is  one  and  the  same 
power  that  understands,  judges  and  reasons.  All  the  powers 
of  the  soul  that  are  concerned  in  the  acts  of  knowing,  when 
taken  collectively,  constitute  the  7nind;  hence,  the  soul  is  the 
spiritual  substance  with  its  perfections;  the  7nind  \s  the  aggre- 
gate of  its  powers  or  faculties,  the  understanding,  conscious- 
ness, will  and  memory  ;  but  7?iind,  more  particularly,  stands  for 
the  power  in  the  soul  of  knowi?ig. 

Every  process  of  reasoning  is  reducible  to  an  act  of  the 
mind  by  which  it  determines  the  agreement  or  disagreement, 
the  identity  or  diversity  of  two  things,  by  comparing  them  to 
a  third;  v.  g.,  "that  which  is  designed  is  the  work  of  an  intelH- 
gent  cause ;  the  world  shows  design ;  therefore,  the  world  is 
the  work  of  an  intelligent  cause."  The  two  things  here  com- 
pared to  a  third,  are  the  "world"  and  "  the  work  of  an  intelli- 
gent cause  ;  "  and  the  third  thing  to  which  they  are  compared 
is  that  which  is  "  designed^'  with  which  they  both  agree,  and, 
therefore,  they  agree  with  each  other. 

All  reasoning  or  argument  rests  on  this  self-evident  princi 
pie  :  "  when  two  things  are  each  equal  to  a  third  thing,  they 
are  equal  to  each  other  ;  "  "  when  one  of  two  things  is  equal,  and 
the  other  unequal  to  a  third  thing,  they  are  unequal  to  each 
other."  Take  care  to  observe,  however,  that  when  the  two 
things  are  both  unequal  to  a  third,  it  does  not  follow  that  they 
are  either  equal  or  unequal  to  each  other. 


36  LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 

The  truth  of  this  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  things, 
following  from  their  relation  to  a  third,  is  termed  the  conse- 
quence or  sequence;  and  the  proposition  which  expresses  that 
agreement  or  disagreement,  as  following  from  the  comparison, 
is  called  the  co?icIusion  or  consequent. 

Hence,  an  act  of  reasoning,  or  an  argument  expressed  in 
full,  consists  of  three  judgments  or  propositions ;  the  first  two 
are  a  comparison ;  and  the  third,  or  conclusion,  affirms  the 
consequent  which  follows  from  this  comparison ;  v.  g., 

"All  virtue  is  commendable  ; 
Diligence  is  a  virtue; 
Therefore,  diligence  is  commendable." 

Here  "  diligence  "  and  "  commendable  "  are  both  compared  to 
"virtue,"  and  judged  to  agree  with  it;  the  agreement  of  "dili- 
gence "  and  "  commendable  "  is  perceived  to  follow  from  their 
agreement  with  "  virtue " ;  and  the  truth  of  that  agreement 
thus  following,  is  the  sequence  or  consequence  which  is  declared 
in  the  third  proposition  or  conclusion,  "  diligence  is  commend- 
able." Seque?ice,  therefore,  expresses  the  dependoice  of  the 
conclusion  on  the  premises;  and  is  truly  there  when  the  con- 
clusion or  consequent  really  follows  from  the  premises. 


ARTICLE     II. 

THE    SYLLOGISM    AND    ITS    LAWS. 

An  argument  expressed  in  the  preceding  form  is  termed  a 
syllogism;  hence,  a  syllogism  is  defined  to  be  "  an  argument 
consisting  of  three  propositions  so  related  to  each  other  that, 
the  first  two  being  granted,  the  third  necessarily  follows  from 
them."  The  first  two  propositions  are  sometimes  termed  the 
antecedent;  also,  the  premises;  and  the  conclusion  is  sometimes 
termed  the  co?isequent;  which,  however,  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  consequence  or  sequence. 

The  peculiar  and  specific  act  of  reasoji,  by  which  its  nature 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART.  37 

is  defined,  is,  the  kiicnving  of  one  thing  fi'om  another;  i.  e., 
reason  is  the  power  of  deriving  the  knowledge  of  one  thing 
from  the  knowledge  of  another  by  means  of  the  relation  be- 
tween the  two.     [Vide  rule  fifth  for  a  good  definition.) 

The  syllogism  is  the  formula  for  the  act  of  deriving  the 
knowledge  of  one  thing  from  that  of  another  by  means  of 
their  relation  to  each  other.  There  is  no  other  mode  of  learn- 
ing truth  proper  to  reason  as  such ;  tor,  it  belongs  only  to  in- 
telligence to  perceive  truth  directly  in  itself,  and  not  by  means 
of  its  relation  to  other  truth.  To  reject  the  syllogism,  there- 
fore, as  a  mode  of  acquiring  truth,  is  to  reject  reason  itself. 
Nor,  in  fact,  is  it  possible  to  state  an  argument  against  the 
syllogism  without  virtually  employing  that  very  form  itself; 
for  the  argument  itself  would  be  an  exercise  of  reason,  inas- 
much as  it  would  be  a  formal  effort  to  derive  the  knowledge 
of  one  thing  from  that  of  another  to  which  it  was  assumed  to 
be  related. 

When  the  propositions  of  a  syllogism  are  categorical,  the 
syllogism  is  categorical;  and  when  they  are  hypothetical,  it  also 
is  hypothetical. 

A  syllogism  consists  of  three  propositions,  each  containing 
two  terms,  and  each  one  of  these  terms  is  named  twice  in  the 
syllogism :  these  terms  are  the  subjects  and  predicates  of  the 
propositions. 

The  subject  and  predicate  of  the  conclusion  are  the  ex- 
tremes, the  former  being  the  mi?ior  extreme  or  t€r7n,  and  the 
latter  the  major  extre?ne  or  term. 

The  7najor  premise  is  strictly  the  one  which  contains  the 
major  extreme;  and  the  minor  premise  the  one  which  contains 
the  minor  extreme.  But  in  practice,  the  premise  which  comes 
first  is  generally  termed  the  7?iajor,  and  the  other  the  7?iinor 
premise. 

The  term  twice  named  in  i\\e  prej7iises  to  which  the  extre>7ies 
are  compared  is  called  the  7niddle  ter7n:  in  the  preceding  syllo- 
gism "  diligence  "  is  the  minor  extreme,  because  it  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  conclusion;  "commendable"  is  the  major  extreme, 
because  it  is  the  predicate  of  the  conclusion  ;  and  "  virtue  "  is 


38  LOGIC:     FIRST    PART. 

the  middle  term,  because  it  is  the  one  to  which  the  two  others 
are  compared,  and  it  is  twice  named  in  the  premises. 

The  rectitude  of  the  conclusion,  as  already  obser^■ed,  de- 
pends on  its  seque7ice;  that  is,  on  its  following  from  the  pre- 
mises ;  its  truth  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  matter. 

Observe,  that  in  the  following  syllogism — 

"Every  virtue  is  hateful; 
Patience  is  a  virtue; 
Therefore,  patience  is  hateful ;  " 

There  is  rectitude  of  conclusion,  but  it  has  not  truths  because 
one  premise  is  false  in  matter. 

The  conclusion  may  express  truth,  and  yet  not  follow  from 
the  premises;  v.  g., 

**A11  virtue  is  good; 
Health  is  not  a  virtue; 
Therefore,  health  is  good." 

Here  there  is  truth  of  matter,  but  not  rectitude  or  sequence  of 
conclusion. 

The  requisites  ot  a  correct,  simple  or  categorical  syllogism 
are  expressed  in  the  following  rules  or  canons : 

Rule  First:  The  syllogism  must  contain  three,  and  only 
three,  terms. 

Rule  Second:  No  term  can  have  greater  extejision  in  the 
conclusion  than  it  had  in  the  premises. 

Rule  Third :  The  conclusion  must  never  contain  the  middle 
term. 

Rule  Fourth :  The  middle  term  must  be,  at  least  once,  dis- 
tributed ;  that  is,  it  must  be,  at  least  once,  taken  according  to 
the  whole  of  its  extensioti. 

Rule  Fifth :  A  negative  conclusion  cannot  follow  from  two 
affirmative  premises. 

Rule  Sixth  :  No  conclusion  follows  from  two  negative  pre- 
mises. 

Rule  Seventh :  The  conclusion  follows  the  less  worthy  pre- 
mise. 

Rule  Eighth.'  No  conclusion  follows  from  two  particular 
premises. 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PAET.  39 

First  Rule  :  The  reason  of  this  rule  is  obvious,  if  we 
reflect  that  a  syllogism  is  founded  on  a  comparison  of  two 
terms  with  a  third ;  and,  hence,  if  there  were  four  terms,  it 
would  not  be  a  syllogism,  but  several  comparisons  from  which 
there  could  follow  no  certain  conclusion  ;  since  the  terms  might 
agree  in  pairs,  or  disagree,  without  any  relation  to  a  thb-d  term. 
There  may  be  four  terms  explicitly  or  implicitly;  v.  g., 
"Diligence  is  commendable; 

But  anger  is  not  a  virtue ; 

Therefore,  anger  is  not  commendable." 

This  syllogism  contains  four  terms  explicitly.  But  when  four 
terms  are  used,  it  is  generally  done  by  employing  the  middle 
term  in  two  senses: 

*  Ctesar  is  a  word  of  two  syllables  ; 
But  Brutus  killed  Ccesar; 
Therefore,   Brutus  killed  a  word  of  two  syllables." 

In  this  syllogism  Ccesar  is  used  in  two  senses — as  a  word  and 
for  di person;  hence,  when  the  middle  term  is  ambiguous,  it  is 
equivalent  to  two  terms. 

Second  Rule  :  If  a  term  have  greater  extent  in  the  con- 
clusion than  it  had  in  the  premises,  there  would  then  be  in- 
ferred from  the  premises  what  is  not  contained  in  them ;  but 
the  conclusion,  from  its  nature,  is  that  which  follows  from 
the  premises;  v.  g., 

"Every  animal  is  a  substance; 
No  tree  is  an  animal ; 
Therefore,  a  tree  is  not  a  substance." 

In  this  syllogism  "substance"  is  a  particular  term  in  the  pre- 
mises, while  it  is  universal  in  the  conclusion ;  that  is,  in  the 
premises  "  substance  "  is  compared  to  the  middle  term  only  as 
to  a  part  of  its  extent;  while  in  the  conclusion  it  is  denied  of 
"  tree,"  according  to  its  whole  extension. 

Hence  the  conclusion,  as  such,  can  have  no  greater  exten- 
sion than  its  premises. 

The  fact  that  we  frequently  derive  the  knowledge  of  that 
which  is  greater  from  the  knowledge  of  that  which  is  less,  as, 
for  example,  when  from  their  relation  we  infer  a  cause  from  an 


40  LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART. 

effect,  which,  as  such,  is  inferior  to  it,*  is  not  adverse  to  this 
rule  when  rightly  understood.  The  conclusion  must  not  have 
greater  extension  than  the  premises ;  but  it  may  have  more 
comprehe?ision;  nay,  its  terms,  in  some  sense,  itiust  have 
greater  comprehension  ;  for  the  conclusion  is  the  synthesis  of 
a  subject  and  predicate  which  is  not  made  in  the  premises. 

Third  Rule  :  If  the  middle  term  be  used  in  the  conclu- 
sion, nothing  would  be  inferred;  since  the  conclusion  in  that 
case  would  be  but  a  repetition,  in  some  shape,  of  one  premise, 
and,  therefore,  it  would  not  express  a  sequence;  v.  g., 

"All  virtue  is  commendable; 
Kindness  is  a  virtue  ; 
Therefore,  virtue  is  commendable." 

Fourth  Rule  :  If  the  middle  term  be  not,  at  least  once, 
distributed ;  that  is,  be  not  at  least  once  a  universal,  it  would 
be  equivalent  to  two  terms ;  for  it  might  be  taken,  according 
to  one  part  of  its  extent,  in  one  premise,  and  according  to  an- 
other part  in  the  other;  whence  the  major  and  minor  terms 
would  not  necessarily  be  compared  to  the  same  thing;  v.  g., 

**  Every  man  is  an  animal; 
Every  bird  is  an  animal; 
Therefore,  every  man  is  a  bird." 

In  this  syllogism  "man"  is  compared  to  "animal,"  taken  ac- 
cording to  one  part  of  its  extension,  and  "  bird,"  according  to 
another  part;  whence,  as  the  two  extremes  are  not  compared 
to  the  same  term,  no  conclusion  legitimately  follows. 

The  subject  of  every  universal  proposition  is  distributed,  and 
it  is  not  distributed  in  any  other  than  a  universal  proposition; 
the  predicate  of  every  negative  proposition  is  distributed,  and 
it  is  not  distributed  in  any  but  a  negative  proposition. 

Fifth  Rule  :  A  negative  conclusion  cannot  follow  from 
two  affirmative  premises ;  for,  when  they  affirm  the  agreement 
of  the  major  and  minor  terms  with  the  middle,  the  conclusion 
must  affirm  the  consequent  agreement  of  the  major  and  minor; 
V.  g.,  "a  substance  whose  action,  or  mode  of  operation,  exceeds 

♦  "Semper  enim  est  potior  causa  suo  effectu." — Div.  Th.  1,  2,  p.  q.  66,  a.  1. 
The  cause  is  always  superior,  in  some  respect,  to  its  eflfect. 


LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART.  41 

the  powers  of  matter,  is  above  matter ;  the  actions  of  the  human 
soul  transcend  the  powers  of  matter;  therefore,  the  human  soul 
is  a  substance  which  is  superior  to  matter,"  is  a  correct  syllog- 
ism by  this  rule. 

Sixth  Rule  :  When  the  premises  deny  the  agreement  of 
both  the  major  and  minor  terms  with  the  middle  term,  then 
nothing  is  affirmed  as  to  the  identity  or  diversity  of  the  major 
and  minor;  it  is  only  declared  that  they  do  not  agree  with  the 
middle  term;  hence,  when  both  extremes  disagree  with  the 
middle  term,  they  may  either  agree  or  disagree   with  each 

other;  v.  g., 

* '  A  reptile  is  not  a  bird ; 
A  snake  is  not  a  bird ; 
Therefore,  a  snake  is  not  a  reptile." 

This  conclusion,  though  false  in  matter,  derives  neither  truth 
nor  falsehood  from  the  premises. 

**  A  bird  is  hot  a  reptile ; 
A  tree  is  not  a  reptile  ; 
Therefore,  a  tree  is  not  a  bird." 

This  conclusion  is  true  in  matter,  but  it  does  not  follow  from 
the  premises. 

Seventh  Rule  :  The  unworthy  premise  is  that  which  is 
negative^  in  respect  to  that  which  is  affirmative;  and  that  which 
is  particular^  in  respect  to  that  which  is  universal.  The  reason 
of  the  rule  will  become  obvious  if  it  be  observed  that  when 
one  premise  affirms  the  agreement  of  its  extreme  term  with 
the  middle  term,  and  the  agreement  of  the  other  term  with  the 
middle  is  denied  in  the  remaining  premise,  it  follows  that  the 
extremes  disagree  with  each  other;  v.  g., 


Or 


If  A  is  equal  to  B, 

And  C  is  not  equal  to  B  ; 

Then  C  is  not  equal  to  A. 


**  None  but  organized,  living,  corporeal  beings  are  mortal; 
Angels  are  not  corporeal  beings  ; 
Therefore,  angels  are  not  mortal." 

Again,  if  a  term  which  is  particular  in  the  premises,  be  made 
universal  in  the  conclusion,  in  such  case,  an  agreement  will  be 


42  logic:  first  part. 

affirmed  in  the  conclusion  which  is  not  implied  in  the  prem- 
ises; V.  g,  "All  virtue  is  commendable;  some  parsimony 
is  a  virtue;  therefore,  all  parsimony  is  commendable."  Here 
the  conclusion  affirms  that  all  parsimony  agrees  with  "  com- 
mendable," though  in  the  premises  it  is  only  said  that  some 
parsimony  agrees  with  "  virtue,"  the  middle  term.  Hence,  this 
is,  at  the  same  time,  a  fault  against  the  second  rule. 

Eighth  Rule  :  When  both  premises  are  particular,  and  at 
the  same  time  affirmative,  then  the  middle  term  is  not  distrib- 
uted, which  is  wrong  by  rule  the  fourth;  v.  g.,  "  Some  Cretans 
were  liars;  some  Romans  were  liars;  therefore,  some  Cretans 
were  Romans."  This  is  a  vicious  syllogism;  for  the  major  and 
minor  terms  agree  with  "  liars  "  in  different  parts  of  its  extension. 

If  both  premises  be  particular  and  negative,  nothing  follows 
from  them,  by  rule  the  sixth ;  but  if  one  of  the  particular  prem- 
ises be  affirmative  and  the  other  negative,  and  the  middle  term 
be  distributed  in  the  negative  premise,  then,  since  the  conclu- 
sion must  be  negative,  one  extreme  will  have  more  extension 
in  the  conclusion  than  it  had  in  the  premises,  which  is  contrary  to 
rule  second;  v.  g.,  "Some  men  are  prudent;  some  merchants 
are  not  prudent;  therefore,  some  merchants  are  not  men." 

Yet,  even  when  the  terms  are  all  singular,  the  conclusion 
may  be  valid;  v.  g.,  "Romulus  was  the  founder  of  Rome;  the 
first  kmg  of  Rome  was  Romulus;  therefore,  the  first  king  of 
Rome  was  the  founder  of  Rome."  Here  the  conclusion  is 
really  consequent,  for  the  middle  term,  "Romulus,"  may  be 
considered  as  virtually  a  common  term  taken  according  to  its 
whole  extent  and  including  "  founder  of  Rome,"  and  "  first 
king  of  Rome;"  this  is  termed  by  the  old  philosophers,  an 
expository  syllogism.  It  is  an  apparent  exception  to  the  eighth 
rule.  When  the  three  terms  are  really  singular^  they  may  be  iden- 
tical as  to  their  object;  and  then  it  is  not  a  real  argument,  but  a 
sort  of  definition,  by  synonyms ;  v.  g..  "  Man  is  a  rational  animal ; 
man  consists  of  soul  and  body;  therefore,  a  rational  animal 
consists  of  soul  and  body."     This  also  is  an  expository  syllogism. 


LOGIC  :   FIKST    PART.  43 


ARTICLE     III. 

HYPOTHETICAL    OR    CONDITIONAL    SYLLOGISMS  ;    THE    DIS- 
JUNCTIVE   SYLLOGISM. 

A  hypothetical  syllogism  is  one  in  which  a  categorical  con- 
clusion is  deduced  from  a  hypothetical  premise.  In  a  hypo- 
thetical proposition,  the  conclusion  or  consequent  is  verified 
when  the  condition  is  verified ;  hence,  when  the  major  propo- 
sition is  conditional,  i.  e.,  has  a  condition  which  is  expressed 
by  "  if,"  or  its  equivalent,  in  the  minor  the  truth  of  the  condi- 
tion is  affirmed  as  a  categorical  proposition,  from  which  the 
truth  of  the  conclusion  follows;  or  the  truth  of  the  consequent 
is  denied;  whence  the  falsity  of  the  condition  will  result;  v.  g., 

**  If  Brutus  killed  Ceesar,  then  Caesar  is  dead; 
But  Brutus  did  kill  Csesar ; 
Therefore,  Caesar  is  dead." 

In  such  syllogisms,  then,  the  minor  premise  may  either  affirm 
the  truth  of  the  condition,  or  deny  the  truth  of  the  conclusion; 
in  the  first  case,  the  consequent  will  be  the  conclusion  of  the 
syllogism;  v.  g.,  '•  Caesar  is  dead;"  in  the  second,  the  denial 
of  the  condition  will  be  the  conclusion  of  the  syllogism;  v.  g., 
"  Brutus  did  not  kill  Caesar ;  "  and  in  both  cases,  the  argument 
will  be  in  form ^  that  is,  consequent. 

But,  as  regards  the  ^natter,  it  does  not  follow  that  if  the  con- 
dition be  false,  the  consequent  is  therefore  false;  for  it  may  be 
true  for  some  other  reason;  v.  g.,  even  if  Brutus  did  not  kill 
Caesar,  still  Caesar  may  be  dead  from  some  other  cause. 

Again,  it  does  not  follow  that  if  the  consequent  be  true  the 
condition  is  therefore  true,  for  the  consequent  might  be  verified 
by  a  different  condition ;  v.  g.,  though  it  may  be  granted  that 
Caesar  is  dead,  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that  he  was  killed. 

In  such  hypothetical  enunciations  as  the  following,  "if  man  is 
a  mineral,  he  does  not  feel;  "  the  consequent  has  not  real,  but 
only  siippositive  truth,  for  the  antecedent  is  merely  an  arbitrary 
supposition. 

Hence,  when,  in  a  conditional  proposition,  the  truth  of  the 


44  '  LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 

affirmative  consequent  is  really  dependent  on  that  of  the  affirni« 
ative  antecedent;  or,  also,  when  the  afitecedent  is  so  included 
in  the  consequent^  that  the  denial  of  the  consequent  necessarily 
implies  the  denial  of  the  afitecedent^  we  have  for  the  conditional 
argument  the  following 

Rule  :  First,  In  the  affirmative  conditional,  the  minor  pre- 
mise must  affirm  the  antecedent^  and  the  conclusion  must  affirm 
the  consequent ;  v.  g.,  "  if  the  soul  reasons,  it  is  a  simple  sub- 
stance; but  the  soul  does  reason;  therefore  the  soul  is  a  simple 
substance."  Seqond,  In  the  negative  co?iditional,  the  minor 
premise  must  deny  the  consequent^  and  the  conclusion  must 
deny  the  antecedent^  observing  that  two  negatives  in  English 
are  equivalent  to  an  affirmative;  v.  g.,  "if  the  soul  perishes 
when  the  body  dies,  then  the  soul  is  not  a  spiritual  substance; 
but  the  soul  is  {is  not  not)  a  spiritual  substance ;  therefore,  the 
soul  does  not  perish  when  the  body  dies." 

As  regards  Xh^form  of  the  hypothetical  or  conditional  argu- 
ment the  preceding  rule  is  absolute,  or  it  admits  no  exception. 
But  it  may  happen  by  accident,  or  in  virtue  of  the  matter,  that 
the  conclusion  is  true,  even  when  these  rules  are  inverted ;  as, 
for  example,  when  the  antecede?it  is  the  sufficient  reason  of  the 
C07isequent;  if  the  antecedent  is  defiied,  the  consequent  may  also 
be  denied;  v.  g.,  "  if  the  sun  is  at  the  meridian,  it  is  noon;  but 
the  sun  is  ?tot  at  the  meridian;  therefore,  it  is  not  noon''  This 
conclusion  is  true,  not  in  virtue  of  the  form,  but  on  account 
of  the  matter;  in  other  words,  it  is  not  logically  consequetit, 
though  it  is  materially  true. 

Also,  when  the  co?idition  and  consequetit  are  in  matter  iden- 
tical and  co-extensive,  by  accident,  and  not  in  virtue  of  the 
form,  the  falsity  of  the  condition  infers  the  falsity  of  the  conclu- 
sion ;  v.  g.,  "  if  Apollo  was  not  a  man,  then  he  was  not  a 
rational  animal;  but  he  was  a  man;  therefore,  he  was  a  rational 
animal"  :  "  if  man  is  immortal,  he  will  not  die;  but  he  is  not 
immortal ;  therefore,  he  will  die."  As  the  condition  and  con- 
ditionate  are  identical,  the  falsity  of  one  always  infers,  neces 
sarily,  the  falsity  of  the  other,  on  account  cf  that  identity.  This 
.species  of  argument,  for  its  brevity,  is  used  in  practice ;  and 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART.  45 

when  the  matter  is  true,  the  proof  of  the  condition  is  the  proof, 
also,  of  the  conditionaie;  or  vice  versa.  The  same  thing  which 
is  misunderstood  or  denied  under  one  forrfl  of  expression,  may 
be  seen  and  admitted  under  another;  hence,  this  mode  of  proof 
is  legitimate,  and  may  be  useful  in  some  cases. 

A  syllogism  is  disjunctive  when  it  proceeds  from  a  disjunc- 
tive proposition.  The  disjunction  of  the  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent is  perfect  when  they  divide  the  whole  matter  so  as  to 
admit  no  medium;  v.  g.,  "man  is  either  mortal,  or  not  mortal;" 
in  man  there  can  be  no  medium  between  mortality  and  immor- 
tality. The  truth  or  rectitude  of  the  disjunction  is  determined 
by  the  matter.  In  the  completely  disjunctive  syllogism,  the 
admission  of  one  member  of  the  disjunction  requires  the  denial 
of  the  other;  v.  g.,  "either  man  is  mortal,  or  he  is  immortal; 
but  he  is  mortal ;  therefore,  he  is  not  immortal ;  "  "  the  honor 
of  first  discovering  America  belongs  either  to  Americus  or  to 
Columbus ;  it  belongs  to  Columbus  ;  therefore,  it  does  not 
belong  to  Americus."  When  one  member  of  a  disjunctive 
premise  is  merely  the  contradictory  of  the  other,  if  the  affirm- 
ative one  be  granted,  the  negative  one  has  a  double  negation, 
which  is  really  an  afhrmative;  v.  g.,  "  either  it  rains,  or  it  does 
not  rain ;  it  does  rain  ;  therefore,  it  does  not  not  rain ;  "  i.  e.,  it 
does  rain. 


ARTICLE    IV. 

OTHER  FORMS  OF  ARGUMENT  WHICH  MAY  BE  REDUCED  TO  THE 
SYLLOGISTIC  FORM. 

The  enthymeme  is  a  syllogism,  one  of  whose  premises  is  not 
expressed;  v.  g.,  "the  poor  are  men;  therefore,  they  are  not 
to  be  contemned."  The  sorites  is  a  series  of  propositions  in 
which  the  predicate  of  the  first  is  the  subject  of  the  second,  the 
predicate  of  the  second  is  the  subject  of  the  third,  and  so  on 
till  the  last  or  conclusion,  in  which  the  predicate  of  the  last 
proposition  is  conjoined  to  the  subject  of  the  first  proposition ; 


46  LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART. 

V.  g.j  "  he  who  does  not  restrain  his  passions,  has  many  violent 
desires;  he  that  has  many  violent  desires,  is  unquiet;  he  that 
is  unquiet,  is  miserable ;  therefore,  he  that  does  not  restrain  his 
passions  is  miserable."  Both  these  forms  of  argument  consist 
of  abridged  syllogisms. 

The  epycherema  is  a  syllogism  in  which  one  or  both  of  the 
premises  are  proved,  each  by  its  reason ;  or  it  has  its  reason 
annexed  to  it  in  the  syllogism;  v.  g.,  "every  spiritual  substance 
is  incorruptible,  since  it  neither  has  parts  nor  depends  on  matter; 
but  the  human  soul  is  a  spiritual  substance,  since  it  is  intel- 
ligent; therefore,  the  human  soul  is  incorruptible." 

The  dilemma  is  a  compound  argument  which  consists  of  two 
members  proposed  disjunctively,  and  so  related  that  the  legiti- 
mate conclusion  from  either  member,  or  horn,  is  a  refutation 
of  the  adversary;  v.  g.,  "  the  skeptic's  denial  of  all  certainty  is 
either  true  or  false ;  if  true,  then  that  is  certain ;  if  false,  still 
more  is  there  certainty ;  therefore,  in  either  supposition,  scep- 
ticism is  false." 

This  argument  is  called  a  dilemma,  because  it  consists  of  but 
two  meinbers.  The  trile7?wia  and  quadrile7nma  are  too  compli- 
cated to  be  ordinarily  useful  in  reasoning. 

A  dilemma  is  faulty;  ist.  If  the  division  of  the  matter  made 
by  the  disjunctive  be  not  co?nplete;  in  other  words,  if  there  be 
a  medium  of  escape  from  it.  The  dilemma  put  into  the  mouth 
of  Socrates  when  dying,  has  this  fault:  "  Death  is  either  a  sweet 
sleep,  or  it  is  a  transition  to  the  happy  companionship  of 
Orpheus  and  Ulysses;  in  either  case,  therefore,  it  is  good  to 
die."  Between  "  sleep  "  and  the  "  society  of  Ulysses,"  there  is 
a  wide  medium.  But  when  the  early  Christians  said  to  the 
Roman  tyrant,  "  either  we  are  innocent,  or  we  are  guilty;  if 
innocent,  why  condemn  us  ?  if  guilty,  why  refuse  us  a  lawful 
trial  ?  "  between  men's  infwcence  and  guilt,  and  also  between 
the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  law,  there  is  no  medium. 
2d,  The  conclusion  derived  from  one,  or  each  member  of  the 
dilemma,  may  not  be  les^iiimaie;  in  this  case,  it  not  only  proves 
nothing,  but  it  may  be  retorted ;  v.  g.,  it  was  said  to  a  judge, 
who  was  about  to  enter  into  office,  "  you  will  administer  the 


LOGIC  :    FIRST   PART.  47 

laws  either  well  or  ill;  rf  well,  you  will  displease  the  people;  if 
ill,  you  will  displease  the  gods;"  he  retorted,  "I  will  adminis- 
ter the  laws  justly  or  unjustly;  if  justly,  I  shall  not  displease 
the  gods;  if  unjustly,  I  shall  not  displease  the  people." 

Another  example  of  the  dilemma  which  may  be  retorted : 
Protagoras  bargained  to  educate  Euathlus  for  the  law,  half  of 
the  money  to  be  paid  when  his  studies  were  finished,  the  rest 
when  Euathlus  gained  his  first  suit;  after  some  time  Protago- 
ras sued  Euathlus,  and  this  was  the  first  case  for  Euathlus. 
Protagoras  thus  argued :  "  Either  Euathlus  will  lose  or  gain 
this  case;  if  he  lose  it,  then  the  money  is  to  be  paid  me  by 
the  decision  of  the  court;  if  he  gain  it,  then  he  must  pay  me 
by  our  cojitract."  Euathlus  retorted :  "  If  the  decision  is  in 
my  favor,  then  I  will  pay  nothing  by  the  sentence  of  the  court; 
if  agamst  me,  I  will  pay  nothing  according  to  the  contract, 
since  I  will  not  have  gained  my  first  case. ^'  The  fallacy  really 
arises  from  Protagoras  having,  by  the  contract,  no  right  to  bring 
the  suit,  as  he  was  to  wait  till  Euathlus  gaified  his  first  case; 
hence,  the  disjunction  did  not  include  the  who/e  matter. 
Euathlus'  dilemma  was  at  fault,  because  he  assumed  that  the 
judge's  decision  would  annul  the  contract,  or  exempt  him 
from  paying,  if  he  gained  the  suit;  and  Protagoras  was  wrong 
for  assuming  the  cancelling  of  the  contract,  in  case  the  decision 
of  the  judge  was  adverse  to  his  disciple. 

A  sophist  argued  :  "You  say  that  you  tie;  and  if  you  speak 
the  truth,  then  you  do  tie;  if  you  ssij  falsely  that  you  lie,  then 
also  you  lie;  therefore,  whether  you  speak  truly  or  falsely,  you 
lie."  He  does  "lie"  in  either  case,  but  not  about  the  same 
thing,  and  under  the  same  respect. 

"  The  logical  axiom  that  '  the  premises  contain  the  conclu- 
sion,' is  either  true,  or  it  is  not;  if  true,  then  the  spiritual  czxi- 
not  be  deduced  from  the  fnaterial,'^  etc.  It  may  be  answered 
that  the  "premises  contain  the  conclusion"  in  respect  to  ex- 
tension, as  a  universal  contains  its  inferiors,  or  also  as  one  term 
of  a  relation  includes  the  other ;  but  they  do  not  necessarily 
contain  the  conclusion  in  any  sense  really  different  from  this. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


ARTICLE    I. 

SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  :  ANALYSIS  AND  SYNTHESIS,  IN  THHIF 
RELATION  BOTH  TO  PARTICULAR  SCIENTIFIC  COGNITIONS, 
AND    TO    SYSTEMS    OF    SUCH    COGNITIONS. 

There  are  two  methods  which  the  mind  follows  in  acquiring 
or  imparting  knowledge  by  reasoning;  namely,  A?ialysis  and 
Synthesis.  In  analysis  the  mind  proceeds  from  the  compound 
to  its  simple  components,  from  the  particular  object  to  the 
general  truth ;  but  in  synthesis  this  order  is  inverted,  and  the 
mind  proceeds  from  the  simple  to  the  compound,  from  the 
general  to  the  particular. 

The  particular,  as  this  man,  this  rose,  is  compound,  or  has 
many  component  marks  or  properties,  while  the  universal  has 
but  one  mark;  hence,  the  process  of  going  from  a  particular 
object  or  truth  to  the  general  or  universal,  is  atialysis.  When 
we  say  that  the  particular  is  compound,  we  regard  the  co7npre' 
hension  of  the  term.  The  more  general  the  term  is,  the  greater 
its  extension,  but  the  less  its  comprehension;  v.  g.,  the  term  man 
includes  many  marks,  as,  "  substance,"  "  animal,"  "  rational " ; 
the  term  being  includes  but  one  mark,  but,  as  to  its  extension, 
it  is  applicable  to  all  things. 

When  by  argument  we  proceed  from  a  subject  to  a  predicate, 
the  method  of  reasoning  is  a7ialytical ;  when  the  reasoning  is 
from  the  predicate  to  the  subject,  the  method  is  synthetical.  A 
simple  syllogism  is  synthetical ;  a  sorites  may  combine  in  it 
both  synthesis  and  analysis.  But  analysis  and  synthesis  may 
also  regard  the  general  method  by  which  a  series  of  cognitions, 
a  particular  system  of  knowledge  or  a  particular  science  is  ac- 
quired or  taught ;  however,  they  are  alvvays  distinguished  from 

48 


LOGIC  :   FIKST    PAET.  49 

each  other  in  the  same  manner.  By  a?ialysis  we  resolve  what 
is  complex  into  its  simple  constituents;  hy  synthesis  viQ  form 
one  whole  out  of  many  constituents.  By  analysis  we  find  the 
extension  of  terms,  ideas  or  propositions ;  by  synthesis  we  find 
their  coniprehev.sion* 

In  all  lengthy  trains  of  reasoning  both  synthesis  and  analysis 
may  occur,  whether  the  general  method  be  conducted  according 
to  the  one  or  the  other.  Induction,  as  a  method  of  acquiring 
science,  is  analysis;  regarded  as  a  syllogism,  it  is  sy?ithesis;  for, 
as  a  general  method  of  scientific  reasoning,  it  deduces  univer- 
sal principles  from  particular  facts,  and  this  is  analysis.  Wlien 
its  conclusions  are  Jinally  established,  it  is  by  one  argument 
concerning  iho.  7iihole  class  in  which  a  law  or  property  is  pre- 
dicated oi  them  ;  this  is  synthesis,  and' yet  it  pertains  to  the  in- 
duction. When  a  property  is  deduced  from  a  substance ; 
when  algebraic  formulce  are  resolved  by  transformation  into 
more  general  formulae ;  the  process  in  each  case  is  analysis ; 
for,  in  these  instances,  the  universal  is  deduced  from  the  par- 
ticular. When  we  predicate  the  effect  of  the  cause,  or  pass 
from  the  general  truth  to  the  particular  object,  the  process  is 
synthesis.  Analysis  is  called,  also,  the  method  of  ifivention; 
synthesis  the  method  of  discipline,  or  instruction. 

Observe,  however,  that  in  educatio?i,  considered  as  to  its 
general  scope  and  progress,  knowledge  advances  by  analysis; 
for  the  progress  of  the  mind  in  education  thus  generally  un- 
derstood, is  from  the  particular  to  the  universal ;  from  what  is 
less  universal  to  what  is  more  universal ;  but  yet  the  particular 
steps  or  acts  of  cognition  by  which  the  mind  proceeds,  are,  as 
already  remarked,  both  those  of  synthesis  and  those  of  analysis. 
This  will  be  easily  understood  if  it  be  kept  in  mind  that  t«> 
deduce  a  general  property  from  its  subject  is  analysis;  to  p7-edi, 
eate  is  synthesis.  The  mind,  by  the  law  of  its  nature,  begins 
with  the  knowledge  of  physical  and  sensible  objects,  reasons 
to  the-.r  general  properties  ;  it  passes  from  quantity  to  its  gene- 
ral properties,  and  finally  attains  to  strictly  metaphysical  truth : 

*  "  Multa  ex  uno  analysis,  unura  ex  multis  eflicit  synthesis."        Anaiysis 
m  ikes  many  out  of  one;  synthesis  makes  one  out  of  many. 
4 


50  LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART. 

/'.  e ,  to  the  most  absolute  and  universal  truth.  This  progress 
of  the  intellect,  considered  as  to  its  general  method  and  final 
result,  is  analytical.  But  the  particular  arguments  or  acts  of 
reasoning  in  this  advance  of  the  intellect  towards  what  is  most 
universal,  are  sometimes  synthetical,  sometimes  analytical,  in 
their  method;  v.  g.,  when  the  universal  axioms  of  geometry 
are  proved  to  be  verified  in  particular  figures,  or  parts  of  quan- 
tity, this  is  synthesis;  but  when,  by  comparing  the  parts  or 
divisions  of  particular  figures,  general  conclusions  are  deduced 
from  them,  this  is  analysis. 

If  we  conceive  gemis  as  composed  of  species,  and  species  as 
co7nposed  of  individuals,  then  to  resolve  genus  into  its  species 
thus  assumed  to  be  its  components,  and  resolve  species  into 
individuals,  is  analysis.  But  this,  however,  would  not  be  a 
strictly  correct  mode  of  conceiving  the  nniversals,  genus  and 
species.  Since  analysis  is  the  resolution  of  that  which  is  cofn- 
poimded  into  its  constituents,  it  properly  regards  the  comprehen- 
sion of  its  object,  not  the  extensio?7.  Yet,  it  may  sometimes  be 
convenient  to  conceive  extension  as  consisting  of  component 
parts  of  quantity;  in  which  case  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  capa- 
ble of  analysis,  in  a  wider  sense  of  the  term. 


ARTICLE    II. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Demonstration  is  a  legitimate  argument  in  which  an  evident 
conclusion  necessarily  follows  from  evident  premises.  Its  pre- 
mises are  either  immediately  evident  in  themselves;  or  they  are 
mediately  evident  as  necessary  conclusions  from  other  premises, 
which  are  evident.  Such  demonstration  is  simple  when  it  con- 
tains but  one  argument,  or  syllogism ;  it  is  complex  when  it 
contains  two  or  more  arguments.  The  premises  are  prior  to 
the  conclusion  ;  they  are  the  cause  of  the  conclusion  ;  they  are 
better  hiown  than  the  conclusion. 

A  demonstration  is  direct  when  the  conclusion  is  evident 
from  the  agreement  of  the  subject  and  predicate;  v.  g.,  "the 


LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART.  51 

first  cause  must  be  independent  of  any  preceding  cause ;  now, 
God  is  the  first  cause;  therefore,  God  is  independent  of  all 
preceding  cause." 

The  demonstration  is  i?idirect  when  it  is  shown  that  the  con- 
tradictory of  a  proposition  necessaftly  leads  to  an  absurdity; 
V.  g.,  "  God  is  either  eternal,  or  he  is  not ; "  to  say  that  "  God 
is  not  eternal,"  is  to  affirm  a  proposition  that  leads  to  absurdity; 
for  that  which  is  not  eternal  is  produced  by  some  cause ;  but 
by  the  hypothesis,  "  God  is  not  eternal ; "  therefore  God,  the 
first  cause,  is  produced  by  some  cause;  which  is  absurd. 

A  demonstration  may  be  either  a  priori  or  a  posteriori.  When 
the  truth  of  the  conclusion  depends  upon,  and  proceeds  from, 
the  truth  of  its  evident  premises,  as  its  necessary  cause,  the  argu- 
ment is  a  priori;  but  when  the  truth  of  the  premises  logically 
depends  upon  the  truth  of  the  conclusion,  then  the  argument 
is  a  posterioii;  in  the  first  case  the  reasoning  is  from  principles 
to  their  results,  or  this  is  to  reason  a  pj'iori;  but  in  a  posteriori 
reasoning,  the  process  is  from  the  results  to  the  principles  or 
causes. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  a  priori  method  of  argument 
regards  truths  taken  in  their  ontologieal  oidQX)  \ki^  ontolvgical 
order  proceeds  according  to  the  real  relation  which  they  bear  to 
each  other  as  cause  and  effect,  in  themselves  considered ;  and 
in  this  respect  the  cause  is  prior  to  the  eff'eci.  The  logical  or 
psychological  order  regards  the  relation  to  each  other  in  which 
we  first  ktiow  or  learn  them;  which,  in  many  cases,  is  in  the 
reverse  order ;  that  is,  by  passing  from  the  knowledge  of  the 
effects  to  the  knowledge  of  their  causes:  taking  truths  in  this 
order,  is  to  learn  or  reason  a  posteriori. 

A  thing  may  be  prior  to  another,  either  physically  or  meta- 
physically; a  thing  \%  physically  prior  to  another,  when  it  is  the 
real  cause  of  the  other ;  it  is  metaphysically  prior.,  when  it  is  an 
essence  from  which  attributes*'  are  conceived  as  emanating ;  or 
in  which  they  are  conceived  as  inhering;  for  essence  is  7neta- 
physically  prior  to  attribute  or  quality  of  any  kind. 

*  "  Propriura  sen  atti-ibutum  est  quod  fluit  ab  essentia  ratione  formse." 
Property  or  atti'ibute  is  what  flows  from  essence  in  virtue  of  the  formal  princi 
l)!e  in  that  essence. 


52  logic:   first  part. 

A  R  T  I  C  L  E     I  I  I . 

INDUCTION. 

Liduction  is  an  argument  in  which  we  conclude  that,  because 
some  property  or  law  is  true  of  each  individual  of  a  class,  or, 
at  least,  of  a  large  number  of  them,  it  is  a  property  or  law  of 
the  whole  class.  The  force  of  the  conclusion  depends  on  the 
uniformity  and  universality  of  the  facts  observed ;  it  affords  cer- 
tainty for  many  physical  laws  of  material  objects ;  because  the 
action  of  such  agents  is  physically  necessary,  and  is,  circum- 
stances being  the  same,  constant  and  uniform.  But  as  regards 
the  laws  of  still  more  strictly  contingent  beings;  that  is,  things 
that  really  depend  on  mutable  free  age/icy  for  their  existence,  or, 
as  to  whether  they  w^ill  happen  or  not,  the  conclusion  is  sel- 
dom more  than  probable  or  conjectural,  as  to  its  logical  value. 
There  are  i^w  classes  of  real  objects  in  respect  to  which  one 
mind,  or  even  several  minds,  can  actually  make  a  complete 
induction.  But  the  general  observation  of  mankind,  extending 
through  a  great  length  of  time,  aiifords  proof  that  is,  in  many 
cases,  perfectly  conclusive,  both  as  to  facts  and  their  obvious 
causes.  The  induction  from  facts  universally  attested,  is  some- 
times first  formally  made  by  one  superior  mind  ;  as,  when 
Newton  inferred  the  law  of  gravitation,  the  general  induction 
being  suggested  by  the  falling  of  an  apple  from  the  tree.  All 
bodies  near  the  earth's  surface  do  gravitate  towards  its  centre, 
whatever  may  be  the  hypothesis  employed  to  explain  the  cause. 

Induction  has  for  its  proper  object  contingent  matter,  and  it 
is  not  concerned  about  necessary  matter,  as  such;  scientific 
demonstration  can  regard  contingent  matter  as  an  object,  only 
under  those  respects  in  which  it  is  necessary;  and  since  all 
contingent  matter  is  necessary,  under  some  or  other  respect, 
it  may  all  form  a  proper  object  of  scientific  knowledge.  In- 
duction, when  regarded  as  demonstration,  is-  reducible  to  a 
simple  syllogism  whose  conclusion  is  proved,  if  the  minor  pre- 
mise be  verified  as  a  universal.  Observe  that  induction  is  not 
identical  with  the  process  by  which  the  intellect  forms  rejiex 


logic:   first  part.  53 

un'wersah :  by  induction,  a  universal  is  formed  from  many ; 
the  reflex  universal  is  deduced  from  one^  and  referred  to  many 
as  essentially  true  of  them.     {See page  ii8.) 

Induction  affords  a  prudent  rule  for  the  observation  and 
study  of  natural  phenomena ;  but  it  is  not  a  new  method  of 
acquiring  or  imparting  science,  since  man  has  observed  facts 
and  drawn  conclusions  from  his  observations  ever  since  the 
days  of  Adam.  Though  Lord  Bacon  gave  no  new  discovery 
in  Logic  or  Philosophy  when  he  wrote  of  induction,  and  in- 
sisted so  much  on  the  extensive  and  accurate  observation  of 
facts,  before  laying  down  their  principles;  yet  his  writings 
stimulated  scientific  research  and  helped  much  to  the  advance- 
ment of  the  material  sciences. 

Both  Bacon  and  Locke  failed  to  perceive  that  induction,  as  a 
distinct  mental  process,  is  nothing  else  than  proving  by  experi- 
ment the  minor  premise  of  a  simple  syllogism,  and  that,  as  an 
argument,  it  is  valid  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  syllogism. 


ARTICLE    IV. 

PROBABLE     ARGUMENT. 

Probability  in  objects  of  cognition  is  an  appearance  of  truth, 
coming  from  a  greater  force  of  argument  on  one  side,  which 
inclines  the  mind  to  assent  to  that  side  as  true,  but  yet  leaving 
room  for  doubt  or  fear  that  the  opposite  may  be  true.  Both 
sides  of  a  proposition  may,  in  respect  to  our  knowledge,  be 
truly  probable. 

An  argument  is  va^x^iy  probable  when  one  of  its  premises  is 
onXy  probable;  for  a  still  greater  reason,  is  it  xneveXy  probable 
when  both  premises  are  only  probable.  A  proposition  is  pro- 
bable only,  when  there  are  strong  reasons  for  assenting  to  it, 
and  yet  there  is  di  possibility  that  its  opposite  may  be  true.  For 
probability,  as  such,  is  essentially  different  from  certainty,  which 
excludes  the  possibility  of  error. 

It  is  manifest  that  truth,  when  considered  in  itself  objectively 


54  LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART. 

ox  a  parte  rei^  is  incapable  of  mere  probability,  which,  by  its 
nature,  pertains  to  finite  cognition  only. 

The  conclusion  follows  the  weaker  premise,  according  to  the 
seventh  lule  of  the  syllogism;  hence,  while  evident  premises 
give  a  certain  and  evident  conclusion,  one  probable  premise 
renders  the  conchision  ojily  probable. 

The  argume?it  is  p?'obable ;  ist,  when  we  reason  from  remote 
and  imperfect  ajialogy  or  indeterminate  resemblajice;  2d,  when 
the  reasoning  is  upon  some  hypothesis.  Analogy  is  a  likeness, 
or  a  certain  agreement  of  relation  or  proportion,  between  ob- 
jects of  different  species,  on  account  of  which  the  one  suggests 
the  other,  and  hence,  from  one  similarity,  another  one  is  in- 
ferred.     [Vide  Chap.  i.  Art.  3.) 

Identity  includes  all  that  likeness,  or  sameness  of  attributes 
or  qualities,  found  in  objects  of  the  same  species.  Similarity 
implies  an  identical  quality,  or  some  identical  qualities,  in  ob- 
jects that  are  otherwise  different;  v.  g.,  same  c^lor,  shape,  etc 

The  force  of  argument  founded  on  analogy.,  or  resemblances, 
depends  upon  such  general  principles  as  the  following:  "  similar 
causes  produce  similar  effects ;  things  that  are  seen  to  be  similar 
in  nearly  every  respect,  are  wholly  similar,"  etc. 

Analogy  can  found  strict  demonstration  or  give  a  conclusion 
which  is  scientific;  v.  g.,  when  we  demonstrate  the  existence 
of  God  from  the  creation.  The  extremes  agree  with  the  medium^ 
in  this  case,  by  analogy  only. 

The  hypothesis.,  or  supposition,  is  a  ^^proposition,  which,  though 
not  yet  demonstrated,  is  assimied  to  be  true,  because  it  affords  a 
satisfactory  explanation  of  7na7iy  fads."  For  example,  to  assert 
that  "  there  is  a  subtile  fluid  diffused  throughout  the  universe 
whose  undulations  explain  the  phenomena  of  light."  To  this 
class  niay  be  referred  many  of  the  theories  adopted  for  the  ex- 
planation of  natural  phenomena.  An  hypothesis  is  more  or 
less  probable,  according  to  the  number  of -facts  or  phenomena 
which  it  satisfactorily  explains.  Its  logical  value  never  excee.ds 
probability ;  or  it  remains  only  an  opinion  until  truly  demon- 
strated. An  opinion  is  a  judgment  which  is  assented  to,  but 
with  some  hesitancy  or  fear,  as  to  its  objective  certainty.       Ar 


LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART.  55 

hypothesis  that  is  demonstrated,  is  thereby  changed  into  a  the- 
sis^ and  ceases  to  be  an  hypothesis. 

Between  the  extremes  of  attaching  too  much  importance  to 
analogical  reasoning  and  hypothetical  theories  on  the  one 
hand  and  pronouncing  them  valueless  on  the  other,  is  the 
wiser  middle  course  of  estimating  them  according  to  the 
degree  of  probability  which  their  arguments  furnish. 


ARTICLE     V. 

SOPHISMS    OR    FALLACTE3. 

A  sophism,  or  fallacy,  is  an  apparent  argument,  which,  under 
the  specious  form  of  truth,  leads  to  a  false  or  absurd  conclusion. 
The  following  are  the  fallacies  which  most  frequently  occur: 
ist,  the  equivocation,  or  ambiguous  middle;  2d,  the  fallacy  of 
composition  and  division;  3d,  of  the  accident;  4th,  dictum  sim- 
pliciter  et  secundum  quid;  or,  confounding  what  can  be  said  abso- 
lutely with  what  can  be  said  under  a  particular  respect  only;  5  th, 
the  igjioratio  elenchi,  or  ignoring  the  questiofi;  6th,  the  petitio 
principii,  begging  the  question,  or,  the  vicious  circle ;  7th,  nan 
causa  ut  causa:  no  cause  at  all  for  a  cause,  or  the  fictitious  cause. 

The  equivocation,  or  ambiguous  middle,  is  a  fallacy  arising 
from  the  use  of  a  term  of  more  meanings  than  one ;  attribut- 
ing to  it  a  different  signification  in  each  premise,  but  drawing 
a  conclusion  that  supposes  the  two  meanings  to  be  identical; 
V.  g.,  the  Romans  equivocated,  when,  after  Antiochus  had 
stipulated  to  surrender  half  his  navy,  they  compelled  him  to 
divide  each  vessel  into  halves,  and  then  deliver  up  the  half  of 
his  navy  by  giving  them  the  half  of  each  ship. 

Ambiguity  arises,  then,  from  the  fact  that  a  proposition  is 
capable  of  having  two  meanings;  for  example,  when  the 
priestess  of  Apollo  said  to  Pyrrhus,  who  consulted  her  when 
he  was  about  to  invade  Rome :  "  I  say,  Pyrrhus,  you  the 
Romans  will  conquer;"  her  credit  was  saved  in  either  eve  it; 
whether  Pyrrhus  or  the  Romans  were  victorious. 


56  LOGIC  :    FIRST    PART. 

This  fallacy,  or  the  double  middle  term,  is  of  the  most  fre- 
quent occurrence,  perhaps,  of  all  the  errors  in  reasoning. 

Composition  and  division:  this  fallacy  is  committed  if,  when 
two  predicates,  taken  separately  or  one  at  a  time,  agree  with  the 
same  subject,  it  is  inferred  that  they  agree  with  it  when  they  are 
taken  conjointly ;  v.  g.,  ''  Peter  can  walk  and  Peter  can  lie 
down ;  therefore,  Peter  can  at  the  same  time  lie  down  and 
walk."  Peter  can  walk,  and  lie  down  by  division,  is  true ; 
otherwise,  it  is  not  true.  Or,  vice  versa,  if  they  agree  when 
taken  conjointly,  and  it  be  inferred  that  they  agree  when  taken 
separately;  v.  g.,  "man  has  a  body  and  soul,  or  is  a  rational 
animal;  therefore,  matter  is  man,  and  spirit  is  man;"  which  is 
incorrect. 

Fallacia  accidentis :  the  fallacy  of  the  accident  arises  from 
confounding  those  predicates  that  esse?itially  belong  to  the 
subject  with  those  that  accidentally  belong  to  it ;  or,  in  other 
words,  from  not  distinguishing  between  what  is  essential,  and 
what  is  accidental  to  the  subject;  v.  g.,  "that  is  bad  from 
which  evil  comes ;  but  evil  comes  from  the  study  of  philoso- 
phy, medicine,  the  physical  sciences,  etc.;  therefore,  the  study 
of  those  things  is  bad."  "  Evil "  comes  by  accident,  to  this  or 
that  person,  owing  to  intellectual  or  moral  defects,  and  erro- 
neous reasoning ;  but  it  does  not  thence  follow  that  the  well 
directed  study  of  those  sciences  is  bad.  Again,  "  the  €xact 
site  of  an  ancient  city  is  not  surely  known  ;  therefore,  that  city 
never  existed." 

The  fallacy  termed  dictum  simpliciter  et  secundum  quid  (of 
confounding  what  is  simply  true  with  what  is  true  in  a  certaiii 
respect  only) :  a  predicate  is  affirmed  simpliciter,  i.  e.,  simply  or 
absolutely,  when  it  is  affirmed  without  any  limiting  word  or 
phrase  joined  to  it ;  as,  "  Plato  is  learned."  Here  the  predi- 
cate, "learned,"  is  not  restricted  to  any  particular  object; 
but  when  the  predicate  is  affirmed  secundum  quid,  or,  in  a  cer- 
tain respect,  there  is  a  Hmiting  adjunct  to  it;  v.  g.,  "Peter  is 
learned  in  Botany/'  here,  "  learned,"  is  restricted  to  a  par- 
ticular object,  "  Botany."  The  fallacy  arises  from  arguing  that, 
because  the  predicate  agrees  with  the  subject  in  one  of  the 


LOGIC  :    FIRST   PART.  57 

senses,  it  therefore  agrees  with  it  in  the  other;  v.  g.,  "he  that 
throws  goods  into  the  sea,  wills  the  destruction  of  them  ; 
but  the  master  of  a  vessel,  in  a  storm,  throws  goods  into  the 
sea;  therefore,  \\q  wills  the  destructiou  of  them."  He  wills 
the  destruction  of  them  in  a  certain  respect,  as  a  means  to  an 
end  necessary,  and  not  otherwise  to  be  attained,  it  is  true ; 
that  he  wishes  to  destroy  them  simply^  or  absolutely  and 
directly,  is  not  true.  The  fallacy  termed,  dictiun  simpUciter  ei 
secundum  quid,  or,  of  what  is  said  simply  and  absolutely,  or 
relatively  and  under  a  certain  respect,  is  like  to  that  termed, 
accidentis.  "A  man  eats  what  he  buys  in  the  market;  he  buys 
raw  meat  in  the  market ;  therefore,  a  man  eats  raw  meat." 

Ignoratio  clenchi,  or  ignoring  the  question;  in  familiar  lan- 
guage, often  termed  '•'■  evading  the  question/^  or,  ^'  changing  the 
question.^' 

Ignoratio  elenchi,  or  ignoring  the  question,  is  an  evasion  of 
the  real  question  in  dispute,  and  attempting  to  prove  some- 
thing else  that  apparently  includes  the  thing  in  dispute;  v.  g., 
if  a  certain  meajis  to  an  end  were  denied  to  be  just,  one  should 
prove  that  the  end  is  good,  and  thereby  seem  to  justify  the 
means ;  or,  if  the  immortality  of  the  soul  were  proved,  and  one 
should  answer  as  if  the  eternity  of  the  soul,  or  its  having  no 
beginniiig,  were  the  question.  The  ignoratio  elenchi,  or  ig?ioring 
the  question,  is  sometimes  from  real,  not  smiulated  ignorance 
of  the  state  of  the  question;  it  may  also  come  from  obtuseness 
of  the  understanding;  but  it  is  often  the  artifice  of  a  crafty  and 
sophistical  mind,  which  is  wanting  in  moral  rectitude.  This 
fallacy  occurs  frequently  in  the  harangues  of  demagogues;  as 
does  also  the  assertion  by  means  of  interrogatory. 

To  the  "ignoratio  elenchi"  may  be  referred  the  error  which 
consists  in  "  proving  too  much ;  "  of  which  it  is  justly  said,  "  he 
that  proves  too  much,  proves  nothmg;"  v.  g.,  if  one  should 
attempt  to  demonstrate  that  the  human  soul  \'s,  a  substance,  and 
his  arguments  went  to  show  that  i?ian's  soul  has  the  properties 
of  matter,  he  would  then  commit  the  error  of  ^^ proving  too 
muchy 

Petitio  principii,  or  begging  the  question,  under  which  may  be 


58  LOGIC  :   FIRST    PART. 

included  the  vicious  circle*  and  the  false  siipposiiioii,  is  the  as^ 
'sumption  of  what  is  in  question ;  v.  g.,  if  it  be  the  question  in 
dispute  as  to  whether  a  particular  substance  have  7veight,  and 
it  be  answered,  "  that  has  weight  which  is  ponderable,  the  sub- 
stance in  question  is  ponderable;  therefore,  it  has  weigJit;'''  this 
would  be  the  petitio  principii,  or  begging  the  question.  If  it 
should  be  argued  that  "  the  earth  turns  on  its  axis  because  the 
sun  is  statio?ia?y;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  sun  is  statio?mry, 
because  the  earth  turns  on  its  axis;  "  tliis  would  be  to  reason  in  a 
vicious  circle,  or  to  prove  two  propositions,  the  one  by  the  other, 
as  a  reason.  Tf  it  be  said,  "  Pompey  did  not  return  to  Kome  after 
the  death  of  Caesar,"  this  would  be  d,  false  supposition,  or  2^  false 
assumption;  Damdy,  falsely  assuming  it  to  be  a  fact  that  Pompey 
was  alive  at  Caesar's  death.  The  argument  may  falsely  sup- 
pose or  assume  either  a  fact  or  a  principle;  the  fallacy  is  the 
same  in  all  these  cases,  and  consists  in  assuming  in  the  argu- 
ment something  that  is  in  question. 

This  fallacy  is  sometimes  concealed  under  a  proverb ;  v.  g., 
"the  exception  confirms  the  rule;""  i.  e,,  \\\q.  formal  exception,  or 
one  properly  so-called,  proves  the  existence  of  its  co-related 
rule.  For  instance,  if  an  old  charter  were  found,  exempting  a 
certain  family,  for  special  reasons,  from  military  tax,  this  ex- 
emption or  exception  in  their  favor,  would  prove  the  existence 
of  a  general  law  imposing  such  tax.  But  this  axiom  is  some- 
times misapplied;  as  v.  g.,  when  counter  facts  or  contrary  in- 
stances are  adduced  to  prove  the  non-existence  of  a  rule,  then 
in  answer,  they  are  preposterously  assumed  to  be  exceptions 
which  prove  the  existence  of  the  rule.  This  is  false  assump- 
tion;  and,  when  viewed  under  another  respect,  it  is  also  the 
fallacy  of  the  double  middle. 

Non  causa  pro  causa,  no  cause  at  all  as  a  cause,  is  a  fallacy, 
in  which  that,  which  is  no  cause  at  all,  is  assumed  to  produce  an 
effect,  simply  because  the  two  are  contiguous  in  time  and  place; 
or  from  some  other  mere  coincidence  or  circumstance.  The 
Pagans  ascribed  "  the  downfall  of  the  Roman  Empire  to  the 

*  "  Circulus  non  est  vitiosus  in  relativis."  Illation  ft-ora  one  co-relative  to 
another  is  not  a  vicious  circle. 


LOGIC  :    FIEST    PAKT.  59 

iise  of  Christianity,"  when,  perhaps,  the  converse  was  more 
nearly  true.  "  Comets  cause  wars,  plagues  and  other  calam- 
ities." Or  this  fallacy  may  be  committed  by  attributing  effects 
to  vague  and  fanciful  agents;  d.s  fate,  hick,  fortune,  or  other 
superstitious  causes.  They  are  all  the  same  fallacy,  and  from 
such  delusions  even  educated  minds  are  not  all  exempt.  The 
origin  of  such  errors  is  ignorance,  along  with  an  instinctive 
desire  to  know  the  cause  of  strange  or  terrible  events. 

"  Post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc; "  or,  "  ^  thing  happened  after 
another,  therefore,  it  was  caused  by  ///"is  obviously  false,  and 
is  a  form  of  expression  which,  on  that  account,  is  often  em- 
ployed in  answer  to  the  fallacy,  "  non  causa  pro  causal 

Of  the  seven  fallacies  above  described,  the  first  two  are  verbal 
fallacies ;  the  remaining  five,  are  material  fallacies  ;  or,  they 
arise  from  the  matter  or  truth  of  the  propositions  being  at  fault. 

Mere  sophistry  is  unworthy  of  a  candid  mind ;  but  even 
vigorous  and  truthful  intellects  may,  by  mistake,  employ  incon- 
sequent argument.  The  most  ordinary  fallacy  that  leads  to 
unintentional  error  in  reasoning,  is  the  complex  or  ambiguous 
middle  term,  which  is  not  accurately  distinguished,  so  that 
what  is  false  may  be  rejected,  while  that  which  is  true  is  ad- 
mitted. 

Examples  of  inconsequent  argument :  "  as  the  body  is  com- 
posed of  many  members,  so  the  soul  is  composed  of  many 
powers ;  therefore,  since  the  former  can  be  divided  into  its 
component  parts,  so  can  the  latter."  Here  distinguish  between 
compoujid  objects  which  possess  nxembers  that  are  really  disti?ict, 
and,  therefore,  separable;  and  objects  that  are  simple,  having 
powers  not  really  distinct  from  them  as  parts ;  and  which  are, 
therefore,  indivisible  substances. 

"  Whatever  is  opposed  to  reason  must  be  rejected ;  but  faith 
in  mysteries  is  opposed  to  reason;  therefore,  faith  in  mysteries 
must  be  rejected ;  "  or,  '■'  Jaith  in  mysteries  is  against  reason^ 
Distinguish  what  is  abot^e  reason  from  what  is  against  reason; 
i3i\s,o,  faith  that  presupposes  prudent  motives  of  credibility;  and 
faith  that  rests  on  insufficie?it  grounds  or  710  grounds  at  all;  and 
is,  therefore,  unreasonable.     To  believe  what  is  aboi^e  reason, 


60  LOGIC  :    FIKST   PART. 

when  we  have  valid  authority  for  its  truth,  is  not  beHef  which 
is  aodi/is/  reason,  though  the  object  is  a//07'e  reason ;  but  to 
beHeve  pretended  mysteries,  that  directly  contradict  the  evi- 
dent principles  of  reason,  would  surely  be  against  reasbn. 

It  will  be  found  that  complex  or  double  middle  terms  gen- 
erally contain  both  truth  and  error;  they  must,  therefore,  be 
carefully  distinguished ;  the  one  to  be  admitted,  the  other  to 
be  rejected. 

An  ancient  sophist  puzzled  some  less  acute  contemporary 
logicians  with  the  following  objection  against  the  possibility  of 
motion  :  "A  thing  cannot  move  where  it  is  7iot;  nor  can  it  move 
where  //  is;  but  that  which  can  neither  rnove  where  it  is,  nor 
where  it  is  not,  cannot  move  at  all ;  therefore,  a  thing  cannot 
move  at  all." 

The  ingenious  reader  will  readily  see  that  the  clause,  "  where 
it  is,"  is  equivocal;  in  one  sense  it  means,  "  where  it  is  at  rest;  " 
in  another  it  signifies,  "  where  it  is  not  at  ?'est;"  i.  e.,  where  //  is 
moving.  In  this  second  sense  of  the  words,  it  may  be  said 
that  "a  thing  moves  where  it  is''  It  surely  cannot  move 
where  it  is  ?iot,  in  the  direct  and  proper  sense  of  the  expression. 

This  sophism,  which  under  a  somewhat  diiOferent  form  is  at- 
tributed to  Zeno;  as  also  the  one  devised  by  him  to  prove  that 
Achilles  could  not  overtake  the  turtle  which  had  a  given  dis- 
tance the  start  of  him ;  both  rested,  in  reality,  on  the  false  as- 
sumption that  a  period  of  time  consists  of  an  infinite  number 
of  moments,  and  that  a  given  distance  consists  of  an  infinite 
number  of  points;  whereas,  in  truth,  time,  distance,  and  simple 
motion,  as  such,  do  not  consist  of  distinct  parts,  for  they  are 
continuous,  and  not,  as  number  is,  discrete. 

Observe  that  an  argument  is  ///  logical fonn,  when  it  violates 
no  canon  of  the  syllogism;  but  an  argument  which  is  ///  logi- 
cal form,  may  still  be  fallacious  or  inconsequent  reasoning, 
from  error  in  its  matter.  'Any  intentional  error  in  the  form 
of  an  argument,  may  be  styled  a  sophism;  an  error  in  the 
viatter  which  leads  to  a  false  conclusion,  is  a  fallacy. 


LOGIC  SECOND  PART. 
LOGIC  APPLIED. 


Since  Logic  is  chiefly  concerned  with  the  acts  of  the  intellect 
in  discourse  of  reason,  or  right  argumentation,  it  is  manifest 
that  it  must  include  in  its  object  the  truth  of  cognitions,  and 
the  means  of  knowing  with  certainty ;  without  which  all  mere 
forms  of  argument  are  unmeaning,  or  nugatory. 

Hence,  the  second  part  of  Logic  treats  of  logical  truth  and 
certainty;  and  the  means  of  attaining  them.  Its  object  is, 
therefore,  the  extrinsic  norma  of  right  reasoning;  that  is,  its 
matter. 

A  genuine  or  truly  valid  argument  must  not  only  be  inform, 
but  its  judgments  must  possess  logical  truth. 


CHAPTER  L 


A  RTI  C  L  E   .1. 

TRUTH,  ERROR  AND  FALSEHOOD  DESCRIBED. 

Truth*  may  be  divided  into  ?netaphysical,  logical  and  moral 
truth.  Metaphysical  truth  is  the  agreement  of  the  essential 
properties  of  a  being  among  themselves,  and  with  their  essen- 
tial concept  or  prototype,  whether  that  being  be  actual  or  only 
possible ;  for,  whatever  exists,  or  is  only  possible,  has,  in  the 

*  "Veritas  estrerum,  cognitionis,  et  sermonis."    Truth  is  of  things,  of  cognition, 
of  language. 

01 


62  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

essential  and  eternal  archetype  of  it,  the  constituents  by  which 
it  is  what  it  is,  and  can  be  nothing  else;  and  it  is  such  inde- 
pendently of  our  knowledge,  though  not  independently  of 
divine  intelligence.  But  ifietaphysical  truth,  as  such,  and  truth 
considered  as  transcendejital,  pertain  to  gefieral  metaphysics^  and 
will  be  treated  in  another  place. 

Logical  truth*  is  the  conformity  of  the  understanding  know- 
ing to  the  thing  or  object  known.  The  concept  or  idea  may 
be  conceived  to  be  the  medium  between  the  object  and  the 
intellect,  "est  medium  quo  incognito. "t  Moral  truth,  \^  the 
conformity  of  the  language,  or  signs  of  thought,  to  the  inter- 
nal judgment  of  the  person  uttering  the  affirmation  of  that 
judgment ;  or,  it  is  moral  truth,  when  the  internal  judgment 
is  truly  expressed.  The  language  or  sign  expressing  the  inter- 
nal judgment  may  be  termed,  the  enunciation.  But  we  must 
distinguish  between  the  logical  truth  of  an  enunciation,  and  its 
moral  truth  ;  the  enunciation  is  logically  true,  when  the  judg- 
ment which  it  declares  is  right;  that  is,  when  the  judgment  is 
objectively  true;  or,  expresses  a  real  conformity  of  the  mirid  to 
the  object  known.j:  The  enunciation  is  morally  true,  when  it 
declares  correctly  the  internal,  judgment,  such  as  it  is  in  the 
mind.  When  this  conformity  of  the  e?iunciatio?i  and  the  internal 
judgmcTit  is  wanting,  then  the  enunciation  is  erro/ieous.  Logi- 
cal truth  of  enunciations  regards  the  rectitude  or  the  correct- 
ness of  the  judgment  objectively;  moral  t-ith  pertains  to  the 
language  of  the  subject  uttering  the  judgment.  It  is  termed 
moral  truth,  because  its  right  expression,  or  enunciation,  is 
generally  subject  to  the  will,  which,  being  free,  attributes  to  it 
a  moral  character. 

As  concrete  truth  always  implies  both  an  object  known,  as 

*  ' '  Veritas  est  adaequatio  intellectus,  et  rei. ' '  Truth  is  the  equation  of  intel- 
lect and  object;  1.  e.,  it  is  the  conformity  of  the  power  as  knowing  with  the 
object  as  known. 

t  "  Species  intelligibilis  (concep^^us)  est  medium  quo  et  incognitum  ut  quod.' 
The  idea  in  the  mind  is  the  medium  of  knowledge,  though  it  is  not  seen  itself  ai 
an  object,  in  the  act  of  perceiving. 

X  ' '  Ex  eo  quod  res  est  vel  non  est,  vera  est  oratio. "  According  as  the  object 
is,  or  is  not,  the  proposition  that  enunciates  it  is  true. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAET.  63 

one  term,  and  the  intellect  knowing,  as  the  other  term  of  the 
relation,  truth  is  sometimes  denominated  by  the  objects^  and  is 
then  called  truth  of  the  metaphysical,  physical  and  moral  order, 
according  to  the  objects.  In  this  sense  we  may  apply  the 
definition  of  truth  by  St.  Augustin :  "  Veritas  est  quae  ostendit 
id  quod  est  : "  Truth  makes  known  that  which  is.* 

Error  is  assent  to  what  is  false,  or  dissent  from  what  is  true  ; 
it  is  an  act  of  the  mind  by  which  we  affirm  two  things  to 
agree,  which  do  not,  in  themselves,  agree ;  or,  we  deny  the 
agreement  of  two  things,  which,  in  themselves,  do  really  agree. 
As  assent,  in  matters  whose  evidence  does  not  force  the  under- 
standing, is  a  free  act  of  the  mind,  error  may  be  attributed  to 
the  will  as  its  formal  or  actuating  cause ;  yet  the  action  of  the 
will,  in  error,  is  not  always  deliberate. 

Falsity :  Falsity  is  the  opposite  of  truth;  and  is,  therefore,  a 
want  of  conformity  in  the  mind  to  the  object  of  cognition. 
This  want  of  conformity  is  either  negative  or  positive;  negative^ 
when  the  concept  expresses  the  object  only  partially  or  ob- 
scurely;  V.  g,  should  it  contain  nothing  more  about  the  moon 

*  Truth  is,  by  its  nature,  for  the  intellect,  and  is  its  proper  object;  as  good  is 
the  object  of  the  will,  as  color  and  figure  constitute  the  object  of  sight,  or  as 
sound  is  the  object  of  hearing.  Truth,  then,  is  of  the  intelligible  order,  or  is 
ordained  for  the  intellect,  by  its  nature;  trxith  and  iiitellect  are  connotative,  so 
that  the  one  supposes  the  other.  Truth,  in  itself,  is  a  relation,  and  is  threefold: 
1st.  The  relation  of  agreement  between  a  real  being  and  its  concept,  or  its  essen- 
tial-prototype, according  to  which  it  is  constituted;  like  to  that,  lor  example, 
which  is  between  the  idea  of  a  house  in  the  mind  of  the  architect,  and  the  real 
house,  which  he  forms  exactly  according  to  that  idea  in  his  mind;  or  the  idea  in 
the  painter's  mind,  and  the  ^ic^ure  on  canvass,  which  accurately  expresses  it. 
2d.  The  relation  of  agreement  between  the  mind  knoAving  an  object,  and  the 
object  itself;  v.  g.,  the  exact  conformity  of  the  mind  knowing  an  orange  to  the 
real  orange  itself.  3d.  The  relation  of  agreement  between  the  words  or  signs  by 
which  we  express  or  manifest  the  cognitions  in  our  minds,  and  those  cogrnZ/ions  as 
they  really  are  in  the  mind ;  v.  g. ,  "  virtue  is  amiable, ' '  are  words  that  express 
truly  a  real  judgment  of  your  mind,  and,  therefore,  your  words  agree  with  the 
mind,  and  the  relation  is  real  between  the  cognition  and  its  enunciation. 

Truth,  then,  in  its  formal  entity,  is  a  relation;  it  is  threefold,  as  said  above, 
and  it  is  totally  comprehended  in  this  threefold  division:  1st.  The  agreement  or 
relation  between  a  thing  and  the  prototype  in  the  concept  of  its  essence  or  nature, 
is  metaphysical  truth;  2d.  The  conformity  of  the  mind  knowing,  to  the  object 
knoAvn,  is  a  relation  of  agreement  between  them,  and  is  called  logical  truth,  or 
intellectual  trifth;  3d.  The  conformity  ov  relation  of  agx-eement  between  words 
and  signs,  used  to  enunciate  or  manifest  cognitions,  and  the  cognitions  as  they 
actually  are  in  the  mind,  ie  called  moral  truth. 


64  logic:  secot^d  paet. 

than,  that  it  is  a  luminary.  This  is  false  hy  privation^  and  is, 
perhaps,  more  properly,  ignorance.  Positive  falsity,  is  a  disa* 
greement  of  the  cognition  and  its  proper  object ;  for,  in  that 
case,  the  mind  attributes  to  the  object  what  does  not  belong 
to  it,  or  denies  what  does  belong  to  it ;  this  is  a  want  of  con- 
formity in  the  understanding,  to  the  proper  object  of  its  cogni- 
tion ;  V.  g.,  "  God  is  a  body;  the  human  soul  is  material." 

It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  falsity  in  the  mind,  when 
positive,  is  the  effect  of  error  in  judgment :  for,  how  else  can 
positive  falsity  be  in  the  mind,  or  get  access  thereto  ? 

Simple  apprehension  cannot,  per  se,  i.  e.,  of  itself,  or  of 
its  own  proper  action,  induce  error,  or  cause  falsity  in 
the  mind.  A  simple  apprehension,  or  perception,  is  an 
act  of  the  mind  by  which  it  acquires  an  inchoate  cognition ; 
by  which  it  takes  hold  of  the  object,  as  it  were;  or  perceives 
it,  and  forms  for  itself  an  idea  or  similitude  ot  it.  In  this, 
nothing  is  explicitly  affirmed  or  denied  by  the  mind ;  and 
its  conformity  to  the  object  is  limited  to  the  mere  perception; 
as  it  does  not  express  a  judgment.  Hence,  the  apprehension 
is  a  necessary  effect  of  a  necessary  law,  and,  therefore,  cannot 
be  false.  The  judg??ient,  or  the  understanding  judging,  is  never 
per  se  false ;  but  assejit  can  be  false,  by  precipitancy,  or,  by 
impulse  of  the  will ;  and,  therefore,  positive  falsity  in  the  mind 
is  produced  only  by  error  in  judgment. 

If  it  be  objected  that  many  ideas  of  rude  and  uncultivated 
people  are  not  conformable  to  their  objects  ;  as,  v.  g.,  they  may 
conceive  "  the  sun  to  be  a  round  plane  a  few  feet  in  diameter  ^^ 
etc. ;  and,  since  all  languages  declare  the  sun  to  rise,  and  set, 
it  would  appear  that  the  minds  of  all  men  were  long  i?i  error 
in  regard  to  a  sensible  fact. 

We  should  distinguish :  that  these  ideas  may  not  be  con- 
formable to  their  objects,  negatively,  i.  e.,  hy privation,  is  true; 
but  if  it  be  meant  that  they  are  not  conformable  to  their  ob- 
jects,/(?i///V.?/v ;  then  we  should  subdistitiguish  ;  they  may  not 
be  really  conformable  after  a  judgment  is  formed;  but  it  is  not 
true  to  say  that  before  the  judgment  there  is  a  positive  falsity^ 
or  want  of  conformity  in  the  mind  to  the  object.     Language 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAET.  65 

expresses  the  sensible  fact  of  the  sun's  risi7ig  and  setlifig,  though 
the  philosophical  hypothesis  formerly  employed  to  explain  its 
cause  is  now  known  to  be  untenable;  or,  in  other  words,  the 
minds  of  men  did  not  err  in  affirming  the  fact,  but  philosophers 
erred  in  giving  its  explanation. 

Mere  apprehensions  or  ideas  are  true,  so  far  as  they  express 
their  objects  positively;  since  they  are  produced  by  the  mind 
and  object,  operating  both  naturally  and  necessarily.  Even 
the  intellect  cannot  be  forced  to  assent  to  what  is  false,  as 
false;  but  it  can,  under  the  command  of  the  will,  assent  to 
what  is  false,  in  those  cases  in  which  the  evidence  of  the  truth 
does  not  necessitate  its  decision.  Truth,  properly  so-called,  is 
only  in  the  understanding  which  judges  ;  and  it  is  only  by  a  cer- 
tain imitation  or  analogy,  and,  therefore,  improperly  and  incom- 
pletely, in  sensation  and  simple  apprehension,  which  are  means 
of  knowing  truth.  Truth  is  fully  and  properly  only  in  that 
act  by  which  the  mind  is  fully  conformable  to  its  known 
object ;  but  the  min'd  is  fully  and  properly  conformable  to  its 
object  only  when  it  affirms  what  the  object  is;  /.  e.,  when 
it  judges.  Any  preceding  act  of  knowing  is  prehminary  and 
preparatory  to  full  knowledge,  or  truth,  properly  so-called. 


ARTICLE     II. 

DIFFERENT  STATES  OF  THE  MIND  IN  RESPECT  TO  TRUTH. 

As  the  mind  attains  truth  by  acquiring  ideas  conformable  to 
their  objects,  and  by  comparing  these  ideas  or  concepts  to  their 
objects,  or  among  themselves ;  it  is  manifest  that  the  mind 
may  by  these  efforts  approach  more  or  less  nearly  to  complete 
knowledge  of  things.  Hence,  the  different  states  of  the  mind 
vn  respect  to  truth. 

The  following  classification  of  those  states  is  sufficiently 
':omprehensive :  ist,  Ignorance;  2d,  Doubt;  3d,  Suspicion; 
4th,  Opinion;  5th,  Certainty.  They  comprehend  the  differ- 
5 


66  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

ent  relations  the  mind  may  have  to  the  objects  of  its  knowl- 
edge, either  as  ignorant  of  those  objects,  or  as  knowing  them 
in  different  degrees  of  perfection,  i.  e.,more  or  less  completely. 

Ignorance  is  the  state  of  the  mind  when  it  has  no  knowledge 
of  an  object;  v.  g.,  we  are  ignorant  as  to  whether  the  number 
of  the  stars  be  odd  or  even ;  or  what  was  the  precise  number 
of  angels  created;  or  how  long  the  present  world  will  endure. 

Doicbt  is  the  state  of  the  mind  when  the  judgment  is  sus- 
pended between  the  two  parts  of  a  contradictory ;  or  when 
the  assent  of  the  understanding  cannot  be  determined  to  either 
of  two  contradictory  propositions  or  judgments. 

Doiibi  is  either  positive  or  negative;  doubt  is  positive  when 
there  are  reasons  that  persuade  in  favor  of  each  proposition ; 
which,  however,  do  not  determine  the  intellect  to  assent  to 
either,  but  leave  it,  now  drawn  to  one  side,  now  to  the  other, 
still  hesitating  in  uncertainty  between  them. 

The  doubt  is  negative  when  there  are  either  no  reasons  at  all 
in  lavor  of  either  side,  or  such  as  are  of  very  litde  moment. 

Suspicion  is  a  propensity  or  i?iclination  to  judge  on  slight 
grounds;  in  it,  the  judgment  is  often  prompted  or  impelled  by 
passion  or  affection  in  the  will ;  and  it  is  apt  to  tend  rather  to 
the  unfavorable  side. 

Opinion*  is  an  assent  of  the  understanding  to  one  of  two 
contradictory  or  opposite  propositions;  not,  however,  without 
fear  of  the  other  being  true. 

For  an  opinion  to  be  prudent,  the  following  conditions  muet 
be  fulfilled:  ist,  a  careful  examination  of  the  reasons  in  favor 
of  each  contradictory,  must  precede  the  assent  of  the  under- 
standing ;  2d,  the  side  embraced  must  have  in  its  favor  a  grave 
motive;  and  the  objections  against  it,  as  well  as  the  reasons  in 
favor  of  the  opposite  proposition,  must  be  suitably  answered; 
3d,  the  assent  in  favor  of  the  opinion  formed  must  not  be  more 
firm  than  the  motive  or  decisive  reason  in   its  favor  justifies. 

*  ' '  Opinio  est  actus  intellectus  quo  fertur  in  uncam  partem  contradictionis  cum 
formidine  alterius.  Assensus  probabilis  est  idem  ac  opiniativns. '  '—(Vide  Div 
Thorn.  P.  I. ;  Qii.  79;  Art.  9;  Ad.  4.)  Opinion  is  an  act  of  the  intellect  by  which 
it  is  borne  to  one  side  of  a  contradictory,  but  with  fear  lest  the  opposite  be  true. 
Assent  to  what  is  probable  is  the  same  as  opinion. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAET.  67 

An  opinion  may  h^  probable,  more  probable,  most  probable )  but 
an  opinion,  as  such,  cannot  transcend  the  hmits  of  probability; 
for.  if  what  was  an  opinion  be  made  afterwards  positively  certai?i, 
it  thereby  ceases  to  be  an  opinion,  and  becomes  a  thesis  or  a 
certain  truth.  Probability  and  certainty  differ  essentially,  since 
they  are  of  different  species;  and  therefore  no  degree*  of  prob- 
ability can  constitute  certainty. 


ARTICLE    III. 
certainty;  evidence;  species  of  certainty;  they  differ 

AS  TO  intensity. 

Certainty  is  a  state  of  the  mind  in  which  it  adheres  firmly 
to  the  truth  on  account  of  motives  which  exclude  all  doubt, 
and  all  fear  of  the  opposite  being  true. 

Certainty,  primarily  and  properly,  is  in  cognition,  and  is 
therefore  subjective  ;t  but  it  is  attributed  by  translation  to  the 
object.  For  the  sake  of  greater  clearness,  therefore,  certainty 
may  be  considered  both  as  objective  and  subjective. 

Objective  certainty  is  the  necessary  truth  of  the  object  known, 
or  cognoscible ;  its  "  necessitas  seujirmitas  essendi. ' '  The  neces- 
sity here  meant  is,  in  the  case  of  facts,  consequent ;  and  it  is, 
therefore,  common  to  all  accomplish  d  and  actual  truth,  or  to 
every  actual  object.  Subjective  certainty  is  a  firm  adhesion  of 
the  mind  to  the  object  as  true,  which  excludes  all  doubt  and 
all  fear  of  the  opposite  being  true. 

*  "  Gradus  non  mutat  essentiam  rei."  The  degree,  \.  e.,more  or  less,  does 
not  change  the  essence  of  a  thing. 

t  * '  Certitudo  subjectiva  est  firmitas  adhaesionis  virtutis  cpgnoscitiva;  ad  siuira 
c©gnoscil)ile."  Subjective  certainty  is  firmness  of  adhesion  in  the  power 
knowing  to  the  object  known. 

"  Objectiva  est  firma  et  invariabilis  object!  determinatio  in  suo  esse." — (Bil- 
liiart.)  Objective  certainty  is  the  firm  and  invariable  determination  of  the  ob- 
ject in  being;  or,  its  existence  as  actual,  and,  under  that  respect,  both  necessary 
an<l  unchangeable. 

' '  Nihil  est  adeo  contingons,  quin  in  se  aliquid  necessarium  habeat. ' '  —  (Div. 
Thorn.  P.  I. ;  Qu.  86;  Art.  4.)  Nothing  is  so  absolutely  contingent  as  to  be,  un- 
der no  respect;  necessary. 


68  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAKT. 

Toe  causes  of  certainty,  or  the  motives  that  lead  to  it,  may 
be  reduced  to  two  classes;  namely,  evidence^  and  authority  or 
testimony. 

Certainty  which  is  produced  by  evidence*  may  be  distin- 
guished, according  to  its  objects,  into  three  kinds,  which  differ 
in  the  degree  of  intensity  or  force  with  which  they  necessitate 
the  assent  of  the  intellect:  ist..  Certainty,  whose  object  is  truth 
which  is  known  per  se;  i.  e.,  which  is  self-evident.,  or  is  seen  to 
be  truth,  and  assented  to,  so  soon  as  the  terms  which  express 
it  are  understood;  v.  g.,  "two  things  which  are  equal  to  the 
same  thing,  are  equal  to  each  other;  the  shortest  distance  be- 
tween two  given  points  is  a  straight  line,"  etc.  2d.,  A  second 
kind  of  the  certainty  which  comes  from  evidence.,  is  furnished 
by  conclusions  which  follow  necessarily  from  evident  first  prin- 
ciples; this  kind  is  often  termed  scientific  certainty.  It  will  be 
explained  more  fully  in  Article  VIII  of  Chapter  II.  3d.,  A 
third  species  of  certainty  is  furnished  by  the  objects  of  internal 
and  external  or  sensible  experience;  or,  that  which  is  possessed 
when  the  power  of  consciousness  and  the  organs  of  sense  are 
directly  cognizant  of  their  proper  objects. 

Certainty,  whose  medium  or  formal  niotive  is  authority  or 
testimony,  is  either  from  evident  signs  or  marks,  or  from  wit- 
nesses that  evidently  testify  to  what  they  know  directly  and  in 
its  objective  evidence — ex  evidentia  in  attestante — as  eye-wit' 
nesses,  ear-witnesses,  and  the  like ;  or,  it  is  the  certainty  which 
is  afforded  by  super tiatiiral faith.,  in  which  neither  the  testimony, 
nor  the  object,  is  evident  to  the  mind  assenting ;  t  v.  g.,  when  we 
believe  that  "^'  that  there  are  three  Persons  and  but  one  Nature 
in  God,  because  God  revealed  it."     Here,  neither  the  fact  of 

*' '  Omnis  certitude  naturalis  postulat  evidentiam  vel  in  re  vel  in  attestante. ' ' 
All  natural  certainty  requires  evidence,  either  in  the  object  or  in  the  witness; 
i.  e.,  evidence  of  the  testimony  that  mediates  between  the  mind  and  the  object  or 
truth.  But,  for  the  act  of  supernatural  faith,  this  evident  nxcdhvm,  witness  or 
testimony  {evidentia  in  attestante)  is  not  required,  except  as  a  preceding  condi- 
tion. 

t"  Fides  omnis  est  essentialiter  obscura  quia  nititur  medio  rei  extrinseco, 
ideoque  res  manet  secundum  se  ignota,  sicut  antea.  "— (Billuart.)  All  faith  is 
essentially  obscure,  because  it  depends  on  a  medium  Avhich  is  extrinsic  to  the 
object,  and,  therefore,  the  thing  remains  unknown  in  itself,  even  after  it  is  be- 
lieved. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAKT.  69 

the  revelation  having  been  made,  nor  the  Trinity  itself,  is  evident 
to  us;*  though  the  revelation  itself  was,  doubtless,  evident  to 
many;  v.  g.,  to  Prophets,  Evangelists,  etc.  In  this  case,  the 
principles  that  supply  for  evidence,  are  the  light  of  faith  in  the 
understanding  and  an  impulse  of  grace  in  the  will;  hence,  actual 
fliith  IS  free,  and  it  is  thereby  capable  of  meriting.  But,  for 
supernatural  faith,  it  is  an  essential  condition,  or  prerequisite, 
that  its  articles  be  evidently  credible.]  "  Non  crederet  (quis) 
nisi  videret  ea  esse  credenda,  vel  propter  evidentiam  signorum 
vel  aliquid  hujusmodi : "  /.  e.,  no  one  can  believe  without  evi- 
dence as  to  the  credibility  of  the  truths  assented  to.  (Div. 
Th.  2,  2,  qu.  I,  a.  4,  ad.  2,)  But  matters  pertaining  to  super- 
natural Faith,  and  the  resolution  of  its  act,J  pertain  to  the 
scope  of  Theology;  it  is  here  proposed  directly  to  treat  only  of 
natural  or  philosophical  certainty,  and  its  principles  or  causes. 
But  from  what  has  been  said  it  may  be  concluded  as  beyond 
doubt,  that  the  individual  reason  can  prudently  assent  to  no 
truth  except  it  either  know  that  truth  in  its  own  objective  evi- 
dence, or  have  for  its  assent  to  the  truth  a  certain  and  infallible 
motive.  While  certainty,  as  already  observed,  is  primarily  in 
cognition,  or  is  subjective,  evidence,  on  the  contrary,  is  primarily 
in  the  object;  or,  it  is  most  properly  the  object  that  is  evident; 
but  the  light  of  the  object  as  seen§  or  perceived  by  the  cog- 
noscive  power,  is  termed  subjective  evidence. 

Evidence  is  either  immediate,  or  ?nediate;  truths  are  imme- 

*"  Motiva  credibilitatis  pra^stant  evidentiam  consequentice,  sed  non  consequen- 
tis  :  probant  quod  revelatio  debet  credi  sed  non  dant  evidentiam  rei  revelataB 
sen  veritatis  creditaj."  Motives  of  credibility  afford  evidence  of  the  consequence, 
but  not  of  the  consequent:  they  prove  that  revelation  ought  to  be  believed,  but 
they  do  not  give  evidence  of  the  thing  I'evealed,  or  the  truth  believed. 

tSuarez,  De  Virt.  Theolog.,  Disp.  4,  Sect.  6,  says  that  the  intellect  does  not 
doubt  in  matters  of  faith  without  rejecting  their  credibility  as  not  evident. 

J  The  "resolution  of  the  act  of  faith,"  is  its  analysis,  which  is  made  in  order 
to  distinguish  clearly  all  that  is  necessary  to  the  act,  whether  as  conditio  sine 
qua  non,  as  directive  of  it,  a,s>  formal  motive,  as  material  object,  etc. 

§  ' '  nia  dicuntur  videri  qrne  per  seipsa  movent  intellectum  vel  sensum  ad  sui 
cognitionem,  ut  sunt  prima  principia  et  conclusiones  ex  ipsis  evidenter  deduc- 
tae,  vel  sensibilia  sensibus  debite  proposita."— (Billuart,  De  Fide;  Disp.  I;  Art 
4.)  Those  things  are  said  to  be  seen  which  of  themselves  move  the  intellect  01 
the  sense  to  know  them ;  such  are  first  principles  and  the  conclusions  evidently 
deduced  from  (hem,  or  sensible  objects  duly  proposed  to  the  senses. 


70  LOGIC  :    SECOND    PART. 

diaiely  evident  when  they  are  known  per  se,  t.  e.,  are  self-evi- 
dent. The  objects  of  the  senses  and  those  of  consciousness 
may  also  be  regarded,  when  actually  observed,  as  immediately 
evident  to  these  cognoscive  powers.  Truths  are  mediately 
evident^  when  the  mind  comes  to  the  certain  knowledge  of 
them  only  through  the  medium  of  reasoning;  or,  when  it 
knows  them  only  as  evident  deductions  from  their  principles. 

Evidence  may  also  be  considered  as  either  intrifisic,  or  extrin- 
sic. It  is  intrinsic^  in  self-evident  truths,  in  the  demonstrated 
conclusions  from  evident  premises,  and  in  the  proper  objects  of 
the  senses  and  consciousness.  Evidence  is  (fJc/nVzj-/^:  when  it  is 
not  derived  immediately  from  the  object  or  truth,  but  passes 
through  the  medium  of  testimony,  and  is  thereby  indirect  and 
and  reflected  light  of  the  objective  truth.  Objects  thus  known 
are  not  said  to  be  evident,  but  believed,  or  they  are  objects  of 
faith.  A  preceding  and  evident  judgment  of  their  credibility 
gives  just  grounds  from  which  is  inferred,  or  may  be  in- 
ferred, the  necessary  truth  of  the  objects  in  themselves. 
Hence,  distinguish  between  what  is  evidently  true,  and  what 
is  only  evidejitly  credible;  in  the  first,  the  object  is  evident;  in 
the  second,  the  object  is  obscure. 

A  high  degree  o^  probability  is  sometimes  termed  moral  cer 
tainty.  ^wt probability  and  certainty  differ  in  species  or  essence; 
and,  therefore,  in  strictness,  no  degree  of  probability  can  equal 
real  certainty;  or,  no  number  of  probabilities  can  constitute 
certainty. 

The  main  theory  of  evidence  and  the  certainty  which  is 
founded  upon  it  may  be  briefly  summed  up  as  follows : 

Evidence,  in  its  general  sense,  includes  not  only  the  capa- 
bility in  the  object  of  being  seen,  or  clearly  known,  i.  e.,  its 
cognoscibility ;  but,  also,  the  capability*  in  an  agent  of 
seeing  it,  together  with  the  exhibition  of  the  object  to  the 
mind,  or  the  act  of  seeing  it  to  be  what  it  is,  and  that  it  cannot 

*"Evidcntia  objecti  est  capacitas  in  objecto  apparendi  iiosti'o  intellectui  si 
eidem  objiciatur;  apparentia  objecti  in  inteUectu  est  evidentia  subjectiva." 
Objective  evidence  is  the  capability  in  the  object  of  being  seen  bj^  the  intellect  if 
presented  to  it;  the  manifestation  of  the  object  in  the  intellect  is  subjective  evi- 
dence. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND    PAET.  71 

be  otherwise  than  it  is  seen.  It  is  manifest,  then,  that  evidenct 
inay  be  considered  as  both  objective  and  subjective. 

The  cognoscibility  of  the  object,  or  objective  evidence,  pre- 
6upposes  objective  certainty,  and  is  caused  by  it.  Hence,  it 
may  be  said  that  objective  certainty  is  the  origin  of  objective 
evidence;  objective  evidence  is  the  proximate  cause  of  subjec- 
tive evidence,  and  the  subjective  evidence  produces  subjective 
certainty.  Therefore,  in  the  order  of  cause  and  effect,  objec- 
.ia  certainty  is  first,  subjective  certainty  is  last,  and  evidettce  is 
the  medium  between  them. 

Certainty^  when  considered  according  to  its  objects,  and  the 
medium  by  which  they  produce  certainty  in  the  mind,  is  tneta- 
physical,  physical  or  vioral.  The  three  kinds  of  certainty  thus 
denominated  differ  in  their  species  or  essence ;  because  their 
objects  differ  specifically.  These  kinds  of  certainty  differ  in 
species  ;  for,  acts  are  specified  by  their  objects,  and  the  objects 
give  determinate  species  not  only  to  the  acts,  but  to  those 
things  that  are  consequent  upon  acts,  as  the  states  produced 
by  those  acts.  The  acts  of  knowing  metaphysical  Xxw\S\,  physi- 
cal \xw\\i,  and  ?pioral  truth,  have  objective  prmciples,  which,  it  is 
clear,  differ  essentially;  for  the  metaphysical  is  purely  of  intel- 
lect, the  physical  \m^\\QS  the  sensible,  and  the  object  of  moral 
certainty  is  inevident,  or  essentially  obscure.  Hence,  meta- 
physical, physical  and  moral  certainty  all  differ  specifically,  be- 
cause their  objects  differ  in  species. 

In  order  to  perceive  the  conclusiveness  of  the  preceding 
reasoning,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  force,  and  to  see 
the  truth  of  the  philosophical  axiom,  "  acts*  are  specified  by  their 
objects."  It  means  about  the  same  thing  as  saying,  "  effects 
derive  their  species  or  essence  from  their  causes;  or,  effects 
depend  for  their  species  or  essence  on  their  causes ;  or,  effects 
really  proceed  from  their  causes;"  which  is  evidently  true. 
Now,  regarding  the  act  as  an  <?^<;/,  the  object  of  the  ai.t  is  one 
of  its  causes,  as  well  as  the  agent  that  puts  that  act      Hence, 


*  "  Actus  sijecificantur  ab  objectis."    Acts  are  specified  by  their  objects;  or, 
»cts  derive  their  species  from  their  objects. 


72  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

when  it  is  said,  "action*  is  specified  by  the  agent;  passion  is 
specified  by  the  term  ; "  or,  "  operations,  and  habits,  and  pow- 
ers, are  specified  by  their  objects ; "  or,  "  all  operation  is  speci- 
fied by  the  form  [by  the  specific  nature)^  which  is  the  principle 
of  the  operation ; "  all  these  expressions  really  convey  the 
same  truth,  though  they  present  it  under  different  respects. 
An  agent  specifies  its  acts,  because  it  gives  to  the  acts  which  it 
puts,  their  determinate  nature;  powers,  habits,  etc.,  are  speci- 
fied by  their  objects ;  for,  since  their  objects  determine  them 
to  act,  the  objects  are  also  principles  or  causes  of  action,  and, 
on  that  acccount,  attribute  to  the  acts  something  which  is 
essential  to  them  as  effects  produced  by  the  objects.  Colors 
cannot  be  heard;  sounds  cannot«be  seeii;  but  color  and  figure 
determine  or  specify  vision,  or  the  act  of  seeing;  sounds  deter- 
mine the  specific  acts  of  hearing.  Hence,  because  objects  are 
principles  that  determine  acts  in  the  agents  to  which  those  ob- 
jects are  connatural,  they  also  specify  those  acts. 

Intensity,  or  force  of  the  assent :  The  assefit  of  the  mind 
differs  in  its  inte?isify,  according  to  the  different  species  of  cer- 
tainty ;  or,  according  to  the  objects  which,  through  their 
proper  mediums,  produce  certainty  in  the  mind. 

Observe  that  assefit  is  an  act  of  the  intellect,  as  co7isent  is  an 
act  of  the  ivill.  The  intellect  assents  to  truth  ;  /.  ^.,  agrees  to, 
admits,  takes  the  truth:  ist,  through  the  ifnmediate  evidence  of 
the  truth,  as  in  matters  which  are  self  evident,  or  known 
per  se;  2d,  through  mediate  evidence,  or  on  account  of  some- 
thing else,  as,  when  it  assents  to  a  demonstrated  conclusion  on 
account  of  the  certain  premises  from  which  it  necessarily  fol- 
lows; 3d,  on  account  of  evident  testimony  to  the  inevident 
truth,  and  also  in  voluntary  obedience  to  the  motives  of  super- 
natural faith  ;  4th,  when  the  motives  furnish  only  probability  ; 
in  which  case  the  assent  is  voluntary,  and  the  judgment 
assented  to  is  only  an  opinion. 

That  the  assent  of  the  intellect,  as  thus  described,  should 

*  ' '  Actio  specKicatur  ab  agente;  passio  a  termino. ' ' 
"  Operationes,  et  habitus  et  potentiie  specificantur  ex  objectis."   (Div.  Th, 
Mem.  Lect.  1,  Sect.  2.) 

' '  Omni.s  operatio  specilicatur  per  formam,  quae  est  principium  operationis.  * 


LOGIC  :    SKCOXD    PART.  78 

have  different  degrees  of  intensity  or  strength,  according  to  its 
motives,  and  the  principles  that  produce  it,  is  both  natural,  and 
just  to  truth  itself:  ist,  because  the  objects  which  produce 
different  kinds  and  degrees  of  assent  differ  in  their  nature ;  2d, 
because  truth  in  the  mind  is  in  conformity  with  the  objects. 

As  to  intensity  in  assent,  there  are  three  principal  degrees  of 
the  siibjective  certainty  that  is  merely  human  or  natural ;  cor- 
responding to  the  three  species  of  objective  certainty,  or  three 
species  of  objects:  ist,  itietaphysical  certainty,  whose  object  is 
necessary  and  immutable,  i.  e.,  metaphysical  Xxm\\\\  2d,  physical 
certainty,  whose  object  is  physical  truth,  i.  e.,  the  existence  and 
the  positive  laws  of  created  or  contingent  beings;  3d,  moral 
certainty,  whose  object  is  truth  known  by  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses, or  the  moral  laws  that  universally  govern  man. 

Metaphysical  certainty  has  for  its  object,  either  truth  that  is 
a  priori,  and  absolutely  necessary;  or  truth  that  is  derived 
from  it  by  demonstrative  reasoning ;  the  certainty  in  us  caused 
by  the  latter  is  less  intense  than  that  which  is  caused  by  the 
former. 

We  h2i\t  physical  CQX\.3\i\iY,  when  the  object  known  is  2i  fact, 
or  is  something  actually  and  physically  existing,  and  is  evident 
to  our  cognoscive  powers;  v.  g.,  we  have  physical  certainty 
that  the  sun  now  shines,  or  does  not ;  or  other  facts  of  sense, 
and  consciousness. 

Certainty  is  styled  moral  when  its  medium  is  that  testimony 
which  depends  for  its  significance  and  truth  on  the  knowledge 
and  veracity  of  an  intelligent  and/r<f<?  witness.  This  testimony 
may  be  manifested  either  by  words,  modes  of  action,  or  any 
other  signs  of  conscious  thought  or  affection.  Hence,  any 
manifestation  of  truth  by  means  of  signs,  which  are  intelligent 
zxiAfree  in  their  cause,  pertains  to  that  testimony  which  is  the 
medium  of  moral  cej'tainty. 

We  have  moral  certainty  when  a  sufficient  number  of  reliable 
witnesses  all  concur  in  testifying  to  a  sensible  fact;  v.  g,, 
"  London  exists."  We  have  moral  certainty,  in  a  less  strict 
sense  of  the  words,  moral  certainty,  that  "  all  mothers  love  their 
children ; "  in  this  latter  case,  exception  is  absolutely  possible. 


74  logic:  second  part. 

When  we  possess  juetapJiysical,  or  physical  certainty,  we  are 
said  to  know  the  truth  that  causes  it,  or  is  its  object;  but  when 
our  knowledge  comes  through  the  testimony  of  others,  we  are 
said  to  believe  the  truth  of  which  we  thus  become  certain. 

In  moral  certainty  we  must  distinguish  between  the  object 
or  truth  testified  to,  and  the  testimony  itself:  the  object  is 
essentially  inevident  or  obscure  ;  but  the  testimony,-  at  least  as 
a  natural  medium  of  certainty,*  must  be  evident. 

The  manner  in  which  natural  faith  and  supernatural  or  divine 
faith  are  respectively  related  to  their  mediums  or  motives  of 
assent,  will  be  rendered  more  clear  by  means  of  an  example : 
"  Hannibal  defeated  the  Romans  in  the  battle  of  Cannae,"  is  a 
historical  fact  which  is  believed  on  its  testimony.  Those  to 
whom  the  fact  of  the  defeat  was  evident  in  itself,  were  the  first 
witnesses,  and  they  knew  the  fact  in  its  own  objective  evidence. 
Through  them  as  eye-witnesses  it  became  generally  credited  or 
believed  as  made  certain  by  their  testimony;  through  writings 
and  other  means  of  tradition  it  has  come  down  to  the  present 
time.  All  the  testimony,  from  that  of  the  eye-witnesses,  as 
descending  to  the  present  time,  constitutes,  when  it  is  all  taken 
together,  the  medium  which  in  some  manner  unites  our  minds 
with  the  fact,  and  this  medium  is  evident  in  itself  to  us ;  fur,  we 
actually  know  it  in  existing  history  and  tradition.  Our  assent 
to  the  fact,  "  Hannibal  defeated  the  Romans  in  the  battle  of 
Cannae,"  is  on  account  of  this  evident  medium  as  extending 
from  the  present  time  to  the  period  when  it  occurred. 

The  proposition,  "  God  is  Triune,"  is  believed  as  an  article 
of  divine  faith.  There  is  likewise  in  this  case  an  evident  tradi- 
tion or  medium  of  testimony,  clearly  traceable  back  to  the 
days  of  the  Messias  himself,  that  this  Messias  explicitly  aflfirmed 
and  taught  "  God  to  be  Triune."  This  medium,  as  in  the  other 
case,  connects  us  in  some  manner  with  the  Messias  revealing 
that  article  of  faith  ;  but  our  assent,  as  an  act  oi  divine  faith^  is 
not  on  account  of  that  medium  or  tradition  which  is  evident 
to  us  and  certain,  for  such  a  medium  constitutes  only  a  natural 

*"Evidentia  in  attestante:  quando  eviclouter  constat  <le  dUscnte,"     It  is  evl- 
4ence  in  the  witness,  \vl)en  the  wituess  is  evidently  known  as  suoh, 


logic:  second  part.  75 

principle  of  assent ;  our  assent,  as  an  act  of  supernatural  faith, 
is  on.y  and  exclusively  because  God  revealed  it.  The  existence 
of  the  evident  medium  is  an  essential  prerequisite  for  this  act  of 
faith,  and  is  a  demonstrative  proof  that  it  is  prudent  to  elicit 
it;  but  it  is  not  itself  any  part  of  the  formal  motive  for  the  act, 
that  formal  motive  being,  God  said  it,  or  God  revealed  it;  in 
such  manner,  however,  that  both  the  motive  and  the  assent  are 
alike  supernatural,  and  totally  distinct  from  the  natural  medium. 

The  further  explanation  and  proof  of  this,  we  remit  to  the 
theologian. 

What  is  here  said  suffices,  it  is  believed,  for  a  correct  under- 
standing of  philosophical  certainty  as  related  to  that  of  super- 
natural faith,  and  as  distinguished  from  it  in  its  principles ;  and 
this  much  was  also  judged  necessary  for  the  adequate  treat- 
ment of  the  matter  proper  to  the  present  article. 

As  a  mode  of  knowing  truth,  the  intellectual  vision,  or  the 
distinct,  evident  perception  of  truth  in  its  own  objective  evi- 
dence, is  more  perfect  than  knowing  it  by  the  medium  of 
faith;  but  yet,  divine  faith*  is  more  noble  in  respect  to  its 
object,  which  is  the  truth  of  God  himself,  than  any  natural 
knowledge,  whose  medium  is  evidence  or  the  testimony  of 
creatures. 

The  intensest  natural  certainty  is  that  which  is  caused  by 
metaphysical  truth,  because  the  object  is  necessary  and  immu- 
table. Physical  certainty  is  next  in  the  degree  of  its  intensity 
or  force ;  though  its  object  is  contingent  truth,  yet,  it  is  made 
evident  to  us,  and  the  certainty  in  the  mind  corresponds  to 
the  principles  that  produce  it.  A  coutingejit  being  is  one  that 
can  exist,  or  cease  to  exist,  according  to  the  free  choice  of  its 
cause ;  or,  it  is  one  that  depends  on  a  free  agent  for  its  exist- 
ence.     Moral  certainty  is  the  least  intense :   ist,  because  its 

*"  Fides  est  nobilior  quam  scientia  ex  parte  objecti;  quia  ejus  objeetum  est 
verit4is  prima;  sed  seientia  habet  perfectiorem  niodum  cognoscendi,  qui  non 
repugnat  perfectioni  beatitudiuis,  scilicet  visioni,  siciit  ei  repuguat  modus 
fidei."  (Div.  Thom.  I,  2  P. ;  Qu.  67;  Art.  3;  ad.  1.)  Faith  is  more  noble  than 
knowledge  as  regai-ds  its  object,  because  its  object  is  the  First  Truth;  but  knowl- 
edge is  a  more  perfect  mode  of  cognition,  because  it  is  not  repugnant  to  beati- 
tude, namely,  to  vision;  to  which,  however,  the  mode  of  knowing  by  faith  i? 
repugnant. 


76  logic:  second  part. 

object  is  obscure  or  is  known  indirectly  and  mediately  only ; 
2d,  because  the  morals  and  actions  of  men  are  more  mutable, 
and  more  purely  contingent,  than  are  the  laws  of  physical 
nature,  or  the  acts  of  natural  agents,  and  the  truth  in  the  mind 
is  in  conformity  to  the  objects. 

Both  metaphysical  and  physical  evidence  always  necessitate 
assent.  Testimony,  also,  when  fortified  with  certain  condi- 
tions, V.  g.,  as  when  it  refers  to  a  sensible  fact,  when  many 
witnesses  agree,  and  collusion  is  impossible,  in  such  adjuncts 
necessitates  assent;  yet,  in  many  cases,  it  is  possible  to  dissent, 
even  when  this  refusal  of  assent  to  the  testimony  is  most  im 
prudent ;  in  other  words,  the  assent  of  the  understanding  to 
the  truth  is,  in  such  instances,  under  the  control  of  the  will. 
This  happens  more  especially  when  the  object  is  wholly  ob- 
scure; or,  when  both  the  object  and  the  testimony  are  inevi- 
dent. 

Though  certainty  is  perfect  in  its  species  when  its  motive  is 
the  evidence  that  the  object  is  what  it  is,  and  that  it  can  be 
nothing  else;  yet,  within  its  species,  the  evidence  can  be  of  a 
higher  or  lower  degree  in  different  minds,  or  in  the  same  mind 
under  dififerent  circumstances.  Hence,  the  certainty  with  regard 
to  the  same  truths  may  be  7nore  or  less  intense,  according  to 
those  conditions. 

Supernatural  Faith*  is,  in  itself,  simply  and  absolutely  more 
certain  than  any  natural  cognition;  bui  it  is  not  thus  as 
regards  us. 

The  certainty  here  meant  is  the  firmness  with  which  the  cog- 
noscive  power  adheres  to  its  cognoscible  object.  This  firm 
adhesion    of  the   mind   may    arise   from   the    action    of   the 

*"  Nihil  prohibet  id,  qnod  est  certius  secundum  naturam,  esse  quoad  nos 
jiiinus  certum  propter  debilitatem  intellectus  iiosti'i :  qui  se  habet  ad  mauifes- 
tissima  naturae  sicut  oculus  noctuai  ad  lumen  solis.  Unde  dubitatio  qua;  aceidit 
in  aliqiiibus  circa  articulos  fidei,  non  est  propter  inccrtitudinem  rei,  feed  prop- 
ter debilitatem  intellectus  humani. "  (Div.  Thorn. ,  1  P. ,  Qu.  1 ;  Ai-t.  5,  ad  1 :  et 
I,  2;  Qu.  4;  Art.  8.)  Nothing  prevents  that  which  is  more  cei-tain  accordiug  to 
its  nature  from  being  less  so  in  regard  to  us,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  our  intel- 
lects, wnich,  in  regard  to  things  the  most  manifest  in  themselves,  are  like  the  eye 
of  the  owl  in  the  light  of  the  sun.  Hence,  the  doubts  which  come  to  some  per- 
sons about  articles  of  faith  are  not  owing  to  uncertainty  in  the  object,  but  to  th« 
weakness  of  the  human  intellect. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  77 

will  determining  the  intellect  to  adhere,  independently  ol  any 
legitimate  motive  of  assent,  to  its  object;  this  actually  happens 
in  obstinate  error.  But  tenacious  adhesion  of  the  mind  from 
such  a  motive  cannot  be  properly  termed  certainty ;  more  cor- 
rectly, it  is  pertinacity.  Again,  this  firm  adhesion  may  arise 
from  a  true  medium  of  certainty,  and  yet  derive  its  efficacy  both 
from  the  intellect  and  the  will.  Now,  divine  faith  derives  its 
certainty  from  the  divine  veracity,  the  First  Truth,  which  in- 
finitely exceeds  all  created  mediums  of  certainty  or  truth,  as  is 
self-evident.  Hence,  faith,  in  respect  to  its  cause,  is  the 
highest  and  most  perfect  motive  of  certainty  which  the  human 
mind  has  in  our  present  state  of  existence. 

As  regards  our  minds,  or  considered  subjectively:  that  is 
more  certain,  in  respect  to  us,  which  the  intellect  can  more 
fully  possess,  which  is  more  connatural  and  proportioned  to  it, 
which  more  completely  satisfies  and  quiets  it;  though,  in  other 
respects  its  assent  through  a  connatural  motive  be,  in  itself,  not 
the  most  certain.  This  is  what  actually  happens  in  that  cer- 
tainty which  we  posess  concerning  objects  which  are  evident  to 
us,  as  compared  to  the  certainty  which  we  have  through  the 
medium  of  divine  faith.*  Hence,  although  faith,  in  respect 
to  its  motive,  gives  the  highest  and  intensest  certainty ;  yet,  in 
the  subject,  i.  e.^  in  our  minds,  there  may  spring  up  indeliber- 
ate doubt ;  for,  the  debilitated  intellect,  like  the  owl  at  noon- 
day, "  sicut  oculus  noctuae  ad  lumen  solis,"  is  unable  to  see  by 
light  so  superior  as  that  of  divine  faith.  This  faith  is  in  itself 
absolutely  the  most  certain ;  but  the  disposition  of  the  subject 
renders  doubt  possible  ;  it  may  be  less  intense  subjectively. 

*  "  Ipsura  testimonium  primje  veritatis  se  habet  in  Me,  ut  principium  in  sci- 
entiis  demonstrativis . ' '  The  testimony  of  the  First  Truth  is,  in  matters  of  faith, 
like  the  principle^  in  scientific  demonstration. 


78  LOGIC  :  sp:cond  part. 

A  R  T  I  C  L  E     I  V. 

ULTIMATE    CRITERION    OF    TRUTH  ;     OR,    ULTIMATE    MOTIVE    OF 
CERTAINTY. 

A  criterion  of  truth  is  a  rule  or  standard  by  which  truth  is 
unerringly  known  and  distinguished  from  falsehood  and  error. 
Also,  because  certainty  in  the  mind  is  the  legitimate  result  of 
truth  thus  known,  it  follows  that  the  criterion  of  truth  is,  at  the 
same  time,  the  criterion  of  certainty.  This  criterion,  in  its  last 
reason  or  motive,  is  evidence  in  concrete.  In  other  words, 
all  certainty  supposes  evidence,  either  as  its  formal  motive,  or 
as  a  preceding  conditio  si?ie  qua  non,  an  indispensable  conditioji, 
to  which  the  mind  finally  reverts  in  order  to  dismiss  all  doubt* 
Hence,  it  will  be  seen  why  the  sounder  philosophers  so  uni- 
versally insist  on  the  truth  of  the  proposition,  "  Evidence  is 
the  ultimate  criterion  of  truth,  or  is  the  ultimate  motive  of 
certainty." 

Evidence  is  said  to  be  the  ultimate  criterion  of  certainty  or 
truth ;  because,  when  the  motives  and  principles  of  certainty 
are  examined  rejlexively,  or  by  their  analysis,  evidence  is  the 
last  reason  or  principle  which  is  dwelt  on  by  the  mind,  in 
determining  the  admissibility,  or  the  validity  of  all  the  motives 
for  Its  assent  furnished  by  any  object.  In  the  direct  acquisition 
of  certainty,  evide?ice  may  be  considered  as,  under  some  respect, 
the  first  principle  or  motive  of  assent.  Hence,  then,  evidence 
is  termed,  under  different  respects,  both  the  Jirst  principle  and 
ultimate  motive  of  certainty. 

The  following  are  essential  requisites  for  the  ultimate  criterion 
of  truth:  ist.  It  should  not  require  demo?istration ;  for,  all 
demonstration  supposes  something  more  known,  from  which 
another  truth  is  deduced,  and  which  thereby  becomes  also 
known;  hence,  if  this  principle  or  criterion  were  demonstrable, 
the  truth  from  which  it  is  deduced,  would  be  the  ultimate 
standard  in  question ;  or,  if  it  were  not  self-evident  or  known 
per  se,  the  medium  through  which  it  is  known,  would  be  that 

*  * '  Evidentia  est  ultimiim  in  quo  quiescit  intellectiis  noster . ' '   (Billaart,  T.  1 ; 
Proem.  Dissert.  1;  Art.  7.)    In  evidence  the  intellect  finally  rests  quiet. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  79 

Standard.  2d.  This  ultimate  standard  must  be  internal,  not  an 
external  rule;  or,  it  must  be  intrinsic  to  the  mind.  An  extrinsic 
standard  of  truth  can  be  known  only  by  its  medium;  or,  it 
must  be  recognized  by  the  individual  reason,  "/<?r  lumen  ra- 
tionis  7uiturale"  through  the  evidence,  that  it  is  a  medium  of 
certainty.  In  other  words,  in  order  to  follow  any  external 
criterion  of  truth,  or  assent  to  it  with  certainty,  an  evident 
judgment  of  its  reliability  is  an  essential  prerequisite;  i.  e., 
dltimately  this  external  standard  must  be  tested  as  a  medium 
or  law  of  certainty  by  evidence  in  concrete,  or  formal  evidence, 
which  is  an  internal  principle.  The  mind  must  first  be  certain 
that  this  external  criterion  exists;  that  it  is  true;  and  it  can 
know  this  truth,  which  is  external  to  itself,  only  by  the  evidence 
of  it  in  the  mind. 

This  standard  cannot  be  divine  faith :  for  faith  presupposes 
the  knowledge  that  there  is  a  God,  who  is  true ;  and  it  is  an 
essential  prerequisite  that  Revelation,  or  the  truths  proposed 
for  belief  be  evidently  credible;  otherwise  there  could  be  no 
rational  assent.  Hence,  divine  faith  cannot  be  either  the  Jirst 
or  the  only  motive  of  certainty;  since  it  has  essential  prerequi- 
sites to  it,  wliich  must  be  known  by  their  evidence. 

The  criterion  of  certamty  cannot  be  the  common  consent  of 
men,  as  some  authors  erroneously  maintain ;  for  the  admission 
of  such  a  standard  of  truth,  which,  like  divine  faith,  is  external^ 
presupposes  the  evident  knowledge  that  men  exist,  attest, 
attach  a  definite  meaning  to  their  words ;  that  they  agree,  etc.; 
all  these  truths  suppose  an  internal  principle  of  the  mind  which 
is  their  criterion,  or  is  the  standard  by  which  they  are  ulti- 
mately tested;  i.  e.,  evidence  in  the  concrete  is  the  ultimate 
criterion  of  all  truth,  or  the  ultimate  motive  of  certainty.* 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  said,  that  error  in  a  sane  mind 
is  never  physically  necessary;  for  assent  is  necessitated  only 
by  perfect  evidence,  and,  in  all  other  cases,  it  is  caused  by  the 
will,  to  which,  therefore,  must  be  referred  assent  or  dissent, 
when  the  understanding  is  not  compelled  by  the  evidence. 

*  In  metaphysical  and  physical'  certainty  this  criterion  is  evidence  from  tho 
object ;  in  moral  certainty  it  is  evidence  that  the  testimony  is  credible. 


80  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

ARTICLE     V. 

PRIMITIVE  Truths;  they  are  not  demonstrable. 

Primitive  truths  are  such  as  neither  require  nor  admit  of 
proof,  either  because  they  are  per  se*  known,  i.  e.,  hiown  of 
themselves^  without  the  aid  of  other  truths  from  which  they  are 
deduced,  or  by  which  they  are  proved;  or,  because  they  are 
facts  of  experience,  known  directly  through  our  cognoscive 
powers. 

To  begin  reasoning  or  philosophising  with  universal  doubt, 
is  simply  absurd;  for  doubt,  as  such,  can  give  neither  evidence 
nor  certainty  of  anything  deduced  from  it,  since  the  conclusion 
has  the  nature  of  the  premises.  It  is  but  httle  less  absurd,  to 
begin  with  admitting  the  testimony  of  consciousness  {cogUo  ergo 
sum,  I  think,  or  a?n  thinking,  therefore,  I  exist,  which  is  a 
petitio  principii),  and  doubting  that  of  other  powers,  the  ex- 
ternal senses,  etc.;  for  all  these  powers,  taken  together,  con- 
stitute our  only  natural  means  of  knowing;  and  it  is  as  legiti- 
mate and  reasonable'to  deny  or  doubt  the  truth  of  one  natural 
faculty  or  power  in  respect  to  its  own  proper  objects  as  that  of 
another. 

From  consciousness,  which  is  purely  subjective,  to  the  ob- 
jective, is  not  a  valid  illation,  since  no  power  or  faculty  can 
transcend  its  own  order  of  objects,  and  pass  without  a  medium, 
to  a  class  specifically  different,  or  really  separated  from  it. 

But  sound  philosophy  must  begin  with,  as  admitted,  because 
undeniable,  the  truths  or  principles  that  are  known  to  reason, 
without  argument,  of  themselves,  and  which  need  no  proof, 
and  admit  none,  and  require  no  other  reason  for  an  assent,  than 

*  '*  Propositio  perse  nota  est,  quando  ea  est  connexio  praedicati  cum  subjecto, 
ut  penetrari  subjectum  nequeat,  quin  ea  connexio  deprehendatur  in  ipsa  ratione 
subjecti.  Seu  propositio  per  se  nota  dicitur  cujus  Veritas  per  se  et  sine  medio  a 
se  distincto  innotescit:  sic  lux  dicitur  per  sevisibilis,  quia  eaipsa  et  non  per 
medium  magis  lucidimi  videtur. ' '  A  proposition  is  per  se  known,  or  is  self-evi- 
dent, when  the  connexion  of  the  predicate  with  the  subject  is  such,  that  the 
fubject  cannot  be  understood,  without  the  connexion  being  perceived  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  subject.  Or,  a  proposition  is  said  to  be  per  se  knoAvn,  or  self-evi- 
dent, whose  truth  is  known  in  itself  and  without  any  medium  which  is  distinct 
from  it:  thus  light  is  per  se  visible,  for  it  is  seen  in  itself,  and  not  by  means  of 
another  medium  more  distinct  than  itself. 


logic:  second  part.  81 

iheir  own  self-evidence.  With  regard  to  empirical  knowledge, 
or  that  acquired  by  experience,  we  must  al^o  admit,  without 
other  proof,  the  evident  perceptions  of  the  mind,  through  the 
senses  and  consciousness  ;  since  these,  too,  are  direct  cogni- 
tions of  evidefit  truth :  nature,  of  itself,  cannot  err.*  Nor  do 
we  thereby  assume  truth  on  faith  in  natural  law.  No;  we  assent 
to  it,  because  it  is  evident ;  and  it  is  evident  because  it  is  truth, 
or  that  which  is,  and  we  know  it  to  be  such  as  we  see  it  to  be. 

Hence,  then,  our  own  existence,  our  perceptions  of  external 
objects,  the  acts  of  consciousness,  truths  known /<fr  j-^,  as,  "it 
cannot  be  that  the  same  thing  exists,  and  does  not  exist,  at  the 
same  time;"  and  the  like,  are  truths  that  are  admitted  as  abso- 
lutely certain,  and  incapable  of  logical  proof;  since  that  alone  is 
capable  of  proof  which  can  be  made  more  evident  by  another 
truth  still  more  evident,  from  which  it  is  evidently  deduced. 

Therefore,  genuine  philosophy  begins,  not  with  doubt  or 
negation ;  but  with  certain  first  truth,  immediately  evident 
without  demonsfative  proof,  and  the  affirmation  of  it. 

This  question,  as  to  primitive  truths,  should  not  be  con- 
founded with  the  question,  as  to  the  origin  of  ideas;  this  latter 
subject  pertains  to  psychology,  or  the  philosophy  of  the  mind, 
but  yet  it  will  be  briefly  treated  in  a  subsequent  part  of  this 
work. 

The  importance  of  the  foregoing  doctrine  will  be  appreciated 
if  it  be  remembered  that,  as  said  by  an  illustrious  author  {D. 
Th.  de  veritate,  a.  i).  "the  certainty  of  knowledge  comes 
from  the  certainty  of  its  principles ;  for,  the  certainty  of  infer- 
ences or  conclusions  is  known  only  when  they  are  resolved 
into  their  principles." 

Observe,  also,  that  inferences  or  conclusions,  as  such,  partake 
in  some  mode  of  the  nature  of  their  premises;  for  they  are 
caused  by  them.  Hence,  principles  or  premises  that  are  evi- 
dent and  absolute,  furnish  conclusions  which  are  necessary  and 
evident  in  virtue  of  those  premises.  I  ^  T^l  ^  0 

*"Natuva  non  deficit  in  necessariis."  Nature  is  not  deficient  in  what  ii 
necessary . 


CHAPTER  II. 


MEANS    OF    ATTAINING   TRUTH    WITH    CERTAINTY. 

The  means  of  attaining  truth  may  be  classified  under  the 
following  heads,  viz. :  ist,  the  faculty  of  consciousness  ;  2d, 
the  internal  senses  and  the  external  senses ;  3d,  the  ideas 
which  the  mind  has  acquired,  and  which  it  compares  among 
themselves,  or,  simple  Apprehension,  Judgment  and  Reason- 
ing; 4th,  Testimony  or  Authority,  which  exacts  rational  assent. 


AR  T  I  C  L  E     I. 

THE    POWER    OF    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The  word  consciousness  is  here  used  to  signify  the  power  or 
faculty  of  the  mind  to  reflect  on  its  own  modifications  or  oper- 
ations, together  with  the  act  of  thus  reflexively  seeing  what 
is  within  itself  In  this  sense  it  corresponds  to  the  Latin 
phrases,  sensus  i?itimus,  conscieiitia  rejlexa,  and  is,  therefore,  not 
only  the  power,  but  includes  the  act  of  the  mind  by  which  it 
sees  and  recognizes  what  happens  within  itself,  as  its  own. 
Hence,  it  has  for  its  immediate  object  internal  facts;  i.  <?.,  ist, 
the  modifications  of  the  mind  alone,  as  ideas,  judgments,  acts 
of  volition;  2d,  modifications  of  the  human  compound,  as 
grief,  gladness,  cold,  hunger.  The  act  or  modification  of  the 
mind  is  not  anything  really  distinct  from  the  mind  itself ;  it  is 
the  mnid  acting  within  itself  as  subject  and  object.  In  an  act 
of  consciousness  two  things  are  always  seen,  at  least  con- 
fusedly, viz.,  the  impression,  and  the  subject  of  it;  for  the  im- 
82 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  83 

pression  is  always  perceived  in  concrete,  as  it  is ;  therefore,  it 
is  seen  not  as  abstract  or  separate  from  the  mind,  but  in  the 
mind  itself.  For  the  mind  knows  itself  as  a  living  principle  of 
action,  by  its  own  operations ;  /.  <f.,  it  knows  its  acts,  as  its  own. 
The  faculty  or  power  of  consciousness  does  not  attain  physi- 
cally and  immediately  to  external  objects;  but  it  becomes  cog- 
nizant of  them  only  as  they  are  presented  through  the  action 
of  the  senses,  the  imagination,  and  as  seen  through  the  ideas 
or  concepts  in  the  intellect,  but  without  directly  perceiving 
the  internal  ;;/^^«/;;/.  (Vide  page  62,  ;/<?/<?.)  Without  this  power 
of  the  mind  we  could  have  no  reflex  knowledge  of  anything; 
even  evidence  itself  can  only  become  a  motive  of  philosophical 
certainty  when  it  is  an  object  of  consciousness;  or  is  reflexively 
seen  as  such.  The  action  of  consciousness  is  implied  in  all 
judgments;  for  it  is  the  directing  and  controlling  influence  in 
all  the  mind's  completely  rational  action. 

Consciousness,  therefore,  affords  an  unerring  motive  of  cer- 
tainty, as  to  the  truth  of  its  objects;  that  is,  both  of  our  ex- 
istence and  the  mind's  own  modifications. 

This  proposition  cannot  be  logically  demonstrated,  since  the 
formal  argument  would  explicitly  assume  what  is  in  question  ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  conceive  or  declare  a  doubt 
of  it,  except  on  its  own  testimony.  All  demonstration  presup- 
poses some  truths  that  are  known  per  se,  that  is,  evident  in 
themselves  without  proof ;  or,  such  as  are  known  through  our 
cognoscive  powers  by  their  own  objective  evidence,  as  facts 
which  neither  require  nor  admit  any  demonstration ;  what  we 
know  by  the  direct  and  immediate  act  of  consciousness  is  an 
evident  fact  of  this  kind.  It  neither  admits  nor  requires 
demonstration  ;  for,  the  understanding  clearly  perceives  the 
truth  in  the  objects  of  its  own  acts,  as  self-evident;  and  it  is 
absurd  either  to  doubt  or  to  attempt  the  a  priori  proof  of  what 
is  self-evident.  To  deny  the  absolute  certainty  of  its  testi- 
mony is  to  reject  all  certainty,  and  the  right  use  of  reason,  and 
logic  itself;  which  would  be  either  intellectual  blindness  or 
moral  perversity. 

The  fact  that  persons  who  are  delirious,  or  dream,  do  not 


84  logic:  second  part. 

have  normal  action  of  consciousness,  and  do  not  thereby 
either  perceive  or  acquire  truth,  does  not  mihtate  against  the 
thesis,  tliat  consciousness  affords  an  infallible  motive  of  cer- 
tainty as  to  its  own  objects.  In  such  conditions  the  mind  per- 
ceives and  judges  by  the  phantoms  of  a  disturbed  imagination. 
This  organ,  in  those  states,  has  none  but  disordered  action ; 
for,  when  diseased  or  disturbed,  the  imagination  cannot  coop- 
erate in  rational  thought,  as  will  be  more  fully  explained  in  an- 
other place.  As  disturbed  water  reflects  images  in  distorted 
fragments ;  so,  when  the  fancy  is  in  an  abnormal  state,  its  action 
is  morbid  and  disorderly,  and  its  imagery  is  in  undistinguisha- 
ble  confusion. 

When  this  organ  is  so  diseased  or  disordered  as  not  to  have 
normal  action,  the  intellect  is  thereby  more  or  less  completely 
shut  off,  according  to  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  affection, 
from  the  entire  world  of  realities,  with  which  the  fancy,  as  will 
be  again  remarked  m  the  next  article,  is  its  essential  medium 
of  communication;  and,  in  this  state  of  seclusion,  it  is  either 
wholly  or  partially  unable  to  distinguish  what  is  merely  of  the 
sickly  fancy,  from  what  is  objectively  real.  In  such  case,  this 
organ  either  forms  no  image  at  all  of  objects  acting  on  the 
external  senses,  or  those  images  are  distorted  and  confused. 
Even  in  dreams,  the  action  of  the  external  senses  being  sus- 
pended, and  those  senses  thereby  ceasing  to  present  real  ob- 
jects to  the  imagination,  it  is  not  then  a  medium  of  rational 
communication  for  the  soul  with  real  or  actual  objects;  which 
strikingly  shows  how  entirely  dependent  the  intellect  is  on  the 
imagination,  for  all  the  objects  of  its  action. 

By  the  power  of  consciousness  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to 
distinguish  in  impressions  that  are  even  but  recently  pas^, 
whether  they  were  acts  of  the  will,  or  acts  of  the  soul  as  not 
free;  especially  since  the  "acts  and  affections  of  the  will  are, 
by  their  nature,  more  obscure  than  are  the  acts  of  direct  per- 
ception or  judgment.  But  even  in  this  and  analogous  cases, 
in  which  truth  may  be  difficult  of  attainment,  close  observa- 
tion of  what  actually  occurs  in  the  mind,  with  careful  reflec- 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  85 

tion,  secures  the  judgment  from  error,  especially  if  the  mind 
merely  affirms  what  it  perceives,  and  as  it  perceives  it. 

Abnormal  action  of  the  faculties  proc-eeds  from  a  disturbed 
condition  of  the  bodily  organs,  and  is  an  exceptional  case,  that 
properly  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  thesis;  for  it  has  reference 
to  the  operations  of  the  mind  only  in  its  sound  condition.  The 
causes  of  diseased  mental  action  properly  pertain  to  another 
science  for  their  analysis. 


ARTICLE    II. 
THE  senses;    the  nature  and  function  of  organic 

POWERS. 

The  senses,  sensation,  the  nature  of  organic  action,  also  the 
nature  and  specific  objects  of  intellectual  action,  are  explained 
somewhat  diffiisely  in  this  article  and  the  succeeding  one;  be- 
cause a  clear  distinction  between  organic  action  and  intellectual 
action  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  even  for  the  very  beginning 
of  philosophic  study.  That  distinction  is  ignored  in  some 
popular  works  on  philosophy,  and  is  directly  denied  in  others, 
either  because  their  authors  had  made  no  careful  and  con- 
siderate examination  of  the  subject,  or  because  it  was  their 
pleasure  to  teach  an  hypothesis  which  identifies  matter  and 
intellect. 

The  old  philosophers  classified  the  senses  as  internal  and 
external.  The  ijiternal  senses  are,  imaginatio7i;  sensile  mem- 
ory; potentia  cestimativa^ox  power  of  estimating  material  things, 
as  good  or  evil  for  sensible  appetite;  seiisus  cotnmiinis,  "com- 
mon sense,"  an  organic  power,  by  which  the  impressions  made 
on  the  external  senses  are  sensibly  distinguished  from  each 
other. 

A  sensible  organ,  or  an  organic  power,  is  a  member  of  the 
living  animal  compound,  i,  e.,  compound  of  a  substantial  vital 
principle,  and  matter;  it  is  capable  of  vital  action  in  respect  to 
its  proper  objects,  and  is  ordained  by  its  nature  to  sustain  and 
perfect  the  living  organism  to  which  it  pertains.     Hence,  sen- 


86  logic;  second  part. 

sible  power  essentially  belongs  to  animal  nature,  and  is,  there- 
fore, living,  and  corporeal  or  inaterial. 

Imagination,  and  fancy,  are  two  names  for  the  same  organic 
power,  or  internal  sense,  and  are  used  in  this  work  indiscrimi- 
nately; the  former  word  is  derived  from  the  Latin  language; 
the  latter,  from  the  Greek.  Imagination  is  the  power  of  form- 
ing and  reproducing  sensible  images  made  out  of  the  impres- 
sions received  by  the  senses  from  external  objects.  Sensile* 
memory  is  the  organic  power  by  which  these  impressions  are 
retained,  and  recognized  when  they  are  reproduced ;  or,  more 
explicitly,  sensile  memory,  which  is  an  organic  power,  is  the 
faculty  of  retaining  the  quasi  concepts  or  ifite?itio?ts  of  those  im- 
pressions and  images  in  the  fancy,  and  sensibly  recognizing 
them  when  they  are  reproduced. 

If  the  reproduction  of  the  past  impression-  be  understood  to 
include  the  recalling  of  it,  then,  the  reproduction  of  an  impres- 
sion may  be  referred,  under  different  respects,  both  to  the 
imagination  and  the  memory. 

The  intellectual  memory  is  not  an  organic  power,  but  is  a 
faculty  of  the  soul  itself,  having  no  more  direct  dependence 
on  the  organs  of  the  body  than  the  understanding  or  will  has. 

THE    CONNEXION    OF    THE    INTERNAL    SENSES,    AND    THEIR 
DEPENDENCE    ON    EACH    OTHER. 

T\\Q  potentia  CRst.itnativa  is  the  power  of  duly  estimati?ig,  i.  e., 
sensibly  appreciating  the  fitness  or  unfitness  of  an  object  to 
satisfy  the  wants  of  animal  nature,  or,  as  good  or  harmful  for 
it.  The  sensus  conununis,  which  is  analogous  to  the  potentia 
cestimativa,  is  the  basis  of  all  the  external  senses,  and  is  thus 
comnio7i  to  them,  somewhat  as  the  sense  of  touch,  under  an- 
other respect,  may  be  regarded  as  the  basis  of  all  the  senses;! 
but  it  moreover  distinguishes  the  impressions  made  on  the  five 
external  senses  from  one  another.     It  was  argued  thus :  even 

*It  is  manifest  that  sensile  is  here  a  more  proper  term  than  sensible,  sensitive  or 
*entient,  any  one  of  which  would  be  equivocal  in  this  connexion. 

t  "  Omnes  alii  sensus  fundantur  supra  factum. "  (Div.  Th. ,  1  p. ,  qu.  76,  a. 
B.)    All  the  other  senses  are  founded  on  that  of  touch. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  87 

the  brute  animal  feels  that  it  sees,  feels  that  it  hears,  feels  that 
It  smells,  etc. ;  but  the  eye  cannot  distinguish  between  color 
and  sound,  the  ear  cannot  distinguish  between  sound  and  smell, 
etc. ;  there-lore,  there  must  be  an  organic  power  which  receives, 
feels,  and  distinguishes  all  these  impressions  made  upon  the 
external  organs.  To  do  this,  is  the  function  of  the  sensus  com- 
7?iu?iis,  or  "common  sense,"  so  called,  because,  as  already  ob- 
served, it  is  the  common  basis  and  principle  of  unity  for  all  the 
five  external  senses.  The  imagination^  which  is  also  an  internal 
sense,  forms  its  images  or  phafitasmata  from  the  impressions 
made  through  the  external  senses  on  the  sensus  conwmnis;  the 
potentia  cestijnativa,  i.  e.,  the  power  of  estimating  or  valuing 
objects  as  good  or  hurtful  for  appetite,  makes  its  appreciation 
or  estimate  of  its  objects  as  presented  to  it  by  images  i?i  the 
fancy;  and  in  this  act  the  potetitia  cestimativa  forms  for  itself 
qitasi  concepts  expressing  the  nses,  ^^  intentions"  of  sensible 
objects,  and  these  quasi  concepts  are  retained  by  the  sensile 
memory.  All  these  powers  are  purely  organic,  and  are  situated 
in  the  brain.  They  are  possessed  by  all  the  perfect  animals  : 
i.  e.,  all  animals  that  havey?z'<?  external  senses. 

They  discriminate,  in  certain  instances,  between  the  prop- 
erties of  objects  presented  to  them  through  the  external  senses; 
not,  however,  by  way  of  a  formal  judgment;  but  by  a  true, 
though  sensible,  appreciation  of  them.* 

But  the  potentia  cestimativa,  as  it  is  in  man,  is  far  more  per- 
fect than  it  is  in  irrational  animals.  In  man  it  is  not  limited 
in  its  action  to  merely  appreciating  a  sensible  object  as  useful 
or  hurtful  for  appetite :  but  it  can  co?npare  particular  and  sin- 
gular objects  of  the  kind  among  themselves,  in  a  manner  not 
unhke  to  that  in  which  the  intellect  compares  universals,  and  it 

* ''Opinio  passionem  facit  in  appetitu,  non  autem  imaginatio;  si  enim  prae- 
cise  imagine7nur  liostes,  non  statim  timemus  aut  riigimus;  secus  vero  si  opine- 
mur  prseseutes.  Ratio  est,  quod  sola  apprehensio  qualis  est  in  phantasia,  non 
movet  appetitum  nisi  accedat  jestimativae  operatio."— Musajum  Philos.  de 
Anima.  Opinion  produces  passion  in  the  appetite,  imagination  does  not;  if 
we  merely  imagine  enemies,  we  do  not  at  once  flee  away  or  fear;  it  is  otherwise 
though,  if  we  have  the  opinion  that  they  are  present.  The  reason  is,  that  the  sole 
apprehension  as  it  is  in  the  fancy  cannot  move  appetite,  unless  there  accede  to 
it  the  operation  of  the  potentia  cestimativa,  which  reputes  the  object  to  be  real .     - 


88  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

thus  approaches  to  a  nearer  resemblance  of  intellectual  action 
Hence,  this  power  in  man,  was  termed  vis.  co^itativa^  or  cogita 
tive  power;  or,  s\?,o,  ratio  partial  laris,  or  particular  rea  soft;  and 
it  was  described  by  the  old  philosophers  as  the  connecting  link 
in  man  between  sense  and  reason.  It  is,  therefore,  under  differ- 
ent respects,  boih  the  highest  power  of  sense,  and,  in  some 
manner,  the  lowest  power  or  act  of  reason :  yet  this  power  is, 
in  itself,  merely  organic. 

The  human  soul,  by  the  power  of  consciousness,  can  reflect 
on  its  own  acts  and  what  affects  it,  and  see  these  operations  as 
its  own;  but  no  sense  or  organic  power,  whether  internal  or 
external,  can  reflect  on  itself  or  its  own  act ;  this  power  of 
reflex  action  pertains  to  simple  intellectual  substance  only. 

It  is,  perhaps,  not  too  much  to  aftirm  that  no  other  theory 
as  yet  proposed  by  philosophers,  so  consistently  or  so  satis- 
factorily explains  the  phenomena  of  what  may  be  termed  by 
^^nalogy,  the  brnte  mind,  or  which  accounts  equally  well  for  all 
that  which  is  merely  sensible  or  organic  operation,  in  man  also. 

THIS    THEORY    FOR    THE    EXPLANATION    OF    SENSE    COGNITION, 
ACCOUNTS    CONSISTENTLY    FOR    ALL    ITS    PHENOMENA. 

In  order  that  the  limits  of  purely  sensible  knowledge  may 
be  more  distinctly  traced,  and  be  more  clearly  seen,  it  will  be 
useful  to  consider  this  truth,  namely,  that  the  doctrine  of  in- 
ternal sense,  or  internal  organs  of  sensible  cognition,  i-;  in  itself 
not  rei)ugnant  to  the  nature  of  organic  power.  For  since  the 
fact  IS  undeniable  that  the  senses  have  many  virtues  or  perfec- 
tions of  various  species  and  degrees,  we  can  easily  conceive 
internal  ones  capable,  without  at  all  transcending  the  specific 
nature  of  organic  power,  of  receiving  and  acting  on  the  impres- 
sions conveyed  to  them  by  the  external  senses,  as  their  conna- 
tural objects;  analogously  to  the  manner  in  which  the  external 
senses  receive  and  act  on  impressions  from  their  objects. 

Since  the  sense  has  no  reflex  action,  the  impression  which  is 
actually  in  it  must  be  immediately  produced  by  the  object  and 
the  organ,  and  as  the  object  is  singular,  concrete  and  material, 
the  impression  as  in  the  organ,  though  vitally  received  by  it, 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  89 

must  be  a  material  effect.  Both  the  organ,  and  the  object 
are  material ;  therefore,  the  effect  of  their  combined  action  is 
material.  The  material  nature  or  character  of  the  impression 
in  the  external  sense,  is  all  that  is/<fr  se  or  necessarily  required 
to  constitute  it  the  connatural  object  of  another  organic  power 
that  is  sui)erior  to  the  external  sense.  That  the  fancy  is  an 
internal  organic  power  of  this  kind,  i.  e.,  that  its  proper  oi 
connatural  object  is  an  impression  furnished  by  the  external 
sense,  will  be  rendered  more  manifest  by  what  is  to  be  shown 
a  little  further  on. 

They  who  deny  or  fail  to  recognize  the  existence  of  internal 
senses,  attribute  all  sensible  operation,  whose  principle  is  not 
obvious,  or  which  cannot  be  explained  by  the  action  of  exter- 
nal sense  alone,  either  to  instinct  or  to  intellect.  Instinct,  in 
such  theory,  is  a  vague  and  indeterminate  power  which  is 
'made  to  account  f)r  all  cognoscive  operation  which  transcends 
the  capacity  of  external  sense.  But  this  is  to  evade  the  diffi- 
culty, n^t  to  explain  it.  Instinct,*  more  precisely  and  accu- 
rately understood,  is  a  natural  impulse  and  positive  tendency 
to  some  vital  action  which  is  useful  or  necessary  for  the  indi- 
vidual agent  or  its  species,  that  utility  of  the  action  not  being 
apprehended  or  known  by  it  as  an  e?id  to  be  attained.  Thus 
we  explain  some  actions  of  beavers,  ants,  migratory  birds,  etc. 
They  apprehend  certain  sensible  objects,  and  are  moved  by 
them  to  action ;  but  the  design  or  intention  of  the  end  in  their 
action,  we  ascribe,  through  the  law  of  their  nature,  to  the 
Author  of  their  being. 

Considered  in  itself,  instinct  appears  to  be  a  virtue  or  prin- 
ciple of  action  superadded  to  nature  as  operative,  over  and 
above  appetite  and  cognition ;  subserved  by  them,  and  direc- 
tive of  them  and  the  subject  to  which  they  belong,  in  certain 
matters  in  which  those  powers  are  not  sufficient  for  the  end  to 
be  attained. 

In  order  not  to  confound  merely  organic  action  with  intel- 
lectual action,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  truth  that  their 

»Div.  Th.  1,  2,  p.  on   40,  a.  3. 


90  logic:  second  part. 

objects  are  essentially  distinct  ;*  the  formal,  proper,  connatural 
object  of  organic  power  or  sense,  is  the  sin.o^ular,  or  concrete 
and  material  XQ'aXw.y  \  that  of  the  intellect,  is  the  abstract,  uni- 
versal or  intelligible,  which  is,  of  its  nature,  absolutely  super- 
sensible^  and  is  therefore  immaterial. 

THE    BRUTE    SOUL,    ANIMA    BELLUINA,    IS    MATERIAL. 

Brutes  evidently  have  those  cognitions  that  are  perfected  in 
sense  alone;  though  they  show  no  signs  whatever  that  they 
possess  intellect  or  free  will.  Their  action  is  physically  neces- 
sary and  uniform,  quid  detentmiatmn  ad  tmum,  "  what  is  deter- 
mined to  one  mode  of  action."  An  agent  which  is  thus  limited 
to  that  action  which  is  physically  necessary  has,  of  course,  no 
rational  empire  over  its  own  operation,  and,  therefore,  has  no 
intelligent  principle  of  action. 

It  cannot  be  legitimately  denied  that  an  agent  which  depends 
on  matter  in  all  its  action,  also  depends  on  matter  in  existing, 
according  to  the  metaphysical  principle,  "  modus  agendi  sequi- 
tur  modum  essendi,"  "action  is  according  to  the  essence  of  the 
agent:"  or,  that  which  is  material  in  its  action  is  also  material 
in  its  essence;  and  hence,  knowing  the  action,  we  may  justly 
conclude  a  posteriori  to  the  essence  or  nature  of  the  agent  that 
puts  it.  This  axiom  holds  true,  whether  the  agent  is  the  uni- 
vocal,  or  the  equivocal  cause  of  the  effect  produced  by  means 
of  its  act. 

The  argument  may  be  stated  more  strictly  in  form,  thus:  all 
organic  action  is  material  action,  because  both  the  organ  is 
material,  and  its  object  is  per  se  material ;  the  brute  mind  has 
none  but  organic  action,  and,  therefore,  it  has  none  but  mate- 
rial action.!     But  that  which  wholly  depends  on  matter  in  its 

*  "  Sentire,  et  consequentes  operationes  animas  sensitivas,  accidunt  cum  ali- 
qua  corporis  immutatioue  .  .  intelligere  exercetur  sine  organo  corporeo. ' ' 
(Vide  DiT.  Thorn.  Sum.,  1  p.,  qu.  75,  a.  3.)  To  feel  sensibly,  and  the  coaise- 
quent  operations  of  the  sensitive  soul,  happen  Avith  some  change  in  the  body 
.     .     .     to  understand,  is  exercised  Avitlaout  a  bodily  organ. 

t '  *  Cum  animse  brutorura  animalium  non  per  se  operentur,  non  sunt  subsis- 
tentes,  similiter  enim  unumquodque  habet  esse  et  operationem. ' '  (Div.  Th.  1  p. 
qu.  78,  a  3.)  Since  the  souls  of  brute  animals  do  not  operate  per  se,  they  do  not 
subsist,  (or  exist  alone  or  apart  from  matter) ,  for  every  thing  exists  and  acta  iu 
a  similar  manner. 


LOGIC  :   SECOND   PART.  91 

action,  also  depends-  wholly  on  matter  in  existing;  now,  the 
brute  soul  is  affixed  to  matter  and  Hmited  to  matter  in  all  its 
action ;  it  is,  therefore,  similarly  dependent  on  matter  in  exist- 
ing;  i.  e.,  it  can  not  exist  per  se,  or  a/o/ie  and  aj>ar^  from 
matter,  but  only  dependently  on  it. 

The  torce  of  this  reasoning  will  be  still  more  clearly  perceived, 
if  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  we  not  only  know  an  agent  by  its 
action,  and  know  it  only  by  its  action;  but  its  action  is,  in 
some  proper  sense  of  the  words,  the  7neasure  of  its  essence ; 
"unumquodque  agit  in  quantum  est  actu,  i.  e.,  in  quantum 
forma  actuatum ; "  "  every  thing  has  action^  in  proportion  as  it 
has  actual  essence T 

THE    HUxMAN    SOUL   A    SPIRITUAL    OR    IMMATERIAL    SUBSTANCE. 

By  similar  reasoning  it  follows  that  since  the  acts  of  the 
human  soul,  intellection  and  volition,  are  wholly  inorganic,  for 
their  objects  are  wholly  immaterial,  and  the  intellect  and  will 
elicit  their  acts  alojie^  i.  e.,  without  any  other  second  cause  as 
a  concurrent  principle,  the  soul  is  therefore  inimaterial;  or, 
since  the  human  soul  operates /<fr  ^(f,  or  without  direct  depend- 
ence on  matter,  it  also  can  exist  per  se,  or  is  an  immaterial 
substance. 

The  intellect  knows  material  or  sensible  things  by  their  intel- 
ligible essence;*  i.  e.,  by  real  intellectual  types  or  simihtudes  of 
them  expressed  in  concepts  of  their  essence ;  hence,  it  knows 
material  things  in  an  immaterial  manner,  which  it  is  not  possi- 
ble for  organic  power  to  do. 

The  human  soul,  when  existing  separate  from  the  body,  is 
said  to  subsist  incompletely ;  because,  by  its  very  nature,  it  is 
ordained  to  substantial  union  with  the  body.  But,  considered 
as  a  substance,  it  can  be  said  to  exist  completely  when  in  that 
state,  because  it  exists  per  se;  i.  e.,  it,  as  it  were,  stands  alone, 
or  exists  without  leaning  or  depending  on  another  thing,  by  in- 
hering in  it. 

♦"Essentiae  rerum  mater ialium  sunt  in  intellectu  hominis,  vel  an^eli,  ut 
intellectum  est  in  intelligente,  et  uon  secundum  suum  esse  reale. ' '  (Sum. ,  1  P. , 
Qu.  57,  Art.  1,  Ad.  2.)  The  essences  of  material  things  are  in  the  intellect  of 
man,  or  the  angel,  as  that  which  is  understood  is  in  that  which  understands, 
and  not  as  to  their  real  existence. 


955  logic:  second  part. 

It  would  seem  necessarily  to  follow  from  what  is  said  above 
that  the  brute  soul,  anima  bel/iiina,  is  a  substantial  and  living 
principle,  or,  as  expressed  by  the  old  philosophers,  forma  sub- 
staiitialis  et  priiicipium  vivens;  and,  in  fact,  such  it  evidently 
must  be.  Yet,  its  total  dependence  on  matter  in  operating 
proves  that  it  is  totally  of  matter  also  in  existing ;  it  can  exist 
only  in  union  by  composition  with  matter,  and  it  is,  therefore, 
only  incomplete^  and,    at    the   same    time,  partial  substance. 

Besides,  even  if  we  conceived  it  absolutely  possible  for  the 
brute  soul  to  exist  separate  from  matter,  to  which  it  must 
naturally  be  affixed  in  existing,  as  shown  above ;  then  it  could 
have  no  sensible  action,  for  it  would  be  destitute  of  an  organ ; 
it  could  have  no  spiritual  action,  for  it  would  have  no  intellect; 
therefore,  its  state  would  be  that  of  mere  potentiality,  or  exist- 
ence without  action ;  i.  e.,  the  supposition  is  absurd. 

IS  THE  IMAGINATION  AN  ORGANIC  POWER;  OR,  IS  THE  SUBJECT 
IN  WHICH  IT  RESIDES,  THE  SOUL;  I.  E.,  THE  SPIRITUAL 
SUBSTANCE  AS  ESSENTIALLY  DISTINGUISHED  FROM  MATTER  ? 

The  imagination  or  fancy  is  organic ;  or,  its  subject  is  the 
living  compound,  and  not  the  soul  or  spiritual  substance  alone; 
its  peculiar  function  in  man  is  to  serve  the  intellect,  or  to  pre- 
sent objects  to  it  by  means  of  true  images  of  those  objects.* 

It  is  an  organic  power,  for  the  brute  animal  possesses  no 
higher  principle  of  action  than  that  of  sense  or  organic  power, 
as  already  seen  ;  but  the  brute  has  imagination,  and  even  sen- 
sible memory  also;  for  the  arguments  which  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  fancy  in  them,  at  the  same  time  conclusively  show 
them  to  possess  organic  or  sensible  memory.  For  the  perfect 
animal,  imagination  is  physically  necessary,  since  it  must  know 
sensible  things  not  only  as  present  and  acting  on  its  external 
organs ;  but  it  must  know  them  when  they  are  absent  so  that 
,it  may  tend  to  such  objects  as  are  necessary  for  sustenance, 

*  *  'Anima  rationalis,  licet  quamdiu  corpus  informat,  supponat  operationera 
phantasiae  quas  per  organiim  operatur,  tamen  oi-gano  non  elicit  suam  intcllec- 
tionem."  (Irenaeus  Cai-mclit,  et  philosophi  passim.)  The  rational  soul,  though 
so  long  as  it  informs  the  Ijody  it  suppose  the  operation  of  fimcy  which  act* 
through  an  organ,  does  not  elicit  its  intellection  by  an  organ. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAKT.  93 

preservation,  etc.  But  to  form  and  preserve  the  images  of 
sensible  things,  to  reproduce  and  recognize  them,  are  respect- 
ively the  functions  of  fancy  and  sensible  memory.  Since  brutes 
have  no  intellect,  this  power  must  be  merely  organic  in  them ; 
it  follows,  therefore,  that  the  faculty,  imagination,  is,  at  least, 
not  pe7'  se,  or  necessarily  intellectual. 

But  even  in  man  this  power  can  form  the  image  of  no  ob- 
ject except  one  that  is  either  sensible  in  itself,  or  which  it  can 
represent  as  invested  with  sensible  forms  or  qualities.  Now, 
a  power  that  can  have  no  object  of  action  but  that  which  is 
sefisibk,  and,  therefore,  material,  must  itself  be  material;  for 
the  7iatiire  of  a  power  is  known  by  the  specific  objects  of  its 
action,  since  action  follows  the  nature,  or  agrees  with  the  nature 
of  the  agent.  The  imagination  in  man  is,  therefore,  an  organic 
power,  or  its  subject  is  the  living  compound  of  soul  and  body. 
Or,  in  fewer  words,  the  imagination  is  not  an  intellectual  prin- 
ciple, because  its  connatural  object  is  only  the  sensible  or 
material ;  and,  hence,  it  is  per  se,  or  essentially  material  or 
organic. 

The  imagination  in  man  is  sometimes  termed  ''the  medium 
between  the  senses  and  the  intellect;"  ''phantasia  est  media 
inter  sensum  et  intellectum."  Hence,  without  the  action  of 
the  external  senses,  the  fancy  could  form  no  images  of  sensible 
objects;  without  the  action  of  the  fancy,  the  intellect  could 
not  naturally  have  any  communication  whatever  with  any  real 
object,  or  any  sensible  power  of  cognition,  and  hence  it  would 
be  totally  insulated  from  all  the  proper  objects  of  its  action. 
The  fandy,  therefore,  is  for  the  intellect  the  essential  medium 
of  conununicatiori  with  the  entire  order  of  reality.  As  we  are 
now  constituted,  the  intellect  cannot  contemplate  or  even  per- 
ceive any  object,  except  as  in  some  manner  embodied  and 
I'ejlected  in  that  ??iinor* 

The  fancy  can  form  no  image  every  real  component  of 
which  was  not  originally  acquired  by  the  actual  observation 

♦"Corpus  requiritur  ad  actionem  intellectus,  non  sicnt  organum  quo  talis 
actio  exerceatur,  sed  ratioue  objecti . ' '  (Div.  Th.  1  p,  qu.  75,  a.  2,  ad.  3.)  '  'The 
body  is  required  for  the  action  of  the  intellect,  not  as  an  organ  by  which  such 
action  is  exercised,  but  on  account  oj  the  object. 


94  logic:  second  part. 

of  sensible  things :  a  man  blind  from  his  birth  can  have  in  his 
fancy  no  real  image  of  color;  "  quibus  deficit  unus  sensus, 
deficit  una  scientia;  "  "they  who  never  pofisessed  any  one 
sense,  are  destitute  of  one  species  of  cognition." 

WHAT,  IN  REGARD  TO  MENTAL  THOUGHT,  IS  THE  SPECIAL 
FUNCTION  OR  ACT  OF  THE  IMAGINATION,  WHOSE  CONNA- 
TURAL   OBJECT,    AS    ALREADY    SHOWN,  IS    PER    SE    MATERIAL. 

Imagination  is  generically  the  same  in  man  and  brute;  in  man 
it  forms  and  presents  images  to  the  intellect,  which  the  intellect 
contemplates,  and  by  abstraction  forms  from  them  its  intel- 
ligible concepts  or  ideas  of  things.*  In  the  brute  its  images 
serve  as  objects  for  the  faculty  of  sense,  termed  potentia  cesti- 
mativa,  or  power  of  sensibly  discerning  objects  as  good  or 
noxious  for  the  animal :  t  called  by  what  name  soever,  unde- 
niable facts  prove  that  brute  animals  possess  this  faailiy  of 
distinguishing  such  uses  or  intentions  of  sensible  objects,  no 
less  than  facts  also  prove  demonstratively  that  they  have  no 
intellectual  act. 

That  no  brute  faculty  can  apprehend  the  abstract  or  universal, 
or  can  judge,  is  strictly  demonstrated  by  induction  only ;  but 
this  induction,  it  cannot  be  questioned,  has  long  since  actually 
been  made  by  mankind,  logically,  over  and  over  again,  and  in 
the  most  general  manner;  and  each  one's  daily  observation 
verifies  the  conclusion  which  is  known,  as  a  fact,  to  have  been 
reached  by  mankind.  Whence  it  logically  suffices  here  merely 
to  affirm  the  impossibility  of  any  duly  attested  law  or  fact  of 
brute  action  being  adduced,  which  cannot  be  fully  accounted 
for,  by  the  operation  of  sensible  or  organic  powers,  as  they  are 
above  described. 

*  With  strange  confusion,  both  of  thought  and  of  language,  this  action  of  the 
intellect  is,  by  certain  writers,  called  imagination.  Wherefore,  since  this  volume 
contains  no  treatise  on  the  science  of  Psychology,  it  was  judged  advisable  to 
explain,  more  fully  and  explicitly  in  this  place  the  specific  and  distinguishing 
acts  of  fancy  and  intellect,  than  is  strictly  pertinent  to  a  work  on  Logic  and 
General  Metaphysics. 

t  "Ad  apprehendendimi  intenliones  quae  per  sensimiuon  accipiuntur  ordinatur 
vis  aBStimativa."  (Div.  Th.,  1  p.,  qu.  78,  a.  4.)  The  vis  cBStimativa,  or  power 
of  sensibly  appreciating,  is  ordained  for  apprehending  the  uses  or  intentions 
Which  are  not  received  through  the  external  sense. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  95 

THE  NATURE  AND  THE  CONNATURAL  OBJECT  OF  THE  EXTER- 
NAL senses;  they  do  not  err  per  SE,  L  E.,  they  CAN- 
NOT PHYSICALLY  CAUSE  ERROR. 

The  external  senses  are  the  five  organs  through  which  the 
mind  becomes  cognizant  of  various  exterior*  objects,  by- 
means  of  the  properties  of  those  objects.  The  organs  are  in 
themselves  capable  of  being  acted  on,  and  of  conveying  to 
the  mind  the  impressions  received,  but  are  indifferent  as  to 
their  particular  object;  their  action  is  determined  in  species 
by  the  connatural  and  singular  object,  which  is  duly  present 
to  them.  The  external  senses  are,  sight,  hearing,  touch,  taste, 
smell. 

Senset  is  an  organic  power  of  the  soul,  and  is  cognoscive 
only  of  those  thmgs  that  are  singular  and  material;  i.  e.,  ist, 
it  is  an  active  principle,  whose  subject  is  ma?i,  or  the  compound 
of  soul  and  body,  and  not  a  part  only  of  man,  as  is  the  case 
with  the  intellect,  whose  subject  is  the  spiritual  substance  of  the 
soul  alone,  not  the  compound ;  2d,  sense  is  termed  organic,  be- 
cause it  is  affixed  to  an  orga?i,  which,  as  already  observed,  is  a 
compound  of  soul  and  matter;  and  hence,  under  this  respect, 
sejtse  could  also  be  denominated  a  power  of  the  body,  or  a  cor- 
poreal power;  3d,  it  perceives  or  apprehends  only  the  sijigu- 
lar;  i.  e.,  the  concrete,  determinate  individual;  while  the  in- 
tellect, on  the  contrary,  has  for  its  object  the  univeisal;  4th, 
it  cannot  attain  in  its  action  to  every  species  of  si?tgular  thing; 
V.  g.,  it  cannot  perceive  an  angel,  but  its  object  is  only  the  sin- 
gular which  is  at  the  same  time  material.\  The  sensible,  there- 
fore, or  the  object  of  se?ise,  may  be  defined  to  be  "any  material, 

*  ' '  Sensus  non  apprehendit  essentias  rerum,  sed  exteriora  accidentia  tantum; 
similiter  neque  imaginatio."  (Div.  Ttiom.  1  P.,  Qu.  57,  Art.  1,  ad.  2.)  Sense 
does  not  apprehend  the  essences  of  things,  but  only  exterior  accidents;  like- 
wise, the  imagination  does  not  apprehend  the  essences  of  things. 

t "  Sensus  est  facultas  animae  organica,  singularium  materialium  cognosci- 
tiva."  Sense  is  an  organic  power  of  tlie  soul,  capable  of  knowing  singulax 
material  objects. 

\  ' '  Omne  sensibile  est  materiale. ' '    Whatever  is  sensible  is  material. 


96  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

extended,  and  singular  object  or  being,  which  is  perfective  of 
sense  or  organic  power,  by  intimate  conjunction  with  it."* 

An  object  is  sensible^  either  per  se,\  ox  per  accidens;  an  object 
is  sensible  per  se  or  of  itself,  which  has,  of  its  own  nature,  the 
power  of  perceptibly  affecting,  or  producing  an  impression  on 
the  sense;  v.  g.,  light  has  of  itself,  and  by  its  own  nature,  the 
power  of  physically  producing  such  impression  on  the  eye;  heat, 
on  the  touch,  etc. 

An  object  is  said  to  be  se?isible  per  accidens,  when,  without 
having  any  power  in  itself  to  act  on  the  sense,  yet  it  has  con- 
joined with  it  some  property  or  accide?it  by  means  of  which  it 
does  become  known  as  present.  In  this  case,  while  it  does 
not  itself  physically  act  on  the  sense,  yet  it  becomes  known  to 
tlie  sense  in  some  manner,  by  means  of  another  thing  in  con- 
junction with  it,  that  does  thus  act;  v.  g.,  Soci'ates  has  cotn- 
plexion,  animal  heat,  etc.;  the  color  can  be  seen  per  se,  the  heat 
can  be  felt  per  se ;  but  it  is  not  Socrates  the  person  that  thus 
acts  per  se  on  the  sefises,  for  se7ise  is  immediately  acted  on,  not 
by  substajice,  but  by  accidents  only;  hence,  Socrates  is  an  object 
that  is  sensible  per  accidens;  or,  more  generally,  substa?ice,  as 
such,  is  sensible  only  per  accidens  ;  i.  e.,  substance,  as  such,  is 
not  properly  a  sensible  object  at  all. 

For  an  object  to  become  seiisible  per  accidens,  the  following 
conditions  must  be  fulfilled ;  ist,  it  must  be  susceptible  of  a 
property  or  accident  which  x^perse,  or  of  itself,  capable  of  acting 
on  the  sense,  and  also  actually  have  such  property  or  accident; 
2d,  it  must  be  an  object  which  can  be  known /^r  se  or  in  itself, 
either  by  the  intellect,  or  by  some  sense  or  organic  power; 
V.  g  ,  the  senses  perceive  or  know  material  substance  per  acci- 
dens, the  intellect  alone  can  know  liper  se;  i.  e.,  as  its  proper 
object;  a  colored  object  may  be  known  per  accidens  by  the 
touch,  but  it  is  known  per  se,  or  as  its  proper  object  only  by 

*"  Sensibile  est  ens  materiale  extensum,  singulare,  perfectiviim  sensus  per 
intimani  cum  eo  conjunctiouem."  The  sensible  is  a  material  being,  extended; 
singular,  and  perfective  of  sense  by  intimate  conjxiuction  with  it. 

t  * '  Sensus  externus  non  fertur  in  priBteritum  nee  futurum. ' '  External  sense 
does  not  attain  to  that  which  is  past,  or  future. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND    PART.  97 

the  Slight.  If  both  the  foregoing  conditions  be  not  verified, 
an  object  cannot,  indeed,  be  known  by  the  senses  at  all. 

I'he  sensible  per  se  is  either  proper,  or  common;  the  prope)^ 
sensible  is  what  can  be  perceived  by  one  sense  and  only  by 
one  sense;  v.  g,,  color,  as  such,  is  the  proper  object  of  sight 
only,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  perceived,  as  such,  by  any 
other  sense. 

The  common  se?isible,  f  is  what  can  be  perceived  by  more 
senses  than  one,  and  it  is  on  that  account  said  to  be  common 
to  them,  or  their  common  object.  Under  the  name,  common 
sensible,  five  classes  of  sensible  objects  are  enumerated  as  in- 
cluding all  things  to  which  the  term  is  applicable;  viz.:  "  motion, 
rest,  number,  figure  and  size."  These  are  all  objects  both  of 
sight  and  touch,  and  they  may,  also,  in  certain  cases,  fall  under 
the  other  senses,  as  a  little  reflection  will  show.  All  the  qual- 
ities or  accidents  of  material  objects  which  can  be  perceived 
by  more  senses  than  one,  can  be  reduced  to  one  or  other  of 
the  preceding  five  genera  of  common  sensibles.  Size,  as  per- 
ceived by  the  eye,  is  modified  and  corrected  when  perceived 
by  the  touch ;  and  vice  versa.  Distance  seen  by  the  eye,  and 
distance  attested  by  the  touch,  serve  to  correct  and  perfect  the 
judgment  of  it  in  the  mind. 

It  may  be  said,  then;  ist,  that  the  common  sensible  modifies 
i\\Q  proper;  2d,  that  the  sensible  per  accidens  is  known  only  by 
means  of  \.\\q  proper,  but  it  does  not  in  any  manner  modify  the 
action  of  \\-\q  proper  sensible  \  on  its  own  particular  organ;  3d, 

*"Proprium  sensibile  uno  solo  sensu  sentitur:  commune,  pluribus."  The 
proper  sensible  is  apprehemled  by  one  sense  only :  the  common,  by  more  than  one. 

t  "  Communia  non  sunt  sensibilia  per  accidens;  quia  hujusmodi  sensibilia 
aliquam  diversitatem  faciunt  in  immutatioue  sensus  ' '  (alterius) .  (Div.  Thorn. 
Ip.,  qu.  7S,  art.  4,  ad.  .2.)  The  common  sensible  is  not  sensible  merely  per 
accidens^  for  it  really  causes  an  efl'ect  on  the  sense. 

X  ' '  Sensibile  per  accidens  nuUam  vim  habet  ex  se  movendi  vel  immutandi  sen 
sum.  * '  The  sensibile  per  accidens  has  no  power,  of  itself ,  of  moving  or  immedi 
ately  aQecting  sense. 

"  Pro;n-mm  est  quod  ita  uno  sensu  percipitur,  ut  alio  percipi  nonpossit;  et 
circa  quod  sensus  errare  non  potest.  Commune  est,  quod  pluribus  sensibus 
potest  percipi,  et  circa  quod  sensus  potest  falli.'^  'Hhe  proper  sensible  is,  xn^v- 
ceived  by  one  sense  only,  and  it  cannot  be  apprehended  by  another :  in  regard 
to  it,  the  sense  cannot  err.  The  common  sensible  can  be  perceived  by  move 
senses  than  one,  unu  in  respect  to  it,  the  sense  can  err. 


98  LOGIC  :    SECOND    PART. 

in  the  common  sensible,  the  same  property  may  be  perceived 
through  different  organs,  but  it  is  done  by  specifically  different 
action  in  them. 

The  mind  is  invincibly  impelled  to  refer  the  impressions 
received  through  the  senses  to  the  external  objects  acting  on 
them,  and  thereby  manifesting  themselves  to  it  as  their  cause; 
not,  however,  by  blind  impulse,  but  by  the  evidence.  The 
mind  thus  refers  the  impressions  received,  even  before  any 
reflex  judgment,  because  it  thereby  actually  perceives  through 
the  senses  the  properties  or  objects  that  produce  them.  This 
inborn  and  resistless  propensity  to  refer  our  sensations,  or  the 
impressions  made  on  the  senses,  to  corporeal  or  physically 
existing  beings,  as  their  actual  cause ;  or,  in  other  words,  this 
sensation  thus  received  and  referred,  is  the  testimony  afforded 
by  the  senses. 

Sensible  objects  act  through  their  properties  on  the  organs ; 
these  properties  are,  ist,  primary  or  absolute  properties;  that 
is,  such  as,  in  some  manner,  flow  from  their  essence,  and  with- 
out which  they  cannot  naturally  exist;  as,  etctension,  figure, 
motion,  or  rest ;  2d,  relative  or  seco?idary  properties  ;  as,  color, 
taste,  particular  size,  etc.  But  as  the  senses  do  not  of  them- 
selves judge,  and  are  incapable  of  reflex  action,  it  is  only  the 
mind  that  perceives  the  nature  of  objects,  or  that  of  their  prop- 
erties. It  is  true  that  there  is  an  implicit  or  imitated  judg- 
ment in  every  sensation  as  such,  since  it  may  be  regarded 
as  an  affirmation,  in  a  wide  sense  of  the  term  ;  but,  because 
the  action  of  sense  is  in  itself  entirely  subject  to  physical  and 
natural  law,  this  implicit  or  imitated  judgment  must  be  referred 
through  the  law  of  their  nature,  in  obedience  to  which  they 
act  necessarily  and  truly,  to  the  Creator  of  the  senses.*     Ex- 

*  "  Veritas  aliqiia  rppcritiir  in  simplici  mentis  conceptione,neqiie  solum  men- 
tis, sed  etiam  sensiuim  .  .  constat  quae  et  qualis  sit  hjcc  Veritas  qnai  in  sim- 
plici mentis  notitia  reperitur:  nihil  enim  alind  est  quam  Veritas  ipsa  transcend- 
entalis,  his  entibus  accommodata."  (Suarez  Metaph.,  Disp.  8,  Sect.  3.)  There 
Is  a  kind  of  truth  found  in  the  simple  conception  of  the  mind,  and  not  only  in 
the  conceptions  of  the  mind,  but  in  those  also  of  the  senses.  .  .  .  It  is  clear 
of  what  nature  this  truth  is,  Avhich  is  found  in  the  simple  knowledge  of  the 
mind:  it  is  indeed  nothing  else  than  transcendental  truth,  accommodated  to 
those  things 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAET.  99 

ternal  objects,  as  remarked,  act  through  their  properties  on  the 
senses ;  the  senses  are,  therefore,  said  to  know  per  accidens,  or 
accidentally,  the  substance;  it  being  invariably  conjoined  with 
those  properties.  But,  substance  is  per  se  known,  i.  e.,  can 
be  smd  formally  3.nd  property  to  be  known  by  the  intellect  only. 

DOES  THE  MIND,  THEN,  ATTAIN  TO  THE  CERTAIN  KNOWL- 
EDGE OF  OUTWARD  OR  SENSIBLE  OBJECTS  BY  MEANS  OF 
THE    SENSES? 

The  soul  informs*  each  organ  of  sense ;  and  on  that  account 
the  soul  is  the  principle  through  which  the  organ  feels,  or  acts 
vitally  ;  and  hence,  by  some,  consciousness,  or  the  soul  as  con- 
scious, is  termed  the  basis  of  sensation.  Yet,  the  soul  being 
affixed  to  an  organ,  its  natural  action  through  that  organ  is 
subject  to  necessary  law ;  i.  e.,  the  organs  of  sense,  in  actually 
perceiving  the  impressions  from  external  objects,  are  governed 
by  physical  laws  of  nature  which  are  immutable,  except  by 
miracle.  When  an  organ  is  in  its  normal  condition,  the  object 
and  concurrent  circumstances  being  the  same,  the  organic 
action  will  always  be  the  same ;  but  a  change  in  the  normal 
state  of  the  organ  will,  in  obedience  to  physical  law,  modify 
the  impression  received  from  those  objects,  according  to  the 
nature  and  extent  of  that  change.! 

But  it  will  help  to  the  clearer  intelligence  of  the  matter,  if 
we  consider  these  sensible  impressions  :  ist,  as  they  affect  the 
organ,  and  are  modifications  of  it;  2d,  as  representative  of  the 
objects  from  which  they  are  received.  These  imprcAsions,  con- 
sidered as  modifications  of  the  organ,  are  always  true,  whether 
the  mind  errs  in  its  judgment  or  not ;  for,  whether  the  organ 
be  well  or  ill  disposed,  it  conveys  the  impression  just  as  it 
receives  it.  There  is  in  it  that  necessary  action  which  belongs 
to  all  agents,  which  operate  in  obedience  to  natural  law  ;  and, 
therefore,  if  the  organ  be  disordered,  the  impression  received 

*^'  Forma  est  prineipium  agendi  in  unoquoque. ' '  The  form  is  the  prlnciplt 
of  action  in  every  objeet. 

t  *'  Quidqiiid  recipitiir,  secundum  modura  recipientis  r«cipitur. ' '  Whatever 
in  received,  is  received  according  to  the  nature  of  the  recipient. 


100  LOGIC  :    SECOND    PART. 

is  modified  by  die  disease,  according  to  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  affection  ;  but  it  still  conveys  what  it  receives,  no  more, 
no  less.  Therefore,  the  senses /<fr  j^,  or  of  themselves,  do  not 
deceive,  since  they  act  by  the  necessary  laws  of  nature  itself, 
and  these  laws  are  true  and  uniform;  i.  e.,  they  always  act  \n 
♦he  same  manner,  under  the  same  circumstances. 

But  when  we  consider  sensible  impressions  as  repj-eseutafive 
of  the  objects  from  which  they  are  received,  the  senses,  being 
ill-disposed,  or  right  means  not  being  employed  to  use  them 
prudently  in  judging,  may  become  the  occasion,  but  not  strictly 
the  efficient  cause,  of  error.  Thus,  when  the  palate  is  disor- 
dered, that  may  seem  to  the  mind  to  taste  bitter  which  is  in 
itself  sweet ;  to  a  diseased  eye,  that  may  seem  yellow  which  is 
really  white ;  but,  in  these  cases,  the  qualities  tasted  and  seen 
are  not  really,  or  a  parte  rei,  the  sweet  or  white  in  the  objects; 
but  these  qualities  as  modified  or  overpowered  by  other  causes. 
It  is  not  the  function  ot  the  sense  to  judge,  or  distinguish 
cause  and  effect ;  this  is  the  function  of  the  mind ;  the  only 
proper  office  of  the  organ  is  to  receive  the  impression  as  given 
and  convey  it  to  the  mind  as  received.  Hence,  the  senses,  by 
accident,  not  per  se,  may  be  the  cause,  or  rather  the  occasion^ 
of  erroneous  judgment. 

For  the  testimony  of  the  senses  to  afford  an  infallible  motive 
of  certainty,  the  following  conditions  must  be  fulfilled  :  ist, 
the  object  must  be  duly  present ;  otherwise,  a  steeple,  for 
example,  that  is  square  may  be  judged  to  be  round;  2d,  the 
organs  of  sensation  must  be  in  a  healthy  or  7iormal  condition; 
v.  g.,  a  jaundiced  eye  makes  all  objects  appear  with  a  yellow 
tinge;  3d,  there  must  be  agreement  in  the  sensations  received, 
both  through  the  same  organ,  and  different  organs,  according 
to  the  nature  of  the  object ;  and  they  should  be  compared  by 
the  mind ;  in  default  of  this  condition,  a  staff  that  is  partly  in 
the  water  will  be  judged  to  be  crooked,  when  in  reality  it  is 
straight,  the  different  refracting  powers  of  air  and  water  not 
being  attended  to  by  the  mind. 

Thus  we  have  certainty  as  to  external  objects,  because  they 
afford  the  mind,  through  the  organs  of  sense,  the  evidence  of 


LOGIC  :    SECOND    PART.  101 

their  existence,  qualities,  etc. ;  and,  therefore,  the  mind  is  cer- 
tain of  their  truth,  because  it  sees  that  truth.  From  this  it  fol- 
lows that  the  certainty  which  we  have  through  the  testimony  of 
the  senses  is  founded  on  eindence,  the  ultimate  motive  of  all 
genuine  certainty ;  lor  we  see  the  essential  connection  between 
the  testimony  of  the  senses,  and  the  reality  of  their  objects,  on 
the  one  hand ;  and  on  the  other,  the  divine  veracity ;  and  this 
is  evidence. 

To  affirm  that  the  objects  of  sense  can  per  se  cause  error ; 
i.  e.,  by  their  own  real  action  produce  error ^  is  to  compromise 
divine  veracity;  because  the  physical  laws  of  nature  depend 
for  their  force  and  whole  efficacy  on  God ;  and  natural  falsity^ 
either  in  them  or  in  the  objects  subject  to  them,  would  be  refer- 
able to  God  as  its  cause. 

As  the  imagination,  or  power  of  forming  and  reproducing 
images  of  things,  is  organic;  that  is,  the  soul  in  intimate  union 
by  real  composition  with,  and  acting  through,  a  material  organ 
as  its  instrument ;  it  is  liable,  as  already  remarked,  to  disease 
and  disordered  action,  inasmuch  as  it  is  material.  Hence,  this 
organ,  above  all  others,  may  interrupt  or  disturb  the  normal 
action  of  the  mind ;  since  the  mind,  as  we  are  actually  consti- 
tuted, can  have  no  normal  action  without  it;  in  other  words, 
the  imagination  truly  co-operates  in  all  thought,  by  presenting 
or  exhibiting  its  images,  or  the  objects  of  thought  in  which  the 
intellect  sees  the  intelligible.  Whence  it  follows  that  the  human 
mind,  while  in  connection  with  the  body  on  earth,  cannot 
naturally  have  completely  independent,  or,  in  every  respect, 
purely  spiritual  action;  i.  e.,  it  requires  the  aid  of  the  imagina- 
tion,* Yet,  this  aid  is  merely  extrinsic  ;  for  the  acts  of  the 
understanding  are  immanent,  and  are  elicited  by  the  faculty 
alone,  as  their  immediate  or  proximate  principle.  But,  even 
in  the  concepts  of  objects  the  most  abstract,  the  imagination 
co-operates  with  the  action  of  the  mind,  by  presenting  terms 
and  various  related  objects  under  their  quasi  images  or  their 
names.      A  striking  proof  of  this   necessary  co-operation  of 

*  VideS.  Th.  1  p.,  qu.  84,  a.  7.  "  Principinm nostrae  cognitionis  est  a  sensii." 
The  beginninsc  of  our  knowledge  is  from  the  senses. 


102  logic:  second  part. 

the  imagination  in  all  our  intellectual  action,  as  noticed  iu 
another  place,  may  be  drawn  from  the  facts  learned  by  obser- 
vation of  insane  minds.  The  mind,- as  such,  or  the  soul,  being 
immaterial  and  simple,  is  incapable  of  dissolution  or  decom- 
position, and,  therefore,  it  cannot  be  diseased  in  its  substance ; 
but  the  imagination,  being  an  organ,  is  material,  and  it  is, 
therefore,  susceptible  of  disease. 

To  recapitulate  what  has  been  said  :  The  action  of  external 
objects  (^n  the  sensible  organs  is  modified  by  various  causes, 
which  may  all,  however,  be  reduced  to  two  classes;  ist,  the 
medium  through  which  the  object  acts  may  be  more  or  less 
changed  by  the  agency  of  other  mediums  which  intervene  and 
combine  or  mingle  with  it;  v.  g.,  the  appearance  of  an  object 
seen  at  a  distance  is,  in  some  instances,  subject  to  many  muta- 
tions of  color,  figure  and  size,  arising  from  vapors,  by  which 
the  refraction  and  transmission  of  light  are  changed.  A  second 
class  of  causes  which  affect  the  sensation  as  actually  received, 
are  such  as  influence  the  natural  action  of  the  organ  itself;  v. 
g.,  disease,  excitement,  diminished  activity,  etc.  Although  the 
external  senses  do  not  err  per  se,  since  they  convey  only  the 
impressions  which  they  actually  receive  from  physical  and  real 
objects,  even  when  these  impressions  happen  to  be  modified 
either  in  the  medium  or  in  the  organ ;  yet,  it  is  conceded  that 
they  may  err  per  accide?is,  or  accideiitally*  By  this  it  is  meant 
that,  under  special  conditions,  their  impressions  are  conjoined 
with  e7'ror  in  the  cognition  or  judgment,  which  these  impres- 
sions do  not  physically  produce,  but  to  which,  however,  they 
give  occasioti.  This  is  an  exceptional  case,  is  accidental,  and 
affords  matter  for  exercising  the  intellectual  virtues,  art  and 
prudence,] 

While  this  contingent  and  occasional  error  does  not  destroy 
the  essence  of  certainty  in  sensible  cognitions,  yet  it  cannot  be 

*  "  Qui  occasione  sensimm  in  errorem  incidit,  non  ideo  fallitur  ob  malum 
mintium,  sed  quia  ipse  mains  est  judex. ' '  (S.  Aug.  de  vera  Relig.,  C.  33.)  He 
that  by  occasion  of- the  senses  falls  into  error,  is  not  therefore  deceived  because 
of  a  bad  witness,  but  because  he  himself  is  a  bad  judge. 

t  "  Ars  et  prudentia  circa  contingentia  versantur."    Art  and  prudence  re 
gard  contingent  things  as  their  proper  objects. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  103 

denied  th:^t  it  weakens  the  force  of  such  certainty  in  its  whole 
species.* 

It  should,  perhaps,  be  said  here,  also,  for  the  fuller  explana- 
tion of  the  whole  subject,  that  the  imagination^  when  in  an 
abnormal  state,  as  it  is  in  the  demented,  errs  per  se,  or,  truly 
causes  error;  for,  in  such  condition  of  that  organ,  true  judg- 
ment is  physically  impossible^  at  least  in  reference  to  some 
matter;  or,  in  other  words,  error  is  then  physically  necessary. 
When  the  imagination  is  diseased,  then  by  its  own  physical 
action,  or  ex  se,  it  obtrudes  images  or  phantasmata  before  the 
mind,  which  are  objectively  false,  and  which,  nevertheless,  the 
intellect  necessarily  apprehends  as  being  really  true.  Hence, 
then,  it  may  be  argued  thus:  that  organic  t^owqx  per  se  deceives, 
which  physically  necessitates  error  in  the  judgment  or  cogni- 
tion; but  the  insane  fancy  does  this;  therefore,  the  insane  fancy 
per  se  deceives.  Hence  it  is  that  such  agent  becomes  irre- 
sponsible. 

But  obser/e  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  image  furnished  by  a 
disordered  external  sense,  as  a  jaundiced  eye,  is  not,  in  strict 
language,  objectively  false;  for,  its  object  is  real,  not  purely  fic- 
titious, as  are  the  phantasms  of  an  insane  imagination ;  and, 
moreover,  in  the  event,  of  abnormal  sensations,  correct  knowl- 
edge and  true  judgment  are  still  attainable,  which  is  not  the 
case  in  reference  to  the  objects  presented  by  the  fancy  when  it 
is  organically  diseased,  so  as  to  be  incapable  of  normal  action. 


ARTICLE     III. 

SIMPLE  APPREHENSION,  JUDGMENT  AND  REASONING,  ALL  FUR- 
NISH INFALLIBLE  MOTIVES  OF  CERTAINTY,  AS  TO  THEIR 
PROPER    OBJECTS. 

The  understanding,  or  intellect,  is  an  inorganic  faculty ;  or, 

*  "  Sensus  fallitiu*  circa  proprium  objectum;  sed  solum  ;jer  acciden-s,  etrarius: 
inde  nihilominus  naturalis  cognitionis  certitudinem  minui,  nemo  negaverit." 
(IveiuBus,  De  An.,  c.  2,  sect.  2,  §.  3.)  The  sense  is  deceived  about  its  proper 
object,  but  only  per  acddens ,  or  by  accident,  and  very  rarely;  hence,  neverthe- 
less, no  one  will  deny  that  the  certainty  of  natural  cognition  is  thereby  some- 
what diminished. 


104  logic:  second  paet. 

in  other  words,  it  is  not  affixed  to  any  organ  of  the  human 
compound;  but  its  acts  are  proximately  from  itself,  and  are,  in 
themselves,  purely  super-sensible ;  and  it  resides  in  the  soul, 
as  its  only  subject. 

The  formal,  adequate  and  connatural  object  of  the  human 
intellect,  i.  e.,  the  intellect  of  man,  who  essentially  consists  of 
soul  and  body  united,  by  substantial  composition^  is  the  quiddity^ 
or  essence^  of  sensible  things.*  Its  cognitions  begin  with  the 
sensible ;  by  means  of  the  sensible  it  proceeds  to  the  abstract 
or  super-sensible,  which  it  understands  by  comparing  it  to  cor- 
poreal things,  or  the  objects  of  sense,  t  The  formal  object  of 
cognition  should  be  proportioned  to,  or  commensurate  with, 
the  power  which  knows;  it,  therefore,  should  possess  a  corres- 
ponding degree  of  immateriality  with  it.  In  other  words,  the 
object  should  be,  in  some  proper  sense  of  the  terms,  as  far 
removed  from  matter  as  the  power;  for,  as  cognoscive  power 
rises  in  perfection,  so  must  its  formal  object  rise  also ;  and  as 
the  power  approximates  or  recedes  from  matter,  according  to 
the  greater  or  less  degree  of  its  perfection,  so  also  must  its 
object. 

According  to  this  principle,  the  uncreated  essence  of  God, 
is  the  commensurate  or  adequate  object  of  the  divine  intellect; 
spiritual  or  Angelic  essence,  i.  e.,  created  immaterial  essence, 
is  the  proportioned  object  of  Angelic  intellect;  the  essence  of 
the  human  soul,  is  the  connatural  and  proportioned  object  of 
the  cognoscive  soul  when  existing  separated  from  the  body ; 
the  essence  of  sensible  things,  is  the  primary  and  conwie?tsurate 
object  of  the  human  intellect,  when  the  soul  is  affixed  to  matter 

*  ' '  Omnia  quae  in  prsesenti  statu  intelligimus,  cognoscuntur  a  nobis  per  cora- 
parationem  ad  res  sensibiles  et  naturales. ' '  (Div.  Thorn. ,  1  p. ,  qu.  87,  art.  7.) 
All  things  which  we  understand  in  our  present  state,  are  known  to  us  through 
comparison  to  things  that  are  sensible  and  natural,  (that  act  by  necessary  phys- 
ical laws,  or  are  sensible  and  physical  agents.) 

t  "  Intellectus  humani,  qui  est  conjunctus  corpori,  proprium  objectum  est 
quidditas,  sive  natura  in  materia  corporali  existens,  et  per  hujusmodi  naturas 
rerum  visibilium,  etiam  in  invisibilium  rerum  aliquam  cognitionem  ascendit.'- 
(Div.  Thom. ,  1  p. ,  qu.  84,  art.  7  in  C.)  The  object  of  the  human  intellect  which 
is  conjoined  to  the  body,  is  the  essence  or  nature  existing  in  corporeal  matter; 
and  by  means  of  such  natures  of  visible  things,  it  aL^o  ascends  to  some  knowl- 
edge of  invisible  things. 


logic:  second  part.  105 

by  union  with  the  body;  the  singular  concrete,  and  material, 
as  having  color,  taste,  smell,  or  as  affecting  the  living  organ,  is 
the  proper  object  of  sensible  or  organic  power.*  Hence,  it 
will  be  readily  seen  why  man  is  often  termed,  "  the  link  that 
binds  together  the  material  and  spiritual  orders."t 

It  would  be  an  error,  however,  to  infer  from  the  preceding 
doctrine  that  the  human  intellect  is  organic;  for  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  because  its  primary  and  adequate  formal  object  is 
the  essence  of  the  sensible,  the  intellect  is  therefore  the  subject 
of  sensible  and  organic  mutations,  or  that  it  has  organic  action. 

But  it  does  logically  follow  that  man's  intellect  knows  God, 
and  other  superior  substances  of  the  spiritual  order,  only  by 
comparison  with  what  he  immediately  knows  in  the  sensible 
order;  and  that  he  rises  by  reflexion  on  sensible  things,  and 
by  abstraction,  to  the  conception  of  those  substances  which  are 
of  another  order.  | 

It  would  be  equally  erroneous  to  infer  from  what  is  above 
stated,  that  the  human  intellect  knows  only  the  sensible  and 
material;  for  it  also  reasons  of  God  and  angels. §     The  mean- 

*  "  Sensus non  fertuv perse uisi  in  singuliiria  et accidentia materialia."  Sense;?er 
se,  i.  e.,ot'itso\vn  action,  attainsonly  to  singular  objects  and  material  accidents. 

t"  Natura  hiimana  rationalis  ab  Angelica  degenerat,  quod  sit  ordinata  ad  in- 
foi-mandum  corpus,  cui  propterea  alligatur;  attamen  cum  Angelica  convenit, 
quod  sit  spiritualis;  et  in  eo  sensitivam  superat  cum  qua  similiter  convenit, 
quod  sit  materialis;  unde  homo  dicitur  a  nonnulli3j?6i(/rt  spiritualis  et  material's 
ordinis,  eo  quod  inter  utrumipie  medius,  ntrumque  in  se  copulat."  Ilatioral 
human  nature  falls  below  the  angelic  nature  in  that  it  is  ordained  to  inform  a 
body,  to  which  it  is,  therefore,  bound;  however,  it  agrees  Avith  the  angelic 
nature,  in  tlutt  it  is  spiritual.  In  this  respect,  also,  it  rises  above  sensitive  na- 
ture, though  it  agrees  with  it  in  that  it  is  material.  Whence  man  is  called  by 
some  the  link  between  the  spiritual  and  material  or<lers,  for  he  stands  between 
both,  and  miites  both  in  himself. 

J  **  Invisibilia  Dei  per  ea  quai  facta  sunt,  intellecta  conspiciuntur."  (Rom. 
i.  20.)  The  invisible  things  of  God  are  clearly  seen,  being  understood  by  the 
things  that  are  made. 

§  ' '  Mens  seipsam  per  se  novit,  quia  tandem  in  suiipsius  cognitionem  pervenit, 
licet  per  suum  actum."  (Sum.  1  p.,  qu.  87,  art.  1,  ad.  1.)  The  mind  know.'' 
itself  by  itself,  because  it  does  come  to  the  knowledge  of  itself,  althougli  by  its 
own  act.  The  soul  knows  itself  only  by  its  acts :  it  does  not  immediately  or 
intuitively  perceive  its  own  real  essence. 

"  Quamdiu  anima  est  corpori  imita,  intelligit  convertendo  se  ad  phantasmata. 
Sed  cum  fuerit  a  corpoi-e  separata,  intelligit,  non  convertendo  se  ad  phantas- 
mata, sed  ad  ea  quae  sunt  secundum  se  intelligibiliiL:  nnde  seipsam  per  seipsam 
intelligit.    Est  autem  commune  Dnmi  substantise  separatae,  quod  intelligat  id 


106  logic:  second  part. 

ing  which  is  intended  to  be  conveyed  in  defining  the  adequate 
or  commensurate  object  of  man's  intellect  is,  that  the  human 
understanding  primarily  and  forinaUy  knows  as  its  first  and 
proper  object,  material  essence ;  and  that  all  its  knowledge  of 
higher  things  it  acquires  by  aid  of  the  material  or  sensible, 
through  which  it  apprehends  what  transcends  the  senses,  and, 
by  comparison  and  abstraction,  forms  ior  itself  concepts  or 
notions  of  superior  essences. 

The  intellect  of  man  first  conceives  God,  angels,  spirits,  under 
imaginary  corporeal  forms;  which  imperfect  ideas  of  super- 
sensible substances,  it  corrects  by  reasoning;  v.  g.,  not  unlike 
what  takes  place  when  we  observe  the  staff  which  is  partly  in 
the  water ;  it  may  be  first  conceived  to  be  really  bent,  but  by 
reflexion  and  further  knowledge  of  truths  not  immediately 
presented  in  what  the  senses  manifest,  we  come  to  know  that 
the  staff  is  not  bent,  but  is  really  straight. 

Similarly,  due  proportion  being  allowed  for  intellects  that 
know  by  simple  intelligence,  and  not  by  the  less  perfect  way  of 
reason,  in  order  for  the  angels  ot  one  order,  or  hierarchy,  to 
conceive  those  of  another,  they  must  compare  and  measure 
them  by  the  primary  and  formal  object  of  their  own  intellect, 
which  is  their  own  essence;*  for,  as  every  sense  has  its  own 
adequate  or  commensurate  object  to  which  it  is  limited ;  v.  g., 
the  eye  has  figure  and  color,  the  ear  has  sound  for  its  proper 

quod  est  supra  se  pel*  modiim  sute  substimtiai.  Sic  euini  intelligitur  aliquid 
secuiuUim  quod  est  iu  intflligente.  Est  autem  aliquid  in  ultero  per  niodum  ejus 
in  quo  est."  (1  j).,  qu.  8!),  art.  2  iu  C.)  So  long  as  the  soul  is  united  to  the 
body,  it  understands  by  converting  itself  to  the  images  in  the  fancy.  But  when 
it  is  sei)arated  from  the,  body,  it  understands  without  converting  itself  to  the 
images  of  the  ftmcy,  but  it  converts  itself  to  those  things  which  are  in  themselves 
intelligible;  hence,  it  then  understands  iiseU  by  itself .  It  is  likewise  common 
to  every  substance  separated  from  matter,  to  understand  that  which  is  above 
itself,  by  means  of  its  OAvn  substance.  For,  a  thing  is  understood,  according 
to  the  manner  in  which  it  is  in  the  one  understanding  it;  and  a  thing  is  in  an- 
other, according  to  the  nature  of  that  other  in  which  it  is. 

*"  Modus  intelligendi  est  proportionatus  modo  essendi:  sen  modus  cogno- 
Bcendi  non  sequitur  modum  rei  cognitie,  sed  modum  essendi  potentire  cogno- 
scitiviB."  The  mode  of  understanding  is  proportioned  to  the  mode  of  being:  or, 
the  mode  of  knowing  does  not  follow  the  mode  of  the  thing  known,  but  the  mode 
of  being  which  is  in  the  cognoscive  power. 

"  Sensus  est  singnlarium;  intellectus  universalium. "  The  sense  is  of  sia- 
gtilars;  the  intellect,  of  universals. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND    PART.  107 

object;  so  must  every  created  intellect  have  its  connatural  and 
determinate  object,  beyond  which,  or  apart  from  which,  it  can- 
not operate ;  that  of  the  divine  intellect  must  be  the  uncreated 
and  infinite. 

The  adequate  or  commensurate  object  of  the  human  intel- 
lect should  be  so  stated  and  understood  as  to  be  clearly  distin- 
guished from  that  of  sense,  and  trom  the  respective  objects  of 
the  purely  spiritual  or  angelic,  and  the  Divine  intellect.  .For  this 
end,  it  should  be  observed  that  every  agent  must  act  or  oper- 
ate according  to  its  essential  mode  of  existing;*  or,  it  must  act 
according  to  its  nature.  Nor  can  its  action  ever  exceed  its 
essence  ;  t  for,  powers  are  the  appendices  of  essence,  and  are 
measured  and  limited  by  it ;  as  no  accidents  can  exceed  their  sub- 
ject, so  no  properties  or  essential  attributes  can  exceed  the  essence 
from  which  they  flow  or  result.  It  is  manifest,  also,  that  pow- 
ers must  have  objects  of  their  action  which  are  proportioned 
to  them,  and  which,  therefore,  must  be  proportioned  in  perfec- 
tion to  the  essence  which  is  the  subject  of  those  powers,  since 
the  power  follows  the  essence,  and  is  limited  by  it. 

In  man,  the  soul  is  bound  to  the  body,  with  which  it  is 
united  by  substantial  composition;  in  that  condition  it  is 
dependent  on  the  external  and  internal  senses  for  its  intelligent 
action,  though  the  cooperation  of  these  organic  powers  is  only 
objective;  i.  e.,  they  efficiently  cooperate  in  so  much  as  they 
present  the  object,  whose  intelligible  essence  the  intellect 
comes  to  know  from  the  sensible  impressions,  by  means  of 
abstraction ;  and,  in  fact,  man,  as  he  is  now  actually  consti- 
tuted, cannot  immediately  perceive  any  other  being  than  one 
which  is,  in  some  respect,  material.  Hence,  the  primary  and 
proper  object  of  man's  intellect  must  be  the  essence  of  sensible 

*  ' '  Uunumquotlque  operatur  ad  modum  sui  esse. ' '  Every  thing  acts,  accord- 
ing to  the  mode  of  its  existence. 

t  "  llnaqiiaeque  potentia  in  operando  limitatur  per  essentiara  cujus  est  polen- 
tia.  "  Every  power  is  limited  in  its  operation,  by  the  essence  of  which  it  is  a 
)iowe. . 

"  Corpus  requiritur  ad  actionem  intellectus,  non  sicut  organum  quo  talis  actic 
exerceatur,  sed  ratioue  objecti."  (Div.  Thom.,1  p.,qu.  75,  art.  2,  ad.  3.) 
The  body  is  required  for  the  action  of  the  intellect,  not  as  an  organ  by  which 
euch  action  is  exercised,  but  on  account  of  the  object. 


108  logic:  second  part. 

and  material  things ;  and  it  is  only  by  reasoning  upon  sensible 
things  that  he  rises  to  notions  of  immaterial  or  spiritual  beings. 
Careful  reflexion  upon  the  facts  of  one's  own  experience  and 
intellectual  operations,  strikingly  confirms  the  truth  of  the  fore- 
going statements. 

The  three  principal  acts  or  operations  of  the  understanding  in 
cognition  are,  Simple  Apprehension,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning 
or  Ratiocination.  A  judgment  consists  of  concepts  or  ideas  that 
are  compared ;  and  reasoning  consists  of  judgments  compared 
to  each  other.  The  principal  and  characteristic  function,  or 
act  of  the  understanding,  is,  to  perceive  truth,  to  distinguish 
the  true  and  false  ;  the  good  and  evil,  as  true  and  false.  In 
the  ideas  or  concepts  of  things,  by  means  of  abstraction  or 
remotion,  it  perceives  the  universal  and  the  intelligible  essence 
of  the  objects  presented  to  it  by  the  organs  of  sensation. 
These  it  compares,  and,  by  means  of  analysis  and  synthesis,  it 
forms  a  multitude  of  new  concepts  and  judgments. 

Simple  Apprehersion  is  the  mere  perception  of  the  object, 
without  any  explicit  affirmation  or  negation.  The  apprehen- 
sion, to  repeat  here  briefly  an  explanation  already  given, 
when  the  term  is  used  to  express  the  concrete  result  or 
product  of  the  act  of  apprehending,  is  also  called  an  idea^  a 
concept^  a  notion.  The  word  idea  is  more  generally  used  ;  and 
it  was  selected  because  the  mind,  by  the  act  of  apprehending, 
forms  a  sort  of  similitude  of  the  object  perceived  ;  and  the 
term  idea  means  a  visible  appearance^  or  a  likeness.  This  idea, 
by  means  of  which  the  mind  expresses  the  object  of  its  cogni- 
tion, is  also  termed  the  mental  word.,  verbum  mentis,  since  the 
mind  is  conceived  to  speak  it,  as  it  were.  But  this  7ne?ital  word, 
or  idea,  in  the  mind  perceiving,  must  not  be  confounded,  as 
already  remarked,  with  sensation,  or  with  the  image,  in  the 
imagination  ;  both  of  which  present  only  sensible  qualities,  and 
are  effects  of  organic  action,  which  are  common  to  us  and  the 
brutes.  Of  the  concept  whose  object  is  entirely  abstract,  as 
the  infinite,  the  imagination  forms  no  image ;  but,  when  we 
think  of  such  objects,  it  strives  to  form  its  image  of  theiii,  and 
it  always  presents,  at  least,  the  terms  for  them. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  109 

The  object  which  the  mind  perceives,  considered  in  itself 
<vith  its  ma?'ks  or  determinations^  by  which  it  is  what  it  is,  and 
nothing  else,  is  tl;ve  fuaterial  object  of  perception;  but  the 
object,  as  actually  manifested  to  the  mind,  is  the  Johnal 
•object  of  perception. 

The  distinction  between  an  apprehension,  a  judgment  and 
reasoning,  may  be  aptly  illustrated  by  an  example.  If  we 
conceive  an  idea  of  worlds  the  mere  act  of  perceiving  or  see- 
ing that  idea  of  world  without  affirming  or  denying  any  pre- 
dicate, is  a  simple  appreliension;  but  in  uttering  the  proposi- 
tion, ''''the  world  is  a  contingent  being"  there  is  2i  judgment 
formed ;  since  it  affirms  the  agreement  of  a  predicate  and  sub- 
ject. If  we  compare  several  judgments,  and  deduce  h^om  them 
another,  or  new  judgment,  on  account  of  its  nexus  with  them, 
this  operation  of  the  mind  is  reasoning;  v,  g.,  "  The  world  is 
a  contingent  being;  therefore,  its  cause  is  a  free  being;  but 
this  cause  being  free^  is  also  intelligent,  since  freedom  and  in- 
telligence connote  each  other."  This  is  reasoning,  or  deducing 
one  judgment  from  others. 

All  these  acts  of  the  intellect  are  immanent;  that  is,  they 
remain  in  the  mind;  or  do  not,  as  such,  pass  out  of  it  to  an 
exterior  term,  or  object  of  efficient  action. 

Immediate  or  simple  judgments  are  those  that  are  formed  by 
the  mind  seeing  directly  and  immediately  the  agreement  of  the 
subject  and  predicate,  without  any  reasoning.  The  material 
object  of  this  immediate  judgment  may  be  either  ideas  or  facts; 
and  these /^r/^  may  be  either  ijiternal  ox  external.  We  form  a 
judgment  of  ideas ^  when  we  consider  their  objects  in  their 
essence,  apart  from  their  actual  existence.  We  judge  oi  facts 
when  we  think  of  objects  in  the  concrete,  and  actual  order  of 
physical  existence,  and  make  any  affirmation  concerning  them ; 
whether  they  be  facts  of  ifiter?ial  consciousness,  or  of  external 
objects. 

The  objects  of  thought  may  be  divided :  ist,  into  those  that 
pertain  to  the  order  of  reason,  or  to  necessary  matter;  2d,  into 
those  that  belong  to  the  experimental  or  empirical  order.  Judg- 
ments whose  objects  are  wholly  of  the   sphere  or  order  of 


110  logic:  second  part. 

reason^  are  necessary  and  wiiversal;  for  their  objects  are  not 
limited  to  iho.  pa?iki/lar,  as  are,  these  trees,  these  men. 

But  when  the  objects  of  the  judgment  are  in  the  order  of 
experience  or  of  the  experimental  order  the  judgment  is  particu- 
lar and  contingent;  because  its  objects  are  particular  and  co7i- 
tingent.  But  in  the  judgments  formed  upon  both  these 
classes  of  objects,  the  evidence  is  immediate;  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  not  derived  from  a  comparison  of  other  judgments,  but  is 
furnished  by  the  simple  comparative  apprehension  of  the  ideas, 
which  are  affirmed  to  agree  or  disagree. 

Mediate  judgments  are  such  as  are  formed  by  discursive 
reasoning;  i.  e.,  by  comparing  several  judgments,  and  per- 
ceiving that  the  tiexus  of  the  premises  and  conclusion  is  such 
that  we  cannot  assent  to  the  premises  without  assenting  to  the 
conclusion  ;  in  other  words,  it  is  by  the  medium  of  reasofiing 
that  such  judgments  are  formed. 

Reasoning  which  proceeds  from  certain  and  evident  prin- 
ciples, is  termed  demonstrative,  or  apodictic.  This  reasoning 
which  is  termed  demonstrative,  or  apodictic,  is  of  four  kinds : 
ist,  reasoni?ig  a  priori;  as  when  we  conclude  from  the  cause  to 
the  effect,  or  from  the  principle  to  its  application;  v.  g.,  "that 
which  has  life  has  motion  ;  an  animal  has  life;  therefore,  an 
animal  has  motion;"  2d,  reasoning  a  posteriori;  as,  when  we 
deduce  the  cause  from  the  effect;  e.  g.,  "order  exists  in  all  the 
works  of  the  universe ;  therefore,  all  the  works  of  the  universe 
have  an  intelligent  cause ; "  or,  as  in  the  proverb,  "  ex  pede 
Herculem,"  from  the  footprints,  I  conclude  it  was  Hercules ; 
3d,  the-reasoning  is  direct,  when  from  one  notion  of  the  subject 
we  infer  another;  e.  g.,  "man  is  free;  therefore,  he  is  intelli- 
gent ; "  4th,  reasoning  is  indirect  or  apagogic,  when  we  show  that 
its  contradictory  or  contrary  leads  to  an  absurdity,  called,  also, 
reductio  ad absurdum;  e.  g.,  "If  God  is  not  eternal,  then  He 
had  a  beginning;  if  He  had  a  beginning.  He  had  a  cause; 
and  if  He  had  a  cause,  then  He  is  not  God  at  all;  which  is 
absurd." 

Of  these  forms  of  demonstration,  the  one  a  priori  excels 
the  rest ;  that  is,  it  is  the  most  satisfactory  to  the  mind ;  for  in 


logic:  second  paet.  Ill- 

it  the  mind  reposes  at  ease,  with  no  desire  to  know  more  of 
the  conclusion  thus  demonstrated  to  it,  or  made  evident  in  its 
causes;  in  the  others,  the  certainty  is  perfect  in  species,  since 
all  doubt  is  excluded ;  but  the  mind's  repose  is  not  so  com- 
plete, it  may  desire  more,  and,  when  the  nature  of  the  matter 
permits,  it  will  strive  to  know  a  prioi'i  the  truth  which  it  thus 
attains  by  reasoning  a  posteriori. 

Knowledge  acquired  by  reasoning  a  posteriori^  in  itself  is  not 
scientific  knowledge;  as  will  be  shown  in  a  subsequent  article. 

Reasoning  is  also  divided  into  pure^  empirical  d.w'X  mixed.  The 
pure  is  that  in  which  the  premises  are  both  necessary^  or  are  of 
the  order  of  reason;  v.  g.,  "  None  but  a  straight  line  is  the 
shortest  distance  between  any  two  points;  a  curved  hne  is  not 
straight ;  therefore,  a  curved  line  is  not  the  shortest  distance 
between  two  given  points." 

The  empirical  argument  has  both  premises  experime?ital 
truths;  "the  rose  bush  that  is  set  out  in  May  will  grow;  this 
rose  bush  was  set  out  in  May ;  therefore,  it  will  grow."  The 
mixed  reasoning  is  that  in  which  one  premise  is  absolute  truth, 
and  the  other  empirical;  v.  g.,  "a  contingent  being  cannot  ex- 
ist unless  there  is  a  7iecessary  being ;  but  there  exist  contingent 
beings;  therefore,  there  is  a  necessary  being.^^ 

In  all  these  species  of  ratiocination,  the  conclusion  has  the 
nature  of  the  premises  in  some  mode,  and  it  follows  the  less 
worthy  premise  in  quality  and  quantity. 

The  intellect,  by  iis  perceptions  or  in  forming  concepts,  passes 
from  the  particular  to  the  universal;  but,  in  I'easoning,  this 
process  is  reversed;  and  the  progress  is  from  what  is  more 
general  to  that  which  is  less  so;  for  the  middle  term  is  always 
general,  in  respect  to  the  conclusion.  Under  this  point  ot 
view,  reasoning  is  synthetical. 

The  conclusion  is  implicitly  in  the  premises ;  it  is  first  expli- 
citly seen,  as  such,  only  when  the  middle  term  is  found ;  the 
nexns  with  the  premises  then  becomes  evident.  This  truth 
solves  the  objections  against  the  syUogism,  whether  it  be  con- 
sidered as  a  means  of  discovering  or  of  proving  truth. 

By  means  of  these  acts  of  cognition,  namely,  simple  apprc' 


112  logic:  second  part. 

liens  ion,  Jndi^^mcfif  and  reasoning,  the  mind  acquires  genuine 
certainty  of  their  objects ;  for,  there  is  truth  in  all  of  them. 
As  already  shown,  truth  is  the  conformity  of  the  mind  know- 
ing to  the  object  known  ;  and,  in  apprehensions  and  judg- 
ments, there  is  this  conformity  in  different  degrees,  to  be  sure ; 
but  each  is  perfect,  according  to  its  kind. 

The  specific  perfection  of  every  cognition,  is  the  truth  that 
is  in  it.  In  a  simple  apprehension,  an  object  is  perceived, 
though  no  explicit  judgment  is  formed;  this  is  conformity  of 
the  mind  to  the  object,  perfect  in  its  species  and  degree.  In 
judgment,  and  reasoning,  this  conformity  is  more  perfect  in 
degree,  because  they  affirm  explicitly ;  and  while  in  apprehen- 
sions there  is  only  that  implicit  affirmation,  or  transcendental 
truth  participated  in  by  them,  and  referable  ultimately  to  the 
first  truth;  in  our  judgments,  truth  is  explicitly  affirmed  by  the 
mind,  giving  to  reason  and  intelligence  their  specific  nature, 
and  their  highest  value. 

If  the  judgment  faithfully  affirms  only  what  the  ideas  are 
immediately  seen  to  include,  or  exclude,  it  is  clear  that  no 
erroneous  judgment  can  be  assented  to.  All  our  cognoscive 
powers  are  determined  to  their  acts  of  cognition  by  the  evidence 
in  their  objects;  and  when  truth  is  seen  to  be  such,  it  is  known 
to  be  such ;  and  their  acts  are  as  true,  as  they  are  necessary, 
f^ariaking  of  the  truth  of  tJieir  first  cause. 

This  doctrine  cannot  be  denied,  unless  by  that  systematic 
scepticism,  in  which  the  human  mind  is  morally  false  to  itself, 
and  is,  therefore,  perverse  in  its  own  enunciations.  For  the 
ailment  of  those  minds  that  can  sincerely  doubt  evident  first 
principles,  philosophy  cai\  furnish  no  remedy. 


ARTICLE    IV. 

OBJECTIVE    REALITY    OF    IDEAS. 

The  ideas  here  meant  are  those  that  express  or  represent  in 
the  mind  the  essences  or  natures  of  objects,  and  which  the 
intellect  forms  by  reflecting  on  its  concepts,  and  abstracting  or 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  113 

removing  from  them  the  conditions  of  individuality,  i.  e.,  the 
concrete  accidents.  They  are  not  the  same  then  as  the  ideas 
which  the  mind  acquires  immediately,  by  simple .  apprehen- 
sion and  by  the  senses,  whose  objective  truth  was  sufficiently 
evmced  in  the  preceding:  articles. 

The  ideas  whose  objective  truth  is  here  to  be  shown,  are 
those  reflex  ideas,  or  notions,  that  are  general,  or,  that  include 
many  objects;  v.  g.,  substajice,  cause,  effect,  the  possible,  etc.  The 
question  is,  then,  do  such  ideas  really  and  truly  express  or  repre- 
sent the  objects  for  which  they  stand,  or  is  there  through  them 
a  conformity  of  the  mind  to  the  objects  of  its  cognitions  ?  Have 
these  ideas  any  objective  value,  or  have  they  true  agreement 
with  their  objects  outside  of  the  mind,  as  perceiving  or  knowing 
them  ?  or,  are  they  merely  certain  subjective  and  innate /^r/z/j-, 
or  types  in  the  intellect,  according  to  which  the  mind  forms  for 
itself  its  objects  which  it  calls  substance,  cause,  effect,  etc.  ?  Is 
that  which  is  expressed  in  these  general  and  primary  ideas,  in 
any  respect,  in  the  objects  for  which  the  ideas  stand ;  or  is  it 
merely  subjective?  Is  the  conclusion  from  the  idea  to  its  ob- 
ject, valid  illation,  as  the  conclusion  from  the  photograph  like- 
ness to  the  person  represented  by  it,  is  valid  illation  ?  Has. 
for  example,  that  which  is  called  substance,  really  in  itself  what 
the  mind  attributes  to  it  in  its  idea  of  it ;  or,  does  it  exist  only 
in  the  idea  or  form  in  the  mind,  the  idea  having  no  extrinsic 
object  truly  corresponding  to  it  ? 

In  the  foregoing  interrogatories  the  same  thing  is  variously 
expressed,  the  same  notion  is  presented  under  different  phases, 
purposely  in  order  that  the  real  state  of  the  question  may  be 
more  clearly  apprehended  by  the  youthful  inquirer. 

It  is  affirmed,  then,  that  ideas  are  truly  and  really  the  repre- 
sentatives, and  exponents  of  their  objects,  as  they  are;  that  the 
objects  of  cognition  are  truly  expressed  in  the  mind,  by  those 
ideas  or  final  and  general  mental  words.  This  is  no  more, 
indeed,  than  affirming  that  the  mind  is  capable  of  acquiring 
true  ideas  of  the  objects  which  it  perceives. 

That  which  is  understood  in  the  mind  is  the  same  as  what 
is  in  the  object;  but  in  the  one  it  exists  in  concrete,  while  in 
8 


114  logic:    SECOND   PART. 

the  other  it  is  in  the  abstract,  yet,  the  relation  between  them  is 
that  of  truth,  or  it  is  the  mind  conformable  to  its  object  of  cog- 
nition. We  must  assign  to  objects  actually  perceived  concur- 
rent causality,  direct  or  indirect,  in  the  formation  of  all  our 
ideas,*  of  every  kind.  In  other  words,  we  find  a  verification 
of  all  that  we  know  or  can  positively  conceive  even  as  possible, 
in  what  we  have  actually  perceived  in  the  order  of  reality.  The 
idea  in  the  mind  then  must  truly  represent  the  object,  so  far  as 
that  object  efficiently  concurred  in  its  production,  else  it  would 
be  an  effect  that  has  no  real  resemblance  to  its  cause. 

The  objective  verity  of  our  ideas,  is  one  of  those  truths  that 
cannot  be  formally  demonstrated,  nor  does  it  require  such 
proof  Nor  can  it  be  denied,  either,  without  implicidy  affirm- 
ing what  is  in  question.  For  he  that  denies  it,  i.  e.,  that  ideas 
are  truly  representative  of  their  extrinsic  objects,  thereby  as- 
sumes that  his  idea  of  an  idea  is  truly  conformable  to,  and 
representative  of,  its  object,  for  logical  truth  is  the  conformity 
of  the  mind  to  its  object;  otherwise,  he  asserts  nothing.  There 
fore,  to  deny  the  objective  truth  of  ideas,  is  an  implicit  as- 
sumption of  the  truth  that  is  in  question. 

It  is  evident  that  if  the  ideas  by  which  the  mind  expresses 
the  objects  of  cognition,  do  not  truly  present  those  objects  j 
then,  the  mind  is  not  capable  of  attaining  truth,  or  of  con- 
forming itself  to  objects  known.  But,  just  as  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  mind  can  and  does  know,  through  the  medium 
of  the  senses,  the  existence  and  distinction  of  singular  and 
concrete  objects  truly  as  they  are ;  so,  it  is  equally  evident, 
that  its  farther  notions  of  their  essence  and  nature,  formed  by 
abstraction  and  generalization,  by  reflexion  and  right  reason- 
ing, are  really  verified  in  those  objects.  He  that  can  doubt 
the  objective  value  of  his  ideas,  and  the  share  that  their  ob- 
jects have  in  efficiently  helping  to  their  origin  and  formation, 
should  also  doubt  all  first  principles,  and  even  internal  facts 
themselves ;  nay,  he  would  be  incapable  of  forming  a  certain 
judgment,  and,  consequently,  incapable  of  any  reasoning.    For 

*  "  Ex  objecto  et  poteiitia  oritur  notitia."    Knowledge  proceeds  from  tho 
object  and  the  power. 


logic:  second  paet.  115 

the  evidence  is  not  more  clear  for  the  certainty  of  first  princi- 
ples, internal  facts,  or  for  any  judgment,  than  that  which  the 
mind  has  for  the  agreement  of  its  ideas  with  their  objects ;  in 
other  words,  for  the  objective  truth  of  its  own  notions  or 
ideas.     They  are  all  evident,  and,  therefore,  all  true. 

Hence,  the  doctrine  that  the  general  or  common  ideas 
in  the  mind  do  not  express  or  declare  real  objective  truth, 
but  are  only  a  kind  oi  subjective  forms  by  which  the  intellect  is 
directed  in  thinkmg ;  is  purely  an  assumption,  directly  against 
what  we  see  and  know  by  the  facts  of  experience ;  is  destruc- 
tive of  all  certainty,  and  has  no  argument  m  its  favor,  except 
those  purely  fanciful  analogies  which  are  the  only  basis  of 
every  merely  arbitrary  hypothesis.  This  hypothesis  does  not  ex- 
plain or  account  for  the  evident  facts  of  experience,  for  instead 
of  being  founded  on  those  facts,  or  being  itself  a  conclusion 
deduced  from  them  as  premises,  these  facts  must  be  distorted 
and  our  concept  of  their  nature  be  changed,  in  order  that  they 
may  be  adapted  to  explain  and  prove  the  theory. 

The  manner  in  which  our  general  or  universal  ideas  are 
formed,  and  the  mode  in  which  they  are  verified  in  their  ob- 
jects, will  be  rendered  more  clear  by  the  fuller  explanation  of 
the  whole  subject,  which  is  given  in  the  following  article. 


ARTICLE     V. 

UNIVERSALS;  THEIR  OBJECTS;  UNIVERSAL  IDEAS,  HOW  FORMED. 

There  was  long  a  dispute  in  the  schools  as  to  the  nature 
and  object  of  what  are  termed  universals;  the  disputants  w^ere 
divided  into  three  celebrated  parties:  the  Jio mi fta lists,  exagger- 
ated realists  and  moderate  realists. 

The  nominalists  maintained  that  imiversals  are  mere  names, 
that  express  indeji?iitely  and  confusedly  a  collection  of  individ* 
uals;  some  thinking  they  neither  existed  in  objects  nor  in  con- 
cepts;  while  others  of  the  same  school  contended  that  they 
exist  in  the  concept,  but  have  no  real  relation  to  the  objects 


116  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAET. 

included.  The  exaggerated  realists  contended  that  the  univer- 
sal is  in  *he  concept,  and  in  the  object  cutside  of  the  mind,  in 
the  same  mafiner  that  it  is  conceived  in  the  mind ;  that  there 
is,  in  objects  of  the  same  species,  one  and  the  -same  real 
essence,  really  common  to  all  the  individuals  included  in  it. 
By  their  theory,  individuals  of  the  same  species,  being  essen- 
tially identical,  differ  only  in  their  accidents  ;  there  is  one  com- 
mon /mman  essence  which  is  actually  in  all  men,  as  there  is  one 
common  e7itity  in  all  beings.  For  example,  the  human  nature 
which  actually  exists  in  Peter,  is  really  identical  with  the  human 
nature  that  is  affirmed  o{  man  in  general;  and,  therefore,  Peter 
is  both  universal  and  particular^  as  regards  his  human  nature 
or  actual  essence. 

It  is  clear  that  this  doctrine  does  not  differ  materially 
from  the  theory  of  Pantheism,  or  the  system  which  identifies 
every  real  being  with  God. 

The  ?noderate  realists  taught  that  there  is  in  objects  of  the 
same  class  a  nature  or  essetice  which  is  apprehended  by  the 
mind  in  a  universal  idea ;  but  it  does  not  exist  in  the  mind  and 
in  the  object,  or  a  parte  rei,  in  the  same  manner;  it  is  concrete, 
in  the  one ;  and  abstract,  in  the  other. 

Now,  as  a  fact,  there  are  in  our  minds  universal  ideas,  and 
there  are  najnes  or  ter?ns  in  language  that  stand  as  signs  for 
Uiem. 

General  or  universal  truths  constitute  the  elements  of  all  the 
sciences ;  nearly  all  the  names,  or  nouns,  of  language,  except 
the  proper  names  of  individuals,  are  co7nmon  or  universal  for 
their  classes  of  objects.  Genus,  species,  difference,  attribute, 
accident,  express  real  generalizations  in  the  mind,  and,  when 
actually  applied  to  objects,  are  by  no  means  vague,  indefinite 
names,  expressing  nothing  but  mere  concepts  which  are  really 
unfounded  in  objects  outside  of  the  ideas. 

Common  or  universal  names  do  not  stand  for  a  collection  of 
particular  individuals ;  as  a  family,  a  people,  a  thousand;  for, 
these  terms  or  names  cannot  be  affirmed  of  each  individual  o^ 
the  collection  singly  :  but  are  applied  to  many  copulatively. 
But,  on  the  contrary,  the  common  names,  animal,  spirit,  vege- 


LOGIC  :   SECOND   PART.  117 

table,  are  predicated  of  many  taken  singly,  but  not   of  many 
taken  copulatively. 

The  perception  of  similarity  in  individuals  gives  rise  to  uni- 
versal ideas  in  the  mind;  and  even  the  idea  of  a  mere  collection 
of  particular  individuals,  presupposes  the  wiiversal  idea. 

Common  terms,  then,  express  a  concept  which  presents  to 
the  intellect  something  that  is  found  equally  in  many  individ- 
uals ;  and,  therefore,  these  terms  express  real  ideas  in  the 
mind,  as  even  the  faculty  of  consciousness  directly  testifies. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  objects  outside  of  the  intellect  which, 
of  itself  and  anterior  to  any  operation  of  the  mind,  is  universal. 

For,  what  is  universal  cannot  become  singular,  since  the 
universal  and  the  singular  are  opposites ;  and  opposites  cannot 
become  identical ;  v.  g.,  one  and  7nany,  white  and  black,  com- 
municable and  incommunicable,  cannot  as  such  become  identical. 
No  real  object,  i.  e.,  7io  actual  imture,  can  of  itself  be  univer- 
sal ;  so  as  to  be  the  same  in  the  many  really,  that  it  is  in  the 
individual.  If  it  were  universal,  would  its  specific,  or  its  ^<?;z- 
mt- nature  be  universal,  or  both?  Clearly,  \hQ  Universal,  as 
such,  does  not  exist,  a  parte  rei. 

Every  universal,  as  such,  is  formed  by  the  intellect ;  but  it 
is  truly  founded  \n  the  realities  which  it  includes. 

Two  things  are  verified  in  a  universal ;  or  it  has  two  con- 
stituents:  ist,  that  which  it  expresses,  is  one;  2d,  it  is  commu- 
nicable to  many;  i.  e.,  it  is  really  multip:ied  in  many  individ- 
uals, so  that  they  are  numbered,  as  individuals  are  numbered. 

If  a  universal  be  not  one,  then  the  individuals  in  which  it  is 
multiplied  would  form  only  a  collection  of  different  things;  and 
at  the  same  time,  if  it  were  not  communicable  to  many,  it  would 
not  be  wiiversal,  but  singular.  The  universal  is,  therefore, 
logically  verified  in  objects,  though  not  really  or  a  parte  rei  ex- 
isting in  them  as  otie,  and  many. 

A  collectioji,  as  already  observed,  is  constituted  by  many  sin- 
gular things,  which  are  considered  as  o?ie;  the  term  collectio7t, 
and  wiiversal,  both  include  the  idea  of  many,  but  the  tmiversa^ 
is  affirmed  of  that  many,  so  that  it  is  applied  both  to  the 
whole,  and  is  distributively  applied  to  its  inferiors  or  subjects; 


118  logic:  second  part. 

'vhile  collection  is  affirmed  only  of  the  whole  number  of  its  in- 
feriors or  std'j'ects;  and  its  individuals  are  only  parts  of  it,  of 
which  collection  cannot  be  affirmed. 

A  thing,  while  an  object  of  sensation,  is  singular;  when  an 
object  of  intelligence,  it  is,  in  some  manner,  universal;  or,  as 
the  old  axiom  has  it,  "singulare  dum  sentitur,  universale  dum 
intelligitur;"  it  is  singular,  as  it  is  in  the  sense;  it  is  universal, 
as  it  is  in  the  intellect. 

This  subject  will  be  more  easily  understood,  if  we  analyse 
the  operation  by  which  the  intellect  passes  from  the  singular, 
in  the  simple  apprehension,  to  the  universal  idea.  The  opera- 
tion of  the  intellect,  in  forming  the  universal  idea,  is  precisive 
and  comparative;  i.  e.,  it  perfects  the  universal  by  the  acts  of 
prescindi/is[,  or  abstracting^;  and  by  comparing  the  inferiors  or 
subjects  of  the  ideas  thus  formed.  When  an  individual  object 
is  presented  by  means  of  sensation  to  the  intellect,  it  abstracts 
for  itself  the  essence  from  the  sensible  representation  ;  and 
thereby  forms  the  concept  in  which  that  essence  is  separated 
from  all  individual  conditions,  or  concrete  accidents. 

This  is  7X.  precisive  cognition,  and  is  the  proper  and  charac- 
teristic act  of  the  intellect ;  and  it  furnishes  the  comprehensio?i 
of  the  universal,  and  common  terms.  TX-vvi  precisive  cognition 
of  the  essence  thus  known,  may  be  called  a  direct  imiversal; 
because  it  is  formed  by  a  direct  cognition;  yet,  it  does  not  ex- 
plicitly affirm  universality,  until,  by  comparison,  its  relation  to 
all  actual  or  possible  inferiors  or  subjects  is  perceived  and 
affirmed  by  the  intellect. 

Thus,  by  \\\\'i  precisive  act  of  the  mind,  and  by  comparison, 
the  intellect  forms  the  idea  of  unity  of  nature,  from  the  indi- 
vidual objects  presented  to  it;  a  tuiity,  that  is  not  real,  but 
logical.  The  essence  which  is  thus  one,  becomes  the  species 
and  genus,  and  is  called  the  reflex  universal.  It  is  by  thus 
operating,  then,  that  the  mind  forms  the  concept  of  the  uni- 
versal nature  or  essence. 

The  basis  on  which  all  universals  are  founded,  or  the  inatter 
of  them,  is  the  similar  nature  that  is  in  the  things  that  consti- 
tute its  inferiors  or  subjects;  the  generalized  idea  of  that  nature 


LOGIC  :  SECOND  PART.  119 

constitutes  the  formal  universal,  or  the  universal  properly  so- 
called.  By  abstraction  the  mind  can  generalize  the  natu7'e 
known  in  one  thing,  so  as  to  extend  it  to  all  possible  things  of 
the  kind. 

Hence,  then,  to  state  still  more  precisely,  and  sum  up  the 
preceding  doctrine,  the  specific  and  distinguishing  properties 
of  the  reflex  universal,  are,  ist,  its  unity,  or  it  is  07ie ;  2d,  its 
aptitude  or  adaptability,  to  be  predicated  of  many,  or  exist  in 
majiy,  whether  as  essence,  property,  or  accident.  In  this  wide 
sense  of  the  word,  all  coinmon  terms  stand  for  imiversals.  The 
five  utiiversals,  or  universal predicables,  namely,  genus,  species, 
difference,  property  or  attribute,  and  accident,  are  the  only 
universals  tliat  can  be  predicated  univocally  of  all  the  ten  cate- 
gories, or  highest  genera.  Other  common  terms  do  not  apply 
to  all  the  categories,  but  are  confined  to  special  ones ;  also,  the 
tra?iscendental  predicables,  as  "  being,*  something,  one,  true, 
good,  etc.,"  cannot  be  applied  in  any  univocal  sense  to  all  the 
ten  categories,  but  yet  they  are  applied  a?ialogically  to  all  the 
categories.  When,  therefore,  it  is  said  by  logicians  that  there 
diYQflve  u?iiversals  a?id  only  five,  the  meaning  is  that  there  are 
just  five  universals  that  can  be  predicated  univocally,  through 
all  the  ten  categories  or  ultimate  genera. 

That  the  five  universals,  genus,  species,  difference,  property 
or  attribute,  and  accident,  include  all  that  is  univocally  pred 
icable  of  the  ten  categories  may  be  thus  shown :  genus,\  which 
includes  species  under  it,  is  not  whole  or  entire  essence,  as 
essence  exists  in  the  individuals  of  a  species;  but  it  may  be 
regarded  as  the  matter  of  whole  essence.  The  specific  difference 
is  the  forma,  or  formal  principle,  which,  by  uniting  with  the 
7?iatter,  constitutes  the  quasi  co?npound,  species,  which  expresses 

*  "  Sex  transcendentalia  sunt :  res,  ens,  verum,  boniim,  aliquid,  umini;  quae 
barbara  voce  amplexa  sunt  per  initiales  litteras  reubau. ' '  There  are  six  trans- 
cendentals :  thing,  being,  true,  good,  something,  one.  To  assist  the  memory,  tlie 
initials  of  the  corresponding  Latin  words  are  formed  into  the  barbarous  word, 
reubau. 

t ' '  Genus  est  quod  praedicatnr  de  pluribus  specie  differentibus  in  quid  incom- 
ftletum,  sen  in  quid  tanquam  pars  maferialis."  Genus  is  what  is  predicated  as 
something  incomplete,  or  as  a  viaterial  part,  of  many  things  differmg  in  their 
species. 


120  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

whole  or  perfect  essence ;  i.  e.,  essence  as  it  actually  is  in  indi- 
viduals. Also,  this  essence  as  in  individuals  has  properties 
that  are  per  se  connected  with  it,  i.  e.,  properties  that  7ieces- 
sarily  be/oug  to  it,  resulting  necessarily  from  the  essence  as  it  is 
in  itself  intrinsically;  and  again^  the  individuals  of  the  species 
may  have  accidents  that  zx^  purely  contingent,  i.  e.,  which  may 
ht  prese?it,  or  abse?it^  without  affecting  the  esseficein  any  manner. 

Now,  whatever  can  be  predicated  at  all  of  any  object,  must 
be  either  within  the  essence  of  that  object,  or  outside  of  its 
essence;  if  it  be  within  the  essence,  it  must  be  either  its  mate- 
rial principle,  in  which  case  it  will  be  genus  that  is  predicated; 
or,  it  must  be  its  formal  principle,  in  which  case  it  will  be  the 
difference  that  is  predicated ;  or,  finally,  it  must  be  the  union 
or  compound  of  the  two,  and  in  this  case,  it  will  be  species 
that  is  predicated..  Again,  if  that  which  is  predicated  be  some- 
thing that  is  outside  of  the  essence,  either  it  is  something  that 
necessarily  belongs  to  the  object,  then  it  will  be  property  oi 
attribute;  or,  it  is  something  that  continge?itly  belongs  to  it,  and 
then  it  will  be  accident.  There  is  no  univocal  predicable  ap- 
plying to  all  the  ten  categories  that  cannot  be  referred  to  one 
or  other  of  these  five. 

The  five  universals  which  Logicians  enumerate  as  the  only 
ones  that  are  strictly  or  univocally  such,  are,  then,  as  already 
observed,  genus,  species,  difference,  attribute,  and  accident,  and 
they  differ  essentially  from  each  other. 

Species  and  genera  differ  among  themselves  essentially*  that 
is  essential  without  which  a  thmg  cannot  exist.  Things  may 
have  some  essential  attributes  common  to  them,  and  yet  differ 
by  other  essential  constituents  which  determine  them  to  wholly 
diverse  natures.  For  example,  brute  and  7?ian,  have  in  com- 
mon all  that  is  included  in  the  generical  concept,  animal ;  but 
man  has,  in  addition,  intellect  that  judges,  reasons,  knows  the 
universal  or  the  super-sensible.     This  is  an  essential  difference 

*  "  Omne  (juod  de  pluribus  univoce  prajtlicatur  vel  est  genus,  vel  est  species; 
vel  ditterentia,  vel  proprium,  vel  accidens."  Whatever  is  predicated  univo- 
cally of  many  things,  is  either  a  genus,  or  a  species,  or  a  diflerence,  or  a  prop- 
erty, or  an  accident. 


LOGIC*    SECOND   PART.  121 

by  which  man  is  constituted  of  a  wholly  different  species  from 
brute. 

In  the  direct  univej'sal,  w^hich  the  mind  has  whenever  it 
forms  its  first  concept  of  any  intelligible  essence  or  nature,  the 
intellect  does  not  positively  refer  the  intelligible  essence  con- 
ceived by  it  to  its  inferiors ;  for,  when  the  concept  of  any 
essence  becomes  actually  related*  in  the  mind  to  its  inferiors, 
it  is  then  the  re/lex  universal. 

Hence,  the  direct  concept  of  an  essence  makes  it  only  nega- 
tively or  inadequately  imiversal;\  but  the  rejlex  and  comparative^ 
which  presents  the  essence  as  actually  referred  to  ma?iy,  is  posi- 
tively and  adequately  universal.  We  may,  therefore,  consider 
the  essence  or  nature  in  different  states  :  ist,  as  it  is  in  singular 
or  concrete  individual  objects,  in  which,  while  it  is  truly  and 
formally  singular,  yet  it  is  materially  and  remotely  universal, 
in  as  much  as  it  is  capable  of  founding  the  universal;  2d,  the 
essence  may  be  considered  in  abstract,  as  first  conceived  by 
the  mind,  but  not  actually  referred  to  many  ;  3d,  it  may  be 
considered  as  one,  and  yet  positively  referred  to  many ;  this 
last  is  the  universal,  properly  so  called. | 

When  it  is  said,  "  the  more  universal  knowledge  is,  the  more 
iinperfect  it  is;"  and  that,  "philosophy  treats  of  the  highest  and 
most  universal  causes  of  all  things ;  "  the  term  universal  is  em- 
ployed in  two  different  senses :  in  the  first  case,  it  is  the  direct 
tiniversal,  which  is  always  more  or  less  vague,  and  indetermi- 
nate; in  the  second,  it  is  the  reflex,  which  refers  to  its  inferiors 
positively,  and  determinately;  and  it  constitutes  man's  most 
perfect  mode  of  knowing. 

♦"Universale  secundum  quod  accipitur  cum  intentione  universalitatis." 
(Div.  Thorn.  I  p.,  qvi.  85,  art.  5,  ad.  4.)  Universal,  according  as  it  is  taken 
with  the  intention  of  universality. 

t  "  Cum  enim  universale  sit  ens  rationis  cujus  totum  esse  est,  ut  cognoscatur 
hand  dubie,  non  est  ■wmversfl/e  quod  ut  tale  non  cognoscitur.  "     For  since  the 
universal  is  an  ens  rationis,  a  creation  of  the  mind,  whose  whole  essence  is  that 
it  should  be  known ;  there  is  no  doubt  that  what  is  not  known  as  such  is  not  a 
universal. 

t"Natura  non  dicitur  adctquate  universalis,  priusquam  concipitur  uti  una 
apta  inesse  multis. ' '  A  nature  is  not  said  to  be  adequately  universal  before  it  is 
conceived  as  ' '  one  fit  to  be  in  many. " 


122  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAKT. 

Hence,  it  must  be  evident  that  the  tmiversal  proceeds  both 
from  things,  and  from  the  inielleci.  The  nature  actually  exists 
in  the  material  basis  of  the  universal,  individual  and  7eal,  in 
each  singular  thing;  while,  in  the  mind,  it  possesses  only  an 
ideal  existence,  and  is  acquired  by  reflex  and  comparative  cog- 
nition. 

As  the  mind,  by  means  of  the  idea,  is  conformed  to  its  ob- 
ject ;  and  because  the  idea  is  formed  by  the  combined  agency 
of  the  object  and  mind,  the  idea  expresses  the  relation  between 
the  mind  and  object;  therefore,  the  idea  is  objectively  true,  i.  e., 
it  is  truly  representative  of  the  object. 

When  we  say,  "  the  mind  as  knowing  is  conformable  to  the 
object  known,"  we  affirm  a  relatioJi  between  the  mind  and  the 
object  of  its  cognition  ;  and  this  relation  is  logical  truth,  strictly 
so  called.  Now,  a  tmiversal  idea  expresses  an  actual  relation 
of  mind  and  object;  for  the  idea  proceeds  from  both.  Though 
the  ufiiversal  nature  does  not  exist  really,  but  only  logically,  yet 
it  is  founded  in  realities,  and  is  verified  in  those  realities;  as  the 
ride  or  measure  is  verified,  as  such,  in  the  objects  conformable 
to  which  it  is  made,  and  to  which  it  is  applied. 

The  tmiversal,  then,  as  referred  both  to  the  object  and  the 
idea,  does  not  possess  a  real  imity  and  idetitity;  but  it  is  logical 
unity  only;  for  that  which  is  really  common  to  many,  is  not 
universal,  but  singular. 

The  conclusion  follows,  then,  that  every  universal,  as  such, 
is  constituted  by  the  intellect ;  but  it  is  truly  founded  in  the 
realities  which  it  includes  as  its  inferiors  or  subjects. 

It  may  not  be  far  amiss  to  observe  in  this  place,  that,  as  to 
the  theory  that  one  species  of  substance  may  be  developed  by 
natural  agencies  into  another  one;  and  which  its  defenders 
carry  so  far  as  to  assert  that  man  even  was  actually  developed 
from  rude  matter,  through  various  intermediate  species  of 
plant,  animal,  to  the  ape,  and  finally  to  man  ;  the  following 
propositions  should  be  carefully  considered: 

First:  As  a  fact,  there  appears  to  be  no  instance  really 
known   of  a  new  species  of  organism   beijig  developed,  either 


LOGIC  :    SECOXD    PART.  123 

from  purely  inorganic  matter,  or  from  another  organism  of  a 
totally  different  species. 

Second:  All  the  reasoning  employed  in  favor  of  this  so- 
called  '-genesis  of  species,"  is  based  upon  remote  analo- 
gies, which,  of  course,  cannot  afford  demonstration;  for  no 
mere  indeterminate  analogy  can  ever  found  a  real  demonstra- 
tion. 

Third:  So  far  as  facts  are  known,  they  all,  without  excep- 
tion, go  to  prove  that  there  is  no  development  by  nature  of 
any  organic  being  except  from  a  germ,  or  from  a  principle 
which  is  the  equivalent  of  a  germ. 

Fourth:  It  is  repugnant  to  reason  to  affirm  that  a  being 
can,  in  its  action,  go  beyond  the  limits  of  its  own  essence  or 
nature,*  or  that  it  can  transcend  its  own  species,  so  as  to  pro- 
duce, of  its  own  efficiency,  an  object  not  only  of  an  essentially 
different  species,  but  which  is  intrinsically  superior  to  it. 

Fifth :  As  a  fact,  also,  there  are  many  species  of  substances 
actually  existing;  each  of  these  species  having  its  own  essen- 
tial constituents,  by  which  it  is  identical  with  each  individual 
of  its  species,  and  by  which  it  differs,  intrinsically  and  essen- 
tially, from  the  individuals  of  every  other  species. 

Sixth:  To  affirm  that  all  m^tQxidX  and  spiritual  substance  is 
only  force,  or  a  collection  of  co-related  forces,  is  to  assert  a 
mere  hypothesis,  for  which  no  real  proof  is  adduced,  or  can  be 
adduced- 

Force  presupposes  an  agent  or  substantial  principle  from 
which  it  proceeds ;  and  it  is  as  intelligible  to  say  that  every 
thing  is  motion  or  time,  as  it  is  to  say  that  every  thing  is 
force;  for  we  can  as  easily  conceive  motion  apart  from  some- 

*  ' '  Eflfectus  noil  superat  causam. ' '     An  effect  is  not  above  its  cause. 

' '  Modus  agenrli  sequitur  raodum  essendi. ' '  Manner  of  acting  must  agree 
with  the  manner  of  existing. 

' '  Materia  non  potest  producere  eflfectum  immaterialem.  (Vide  Div.  Thorn.  1 
I*. ,  qu.  118.)     Matter  cannot  produce  an  immaterial  effect. 

"Forma  est  principium  speciei;  et  ab  una  forma  non  proveniunt  diversae 
species.  (Sum.  1  p. ,  qu.  76,  art.  5.)  The  form  determines  a  thing  in  its  species 
or  essence;  and  from  this  form,  other  forms  of  different  essence  or  species  can- 
not proceed. 


124  logic:  second  part. 

thing  moving,  as  we  can  conceive  force  without  some  agent 
exerting  it.* 

"  But,"  it  may  be  said,  ^^ force  is  here  the  same  thing  that 
act  is  when  it  is  understood  as  \\\q  fojinal  principle  in  every 
thing  that  actually  exists^ 

God  is  called  in  true  philosophy,  actus  purissimus,  or  the 
absolutely  pure  act.  In  this  sense  of  the  word,  to  exist  substan- 
tially, is  act  (actus),  and  actus purissimus  includes  not  only  exist- 
ing substa/itially,  but  existing  in  a  manner  that  implies  infinite 
perfection,  and  absolute  independence  of  a  cause.  By  the 
terms,  "  actus  purissimus,"  besides  the  positive  perfection 
affirmed,  there  is  excluded  from  the  concept  of  God  all 
pote7itiaUty ;  i.  e.,  all  perfectibility  in  him  by  any  sort  ot 
7nutation,  from  non-action  into  action.  Created  act  perfects 
the  creature;  for,  by  action,  it  acquires  what  it  had  not  be- 
fore. The  human  soul,  and,  likewise,  all  other  created  sub- 
stantial for?ns,  are  also  said  to  be  acts;  i.  e.,  are  substantial 
and  active  principles;  but  they  are  perfected  by,  successive  ac- 
tion; or,  their  existence  or  their  action  is  not  simultaneous ;  i. 
e.,  their  existence  is  by  successive  acts  of  existing;  but  infinite 
and  eternal  act  is  simultaneous;  i.  e.,  free  from  all  succession, 
or  all  successive  action. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  concept  oi  pure  act,  and  the  con- 
cept which  we  have  of  a  substantial  principle  which  is  in  poten- 
tia  first,  and  then  \>qc.o\'\\q's,  actual,  exclude  each  other  as  com- 
pletely as  do  those  of  the  fi7iite  and  the  Infinite.  These  things 
being  true,  it  may  be  affirmed  that,  any  theory  which  resolves 
all  actual  things  into  co-related  forces,  so  as  to  ignore  or  deny 
the  preceding  distinctions,  must  be  false ;  for,  it  must,  in  some 
sense,  identify  beings  which  are  totally  and  absolutely  distinct, 
or  make  no  distinction  between  beings  which  have  nothing 
that  is,  in  any  nnivocal  sense,  common  to  them,  and  which  are, 
therefore,  totally  distinct. 

The  ambiguity  of  the  term  force,  which  is  used  one  while  to 

*  ' '  Prius  est  esse  quam  ag-ere."  "  Nulla  substantia  creata  potest  fieri  immedi- 
ate operativa."  Existence  is  presupposed  to  operation.  No  created  sub- 
Btance  is  immediately  opei'ative;  i.  e.,  it  must  possess  powers. 


LOGIC  :   SECOND   PART.  125 

express  the  degree  of  power  exercised;  another  while  for  the 
concrete  ag^nt  itself;  and  then  for  what  is  purely  phcnomeiial^ 
gives  rise  to  much  equivocal  and  fallacious  reasoning. 

Not  a  few  recent  writers  on  philosophical  subjects  confound, 
and  even  identify,  certain  organic  effects  which  precede  or 
accompany  ifitellectual  thought^  with  the  action  of  the  intellect 
itself;  thus  they  perplex  and  darken  for  their  readers  some 
truths  that  are  in  themselves  clear,  w^ith  language  that  is  in 
reality  either  superficial  or  eccentric.  Such  authors  will  speak 
of  the  acts  of  fancy,  or  even  those  of  the  external  senses,  as  if 
they  were  really  intellectual  operations. 


ARTICLE     VI. 

MEMORY. 

Memory*  is  the  power  of  recalling  to  the  mind,  recognizing 
and  distinguishing  things  formerly  known. 

The  memory^  therefore,  performs  four  principal  functions  : 
namely,  retentioji  of  the  object  or  idea;  its  reproduction^  with 
the  help  of  the  fancy ;  its  recognition^  and  the  distificiio?t  of  its 
time. 

There  is  a  sensile  or  organic  memory;  and  there  is  the  intel- 
lectual memory.  The  sensile  or  organic  memory  recalls  to  the 
imaginationt  objects  of  the  senses  formerly  known  through 
them,  and  recognizes  them  by  means  of  the  sensible  conditions 
or  properties  with  which  they  are  invested.  This  memory, 
being  purely  organic,  is  possessed  even  by  brutes;  v.  g.,  the 
dog  recognizes  his  master ;  the  cattle  return  at  the  same  time 
and  to  the  same  place  for  food ;  and  numberless  other  facts 
will  readily  occur,  which  put  the  the  truth  beyond  a  doubt. 

*  ' '  Memoria  prseteritoriun  est :  Sen  est  ipsa  ratio  prczteriti  quam  attendit  me- 
moria."  (S.  Thorn.  1  p.,  qu.  78,  art.  4.)  Memory  is  of  past  things;  or,  it  is 
precisely  th.&past  as  such  that  memory  regards. 

t  "  Imaginatio  est  qnasi  thesanrns  formariira  per  sensnm  acceptarnm.  (Siun. 
1  p.,  qu.  78,  art.  4.)  The  imagination  is,  as  it  were,  a  treasury  of  imiigea 
acquired  through  sensible  power . 


126  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAET. 

Since  the  seiisile  memory  is  organic,  it  is  subject  to'  all  the 
contingencies  of  disease  and  decay,  which,  in  the  present  order 
of  Providence,  are  common  to  all  living  organs. 

The  se/isik  or  organic  memory,  therefore,  has  for  its  object 
sensible  facts,  reproduced  with  some  of  their  sensible  conditions, 
and  distinguished  by  their  intentions,  i.  e.,  as  pleasing,  hurtfnl, 
etc. ;  and  known  as  past.* 

The  action  of  the  intellectual  ??iemory  has  a  higher  order  of 
cognition  in  it ;  this  faculty  may  be  defined  :  the  power  of 
reproducing,  and  recognizing  concepts  or  ideas  and  judgments 
formerly  had.  Memory  may  act  sporitaneously ;  or  it  may  be 
made  by  the  will  to  exert  itself,  and,  along  with  the  under- 
standing, or  rather  by  means  of  it,  to  pass  through  interme- 
diate or  associated  ideas  to  ideas  more  remote. 

This  exercise  of  the  memory,  in  which  the  understanding  is 
applied  to  various  reproduced  ideas  in  order  to  recall  forgotten 
things  by  means  of  comparison  and  reasoning  on  their  relation 
to  something  which  is  remembered,  is  called  reminiscence.  \ 
Such  mode  of  remembering  is  proper  only  to  ratio?ial  beings. 

Why  is  it  that  among  the  ideas  with  which  we  are  per- 
petually occupied,  some  are  remembered;  and  others  entirely 
vanish  from  the  memory  ?  In  memories  which  are  in  a  normal 
state,  the  difference  depends,  in  a  great  degree,  upon  the  atten- 
tion; and  on  the  association  of  ideas. 

The  attention  is  the  direction  of  the  mind  to  an  object  to 
which  it  adheres  for  a  time.  The  attention,  in  such  case,  is 
either  spontaiieous,  or  voluntary  and  reflex.  There  is  sponta- 
neous attention  in  all  thought;  even  when  the  mind  takes  no 
reflex  notice  of  its  own  operations.  It  is  violently  arrested, 
and  long  kept,  by  objects  that  are  strange  or  marvelous;  and 
often  returns  to  them. 

*  "  Sensus  (hominis)  est  deficiens  qucedam participatio  intellectus."  (Sum.  1  p., 
qu.  77,  art.  7.)    Sensible  power  is  a  certain  imperfect  participation  of  intellect. 

t ' '  Reminiscentia  est  inqiiisitio  alicujus,  quod  a  memoria  excidit;  sen,  memo- 
riae amissie  instauratio  ex  aliquo  interno  principio,  quod  oblivione  deletum  non 
est. ' '  Reminiscence  is  seeking  for  something  which  has  escaped  from  memory ; 
or,  is  the  bringing  back  of  a  forgotten  object,  by  means  of  some  internal  prin- 
ciple which  is  not  lost  in  oblivion. 


logic:  skcond  part.  127 

Attention  is  voluntary,  when  the  will  directs  the  mind  to  an 
object  to  which  it  adheres  for  a  time;  and  this  it  does  either  by 
one,  or  many  repeated  acts.  These  repeated  acts  of  the  atten- 
tion, by  which  the  powers  of  the  mind  are  often  directed  to  an 
object,  constitute  meditation* 

A  good  memory  is  susceptible,  retentive  and  ready.  Its  sus- 
ceptibility much  depends  upon  a  happy  constitution  of  mind 
and  body.  Retentiveness  and  readiness,  depend  in  part  upon 
the  same  cause ;  but  also  upon  that  degree  of  attention  which 
enables  the  understanding  to  form  clear  and  distinct  ideas  of 
its  objects.  Prudent  exercise  of  the  memory  greatly  improves 
it  in  all  these  perfections.  Habitual  moral  truth  and  the  virtue 
of  temperance  are  requisites  for  perfecting  in  it  healthful  and 
vigorous  action. 

The  association  of  ideas  is  also  a  great  aid  both  for  retentive- 
ness and  readiness  of  me?nory.  Ideas  may  be  associated,  or 
united,  with  other  ideas  which  are  distinctly  remembered,  by 
any  circumstances  of  time,  place,  number,  mode,  quality,  anal- 
ogy, resemblance;  or  even  by  any  arbitrary  law.  But  it  is 
advisable,  when  it  can  be  done,  to  associate  truths  in  the  mem- 
ory by  some  principle  of  logical  connexion.  In  any  of  these 
cases,  when  one  idea  occurs  to  the  mind,  it  readily  recalls  those 
that  are  associated  with  it. 

The  correctness  of  intellectual  acts,  much  depends  on  the 
fidelity  of  memory :  and  even  the  greater  or  less  capacity  of 
the  intellect,  indirectly  proceeds,  in  no  small  degree,  from 
greater  or  less  perfection  in  the  organic  powers,  sensile  mem- 
ory and  imagination,!  owing  to  its  peculiar  dependence  on 
these  organs. 

The  memory,  though  naturally  it  is  so  susceptible  of  direct 

*  "  Plurilnis  intenhis,  minor  est  ad  singula  sensus."  If  the  mind  be  intent 
on  many  objects,  its  attention  is  less  to  single  ones. 

'  *  Meditatio  est  frequens  et  iterata  mentis  attentio  olyecto  voluntarie  adhibita." 
Meditation  is  the  exercise  of  frequent  and  repeated  acts  of  attention  in  the  mind, 
Toluntarily  directed  to  an  object. 

t ' '  Illi  in  quibus  virtus  imaginativa,  memorativa,  et  cogitativaest  melius  dis- 
posita,  sunt  melius  dispositi  ad  intelligendum."  (Div.  Thorn.)  They  in  whom 
the  internal  senses,  imagination,  memory,  and  the  cogitative  power  are  best 
disposed,  are  best  fitted  to  understand. 


128  logic:  second  part. 

improvement,  is  often  debilitated  by  disease,  is  impaired  by 
indolence  and  sensuality,  and  it  grows  dull  and  feeble  in  old 
age.     But,  in  its  ordinary  and  normal  state,  it  may  'be  affirmed, 

First.  That  memory  never  deceives  per  se,  i.  e.,  of  itself,  or  by 
its  own  efficient  action. 

Second.  //  affords  certainty  as  to  the  objects  which  it  recalls 
and  distinctly  recognizes. 

The  memory  never  deceives  per  se;  for,  either  we  distinctly 
remember  the  past  thing,  or  we  do  not;  if  we  do  not  distinctly 
remember  it,  no  error  is  committed,  provided  we  do  not  judge 
it  to  be  different  from  what  it  is  remembered  to  be 5  and  we 
judge  it  only  as  it  is  remembered.  It  follows,  then,  that  the 
memory,  of  itself,  does  not  deceive,  but  that  error  in  its  case, 
as  in  all  others,  proceeds  from  the  will  urging  the  understand- 
ing to  affirm  precipitately  or  imprudendy  more  or  less  than  the 
mind  sees.  But  if  we  distinctly  remember  the  past  thing,  w^e 
are  perfectly  sure  of  it,  and  are  not  deceived. 

This  perfect  and  unerring  certainty  of  memory  is  implied  in 
all  the  important  affairs  of  individual  life  and  civil  society ;  it  is 
implied  also  in  all  our  reasoning;  for,  without  memory,  there 
could  be  no  process  of  reasoning.  Hence,  it  is  false  to  affirm 
that  memory  can  afford  the  mind  only  pjvbability;  it  gives  per- 
fect certainty,  as  to  the  most  important  things.  Who  can  doubt 
that  he  often  heard  of  London,  Paris,  Rome,  and  that  he  re- 
members with  perfect  certainty  numberless  past  things?  Nay, 
we  are  as  certain  as  to  the  objects  of  that  faculty,  as  we  are  of 
those  of  external  sense,  or  any  other  power,  through  which  the 
understanding  comes  to  know  truth.*  Memory  will  seldom 
prove  to  be  even  an  occasion  of  error,  provided  we  affirm  pre- 
cisely, and  only,  what  the  memory  recognizes  in  its  comparative 
apprehension,  and  as  it  recognizes  it. 

*  ' '  Unusquisque  judical  prout  affectus  est. "  "  One  judges  according  as  he 
is  affected. "  Feeling  and  passion  greatly  influence  the  judgment,  and  they  are 
frequently  the  cause  of  error. 


logic:  second  part.  129 

ARTICLE    VII. 

testimony;*  doth  it  afford  a  means  of  philosophical 
certainty  in  some  important  matters. 

Fhilosophical  certainty  is  the  re^ex  certainty  which  is  derived 
from  a  critical  examination  or  scrutiny  of  the  motives  and  the 
principles  that  afford  ordinary  direct  certainty,  whether  it  rest 
on  the  evidence  of  the  object,  or  on  authority. 

Our  senses  enable  us  to  know  by  experience  only  present  ob- 
jects that  express  themselves  in  our  minds  through  the  organs. 
But  objects  not  known  through  our  own  senses,  and  which  are 
distant  in  time  or  place,  we  can  know  only  through  witnesses, 
or  by  faith  in  testimony. 

A  witness  is  one  who  assures  another  of  a  fact  or  truth  which 
he  either  knows  of  his  own  knowledge,  or  on  due  authority. 
An  immediate^  or  eye-ivitncss^  is  one  who  testifies  to  a  fact  or 
object  which  he  perceived  in  its  own  evidence  to  him;  a  medi- 
ate^ or,  an  ear-witness,  is  one  who  gives  testimony  of  a  fact 

♦In  the  phraseology  of  the  Legal  Profession,  or  in  our  civil  jurispruilence,  the 
consistent  testimony  of  asiitlicient  number  of  competent  witnesses,  is  said  to 
furnish  evidence  to  the  court  or  jury,  or  to  constitute  evidence,  of  the  fact  to  be 
proved;  and  in  some  connexions,  the  terms  evidence  and  testimony,  are  employed 
by  jurists  as  synonymous;  v.  g.,  "the  witness  gives  evidence,"  and  "the 
witness  gives  testimony,"  are  expressions  Avhich  are  frequently  used  by  them, 
indiscriminatelj^  or  as  being  identical  in  meaning. 

It  is  perfectly  legitimate  for  lawyers,  in  order  to  secure  simplicity,  clearness 
and  precision,  to  restrict  or  extend  the  application  of  terms  employed  by  them 
in  a  technical,  and,  therefore,  an  arbitrary  sense.  ButitAvould  be  erroneous, 
and  not  scholarly,  to  found  a  philosophical  explanation  of  evidence  and  testimony 
as  motives  of  certainty,  on  this  confined  and  special  view  of  the  subject,  and 
this  particular  use  of  those  terms  in  civil  courts  of  justice;  this  is  actually  done, 
however,  in  some  books  of  Logic.  It  is  manifest  that  to  treat  the  motives  of 
certainty  philosophically,  greater  scope  must  be  given  to  their  explanation.  It 
should  be  based,  it  would  also  seem,  on  that  signification  of  those  terms  which 
is  atti'ibuted  to  them  by  prevailing  use  among  the  learned  in  general. 

The  object  or  truth  Avhich  is  evident  to  us,  we  see;  that  Mhich  Ave  know  only 
by  testimony,  we  believe,  but  do  not  see;  for  that  which  is  seen,  is  evident,  and, 
vice  versa,  that  which  is  evident,  is  seen.  This  exemplifies  the  proper  meaning 
of  the  words,  according  to  approved  general  usage;  as  the  observant  reader 
will,  doubtless,  have  noticed  for  himself. 

In  fact,  there  is  seldom  a  case  actually  occurring,  in  Avhich  the  testimony 
elicited  before  a  civil  court  possesses  all  the  requisites  to  constitute  it  a  motive 
that  furnishes  philosophical  certainty;  or,  in  other  words,  the  certainty  which 
there  suffices,  because  the  best  Avhich  is  practically  attainable  in  juridical  mat- 
ters, can  rarely  fulfill  the  requirements  of  philosophical  certainty,  which  ex- 
cludes even  the  possibility  oj  error. 

9 


130  logic:  second  part. 

which  he  heard  from  others ;  whether  these  others  were  them- 
selves immediate,  or  mediate  witnesses. 

Proposition :  The  testimony  of  witnesses  can  furnish  infalli- 
ble certainty  in  regard  to  sensible  facts  or  events. 

The  testimony  of  the  witnesses  for  its  credibility  depends, 
first,  upon  their  knowledge  of  the  fact  or  event  to  which  they 
testify;  and,  second,  upon  their  veracity.  Now,  if  we  sup- 
pose the  witnesses  to  be  numerous;  of  different  interests, 
habits,  education,  age,  character,  etc.;  and  that  they  unani- 
mously and  constantly  testify  to  the  same  substantial  state- 
ment of  the  fact,  such,  v.  g.,  as  is  the  case  with  regard  to  the 
existence  of  such  cities  as  Paris,  London,  Rome,  etc.,  or  any 
other  public  and  notorious  fact,  to  which  many  bear  testimony: 
it  is  perfecdy  evident  that  many  persons,  under  the  conditions 
thus  described,  can  neither  coiispii-e  to  deceive  in  regard  to  a 
sensible  fact,  nor  could  they  themselves  be  deceived.* 

In  regard  to  the  facts  or  events  in  question,  we  should  sup- 
pose that  they  are  public,  sensible,  and  striking  or  important. 

When  the  testimony  of  witnesses  has  all  the  preceding  condi- 
tions verified,  it  vs, physically  impossible  for  them  to  be  deceived; 
and  it  is  morally  impossible  for  them  to  deceive ;  or,  assuming 
\\\Q physical  d.x\6.  7no7'al\2,\vs>\\\  the  case  supposed,  it  is  7neta' 
physically  impossible  for  their  testimony  to  be  false;  i.  e.,  it 
affords  pJiilosophical  certainty. 

If  error  or  falsehood  could  originate  from  such  testimony,  it 
must  be  either  because  the  witnesses  are  deceived  themselves, 
or  because  they  are  not  truthful,  and  deceive  us;  but  neither 
can  happen  in  a  case  such  as  that  above  supposed.  For,  we 
cannot  even  conceive  the  possibility  of  error  or  deception  un- 
der such  conditions  without  referring  it  to  the  Author  of  the 
physical  and  moral  laws  by  which  human  nature  is  governed 
in   its   operations,   and  thereby  compromising   Divine  wisdom 

*  * '  Conditiones  quae  necessaviae  sunt  lit  testimonium  prjebeat  certitudincm, 
Eunt  pi-Eecipue  haeti-es:  1.  Ut  sit  circa  factum  possibile  et  seusibile;  2.  Ut  testes 
communiter  sint  pliires;  3.  Ut  evidenter  appareat  testes  non  esse  in  collusione." 
(Philos.  passim.)  The  conditions  requisite  for  the  testimony  of  witnesses  to 
furnisii  certainty  are  chiefly  these  three:  1st,  that  it  regard  a  fact  which  is  pos- 
Bible,  and  sensible;  2d,  that  the  witnesses  ordinarily  be  numerous;  3d,  that  tbc 
witnesses  be  evidently  not  in  collusion. 


logic:  second  pakt.  131 

and  Providence.  Hence,  it  is  evident  on  every  side,  that  the 
testimony  of  witnesses  can,  and  does,  furnish  unerring  cer- 
tainty as  to  many  sensible  tacts  or  events. 

Against  the  truth  thus  proved  it  is  sometimes  objected,  as  in 
the  following  specious  argument:  "The  testimony  of  one  wit- 
ness to  an  extraordinary  object  affords  only  probability  of  its 
truth;  therefore,  the  testimony  of  many  witnesses  gives  only  a 
sum  of  probabilities ;  but  no  number  of  probabihties  can  pro- 
duce certainty,  which  is  of  a  different  species."  Answer :  the 
testimony  of  one  witness,  in  se,  or  ifi  i/self,  is  often  both  phy- 
sically aijd  morally  certain  as  to  the  witness  himself;  but,  in  case 
of  a  solitary  witness  to  a  fact,  owing  to  special  contingencies, 
which  have  no  existence  when  the  witnesses  are  many,  his  tes- 
timony to  the  certainty  which  he  has  himself  cannot  be  ac- 
cepted as  such  by  us.  These  extrinsic  and  special  reasons  or 
contingencies  which  afford  cause  for  doubt  or  fear,  are  :  ist, 
he  may  have  deceived  himself  by  haste,  imprudence,  or  other 
cause  ;  2d,  he  may  intend  to  deceive  us  purposely.  But  these 
special  grounds  for  apprehending  deception  are  entirely  removed 
when  the  witnesses,  besides  being  ?iu)fierous,  have  the  other  con- 
ditions above  specified ;  for,  the  fulfillment  of  all  these  condi- 
tions entirely  removes  any  and  twQry  possibility  of  deception. 

Hence,  the  testimony  of  many  concurrent  witnesses  is  not  a 
sujn  of  probabilities,  in  the  case  supposed;  there  is  the  sum,  if 
you  choose,  of  as  many  physical  and  moral  certaitities,  as  there 
are  witnesses;  but  without  any  one  of  the  special  reasons  for 
doubt,  which  we  have  when  there  is  but  a  single  witness.  Yet, 
the  truth,  as  such,  in  its  objective  entity,  is  as  perfectly  such 
in  one  eye-witness  as  it  is  in  all;  for  the  objective  truth  in  such 
case  is  really  o?ie,  though  seen  by  many.  The  fact  that  many 
see  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  at  the  same  time  does  not  multiply 
the  truth  in  itself  that  there  was  an  eclipse  of  the  sun;  the 
multiplicity  and  the  diversity  of  the  witnesses  may  and  do  take 
away  extrinsic  reasons  for  doubt,  as  regards  persons  who  learn 
that  fact  on  their  authority. 

The  assetit  which  the  mind  yields  to  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses is  faith  or  belief. 


132  logic:  sp:cond  part. 

T\\Q  dogmatic  or  doctrinal  te^.ch'mgs  of  scientific  men,*  phil* 
osophers,  etc.,  which  depend  upon  the  Hght  of  natural  reason 
for  their  evidence,  are  worth  no  more  than  are  the  reasons  or 
proofs  which  can  be  adduced  for  them.  Hence,  such  authority 
of  itself,  or  per  se,  does  not  always  afford  certainty,  properly 
so-called. 

The  judgments  of  mankind  which  are  based  upon  good 
common  sense,  and  which  regard  evident  and  practical  mat- 
ters, are  true;  v.  g.,  when  those  judgments  regard  first  princi- 
ples, or  the  immediate  deductions  from  them.  These  judg- 
ments, when  constant  and  general,  are  a  certain  argument  for 
truth;  but  they  are  by  no  means  the  general  criterion  of  truth, 
as  some  authors  have  erroneously  maintamed;  nor  are  they  an 
ultimate  jnotive  for  certainty. 

It  is  obviously  in  accordance  with  the  preceding  doctrine 
that  the  documents  and  monuments  of  authentic  history,  under 
proper  conditions,  afford  complete  certainty  as  to  the  substance 
ot  important  facts  of  past  times. 


ARTICLE    VIII. 

SCIENTIFIC  knowledge;  in  what  it  consists;  the  sci- 
ences; THEIR  species,  WITH  THEIR  CO-ORDINATION  AND 
PRINCIPL.E    OF    UNITY. 

Knowledge^  in  its  general  acceptation,  includes  every  species 
of  cognition,  how  perfect  or  imperfect  soever  it  may  be.  But 
scientific  knowledge,  or  science,  is  the  evident  and  certaiii  knowl- 
edge of  a  necessary  tlmig  by  its  proximate  and  real  cause.  The 
object  of  scientific  knowledge  is  a  7iecessary  thing  in  the  sense, 

*"  Alii  sancti  hoc  tradiderunt,  non  quasi  asserentes,  sed  sicut  utentes  his 
qu£e  in  philosophia  didicerunt;  unde  non  sunt  majoris  auctoritatis  quam  dicta 
philosophorum  quos  sequuntur,  nisi  in  hoc  quod  sint  ab  omni  iufidelitatis  suspici- 
one  separati."  (Div.  Thorn,  in  2  sent.  disp.  14,  art.  2,  ad.  1.)  Other  holy 
authors  taught  this,  not  as  asserting  it  positively,  but  as  using  what  they  learned 
in  philosophy;  hence,  they  have  no  more  authority  than  the  sayings  of  the  phil- 
osophers wliom  they  follow,  unless  in  this  that  they  are  free  from  all  suspicior 
»f  infidelity. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  133 

that  it  is  a  conclusion  which  necessarily  follows  from  its  pre- 
mises, or  an  effect  which  proceeds  necessarily  from  its  cause. 
We  truly  know  a  thing  only  when  we  know  it  in  its  principles, 
or  cause;  not  the  cause  as  a  fact  only;  but  the  cause  as  pro- 
ducing it  or  giving  to  it  its  being  or  existence  as  an  effect. 

Science  has  for  its  object,  then,  the  ontological  causes  of 
things,  their  causce  essendi. 

A  demonstration*  is  a  legitimate  argument  that  gives  an  evi- 
dent truth  which  necessarily  follows  from  evident  premises  : 
such  conclusion  is,  therefore,  scientific  knowledge^  since  it  is  an 
effect  known  to  follow  necessarily  and  immediately  from  the 
premises  by  which  it  is  produced. 

But  distinguish  between  the  ontological  order,  and  the  logical 
order;  or,  the  order  in  which  effects  are  produced  by  their 
causes,  and  the  order  in  which  reason  knows  them,  or  learns 
them.  In  a  priori  arguments,  we  reason  from  cause  to  effect; 
that  is,  the  argument  proceeds  in  the  ontological  order;  and  in 
this  case,  the  logical  order  agrees  with  the  ontological  order. 
In  a  posteriori  recisoning,  the  ontological  order  is  inverted,  since 
we  argue  from  effect  to  cause.  When  we  conclude  from  effect 
to  cause,  and  then  reflexly  see  the  effect  as  truly  and  neces- 
sarily produced  by  its  cause,  such  knowledge  of  that  effect  is 
scientific ;  for  it  is  the  knowledge  of  an  effect  as  produced  by 
Its  proximate  and  true  cause,  i.  e.,  its  ontological  cause,  {causa 
essendi. ) 

When  we  say  an  effect  necessarily  follows  from  its  cause,  the 
necessity  referred  to  is  either  that  which  arises  absolutely  from 
the  essence  of  things;  or  that  which  is  consequent  upoji  suppos- 
ing physical  or  moral  laws,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
matter  which  furnishes  the  premises  and  conclusion. 

T\\Q proxi/nate  cause  is  that  nearest  cause  which  directly  and 
immediately  produces  the  effect;  it  is  real,  because  it  is  distin- 
guished from  an  apparent,  or  accide?ital  cause. 

*  "  Demonstratio  ea  est  ratiociuatio  qu£e  scientiam  eflicit:  et  scientia  est  de- 
monstrationis  conclusio  sen  eff'ectus."  Demonsti'ation  is  reasoning  which  pro 
duces  scientific  knowledge;  the  scientific  knowledge,  then,  is  the  conclusion  or 
the  effect  of  demonstration. 

'  Scientia  est  syllogismus/aden*  scire." 


134  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

A  reasoning  mind  does  not  rest  quiet  in  the  mere  facts  ot 
experience,  or  in  causes  which  are  known  merely  as  facts,  or 
in  remote  causes;  but  it  seeks  to  know  why  the  thing  is  so, 
why  it  exists  as  seen :  this  it  finally  learns  in  its  causa  essendi, 
its  dependence  on  its  ontological  or  real  and  immediate  cause  ;* 
and  this  the  inquiring  mind  seeks  for  in  all  the  objects  of  cog- 
nition. 

Here  it  might  be  objected  that  a  cause  is  extrinsic  to  its  effect ; 
whereas,  perfect  knowledge  should  represent  the  intrijisic  or 
<fi-^^;;//^/ constituents  of  a  thing;  and,  therefore,  the  knowledge 
of  a  thing  by  its  cause,  is  not  rightly  called  scientific  knowl- 
edge. 

Before  answering  this  objection  it  is  proper  to  observe  that 
by  cause  we  mean  a  principle  on  which  a  being  depends  for  its 
existence. 

Also,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  all  causes  are  reduced 
to  four  principal  kinds;  namely,  the  finals  efficient,  formal  ^Xi^ 
7naterial.  ThQ  final  cause  and  efficient  cause  are  really  extrinsic 
to  the  effect ;  the  formal  and  material  causes  are  intrinsic  to 
the  effect,  and  by  their  union  constitute  the  effect. 

The  efficient  cause  is  that  which  produces  the  effect;  v.  g., 
the  builder  who  fnakes  a  house,  is  its  efficient  cause ;  the  final 
cause  is  that  end,  or  purpose,  on  account  of  which  the  efficient 
cause  produces  its  effect,  or  operates  :  v.  g.,  the  house,  y^r  the 
sake  of  a  home ;  or,  as  regards  the  builder,  for  the  price  ;  the 
material  cause,  is  that  thing  out  of  which  the  effect  is  made; 
V.  g.,  the  stone,  brick,  wood  and  other  niaterial,  out  of  which 
the  house  is  made;  i\\Q  formal  cause  is  that  by  which  the 
essence  or  particular  nature  of  the  effect  is  determined  to  be 
what  it  is;  as,  v.  g.,  the  plan,  design,  or  for?n  of  the  house  is 
that  which  determines  or  constitutes  the  material,  a  house,  in 
the  example  supposed.  The  marble  is  the  material  cause;  and 
the  shape  the  formal  csiuse,  of  the  statue  or  bust. 

Now,  for  knowledge   to  be  perfect  and   adequate,  all  the 

*  * '  Cognitio  rei  perfecta  iu  causis  est  nobilior  quam  coguitio  in  effectu.  Ordo 
causarum  est  uobillor  quam  ordo  effectiium. ' '  The  perfect  knowledge  of  a  thing 
in  its  causes,  is  nobler  than  the  knowledge  of  it  in  its  effect;  for  the  order  of 
eauses  is  more  noble  than  the  order  of  effects. 


logic:  second  part.  135 

causes  on  which  an  effect  depends  should  be  known;  which, 
however,  it  is  not  possible  for  man  to  know,  with  completeness 
at  least ;  yet,  though  our  knowledge  be  not  adequate,  we  may 
approximate  perfect  knowledge  within  degrees  which  satisfy 
rational  longing.  For  this  object,  any  one  of  the  four  causes 
may  suffice,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  effect  contemplated. 

The  definition  *  which  gives  the  formal  and  material  cause 
of  an  object  is  usually  selected,  when  possible,  to  enunciate 
scientific  truth ;  as  the  scientific  definition  aims  to  assign  the 
formal  and  material  causes  of  the  object  defined,  whenever  the 
nature  of  the  matter  permits  it. 

A  definition  which  assigns  the  matter  and  form  is  preferable, 
when  it  is  possible ;  because  they  are  the  intrinsic  constituents 
of  an  object:  genus  and  specific  difference,  assign  the  quasi 
viatier  a.ndfi9rm. 

We  may  define  by  all  the  four  causes,  either  all  given,  or 
some  only.  Their  proper  order  is  :  ist,  by  the  mattery  2d,  by 
the  form,\  which  is  the  principal,  as  the  form  determines  and 
perfects  the  matter;  3d,  the  efficient  cause,  or  agent;  4th,  the 
fitial  cause,  which  though  last  in  the  execution,  is  the  first  in 
the  intention.  The  final  cause  is  not  demonstrable  a  priori  ; 
because  it  is  first,  there  is  none  prior  to  it,  and  it  is  the  cause 
of  the  other  causes.  The/t^/v;/,  is  the  cause  why  the  matter  is 
perfect ;  the  agent  or  efficient  cause,  is  the  cause  why  the  form 
perfects  the  matter;  and  theyf;//>,  or  eiid,  is  the  cause  why  the 
agent  produces  thQ  form  in  the  matter;  no  further  cause  can  be 
a9signed  why  the  finis,  or  end,^  moves  the  agent  or  efficient 
cause. 

A  collection  or  system  .of  demonstrated  or  scientific  conclu- 
sions, regarding  many  objects  of  the  same  species,  constitutes  a 
science;  v.  g.,  the  body  of  demonstrated  conclusions  in  regard 

*  ' '  Definitio  est  oratio  explicans  rei  naturam. ' '    The  definition  is  a  discourse 

which  explains  the  nature  of  a  thing. 
* 
t '  •  Forma  est  principium  agendi  in  unoquoque.    Seu  iinuniquodque  ageus  agit 
per  suam  formam."       The  form  is  tlie  principle  of  action  in  everything,  or, 
every  agent  acts  by  virtue  of  its,  form. 

X  "  Finis  est  prima  et  altlsslma  causarura."  The  end  is  the  first  and  the 
highest  of  causes. 


136  logic:  second  part. 

to  the  stars  and  planets,  constitutes  the  science  of  Astronomy  ; 
and  similarly  for  other  classes  of  scientific  objects. 

It  is  evident  that  the  sciences  have  their  species  determined, 
and  are  to  be  classified,  according  to  their  objects ;  or,  it  is 
their  objects  that  specify  them. 

But  it  would  serve  the  uses  of  philosophy  to  coordinate  them 
according  to  some  clear  law  or  principle  of  unity. 

Philosophers  in  all  ages  regarded  the  reducing  of  all  sciences 
to  unity  as  a  matter  of  importance;  though,  in  striving  to  ac- 
complish this  object,  they  did  not  agree  upon  a  principle  of  uni- 
fication Some  sought  for  this  principle  of  unity  in  the  genera 
of  objects;  others  looked  for  it  in  the  powers  of  cognition; 
but  they  discovered  no  principle  by  which  they  could  unify  the 
sciences,  without  destroying  their  specific  differences;  they 
failed  to  make  them  one,  and  yet  preserve  their  species. 

Some  make  a  general  classification  of  the  sciences,  accord- 
ing to  the  degree  of  abstraction  which  the  intellect  employs 
when  contemplating  and  determining  the  objects  of  those 
sciences.  There  are  three  principal  degrees  of  this  abstrac- 
tion :  ist,  we  may  know  se/nible  objects,  as  such;  as  trees, 
crystals,  animals,  etc.;  2d,  we  may  prescind  from  all  sensible 
qualities,  except  quantity ;  continuous  quantity,  as  lines,  sur- 
faces, etc.;  or  discrete  quantity,  as  numbers ;  3d,  we  may  ab- 
stract from  all  sensible  conditions, and  go  to  the  super-sensible; 
V.  g.,  to  the  essential  prototypes  of  objects,  to  spirits,  to  God. 

These  grades  of  abstraction  correspond  to  physics,  mathe- 
matics and  metaphysics.  The  principle  of  unity  is  abstraction ; 
and  the  sciences  are  divided  into  classes  by  the  different  ^<f^'r^?<f.y 
of  abstraction  required  to  know  scientifically  the  different  classes 
of  objects  about  which  each  science  is  conversant. 

The  general  principles  on  which  this  theory  rests  are  these  : 
ist,*  sensible  things  taken  as  singular  and  in  concrete  are  the 
objects  of  the  senses ;  their  essence  is  the  object  of  the  intel- 
lect, and  this  object  it  attains  by  means  of  abstraction ;  2d, 
science  has  for  its  object  universals;  the  singular  belongs  to 
history,  to  the  testimony  of  the  senses;  history  is  not  a  science, 
because  its  subject  matter  is   contingent    truth,  or   facts;    it 


logic:  second  part.  137 

pertains  to  science^  however,  to  assign  the  proximate  and  neces- 
sary causes  of  facts,  when  this  is  possible;  3d,  Ufiiversals  are 
the  work  or  product  of  abstraction ;  and  the  more  perfect  this 
abstraction,  the  higher  is  the  science. 

In  the  sciences  which  depend  merely  upon  the  natural  light 
of  reason, metaphysics  is  supreme,  or  it  rules  all  other  sciences; 
for  it  furnishes  the  ultimate  principles  by  which  they  are  finally 
judged,  and  from  which  they  receive  their  last  decisive  proof. 
Therefore  all  mere  human  science  is  subject  to  metaphysics. 

"  No  science  proves*  its  own  first  principles."  For,  as  science 
is  from  demonstration,  either  those  first  principles  are  known 
per  se,  i.  e.,  are  self-evident,  in  which  case  they  cannot  be  dem- 
onstrated; or  they  are  demonstrated  conclusiofis  from  another 
science;  in  which  case  their  demonst?'ation  pertains  to  the 
science  in  which  they  are  conclusions  from  first  principles ;  so 
in  either  case  they  are  assumed. 

It  suffices  for  scientific  demonstration  that  the  medium  be 
analogical  unity\  only.  The  medium  of  demonstration  for  the 
existence  of  God,  i.  e.,  creatures^  as  effects^  has  only  analogical 
unity ;  for  God  and  creatures,  when  included  under  the  gen- 
eral concepts,  cause,  being,  etc.,  ag?'ee  only  by  analogy.  If  this 
unity  of  analogy  did  not  suffice  for  demonstration,  then  the 
existence  of  God  could  not  be  demonstrated  a  posteiiori. 

It  will  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  distinguish  between  the 
different  species  of  intellectual  cognition,  or  the  perfections  in 
the  understanding,  usually  termed,  intelligence,  science,  i.  e.,  sci- 
entific knowledge,  and  wisdom,  or  philosophical  knowledge; 
they  are  also  called,  intellectual  virtues.  These  different  species 
of  cognition  in  the  understanding  have  speculative  matter  only 
for  their  object ;  or,  in  other  words,  they  do  not  directly  re- 
gard the  merely  cortingent  and  practical  at  all,  as  such,  but 
they  directly  consider  truth  only  as  it  necessarily  is  in  itself, 
apart  from  its  practical  application  to  the  feasible,  and  to  fnoral 
ends.     Art  d^nA prudence  have  for  their  object  \\\^  practical,  not 

♦"Nulla  scientia  sua  probat  principia."  No  science  proves  its  own  first 
principles. 

t"  Ad  scientiam  suflicit  unitas  analogica."  (Div.  Thorn.  4  met  ;  lect.  1.) 
Analogical  unity  suffices  for  scientific  knowledge. 


138  logic:  second  part. 

the  speculative.  A7't  enables  its  possessor  to  accomplish 
what  is  feasible.,  or  physically  capable  of  being  effected;  pru- 
dence enables  one  to  choose  that  which  is  morally  best,  in  re- 
spect both  to  means  and  end ;  or,  as  it  is  briefly  said  in 
an  axiom,  "  ars  est  factibiliuni;  prudentia^  agtbilium''  Art  is 
of  that  which  can  be  done  physically ;  prudence,  of  what  can 
be  done  morally. 

Intelligence  is  not  the  intellect  itself,  but  it  is  a  perfection  of 
this  faculty,  by  which  it  is  strengthened,  and  directed  in  assent- 
ing to  the  true,  and  dissenting  from  the  false.  It  is  sometimes 
termed  lumen  intellectuale,  the  light  of  the  understanding ;  it 
was  called  by  the  old  philosophers,  a  habit,  "intellectus  est 
habitus  primorum  principiorum."  The  understanding,  as  thus 
empowered  by  the  habit  or  perfection  termed  intelligence,  has 
for  its  object  only  self  evident  truth,  "verum  per  se  notum;" 
or,  intelligence  has  for  its  object,  evident  first  principles.  Sci- 
ence, or  scientific  knowledge,  as  already  explained,  has  for  its 
object  the  necessary  conclusions  derived  from  evident  first 
principles,  "  verum  per  aliud  notum  ; "  or,  it  has  for  its  object, 
demonstrated  conclusions  from  evident  first  principles.  It  is 
manifest,  then,  that  scientific  knowledge  is  essentially  the  pro- 
duct or  fruit  of  reason,  smce  it  attains  its  object,  not  immedi- 
ately, but  through  the  medium  of  demonstration. 

But  principles  may  be  first  either  in  a  particular  genus  of 
cognitions  only,  as  v.  g.,  the  first  prificiples  of  Geometry,  of 
Astronomy,  of  Logic,  of  Physiology,  etc. ;  or,  they  may  be 
first  in  respect  to  the  whole  sphere  of  man's  knowledge.  Now, 
the  principles  that  are  first  in  the  particular  genera  of  man's 
cognitions  classified  according  to  their  objects,  together  with 
the  necessary  conclusions  deduced  from  them,  constitute  the 
objects  of  the  sciences,*  and  the  knowledge  of  them  is  science  or 
scientific  knowledge.  But  the  knowledge  of  particular  genera 
of  first  principles  as  compared  among  themselves,  and  also 
their  conclusions,  all  as  tested  and  judged  by  the  highest  prin- 
ciples of  man's  knowledge,  is  philosophical  knowledge,  or  wis- 

*  "  Secuudum  diversa  genera  scibilium,  sunt  diversi  habitus  scientiavunj;  aa^ 
plentia  non  est  nisi  una. ' ' 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  139 

dom*  Hence,  wisdom  considers  both  all  scientific  knowledge, 
and  its  principles;  and,  therefore,  its  conclusions  are  the  highest 
and  most  universal  of  all  that  reason  can  attain  to.  Although 
its  principles  are  the  last  which  the  mind  comes  to  know,  they 
are  absolutely  yfr^-//  or  are  objectively  first. t 

Hence,  philosophical  knondedge,  or  wisdom,  has  for  its  object 
the  highest  and  most  universal  causes.  They  possess  the 
greatest  of  all  objective  certainty,  "necessitatem  essendi:"  they 
are  not  only  necessary  and  immutable,  but  they  are  presup- 
posed objectively  to  all  scientific  truth,  though  they  are  the 
last  learned  by  human  reason,  which  attains  to  them  only  by 
rising  from  that  which  is  lower. 

Philosophical  knowledge,  or  wisdom,  is  at  the  same  time 
sciejitific  knowledge,  in  as  much  as  it  demonstrates  conclusions 
by  their  principles;  but  it  has  this  in  addition  to  mere  science, 
and  peculiar  to  itself,  that  it  judges  of  all,  not  only  the  conclu- 
sions, but  the  principles  also ;  and  this  is  the  respect  in  which 
it  goes  higher  than  science  does,  strictly  as  such.  Hence,  it 
may  be  said  that  philosophy  begins  where  the  sciences  end  ; 
and  it  is,  therefore,  jusdy  styled  the  science  of  the  sciences 
whose  principles  are  furnished  by  natural  reason. 

An  example  will  help  to  make  the  preceding  distinctions 
clear  to  the  mind;  the  axioms  of  geometry  may  be  regarded 
as  Jirst  principles;  for,  they  are  self-evident ;  they  are,  there- 
fore, an  object  of  intelligence. 

The  following  thesis,  "the  solid  contents  or  geometrical 
quantity  of  any  cube  is  equal  to  the  product  of  its  three  dimen- 

*  "  Sapientia  est  habitus  intellectualis  circa  altissima  occupata."  Wisdom 
is  a  habit  of  the  intellect  which  is  concerned  about  the  highest  things. 

t  "  Ea  qiise  sunt  posterius  nota  quoad  nos,  sunt  priora  et  magis  nota  secundum 
naturam;  ideo,  id  quod  est  ultimum  respectu  totius  cognitiouis  human.-e,  est  id 
quod  est  primum  et  maxime  cognoscibile  secundum  naturam;  circa  hiijusmodi 
est  sapientia,  quas  considerat  altissimas  causas."  (Div.  Thom.  1,  2,  p.,  qu.  57.,  art. 
2.)  Those  things  that  are  last  known  as  regards  us,  are  according  to  their 
nature  first,  and  they  possess  most  of  what  makes  knowledge,  or  most  to  be 
kuo^vn;  therefore,  what  is  last  in  respect  to  the  Avhole  of  human  knowledge,  is 
what  is  first  and  greatly  the  most  capable  of  causing  knowledge,  according  to 
its  nature:  wisdom,  which  considers  the  highest  causes,  regards  such  objects. 
That  which  is  in  itself  the  highest  and  greatest  truth,  is  the  last  known  to  us, 
because  the  medium  of  knowing  is  extrinsic  to  it,  and  obscm-e. 


140  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART. 

sions,"  is  a  demonstrated  conclusion^  and  is,  on  that  account,  an 
object  of  scientific  knowledge*  The  question,  " is  qua?itity,  as 
extended  in  space,  absolutely  separable  from  material  sub- 
stance ? "  proposes  philosophical  matter.  For  a  determinate 
answer  to  this  question,  we  must  consider  quantity  as  geome- 
trical, quantity  as  material,  and  also  the  essential  and  metaphysi- 
cal conditions  which  are  prerequisite  for  matter  to  exist  at  all : 
the  conclusion  which  logically  follows,  is  philosophical  truths 
or,  is  an  object  of  that  virtue  m  the  intellect  which  we  termed 
tvisdom. 

It  may  be  affirmed,  then,  that  Philosophy,  which  embodies 
and  explains  the  teachings  ot  wisdom,  is  entitled  to  the  rank 
assigned  it,  as  "  Queen  and  Moderatrix  of  the  Sciences."  The 
name,  Philosophy,  is  directly  and  appropriately  due  to  Meta- 
physics alone,  since  Metaphysics  alone  has  for  \\.'?>  proper  object 
the  most  universal  truths  and  principles. 

*  The  terms  science  and  philosophy,  arc  employed  by  many  popular  Avriters 
in  a  vague  and  indeterminate  sense,  for  whatever  pertains  to  any  species  of 
superior  learning.  Even  with  not  a  few  well  educated  authors,  these  words 
seem  to  have  no  fixed  or  precise  signification,  but  are  made  to  include  a  number 
of  undefined  and  undistinguished  generalities;  by  them,  the  terms  appear  to  be 
used  indiscriminately,  so  that  all  philosophy  is  science,  and  convei'sely,  all 
science  is  philosophy. 

But  the  discerning  student  of  philosophy  will  quickly  discover  for  himself  the 
fact  that,  among  exact  writers  on  these  subjects,  the  distinction  between  science 
and  philosophy ,  which  is  based  on  their  Avholly  distinct  objects,  is  clearly  made 
and  is  strictly  maintained.  As  defined  by  their  proper  objects,  philosophy  seeks 
for  the  highest  and  the  most  universal  causes  of  things;  science  has  for  its  ob- 
ject, the  necessary  and  proximate  or  immediate  causes  of  things.  Their  objects 
are,  therefore,  determinate,  and  it  is  clear  that  they  are  specifically  distinct 
kinds  of  knowledge. 

Hence,  it  is  an  inept  use  of  language,  and  a  confusion  of  things  that  should 
be  kept  distinct,  to  give  the  name  philosophy  to  physics,  or  the  collective  branches 
of  physical  science  which  explain  the  causes  of  natural  phenomena.  The  philo- 
sophical study  of  physical  and  material  nature,  is  properly,  and  in  accordance 
with  long  established  usage,  named  cosmology,  in  a  course  of  philosophy. 

It  was  believed  that  these  remarks  should  be  here  made,  in  the  interests  of 
learners:  since  precision  of  language,  correctness  of  cognitions,  and  accuracy 
of  judgment,  mutually  aid  each  other  in  the  work  of  mental  discipline. 


APPENDIX. 


disputation;  or  practical  exercise  in  reasoning. 

In  many  colleges  and  higher  institutions  of  learning,  the  stu- 
dents of  Logic  and  Metaphysics,  or  the  class  of  Philosophy, 
have  regularly  some  practical  exercises  in  argumentation,  last- 
ing for  half  an  hour  at  a  time,  or  longer,  and  occurring  two  or 
three  times  a  week,  and  even  oftener,  when  the  class  is  suffi- 
ciendy  numerous.  These  disputations  usually  begin  soon  after 
the  class  has  reached  the  second  part  of  Logic,  or  Logic 
Applied.  So  important  is  this  practice  judged  to  be  by  many 
instructors  of  youth,  that,  in  a  large  number  of  well-couducted 
institutions  of  learning  it  is  never  dispensed  with. 

The  form  or  manner  of  conducting  this  useful  exercise, 
which,  in  familiar  language,  is  usually  styled  the  "  Circle,"  is 
here  briefly  described,  for  the  information  of  those  readers  who 
are  unacquainted  with  it. 

A  day  or  more  in  advance  of  the  exercise,  one  proposition, 
or  even  two  propositions,  the  proofs  of  which  may  be  gathered 
from  what  was  already  seen  in  the  text  book,  or  was  ex- 
plained in  class,  are  assigned  to  a  student,  to  be  proved  and 
defended  in  class  by  him.  In  some  cases  several  propositions 
are  divided  for  this  purpose  between  two  students ;  and  occa- 
sionally the  disputation  takes  place  in  presence  of  a  select 
audience  of  educated  persons,  in  addition  to  the  class.  Also, 
two  or  three  other  students  are  selected  beforehand  to  prepare 
objections  to  be  brought  by  them  against  the  assigned  theses. 
These  objections  are  required  to  be  brief,  and  in  correct  logical 

for?n;  ioT,  an  objection  which  is  not  ifi  logical  fonn,  is  not 

141 


142  LOGIC  :    SECOND   PAKT. 

regarded  as  legitimate  in  the  "circle,"  and,  therefore,  care 
should  be  taken  never  to  offer  in  argument  a  syllogism  which 
is  not  in  form.     (See  p.  60,  at  the  end.) 

On  the  appointed  day  the  exercise  begins  by  one  of  the  ob- 
jectors or  opponents  denying  the  proposition  which  he  intends 
to  assail,  which  is  equivalent  to  asking  for  the  proofs  of  it. 
The  defender  then  enunciates  the  thesis  or  proposition,  dis- 
tincdy,  and  somewhat  deliberately.  He  may  begin  either  by 
explaining  briefly  the  precise  meaning  and  scope  of  his  thesis, 
or,  if  that  be  judged  unnecessary  for  it,  by  stating  his  princi- 
pal argument  in  the  form  of  a  syllogism,  or  in  any  of  the 
legitimate  forms  of  argument  which  are  recognized  in  Logic; 
though  the  simple  categorical  syllogism  is  generally  preferable. 
In  such  case,  his  further  proofs  and  explanations,  in  which  he 
should  have  some  latitude  to  dispense  with  strict  syllogistic 
iorms,  will  generally  regard  the  minor  or  second  premise.  In 
order  not  to  perplex  the  attention  with  matters  of  only  sec- 
ondary importance,  it  is  a  sufficiendy  approved  practice  always 
to  call  the  first  premise  of  a  regular  syllogism  the  viajor^  and 
the  second  the  jninor  premise,  without  regard  to  its  technical 
propriety. 

After  the  brief  proof,  or  proofs  by  which  the  truth  of  his 
thesis  is  demonstrated,  the  objections  against  it  immediately 
begin.  In  answering  them  he  should  suppress  excitement  or 
anxiety,  avoid  precipitancy,  and  strive  to  avail  himself  of  the 
advice  given  to  him  who  defends  the  truth,  by  the  well-known 
axioms  of  the  "circle;"  "raro  affirma,  soepe  nega,  semper  dis- 
tingue;" rarely  affirm,  often  deny,  always  distinguish.  A 
plausible  objection  to  the  truth,  besides  being  in  logical  form ^ 
will  generally  contain  both  somethmg  that  is  true,  and  some- 
thing that  is  false. 

The  defender  always  begins  his  answer  by  repeating  the 
argument  of  the  adversary,  just  as  it  was  stated  by  him;  it  is 
then  repeated  a  second  time,  the  answer  being  given  to  each 
proposition  as  soon  as  it  is  enunciated.  In  the  solution  of  the 
objection,  either  some  one,  or  more  terms.,  will  be  distinguished, 
so  as  to  grant  what  is  true,  and  to  deny  what  is  falsely  affirmed 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  143 

by  them ;  or  else  one  or  both  premises  will  be  denied.  The 
objector,  in  his  next  argument,  having  in  his  preparation  before- 
hand anticipated  the  answer  given  to  his  first  objection,  will  be 
ready  to  bring  an  argument  to  prove  what  is  denied ;  and  thus 
the  contest  may  be  continued  at  pleasure.  Practice  will  speedily 
render  the  disputants  skillful  in  finding  arguments,  extempora- 
neously, or  "at  the  spur  of  the  moment." 

Either  the  teacher,  or  some  one  else  who  is  competent  for 
the  task,  presides  as  moderator  at  these  exercises,  and  sees  both 
that  the  objections  are  rightly  put,  and  that  they  are  accurately 
and  satisfactorily  solved ;  it  is  also  his  duty  to  see  that  the 
whole  exercise  is  conducted  with  decorum,  and  that  the  dispu- 
tation be  not  uselessly  or  unduly  protracted. 

When  both  parties  prepare  diligently  beforehand  for  their 
contest,  it  is  found  by  experience  that  the  "  circle "  always 
proves  to  be  both  a  highly  interesting  exercise  for  advanced 
students,  and  a  profitable  one. 

An  example  will  help  to  render  the  fonn  of  conducting  this 
exercise  more  clear  to  the  mind :  suppose  the  thesis  to  be  de- 
fended is  the  following ;  "  The  external  senses  furnish  to  the 
mind  an  unerring  motive  of  certainty,  as  to  their  proper  ob- 
jects." 

The  defender  might  here  first  explain  the  scope  and  mean- 
ing of  the  thesis;  v.  g.,  ist,  that  it  supposes  the  senses  to  be 
in  a  healthful  or  normal  state;  2d,  he  might  mention  some 
conditions  to  be  complied  with  for  prudently  using  the  senses ; 
3d,  he  might  distinguish  between  inducing  error, /<?/- j-<f,  i.  e., 
causi?ig,  or  physically  effecti?ig  error  ;  and  erring  accidentally,  in 
which  latter  case,  error  happens  through  precipitancy  in  judg- 
ing, etc.  He  may  then  state  in  form  one  of  his  principal  argu- 
ments; V.  g.,  "  No  agent  that  acts  only  by  natural  or  necessary 
physical  law,  can  be  false;  but  the  external  senses  act  only  by 
natural  or  necessary  physical  law;  therefore,  the  external  senses 
cannot  be  false."  In  explaining  and  proving  the  premises,  he 
may  employ  the  syllogism,  the  enthymeme,  the  sorites,  or  any 
legitimate  form  of  argument,  that  may  occur  to  him;  and 
it   would   be   appropriate  to    the  argument,  as    above  giveii. 


144  logic:  second  paet. 

to  show  how  false  actio7i  in  natural  or  physical  agents,  if  con 
ceived  to  be  at  all  possible,  would  be  referable  to  God,  etc. 
His  proofs  may  proceed  till  finished ;  or  they  may  be  sus- 
pended, at  the  discretion  of  the  moderator,  in  order  that  the 
objections  may  be  given. 

The  objector,  when  the  proofs  are  finished,  begins  at  once; 
V.  g.,  "  Those  organs  cannot  be  said  to  furnish  unerring  cer- 
tainty, which  mislead  the  judgment;  but  the  external  senses 
mislead  the  judgment ;  therefore,  the  external  senses  do  not 
furnish  the  mind  unerring  certainty." 

The  objection  having  been  repeated,  in  order  to  prevent 
misunderstanding  as  to  its  precise  meaning,  is  then  answered 
by  parts ;  v.  g.,  "  Those  organs  cannot  be  said  to  furnish  cer- 
tainty which  per  se  mislead  the  judgment,  or  by  their  own 
action  necessitate  error  in  the  mind,  I  grant;  but  that  their 
accidental  connexion  with  error,  really  and  properly  causes 
that  error,  I  deny ;  similarly  I  distinguish  the  minor,  and, 
therefore,  I  deny  the  consequence  and  consequent — or,  I  deny 
the  conclusion." 

Objector  insists,  "To  cause  error  even  accidentally,  is  really 
and  truly  to  cause  error;  but,  as  you  admit,  the  senses  cause 
trrox  accidentally ;  therefore,  the  senses  really  and  truly  cause 
error." 

Answer,  after  repeating  the  objection  ;  "  I  distinguish ;  that 
to  cause  tnor per  se,  that  is,  physically  and  efficiently  to  cause 
it,  is  really  and  truly  to  cause  it,  I  grant;  that  to  cause  error 
accidetitally,  is  really  and  properly  to  cause  error,  I  deny,  and, 
therefore,  I  deny  the  conclusion." 

Objector  insists,  "  Whatever  has  the  nature  of  a  cause,  has  its 
own  proper  effect,  which  it  brings  about;  the  accidental  cause 
has  the  nature  of  a  cause;  therefore,  it  has  its  own  proper 
effect  which  proceeds  from  it." 

Answer,  after  repeating  the  objection,  "That  the  cause  per 
se,  or  cause  that  really  and  positively  influences  action,  has  its 
own  proper  effect,  which  it  positively  brings  about,  I  grant; 
that  the  accidental  cause  really  and  positively  influences  in  the 
production  of  any  effect,  I  deny ; "  etc. 


LOGIC  :    SECOND   PART.  145 

Here  the  defender  might  be  required  to  explain  more  pre- 
cisely what  this  accidental  cause  is,  and  under  what  respect  it 
is  termed  a  cause  at  all. 

The  foregoing  example  is  by  no  means  offered  as  a  model  of 
argumentation ;  but,  though  imperfect,  it  may  serve  to  illustrate 
by  something  visible,  the  form  or  uiajiner  of  conducting  logical 
and  metaphysical  disputations  in  the  class-room,  or  the  college 
hall.  It  is  hoped  that  even  this  oudine  description  of  the 
exercise  will  suggest  reasons  to  prove  its  importance  and  value 
for  cultivating  the  reasoning  power,  and  as  a  means  of  acquir- 
ing precise  notions  and  judgments.  When  a  proposition  stands 
either  as  a  premise  or  the  conclusion  of  a  well  conceived  syllo- 
gism, to  which,  by  the  nature  of  its  matter,  it  belongs,  its  full 
meaning  and  value  are  then  distinctly  appreciated. 

It  was  said  above  that  in  the  regular  disputation,  no  objec- 
tion was  regarded  as  valid  or  legitimate,  unless  it  be  in  logical 
form :  the  reason  for  thus  absolutely  excluding  these  vicious 
or  spurious  arguments,  is  manifest.  For,  if  the  disputation 
were  permitted  to  turn  merely  upon  fallacies  in  the  form  of 
argument,  it  would  thereby  become  degraded  to  the  rank  of 
sophistry;  which,  considered  as  an  exercise  of  reason,  possesses 
little  more  value  or  dignity  than  the  trivial  practice  of  punning. 

Logic,  which  is  the  means  of  ascertaining  and  imparting 
truth  by  discourse  of  reason,  would  thus  be  rendered  practi- 
cally aimless ;  for  its  natural  tendency  as  a  study  would  then 
rather  be  to  make  the  mind  astute  and  disingenuous,  than  to 
develop  and  cultivate  in  the  understanding  healthful  and  nor- 
mal habits  of  thought,  or  give  it  facility  in  demonstrating  and 
maintaining  truth  by  its  reasons. 

It  would  be  erroneous,  however,  to  infer  from  what  is  said, 
that  all  exercises  in  the  fallacies  or  sophistical  methods  of  rea- 
sonmg,  which  are  adapted  to  give  readiness  in  detecting  and 
refuting  errors  in  the  form  of  arguments,  are  to  be  condemned, 
or  are  intended  thereby  to  be  censured.  The  "  circle,"  which 
may  be  considered  an  exercise  that  is,  under  some  respect, 
public,  is  designed  to  represent  the  contest  for  truth,  so  far  as 
practicable,  just  as  it  is  conducted  by  sincere  and  upright  op- 

lO 


146  logic:  second  part. 

ponents.  Hence,  the  objections  offered  to  the  proposed  thesis, 
which  thesis  may  perchance  happen  to  be  really  untrue,  should 
by  no  means  be  limited  to  feigned  difficulties  against  the  doc- 
trine defended:  but  if  valid  arguments  can  be  adduced  which 
refute  it,  they  are  not  to  be  withheld ;  for  truth  should  prevail, 
even  if  the  defender  of  the  assigned  proposition  be  discomfited. 

But  the  practice  of  giving  exaggerated,  and  even  exclusive 
attention  to  the  mere  forms  of  argument,  or  of  making  all  exer- 
cise in  Logic  consist  in  the  various  transformations  or  conver- 
sions which  are  possible  in  these  forms,  employing  for  the  pur- 
pose only  abstract,  algebraic  formulae,  or  the  related  parts  of 
certain  diagrams,  is,  perhaps,  as  much  a  mechanical,  as  it  is 
an  intellectual  operation;  and  while  the  limited  use  of  such 
methods  is  not  without  its  advantage,  yet  excessive  attention 
to  these  extrinsic  devices  has  not  a  beneficial  effect  upon  the 
mind.  The  rules  of  correct  argument  are,  for  the  mind  that  is 
loyal  to  truth,  few  and  simple.  It  is  the  ignoble  office  of  per- 
sistent error  to  employ  subterfuge,  obscurity,  equivocation,  and 
all  the  vices  of  false  reasoning. 

It  cannot  be  justly  doubted  that  the  direct  proofs  of  truth, 
and  its  positive  criteria,  as  explained  in  Applied  Logic,  and 
the  principles  of  General  and  Special  Metaphysics,  furnish  the 
most  profitable  subject  matter,  for  exercising  the  young  mind 
in  Practical  Logic. 


End    of    Logic. 


ONTOLOGY 


OR. 


GENERAL  METAPHYSICS. 


147 


ONTOLOGY; 


OR, 


GENERAL  METAPHYSICS. 


The  metaphysical*  transcends  the  conditions  of  material  and 
sensible  existence,  as  the  term  metaphysical^  i.  e,,  beyond  the 
physical,  implies.  It  considers  truths  and  principles  in  the  pro- 
totypes of  things;  or,  as  they  are  contained  or  implied  in  the 
essential  concepts  of  things,  abstractedly  from  the  existence  of 
those  things,  or,  also,  as  verified  in  their  existence.  Hence,  it 
has  for  its  object  the  most  universal  attributes  of  beings ;  and 
the  laws  and  axioms  of  all  the  sciences  are  subject  to  it,  and 
are  tested  by  its  principles ;  since  error  is  refuted,  and  truth 
demonstrated,  only  by  means  of  principles  that  are  known  per 
se,  i.  e.,  are  self-evident,  necessary  and  immutable.  In  a  more 
special  sense,  it  also  includes  whatever  is  immaterial,  as  spirits, 
God;  since  we  naturally  know  spirit  only  by  metaphysical 
principles  and  reasoning. 

As  ontology  or  general  metaphysics,  which  is  the  science  of 

*  '  *  Metaphysicus  considerat  reriun  essentias  et  modos  essendi ;  Logicus  con- 
siderat  pra^dicationes  seu  modos  praedicandi."  The  Metaphysician  considers 
the  essence  of  things,  and  their  necessary  modes  of  existing;  the  Logician  con- 
siders predicables,  or  modes  of  predicating. 

* '  Metaphysica  in  objecto  suo  includit  ens  universalissimiira  et  ejus  attributa 
essentialia. "  Metaphysics  includes  for  its  object,  being  as  most  universal,  and 
its  essential  atti'ibulea  or  properties. 

149 


150  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

being  in  the  most  general  sense  of  the  term  being*  furnishes  to 
the  mind  the  fundamental  and  ultimate  principles  on  which  all 
philosophy  rests,  and  by  which  all  science  must  be  finally 
tested,  its  importance  is  very  great.  Its  neglect  cannot  but 
prove  disastrous  to  all  sound  method  of  philosophizing,  and 
thus  result  in  vague  hypotheses  and  dark  theories,  instead  of 
certain  and  genuine  science.  By  a  careful  study  of  it,  the 
educated  mind  comes  finally  to  rest  quiet  in  its  conclusions; 
for  it  sees  them  as  they  flow  from  their  first  and  necessary 
principles. 

Just  as  no  one  can  erect  a  perfect  arch,  span  the  broad  river 
with  a  bridge,  or  construct  a  building  that  is  at  the  same  time 
safe,  well-proportioned  and  massive,  unless,  besides  knowing 
the  contingent  physical  laws  of  matter,  he  know  also  the 
metaphysical  laws  of  mathematical  quantity ;  so,  he  that  would 
comprehend  the  real  thiftgs  of  any  species  or  category,  must 
know  the  determinate,  necessary  and  immutable  first  princi- 
ples to  which  those  things  are  subject;  because,  these  meta- 
physical principles  are  the  measure  for  the  nature  or  essence  of 
those  objects.  Every  real  being  is  subject  to  its  own  essential 
truths  and  laws,  in  the  light  of  which  it  must  be  seen  in  order 
to  be  clearly  understood. 

There  is  a  class  of  writers  who  affect  to  doubt,  and  even  to 
deny,  all  first  principles  and  metaphysical  truths,  except  those 
that  directly  regard  mathematical  quantity.  Since  the  meta- 
physics of  quantity  has  constant  application  in  the  daily  affairs 
of  life,  its  principles  can  neither  be  doubted  nor  ignored  with 
impunity ;  but  vulgar  ridicule  is  not  incurred  by  the  denial  of 
equally  evident  and  necessary  principles,  when  they  regard 
objects  having  fewer  practical  relations  to  man's  material 
wants ;  yet,  in  itself,  it  is  not  more  absurd  to  deny  one  neces- 
sary and  self-evident  truth  than  another. 

♦  "  Metaphysica  speculatur  universalia  entis  attributa;  quaj  videlicet  enti  per 
Be  insiint,  et  qujecunque  spectant  ad  eadom  ilia,  sive  per  oppositionem  sive  per 
connexionem:  Ex.  gr.  in  ente,  unum,  verum,  bonum,  essentiam,  existentiam,"  etc. 
Metaphysics  regards  the  most  univei'sal  attributes  of  being;  namely,  whatever 
is  essentially  in  being,  or  pertains  to  its  essential  attributes,  whether  by  opposi- 
tion or  connexion;  v.  g.,  its  unity,  truth,  goodness,  essence,  existence,  etc. 


CHAPTER  I. 


ARTICLE    I. 

WHAT  THE  NOTION  BEING  IN  ITS  GENERAL  SENSE^  INCLUDES 
ESSENCE  OF  THINGS;  EXISTENCE;  UNITY;  IDENTITY;  DIS- 
TINCTION. 

Beings  in  its  most  general  sense,  includes  in  its  concept  what 
actually  exists,  and  what  has  any  sort  of  entity,  whether  it  be 
substance  or  accident.  Creator  or  creature.  Beifig,  thus  un- 
derstood, is  the  material  object  of  ontology.  Beings  in  this 
general  sense,  is  not  generical  in  its  meaning  when  applied  to 
different  objects,  v.  g,,  mineral^  animal,  substance,  accident; 
here  its  signification  is  not  tmivocal,  but  analogical.  For,  genus 
requires  the  term  which  stands  for  its  essence  to  be  nnivocally 
applied  to  its  inferiors  or  subjects;  v.  g.,  "the  horse  is  ajii??ial; 
the  lion  is  animal;  man  is  animal^  In  these  examples,  ajiimal 
expresses  precisely  the  same  concept  in  all  the  objects  termed 
animal.  But  in  the  examples,  "  accident  is  being,  substance  is 
being,  matter  is  being,  spirit  is  being; "  the  word  beifig  has  not 
the  same,  univocal  significance  in  its  application  to  these  ob- 
jects; for,  accident  as  compared  to  substance,  or  matter  to 
spirit,  is  being,  only  by  analogy,  since  they  are  in  their  real  en- 
tity generically  diiferent,  therefore  essentially  and  wholly  differ- 
ent, and  we  cannot  say  that  the  one  is  the  other,  except  by 
some  relation  of  analogy. 

The  word  being,  which  stands  for  the  simplest  and  most 
universal  of  our  ideas,  cannot  be  defined,  nor  does  it  require  a 
definition.  It  cannot  be  defined,  for,  genus  and  specific  differ- 
ence are  both  being,  and  even  every  synonym  of  the  term  is 

151 


152  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

also  being;  hence,  behig^  when  thus  understood,  cannot  be  sub 
jected  to  definition. 

The  general  concept  of  being  {e?itis)^  does  not  expressly  say 
for  its  object,  either  substance  or  accident,  Creator  or  creature; 
but  all  of  them,  as  in  some  manner  one,  i.  e.,  as  being;  of 
course,  they  are  one,  or  are  being  only  by  a  sort  of  analogy. 
As  observes  Suarez,  "To  the  formal  concept*  of  beings  corres- 
ponds one  objective  concept,  adequate  and  immediate,  which 
does  not  expressly  say  either  substance  or  accident,  either  God 
or  creature,  but  says  them  all  as  one  :  namely,  as  being  similar 
in  some  respect,  and  as  agreeing  in  this,  that  they  are  all 
beings ''\ 

Hence,  it  may  be  inferred  that  being  is  not  predicated  equi- 
vocally of  God  and  creature,  for  then  nothing  could  be  demon- 
strated concerning  God  from  creature,  since  the  7nedium,  or 
middle  term,  would  be  equivocal;  it  is  neither  predicated  uni- 
vocally,  for  in  this  case  God  and  creature  would  be  of  the  same 
species ;  it  is  predicated  of  them  only  analogically,  owing  to  a 
certain  similarity  by  which  they  are,  in  some  sense,  united  in 
the  same  concept  of  being. 

The  word  nothing,  taken  absolutely,  expresses  the  exclusion 
of  all  being  or  entity;  yet  the  mind  can  make  of  nothing  a  quasi 
object,  by  its  relation  to  something,  which  it  excludes.  But,  con- 
sidered as  an  object,  it  is  merely  a  creature  of  the  mind,  efis 
rationis,  whose  only  foundation  in  reality  is  the  relation  referred 
to. 

When,  by  a  reflexive  judgment,  the  mind  affirms,  "whatever 
exists,  is ;  what  does  not  exist,  is  not,"  it  thereby  employs  the 
principle  of  identity,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  more  reflex  cer- 
tainty to  the  proposition. 

When,  for  the  same  purpose,  we  affirm  that  "  it  is  impossible 
for  the  same  thing  to  exist,  and  not  exist  at  the  same  time ; " 
we  thereby  employ  the  principle  of  contradiction.     When  we 

♦See  Article  I,  Log.,  I  Part,  p.  16. 

t  "  Conceptui  formali  entis,  respondet  iinus  conceptus  objectivus,  adaequatus 
et  immediatus,  qui  expresse  non  dicit  substantiam  neque  accidens,  neque  Deum 
Deque  creaturam;  sed  ha;c  omnia  per  modum  unius;  Tiz. ,  quatenus  sunt  inter  se 
aliquo  modo  similia,  et  conveniunt  in  essendo."    (Metaphys.  Disp.  2,  Sect.  2.) 


GENEEAL     METAPHYSICS.  153 

put  the  affirmation  under  this  disjunctive  form,  namely,  "either 
the  thing  is,  or  it  is  not,"  it  is  called  \\\^  principle  of  the  excluded 
middle;  since  no  fnediiim  is  possible  between  being,  and  not 
being;  or,  as  applied  under  the  same  respect,  and  to  the  same 
thing,  all  middle  or  medium  is  excluded,  in  a  complete  disjunc- 
tion. 

The  essefice  of  a  thing  includes  all  that  by  ivhich  the  thing 
is  what  it  is,  and  without  which  it  could  not  possibly  exist  at  all; 
V.  g.,  a  triangle  is  constituted  such  by  having  three  angles, 
and  three  sides.  Its  constituent  elements  are  the  three  angles, 
and  three  sides,  and  if  any  one  of  these  essential  constituents 
be  wanting,  its  essence  is  thereby  destroyed,  and  it  ceases  to  be 
a  triangle,  for  they  are  all  and  each  necessary  for  the  very  con- 
cept of  it.  The  essence,  therefore,  is  that  without  which  a 
thing  can  neither  exist,  nor  be  conceived,  and  which  makes 
it  what  it  is,  when  it  exists.  Essence  of  a  thing,  is  the  real 
answer  to  the  question  :  "  What  is  it  ?  " 

When  the  essence*  of  a  thing  is  considered  as  active,  or  as  a 
principle,  capable  either  of  eliciting  or  putting  acts,  it  is  in  that 
sense  the  same  as  the  nature  of  that  thing;  the  essence  consti- 
tutes the  being  what  it  is ;  its  nature  is  the  essence  viewed  in 
reference  to  its  operations,  or  as  e?npowered  to  act.  That  which 
constitutes  a  being  immediately  operative  or  able  to  act,  may 
be  considered  as  the  compleme?it  of  essence. t  This  compleme/it 
of  essence  consists  of  all  the  powers,  or  active  and  passive  vir- 
tues, that  belong  to  that  essence. 

Hence,  since  the  nature  %  of  a  thing  is  its  <?j-j'<?;z^:<?  as  empowered 

♦"Essentia  est  in  ordine  ad  esse,  natara,  principium  agendi."  "What  is 
essence,  in  respect  to  existence,  is  nature,  when  regarded  as  a  principle  of  ac- 
tion.    (See  p.  29,  rule  sixth.) 

t  "  Nulla  substantia  creata  est  immediate  operativa."  No  created  sub- 
stance is  immediately  operative. 

X  *  *  Potentia  definitur  per  actum. ' '    Power  is  defined  by  its  act. 

'*  Definitio  est  oratio  explicans  reinaturam."  Definition  is  a  discourse  ex- 
plaining the  nature  of  a  thing. 

' '  Actus  specificantur  ab  objectis. "    Acts  are  specified  by  their  objects. 

"Substantia  rei  cognoscitur  ex  operatione;  operatio  vero  ex  objecto  circa 
quod  versatur."  (Lessius  opuscul .  de  immort.  animse,.  Lib.  2,  No.  55.)  The 
substance  of  a  thing  is  known  by  its  operation;  the  operation  is  known  by  the 
object  which  it  regards. 

"  Praeterea  nulla  forma  materiae  immersain  essendo  et  operando,  potest  re* 


154  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

to  act ;  and,  also,  since  powers,  i.  e.,  nature  as  operative,  are 
defined  by  their  acts,  and  acts  are  specified  by  their  connatural 
objects,  it  fi.Uovvs  that  we  know  the  species  of  any  thing  from 
knowing  the  species  of  its  acts,  and  this  vve  know  from  the 
connatural  objects  of  these  acts;  when,  therefore,  two  acts  are 
specifically  different,  the  powers  or  natures  that  put  these  acts 
are  also  specifically  difterent. 

The  following  demonstrative  argument  exemplifies  both  the 
force  and  the  application  of  this  undeniable  principle,  namely, 
that  by  knowing  the  species  of  the  acts,  we  thereby  know  the 
species  or  kind  of  the  nature  that  puts  those  acts :  "  the  human 
intellect  has  for  the  connatural  objects  of  its  acts  the  true,  the 
ufiiversal,  the  abstract,  the  super-sensible;  but  these  objects  of 
its  acts  are  absolutely  hnniaterial ;  therefore,  the  intellect  or 
intelligent  nature  which  by  its  acts  attains  to  them,  is  absolutely 
immaterial  also."  Or,  in  fewer  words,  that  is  immaterial,  the 
connatural  objects  of  whose  action  are  immaterial. 

The  essence  may  be  considered  as  physical,  or  7netaphysical. 
The  genus  and  specific  difiference,  assign  the  metaphysical  essence 
of  an  object ;  as  v.  g.,  material  ajid  inorganic  substance.  These 
terms,  substance,  material,  inorga7iic,  give  the  nietaphysical  con- 
stituents of  the  object.  The  physical  essence  includes  the  con- 
stituent attributes,  or  elements,  as  they  are  actually  and  con- 
cretely, in  the  object. 

The  human  mind  may  understand  and  quite  clearly  com- 
prehend the  essence  which  it  constitutes  for  itself  out  of  genus 
and  specific  difference,  which  it  founds  on  the  realities  of  objects 
as  known  to  it;  but  the  physical  essence  of  objects,  as  they  are 
actually  existing,  it  can  know,  not  immediately  and  intimately; 
but  only  i?iediately  or  through  their  extrinsic  action  and  effects. 

This  is  evident,  when  we  reflect  that  we  depend  for  our 

flcctere  supra  suara  operationem;  v.  g. ,  oculus  non  videt  suam  visionem,  etc. , 
anima  autem  rationalis  reflectit  supra  propriam  operationem.  Ergo  anima 
ratioiialis  est  superior  omni  materise  in  essendo  etoperando."  (Philosophi. 
passim.)  No  form  whicli  is  dependent  on  matter,  both  in  existing  and  in  opera' 
ting,  can  reflect  on  its  own  act;  v.  g. ,  the  eye  cannot  see  itself  seeing,  etc. ;  but 
the  rational  soul  can  reflect  on  its  own  act.  Therefore,  the  rational  soul  is 
superior  to  matter,  both  in  its  essence  and  its  action. 

"Actus  et  potentia  sunt  ejusdem  generis."  Act  and  the  power  are  of  th« 
Bame  genus. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  155 

knowledge  of  the  objects  around  us,  upon  the  senses,  which 
are  acted  on  by  those  objects  through  their  quaHties;  and, 
therefore,  the  mind  does  not  perceive  their  essence  imme- 
diately, but  by  experience,  comparison,  reflexion  and  abstrac- 
tion, it  forms  its  concept  of  that  essence,  as  the  nature  of  the 
object.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  very  erroneous  to  assert, 
as  Locke  does,  that  we  know  notJwig  of  the  physical  essence 
of  things ;  for  we  do  know  physical  essences,  at  least  so  far  as 
they  manifest  themselves  in  their  properties  and  operations. 

The  essence  of  an  actual  being  is  true  because  it  is  conform- 
able to  the  type  of  that  being,  as  it  exists  in  the  Divine  Mind. 
The  essential  prototypes,  or  essences  of  things,  as  in  the  Divine 
Mind,  are  eternal,  indivisible,  and  immutable.  For  if  they 
could  be  divided,  or  diminished,  and  thus  changed,  they  would 
thereby  become  something  else ;  some  other  essence,  or  cease 
to  be  what  they  are,  which,  in  reality,  would  be  to  conceive 
other  essences,  not  to  change  these.  (Vide  page  6i  et  seq.  and 
note  page  ^t^.) 

IN    WHAT    REAL    MUTATION    CONSISTS. 

It  will  help  towards  a  fuller  comprehension  of  this  whole 
matter,  if  we  distinguish  the  different  senses  in  which  the  ex- 
pressions "mutation,"  and  "change  of  one  thing  into  another," 
are  understood  by  philosophers;  v.  g.,  as,  conversiott,  transnb- 
stantiatioft,  alteration,  a7inihilatio?i  and  creation,  all  of  which 
operations  imply  some  sort  of  chajige  in  the  terms,  or  objects 
of  them. 

For  the  cojiversion  of  one  thing  into  another,  the  fulfillment 
of  the  following  rules  and  conditions  is  essential : 

First:  There  must  be  two  terms,  both  of  which  zx^ positive; 
i.  e.,  not  mere  privations  or  negations,  but  some  positive  and 
real  substance.  The  first  one  of  these  terms  is  called  the  ter- 
minus a  quo,  or  conversus;  i.  e.,  the  term,  object  or  thing  that 
is  changed ;  the  other  term  of  the  conversion  is  called  the 
terminus  ad  que tn,  or  convertens;  i.  e.,  the  term  or  thing  into 
which  the  first  one  is  changed,  or  which,  in  some  manner, 
replaces  the  first  one. 


156  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

Second.'  There  must  be  a  subject  either  in  which,  or  in 
respect  to  which,  the  change  is  made,  this  subject  in  itself 
remaining  unchanged;  i.  e.,  what  is  intrinsical  to  one  term  is 
changed  into  what  is  intrinsically  of  another  term,  something 
receiving  that  change  as  a  subject,  or  at  least  as  a  quasi  sub- 
ject, this  subject  thereby  passing  from  the  one  to  the  other 
without  being  itself  otherwise  changed. 

Third :  The  terminus  a  quo  must  cease  to  exist  in  the  sub- 
ject, and  be  succeeded  by  the  ternwius  ad  quetn,  the  cessation 
of  the  one  and  the  succession  of  the  other  having  some  rela- 
tion of  dependence  on  each  other;  this  ceasing  of  the  one 
term  and  beginning  of  the  other  can  be  effected  only  by  some 
real  physical  action. 

Fourth:  Hence,  there  must  be  a  double  mutation  :  one  by 
which  the  terminus  a  quo  passes  from  existence  to  non-exist- 
ence; and  the  other,  by  which  the  terminus  ad  quem  passes 
from  non-existence  to  existence,  a  subject  receiving  the  one, 
after  giving  up  the  other;  this  subject  is  the  inatter,  or  quasi 
matter. 

An  example,  though  it  does  not  perfectly  embody  these  con- 
ditions, yet  may  help  to  illustrate  for  the  young  mind  what  is 
thus  far  said :  suppose  an  orange  and  an  apple  be  placed  near 
to  each  other  on  the  table.  Now,  if  all  that  specifically  or 
essentially  constitutes  the  orange  what  it  is,  were  caused  to 
pass  into  the  apple,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  force  all  that  spe- 
cifically or  essentially  constitutes  the  apple  to  give  way,  or 
cease  to  remain  in  the  matter  in  which  it  dwelt,  and  thus  be 
succeeded  therein  by  the  corresponding  constituents  of  the 
orange,  thereby  making  that  which  was  an  apple  become  an 
orange,  such  change  would  be  the  conversion  of  one  thing  into 
another,  and,  in  this  instance,  it  would  be  the  conversion  of  an 
apple  into  an  orange.  The  apple  would  be  the  termi?ius  a 
quo,  and  the  orange  would  be  the  terminwi  ad  quem.  The 
matter  in  which  the  essence  of  the  apple  ceased  to  be,  and  into 
which  the  essence  or  specific  nature  of  the  orange  subsequently 
came,  is  the  subject  of  the  conversion. 

As  to  whether  there  is  any  conversion,  as  thus  described,  of 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  157 

one  material  substance  into  another,  by  natural  laws  and 
agency,  is  a  question  which,  in  the  opinion  of  some  great 
minds,  is  not  yet  demonstratively  and  definitively  settled  by 
philosophers  and  physicists. 

The  misfortune  of  the  Alchemists  was  the  assuming  as  a 
general  principle,  such  conversion  of  material  substance  to  be 
naturally  possible ;  and  hence  their  many  futile  and  disastrous 
attempts  actually  to  convert  base  metals  into  gold.  But  all 
agree  that  absolutely  and  intrinsically  the  conversion  of  one 
substance  supposed  to  consist  of  a  dual  principle,  as  implied 
in  the  idea  of  conversion,  into  another,  is  not  impossible  to 
Infinite  Power;  still  more  evidently  is  there  no  repugnance 
when  that  change  of  one  thing  into  another  is  a  transubsta?i- 
tiation. 

In  this  case  it  is  not  alone  the  formal,  or  specific  principle 
of  the  dual  constituents  of  material  substance  that  is  converted 
into  another,  the  material  principle  remaining  in  itself  un- 
changed as  the  subject  of  two  successive  substantial  forms;  but 
in  tra7isubsta)itiation  the  whole  substance,  both  as  to  matter 
and  substantial  form,  ceases,  and  a  complete  new  substance 
succeeds  it,  the  accidents  which  are  se?isible,  or  the  sensible 
species  alone  remaimng  unchanged,  except  as  to  their  relation 
to  the  substance. 

In  the  case  of  Eucharistic  transubstantiation,  the  sensible 
species  exist  without  a  subject  of  inhesion.  This  transubstan- 
tiation is  not  effected  by  natural,  but  by  supernatural  agency. 
There  seems  to  be  no  proof,  however,  that  such  transubstantia- 
tion can  be  effected  by  any  merely  natural  agency. 

Alteration  expresses  change  of  one  quality  into  another ;  the 
terminus  ad  quern,  in  alteration,  is  quality;  in  conversion,  the 
■terminus  ad  quern,  is  substance,  as  already  said. 

There  is  alteration  in  the  most  strict  sense,  only  when  some 
quality  of  a  given  substance  is  changed  into  a  contrary;  v.  g. 
when  black  is  changed  into  white,  they  being  conceived  as 
contraries.  In  this  case,  the  whole  substance,  which  is  the 
subject  of  alteration,  passes  from  a  positive  quality  which  ceases, 
"to  a  n^w  and  contrary  quality,  which  succeeds  it.     Accidents 


158  gp:neral   metaphysics. 

that  perfect  their  subject,  are  not  said  to  alter  it,  since  it  is  not 
consistent  to  say  that  a  thing  is  altered^  or  becomes,  in  any 
proper  sense,  another*  by  being  perfected. 

In  creation^  a  thing  is  produced  from  nothing;  i.  e.,  it  is  not 
educed  in  any  sense  from  a  preexisting  subject,  but  derives  its 
whole  being  from  a  purely  efficient  cause.  By  aimihilation^  a 
being  is  totally  reduced  to  non-existence,  so  that  nothing  of  it 
that  is  either  substantial  or  accidental,  is  remaining. 

Since  the  essence  of  a  thing  includes  precisely  those  constit- 
uents that  are  necessary  to  make  it  what  it  is  individually,  and 
which,  at  the  same  time,  render  it  conformable  to  its  archetype 
in  the  divine  mind,  it  '\s  per  se  evident  that  neither  this  type  of 
it  in  the  divine  mind,  nor  the  truthful  copy  of  it  in  the  actual 
being,  can  be  intrinsically  changed. 

The  mutations  above  described  as  co?iversian,  alteration,  etc., 
include  all  real  changes  in  a  being  that  are  possible,  or  con- 
ceivable ;  but  in  no  one  of  them  is  there  change  of  intrinsic 
essence.  Even  existence,  and  non-existe?ice,  are  only  different 
states  or  conditions  of  a  being  or  essence,  which  include  no 
intrinsic  change  of  essejice  in  itself.  Hence,  all  mutation  is 
limited  to  the  existence  or  non-existence,  and  to  the  real  rela- 
tions, of  its  terms ;  and,  therefore,  essences  are  intrinsically 
immutable. 

Essence  is  eternal:  Essence,  in  the  possible  or  intelligible 
order,  could  have  had  no  beginning ;  for  it  was  always  true 
that  if  'alhing  of  a  given  or  determinate  essence  ever  existed 
afterwards,  it  must  have  such  or  such  essential  constituents; 
since  this  eternal  possibility  depends  on  God,  who  is  eternal,  is 
the  cause  of  truth,  and  knows  in  His  own  essence  the  essential 
prototype  of  every  possible  creature,  from  eternity;  therefore, 
essence,  regarded  as  a  concept  of  the  divine  intellect,  must  be 
eternal. 

Existence  is  affirmed  of  those  essences  that  are  actual,  or 
that  have  passed  from  possibility  into  the  order  of  real  things ; 
and  they  are  then  said  to  exist.     It  is  manifest  that  existence 

*"Conversio  terminatur  ad  aliud;  alteratio  ad  alterum."  The  term  of  con* 
pfrsior^  is  another  substance;  that  of  alteration,  another  quality. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  159 

cannot  be  strictly  defined ;  and  yet  nothing  is  more  clear  to 
the  mind  than  it  is. 

Essence,  as  possible,  being  logically  presupposed  to  its 
actual  existence  in  the  real  order  of  things,  metaphysicians 
amuse  themselves  with  the  subtle  question,  "  Is  actually  exist- 
ifig  essetice  truly  different  from  its  real  existence  ?  "  Though 
the  question  is  not  practically  important,  and  perhaps  turns 
partly  on  an  equivocal  use  of  terms,  it  may,  however,  exercise 
mental  acumen  in  the  inquisitive  student  of  philosophy,  to 
state  it  briefly  in  this  place. 

One  side,  interpreting  in  their  favor  the  expressions  often 
employed  by  the  "Angel  of  the  Schools,"  St.  Thomas  of 
Aquin,  v.  g.,  "essentia  entis  perfectissimi,  absoluti,  necessarii, 
etc.,  est  suum  esse;"  the  essence  of  absolutely  perfect  being 
includes  its  existence ;  "  essentia  entis  contingentis  non  est 
suum  esse;"  the  essence  of  contingent  being  does  not  postu- 
late in  its  concept  actual  existence;  "in  creatis,  est  compositio 
inter  essentiam  et  esse ; "  in  created  things,  there  is  composition 
between  essence  and  existence,  etc.,  argue  that  the  two  are 
different ;  that  is,  that  real  essence  and  its  actual  existence  are 
different  objectively.  They  hold  that  the  term  of  every  creative 
act  must  be  actually  received  by  a  subject^  since  all  created  essence 
is  participated  or  derived.  Hence,  in  this  theory,  existence  is 
the  actuality,  and  essence  is  the  subject  that  receives  it ;  some 
saying  that  the  existence  is  a  substantial  form  educed  from  the 
essence;  others,  that  it  is  7nodal  only.  It  thence  follows,  there- 
fore, that  essence  and  its  existence  constitute  a  dual  principle, 
like  to  that  of  matter  and  for?n,  in  corporeal  substance,  the 
essence  being  the  potentia,  or  quasi  matter^  and  existence  being 
the  form. 

The  other  side,  who  maintain  that  it  is  a  distinction  without  a 
difference,  answer  that  this  theory,  thus  applied,  presents  a  less 
simple  and  perfect  concept  both  of  the  creative  act,  and  the 
nature  of  uncompounded  or  simple  substance ;  that,  for  the 
existence  of  corporeal  substance,  it  necessitates  the  admission 
of  a  double  dual  principle ;  namely,  matter  and  form,  essence 
and  existe7ue.     They  argue,  moreover,  that  their  adversaries' 


160  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

theory  being  true,  namely,  that  all  actual  being  must  be  received^ 
no  sufficient  reason  can  be  given  why  the  series  of  dual  prin- 
ciples should  be  limited  at  all ;  that  this  hypothesis  is  obscure, 
and  difficult  to  be  comprehended ;  that  it  is  susceptible  of  no 
positive  or' conclusive  proof ;  that  it  is  a  multiplicatioji  of  eniia, 
which  rather  perplexes  than  simplifies  philosophic  thought,  and 
that  it,  therefore,  is  introduced  without  logical  necessity.* 

From  this  imperfect  outline  of  a  few  arguments  adduced  by 
each  side,  some  idea  may  be  formed,  at  least,  of  the  poitii  on 
which  the  dispute  turns. 

Possibility :  Whatever  creature  exists  is  capable  of  existing, 
and  was  capable  of  existing  before  it  existed  at  all.  A  thing  is 
intrinsically  possible,  when  its  essential  constituents  have  no  re- 
pugnance or  contradiction  among  themselves;  as  v.  g.,  it  is 
possible  to  construct  a  locomotive  that  is  impelled  at  a  given 
velocity  by  steam.  Extrinsic  possibility,  besides  presupposing 
the  intrinsic  possibility,  implies  also  that  there  is  a  sufficient 
cause  that  can  actually  produce  the  effect;  v.  g.,  the  builders, 
material,  etc.,  of  the  locomotive,  in  the  example  supposed. 

Possibility,  taken  simply  or  adequately,  includes  both  the 
extri7isic  and  the  i?itrinsic possibility. 

Corresponding  to  this  double  respect  of  possibility  there  is  a 
twofold  impossibility ;  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  impossibility.  All 
things  that  are  intrinsically  possible,  :xxe,m  respect  to  the  power 
of  God,  also  extrifisically  possible.  In  respect  to  the  power  of 
creatures,  many  things  which  are  intrinsically,  and,  therefore, 
extrinsically  possible  to  God,  are  for  them  physically  impossible/ 
V.  g.,  it  \s  physically  impossible  for  men  to  stop  the  motion  of  the 
earth,  and  still  more  is  it  physically  impossible  for  a  creature  to 
create  from  nothing.  A  thing  is  morally  impossible  which,  con- 
sidering the  moral  nature  of  man,  cannot  be  done  by  him ;  v. 
g.,  all  parents  cannot  hate  their  offspring;  all  men  cannot  unite 
in  a  lie. 

Intrinsic  possibility  does  not  primarily  proceed  either  from 

*  This  question  is  argued  acutely  and  at  gi'eat  length  by  Suarez  (Metaphysics, 
Disput.,  31) ;  where  he  defends  the  latter  opinion,  and  denies  that  there  is  any 
real  difference  between  actual  essence  and  Us  existence. 


GENEEAL     METAPIIYSICS.  161 

the  power  or  the  will  of  God;  but  from  the  essences  of  things 
as  seen  by  the  Divine  InteUigence;  or,  in  other  words,  they 
have  their  origin  in  the  Divine  Essence  itself 

It  is  obvious  that  both  power  and  will  presuppose  the  possi- 
bility of  the  thing  to  be  done  or  effected,  since  intelligence 
must  logically  precede  both  volition*  and  the  power  that  fol- 
lows, or  obeys  volition.  Otherwise,  one  might  say,  "  God  can 
make  a  circle  that  is  not  round,  if  its  possibility  depends  formally 
on  his  will^  or  his /^7£'<?ry  "  whereas,  the  supposition  is  absurd; 
for  contradictions  mutually  destroy  themselves,  and,  in  the 
case  supposed,  leave  no  term  of  action.  It  would  be  the  same 
as  saying,  God  can  make  a  circle  and  not  make  a  circle  at  the 
same  time  and  under  the  same  respect ;  which  is  actually  say- 
ing nothing  at  all,  as  an  object  of  thought  or  real  term  of  ac- 
tion. 

Hence,  it  is  easily  seen  that,  as  before  stated,  ifitrinsic  possi- 
bilities, or,  what  is  virtually  the  same,  the  essences  of  things, 
are  i??imutable,  and  are,  therefore,  incapable  either,  of  increase 
or  dmiinution. 

Every  beifig  is  one.  Unity  is  the  negation  of  division  in  a 
being.f  For,  every  being  is  either  simple,  or  it  is  compound ; 
if  it  is  simple,  it  is  indivisible ;  if  it  is  compound,  it  ceases  to 
be  a  being  when  divided,  and  becomes  not  a  being,  but  be- 
ings. Yet,  a  thing  may  be  one  in  some  respect,  and  many  m 
another  respect;  v.  g.,  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  one;  but  its 
integral  parts  may  be  many.  The  universal  is  actually  one,  but 
capable  of  becoming  many,  under  a  certain  respect.| 

Identity^  is  founded  on  unity,  and  signifies  the  agreement  of 

*  *  *  Nihil  volitum  nisi  prsecognitum. ' '  That  which  is  wished  must  have  been 
previously  known ;  or,  more  litterally,  nothing  is  wished  unless  what  is  fore- 
knoAvn. 

f  *  *  Omne  principium  est  unum. ' '    Every  principle  is  one. 

*  *  Ab  uuo  non  nisi  unum. ' ' 

t '*  Universale,  «?*«?»  est  actu;  mw/Za  in  potentia."  The  universal  is  one  ac-: 
tually,  but  many,  potentially. 

§  *  *  Unum  in  substantia  facit  idem ;  unum  m  qualitate  facit  simile;  unum  in 
qantitate  facit  csquale,  seu  aaqualitas  fundatur  in  imitate  quantitatis,  servata  dis- 
tinctione  extremorum. "  To  be  one  in  substance,  makes  identity;  one  in  quality, 
makes  similarity;  one  in  quantity,  makes  equality;  or,  equality  is  founded  on 
unity  of  quantity,  keeping  the  distinction  of  the  extremes. 
II 


162  GEJ^ERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

a  thing  with  itself.  Identity  may  be  ge?ie7'k,  as.  ajiimal^  in 
man  and  brute ;  or  specific,  as  man,  when  applied  to  different 
men ;  or  numerical,  as  a  man  compared  with  himself. 

Similarity*  is  connected  with  identity  and  unity,  since  it  is 
founded  on  unity  or  identity  under  some  respect. 

Similarity  is  an  agreement  of  distiiict  things.  This  agree- 
ment is  in  some  quality  or  perfection,  and  it  may  exist  in  ob- 
jects of  different  species;  "the  child  resembles  its  mother; 
the  color  of  the  evening  sky  is  like  to  that  of  gold  ; "  "  vices 
in  the  evening  of  life,  like  shadows  at  the  decline  of  day,  grow 
great  a?id  monstrous^  The  resemblance  between  the  objects 
in  the  last  example  is  properly  that  of  analogy,  though  the 
comparison  be  termed  simile.  Agreement  in  all  respects  is 
peculiar  to  objects  of  the  same  species,  as,  Peter  is  like  Paul ; 
this  is  specific  identity. 

Leibnitz  and  Clark  disputed  as  to  whether  two  objects  of  the 
same  species  could  be  so  completely  alike  as  to  differ  only 
numerically;  Leibnitz  denied  the  possibility  of  it ;  Clark  main- 
tained it  to  be  intrinsically  possible;  and  in  this  he  was  correct. 

Distinguish  between  similarity  and  analogy;  similarity  is 
founded  on  the  specific  identity  of  some  one  or  more  qualities 
or  properties  in  objects  which  are  otherwise  different,  and  which 
are,  therefore,  predicated  of  the  objects  univocally.  These  ob- 
jects, or  the  subjects  of  the  like  quaHties,  may  be  either  of  the 
same  or  different  species.  Analogy,  on  the  contrary,  properly 
supposes  its  objects  or  the  terms  of  it,  to  be  of  different  species. 

Analogy  is  not  founded  on  specifically  identical  quality  in  its 
objects  or  terms ;  but  on  a  certain  proportion  between  its  ob- 
jects, or  their  proper  effects,  by  which  the  one  becomes  related 
in  the  mind  to  the  other. 

This  proportion  is  not  that  which  is  in  parity,  which  is  reduc- 
ible to  mathematical  quantity,  and  which,  being  of  the  same 
species,  is  predicated  univocally  of  its  terms ;  but  the  propor- 
tion which   makes  analogy  is  not  reducible   to  mathematical 

*  "  Ut  duo  dicantur  perfecte  similia,  debent  habere  secundum  eamdem  ratio- 
nem  id  in  quo  conveniunt. ' '  For  two  things  f,o  be  called  perfectly  similar,  thej 
must  possess  that  in  which  they  agree,  in  the  same  manner. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  163 

quantity ;  it  is  a  relation  or  agreement  which  has  no  proper 
unit  of  measure,  is  neither  uni vocally  nor  equivocally  predi- 
cated of  its  objects  or  terms,  and  yet  they  have  that  basis  of 
somewhat  indeterminate  resemblance  which  founds  for  the 
mind  a  relation  of  the  one  to  the  other. 

Both  similarity  and  analogy,  therefore,  are  founded  on  like- 
ness of  objects,  and  hence,  they  may  be  considered  as  agreeing 
generically,  though  they  differ  specifically. 

Distinctioji*  is  opposed  to  ide7itity.  Real  distinction  is  either 
substantial  or  accidental:  the  distinction  between  an  apple  and 
a  pebble  is  substantial;  also,  that  between  the  body  and  soul  in 
man,  though  constituents  of  the  same  compound.  The  dis- 
tinction between  substance  and  its  accidents^  or  among  the  acci- 
dents themselves,  is,  under  different  respects,  either  accidental 
distinction,  or  substantial  distinction. 

The  distinctioji  of  reason  f  is  so  called,  because  it  is  made  by 
the  reason,  and  exists  only  in  the  reasoning  which  the  mind 
employs  in  its  efforts  to  comprehend  or  explain  certain  difficult 
objects  in  which,  being  unable  to  use  the  real,  it  helps  itself  by 
this  artificial  distinction. 

This  distinction  of  reason  is  two-fold ;  it  is  either  virtually 
founded  in  the  object;  or,  it  is  purely  mental.  The  distinction 
of  the  attributes  in  God,  as  all-wise,  all-powerful,  free,  mer- 
ciful, just,  etc.,  since  his  absolute  perfection  contains  in  a  cer- 
tain pre-eminent  manner  what  we  thus  denominate,  is  a  dis- 
tinction of  reason  founded  m'\X.^  object;  though  God  and  his 
attributes  are  really  ide?itical. 

The  distinction  between  man  and  rational  animal,  or  Cicero 
a?id  Tully,  is  purely  mental,  or  of  reason;  one  being  the  other 
differently  expressed.  The  mind  employs  these  distinctions  of 
reason  in  its  operations  that  regard  objects,  whose  unity  and 
simplicity,  or  greatness,  it  is  unable  to  express  by  one  direct 
and  adequate  concept  of  those  objects. 

*  ' '  Distinctio  est  carentia  identitatis. ' '    Distinction  is  a  want  ol  identity. 

t '  *  Distinctio  ratiouis  est  duplex:  distinctio  rationis  ratiocinates,  quae  fit  cum 
ftindamento  in  re;  et  distinctio  rationis  ratiocinantis,  quae  est  sine  fundamento  in 
re. "  The  distinction  of  reason  is  twofold:  the  one  is  founded  in  the  object;  the 
other  is  not  founded  in  the  object. 


164  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

To  this  head  we  may  likewise  refer  various  mere  figments 
of  the  imagination:  "ens  imaginabile  latius  ampliat  quam 
ens  possibile ; "  the  fancy  extends  its  action  even  beyond  the 
possible  object,  to  the  impossible  or  absurd. 


ARTICLE     II. 

TRUTH. 

Iruth*  is  a  predicate  of  every  being ;  and  is,  therefore,  enu- 
merated among  the  transcendentals,  or  the  transce?idental  pre- 
dicates :  it  consists  in  this,  that  every  being  agrees  with  the 
essential  type,  or  concept  of  itself.  Truth,  thus  understood,  is 
now  more  commonly  called,  metaphysical  truth. 

All  truth,  as  already  declared  in  speaking  of  logical  truth,  is 
a  relation  of  agreement  between  intellect  and  object. t  When 
Leibnitz  defines  it  to  be,  order  in  the  constituents  of  beins^,  his 
definition  pertains  rather  to  the  goodness  or  perfection  of  being. 

Absolutely  speaking,  things  are  true  because  they  agree  with 
the  intellect  that  constitutes  them ;  that  is,  when  they  agree 
with  the  archetypes,  or  essential  ideas  according  to  whose 
exemplar  they  are  made.  Thus  all  actual  things  agree  with 
their  exemplars  in  the  Divine  Mind;  and,  similarly,  artificial 
things  made  by  man  are  true,  as  agreeing  with  the  precon- 
ceived idea  of  them  in  the  mind  of  him  who  devises  and  makes 
them.  Hence,  it  is  easily  seen  that  falsity  %  in  beings,  or  real 
things,  is  nothing;  but  falsity,  or  not  being,  is  predicated  of  them 
by  a  concept  of  reason,  which  attributes  to  them  what  is  really 
in  the  judgment,  or  in  the  mind  only. 

A  statue  is  said  to  h^  false,  which  fails  to  express  the  intended 
likeness ;  a  deceiver  is  called  a  false  friend ;  objects  are  called 
false,  which  give  occasion  for  false  judgment,  as  "  fools'  gold," 
etc.     But  falsity,  formally  taken,  is  the  negation  of  truth,  and 

*  ' '  Omne  ens  est  verum. ' '    Every  being  is  true. 

t  *  *  Veritas  est  adsequatio  intellectus  et  rei. "    Truth  is  the  equation  of  intel- 
lect and  object. 
X  ' '  Falsitas  in  rebus  nihil  est. ' '    There  is  no  falsity  in  real  things. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  165 

in  its  primary  or  radical  sense,  is  to  be  referred  to  tvill  and 
judgineni,  or,  to  finite  cognition,  but  not  to  things  or  beings, 
as  positive. 

After  a  little  attention  to  the  preceding  considerations,  the 
following  propositions  will  be  readily  admitted : 

First :  There  is  truth  in  all  real  things,  and  that  independeiitly 
of  our  knowledge  of  them  For  they  are  conformable  to  their 
archetypes  in  the  Divine  Intellect;  and  this  relation  of  agree- 
ment is  metaphysical  truth.  Also  things  are  principally  or 
primarily  true  by  their  relation  to  the  Divine  Intelligence,  to 
which  must  be  referred  the  origin  of  all  essences. 

Second :  No  object  is  false,  in  respect  to  the  Divine  Jntellect. 
For  God  is  infinite  in  intelligence  in  which  they  originate,  and 
freedom  which  wills  to  create,  and  power  which  actually  effects 
them,  or  gives  them  their  real  being;  therefore,  all  thmgs  that 
exist  must  agree  with  their  essential  exemplars,  as  they  are  in 
His  intelligence  :  this  is  truth  in  those  things;  since  they  must 
be  what  they  are  seeji,  willed  and  made  to  be,  by  Him. 

Third:  Eveiy  being  is  true:  {omne  ens  est  verum.)  For  so 
far  as  any  thing  is  being  at  all,  so  far  forth  is  it  true ;  since  we 
can  predicate  7iot  true  only  of  that  which  is  not. 

Fourth  :  In  respect  to  the  Diinne  Intellect,  created  things  are 
as  the  measured  to  the  measure ;  but  in  respect  to  the  human 
intellect,  on  the  contrary,  creatures  are  as  the  7neasure  to  the 
measured.  I'hat  is,  Divine  Intelligence  is  the  cause  of  created 
things ;  but  these  created  things  are  the  cause  of  the  human 
intellect  knowing  them ;  for,  as  objects,  they  specify  the  acts  of 
human  knowledge  which  they  cause ;  and  without  their  active 
concurrence,  the  human  intellect  could  not  know  them. 


ARTICLE     III 

GOOD    AND    EVIL. 


Every  thing  that  exists  may  be  conceived  as  having  for  its 
object  a  certain  good  which  is  connatural  to  it,  and  to  which 
it  tends,  therefore,  by  the  law  of  its  nature.     This  propensity 


166  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

or  positive  tendency  to  that  good  which  is  an  end  for  each 
being,  is  often  called,  under  different  respects,  its  appetite^  or 
its  power  of  appetitio7i. 

Appetite,  then,  is  the  propensity  or  positive  tendency  of  a 
being  to  its  connatural  good.  Elicited  appetition  is  this  pro- 
pensity or  tendency  to  a  knowji  good;  and  since  knowledge  may 
be  either  sensible  or  rafiofial,  it  is  obvious  that  appetite  may  also 
be  either  sensible  or  rational.  Rational  appetite,  which  is  the 
will,  tends  to  a  good  which  is  apprehended  by  the  intellect,  as 
the  sensible  appetite  tends  to  good  which  is  known  through  the 
organs  of  sense. 

An  act  IS  elicited  by  a  power  when  it  proceeds  immediately 
and  physically  from  that  power ;  or,  when  that  power  is  the 
active  principle  that  gives  origin  to  it.  Thus,  the  will  elicits 
its  own  acts,  or  they  are  immediately  and  physically  from  the 
will.  Owing  to  the  authority  of  the  will  over  our  faculties 
and  members,  their  acts  which  are  put,  in  obedience  to  the 
will,  are  cominanded  or  ordered  acts.  Objects  which  have  not 
a  z'//^/ principle  of  action  in  them  do  not  elicit  acts;  but  are 
moved  to  action  only  by  an  efficient  and  extrinsic  cause. 

IN    WHAT    THE    LIBERTY    OR    FREEDOM    OF    THE    RATIONAL 
APPETITE,    OR    THE    HUMAN    WILL,    CONSISTS. 

That  power  is  free,  which,  all  things  being  put  which  are 
required  for  its  action,  can  either  act,  or  not  act.*  Hence, 
when  the  objects  which  are  subject  to  the  will's  free  choice  are 
actually  presented  to  it  by  the  intellect,  it  is  truly  indifferejit  in 
respect  to  them ;  i.  e.,  its  election  or  choice  is  not  determined 
by  the  objects  proposed  to  it,  but  is  determined  by  the  will 
itself,  by  its  own  proper  act. 

*"  Potentia  libera  ilia  est,  quae,  positis  omnibus  requisitis  ad  operandum, 
potest  operari  et  non  operari. ' ' 

"Omnia  bonum  appetunt;  malum  est  praeter  intentionem."  All  things 
desire  their  good;  evil  is  beside  intention. 

"  Voluntas  est  appetitus  intellectus,  seu  est  inclinatio  ad  bonum  per  intel- 
lectum  apprehensum. ' ' 

* '  Appetitus  boni  cum  ratione. ' ' 

The  will  is  the  appetite  of  the  intellect,  or  it  is  inclination  to  good  which  is  ap- 
prehended by  the  intellect;  it  is  the  appetite  of  good  with  reason. 


GENERAL    METAPHYSICS.  167 

As  there  are  two  distinct  classes  of  objects  which  the  action 
of  the  will  regards,  the  liberty  or  freedom  of  the  will  may  be 
considered  under  two  corresponding  respects:  ist,  it  maybe 
considered  as  exempt  from  force,  or  forced  action,  but  not 
exempt  from  necessity,  or  necessitated  2iQX\0Vi\  2d,  the  action  of 
the  will  may  be  considered  as  exempt,  both  from  force  and 
necessity.  It  is  liberty  or  freedom  of  action  in  this  second 
sense  alone,  that  is  specified  in  the  preceding  definition  of  lib- 
erty. In  this  case,  therefore,  even  all  things  being  supposed 
which  are  required  for  its  action,  the  will  can  either  act,  or  not 
act,  the  final  choice  being  strictly  its  own  act. 

Distinguish,  therefore,  between  the  will's  action  as  thus  free, 
and  its  necessitated  action.  Beings  that  see  God  intuitively 
are  necessitated  by  that  vision  oi  perfect  good,  to  love  God 
supremely ;  but  they  are  not  forced  to  do  so,  since  force  im- 
plies violent  and  compulsory  action.  For,  it  is  manifest  that 
force,  or  forced  action,  comes  from  an  extrinsic  principle,  and 
the  subject  which  is  compelled  by  it  is  entirely /-^^i^zV^,  and, 
therefore,  does  not  positively  or  efficiently  contribute  to  the 
forced  action. 

It  is  essential  to  the  very  concept  of  appetite,  or  power  of 
appetition,  and  above  all  to  a  rational  appetite,  that  it  tend  by 
its  natural  action  only  to  what  is  apprehended  as  the  good  of 
its  subject ;  and  that  it  avert  from  evil,  when  it  is  apprehended 
precisely  as  such.  For,  if  the  appetite  could  tend  to  evil,  as 
evil,  it  would  itselt  be  physically  and  essentially  evil,  for,  in 
such  supposition,  it  would  tend  to  evil  as  its  connatural  object, 
and,  therefore,  its  evil  action  would  be  in  obedience  to  the  neces- 
sary physical  law  of  its  nature.  The  appetite  would,  in  such 
case,  be  intrinsically  evil,  as  is  evident ;  but  this  would  dis- 
honor God.  Therefore,  an  appetite  must,  of  its  very  nature, 
tend  to  what  is,  at  least  in  some  respect,  the  good  of  its  sub- 
ject. 

Hence,  it  must  follow  that  the  will  can,  by  its  natural  action, 
tend  to  no  object  which  is  not  apprehended  as,  under  some 
respect,  good  for  its  subject.  And  this  is,  at  the  same  time, 
as  a  little  observation  and  reflexion  will  verify,  an  obvious  fact 


168  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

of  experience,  as  regards  the  operation  of  all  those  agents 
which  have  natural  to  them  these  principles  of  action  termed 
appetites,  or  powers  of  appetition. 

The  will,  when  considered  as  exempt  from  force  or  compul- 
sory action,  but  yet  as  iiecessarily  tending,  in  all  its  action,  to 
good^  is  often  termed  a  natural  agent;  in  the  sense  that,  like 
all  physical  and  second  causes,  its  action  is  spontaneous^  i.  e., 
springs  from  itself,  or  its  own  nature  as  operative :  its  action  is 
still  vohmtary,  or  of  the  will,  but  it  is  not  f7'ee. 

The  term  spontaneous,  is  used  in  several  distinct  senses :  ist, 
the  action  even  of  inanimate  beings,  as  minerals,  stones,  etc., 
is  said  to  be  spontajieous,  in  the  sense  that  their  action  is  their 
owfi,  or  really  proceeds  from  them,  as  a  principle  that  puts  or 
produces  it ;  2d,  that  species  of  choice,  in  a  wide  and  analogi- 
cal sense  of  the  term,  which  irrational  animals  make  by  virtue 
of  sensible  power  in  them,  among  the  objects  of  their  appetites, 
is  often  termed  spontaneous  action  in  them  :  3d,  the  action  of 
the  will  as  necessitated  to  desire  good,  is  termed  spotitaneous 
action  ;  and,  in  the  same  sense,  it  is  often  called  voluntary  ac- 
tion, as  opposed  to  free  action,  inasmuch  as  the  will  is  its 
principle,  or  it  is  elicited  by  the  will ;  4th,  the  free  action  of 
the  will  is  also  termed  spontaneous,  as  opposed  both  to  forced 
and  necessitated  action. 

Hence,  sponta7ieous  action,  in  the  primary  sense  of  the  word 
from  which  its  other  meanings  are  derived,  is  opposed  io  forced 
action  ;  or,  spontafieous  action  is  that  action  which  is  not  forced, 
but  is  put  by  the  agent  as  its  principle. 

The  will  is  properly  termed  free,  as  already  observed,  only 
when  it  is  exempt  both  from  force  and  necessity  or  necessitated 
action.  As  subject  only  to  necessity,  it  is  still  the  formal  prin- 
ciple of  its  own  action,  or  it  elicits  its  volitions :  but  it  does  so, 
in  obedience  to  physical  and  necessary  law.  Every  agent, 
truly  such  ;  the  intellect,  the  senses,  irrational  animals,  inani- 
mate substances,  can  all  act,  and  do  act,  with  some  sort  of 
spontaneity,  or  without  being  forced  to  operate,  as  above  ex- 
plained; but  yet,  they  are  never  exempt  from  tiecessity;  or,  all 
their  actions  are  necessitated,  for  they  are  determined  by  their 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  169 

objects.  The  intellect  in  its  three  principal  acts  of  simple 
apprehension,  judgment  of  composition,  and  judgment  of  illa- 
tion, and  every  other  cognoscive  power,  all  depend  for  action 
on  the  objects,  for  the  objects  must  determine  them  to  act ; 
and  when  their  objects  actually  influence  them,  they  must 
necessarily  act. 

But  no  object,  in  regard  to  which  the  will  is  free,  ever  deter- 
mines its  action ;  it  determines  its  own  free  action  for  itself. 
Over  its  election  between  those  objects  which  are  subject  to  its 
choice,  it  has  complete  empire ;  but  no  other  power  ever  has  any 
such  control  over  its  own  action.   (Div.Th.  i,2,p.  qu.  lo,  a.  2.) 

In  respect  to  the  relation  which  the  will  may  have  to  the 
different  objects  which  are  subject  to  its  choice,  its  liberty  or 
freedom  is  distinguished  into  that  of  contrariety  or  specifica- 
tion, and  that  of  contradiction  or  exercise. 

Liberty  of  contrariety  or  specification  implies  capability  in  the 
will  of  selecting  between  species  of  objects  which  are  subject 
to  its  choice;  v.  g.,  if  the  matter  or  objects  which  are  pro- 
posed to  it  be,  "  will  I  write  a  letter  now,  or  go  into  the  grove, 
or  visit  my  friends  ?  "  The  actual  choice  between  these  objects 
may  be  considered  the  exercise  of  liberty  as  to  the  contrariety 
or  specificatiojt  of  its  action.  But  when  the  terms  are  employed 
more  strictly  and  precisely ;  liberty  of  coiitrariety  regards  ob- 
jects which  are  contraj-y^  as  good  or  bad;  liberty  of  specification, 
regards  merely  the  species  of  the  objects. 

But  if  the  question  be,  "  will  I  answer  the  letter,  or  not  answer 
it?"  This  is  to  determine  between  acting,  and  not  acting; 
which  is  exercising  liberty  of  contradiction.  In  virtue  of  its 
liberty  of  contradiction  or  exercise,  then,  the  will  can  either 
positively  choose,  or  not  choose,  a  certain  good  object  pro- 
posed to  it. 

Liberty  thus  to  choose  between  species  of  acts,  and  between 
acting  and  not  acting,  or  liberty  of  exercise,  necessarily  requires 
indifi^erence  in  the  will;  i.  e.,  that  it  be  undetermined  to  one 
side  or  another,  whether  by  the  object  proposed,  or  by  any 
other  prirciple  which  is  extrinsic  to  itself,  thus  leaving  it  so 
disposed  that  the  choice  actually  made  will  come  from  itself. 


170  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

The  powers  which  act  only  when  determined  by  their  objects, 
are  not  indtfferoit  to  action,  nor  to  the  species  of  their  acts  ;  but 
when  the  objects  are  sufficiently  presented  to  them,  and  actually 
influence  them,  their  action  is  necessitated,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  their  acts  are  specified  by  those  objects. 

THE    WILL,  WHEN    FREELY    CHOOSING,  IS    NOT    DETERMINED    BY 
THE    GREATEST    MOTIVE. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  will,  in  choosing  among 
objects  that  are  subject  to  election,  is  determified  by  the  greatest 
motive,  as  some  authors  erroneously  affirm.  In  such  a  suppo- 
sition, the  will  would  really  not  be  free  at  all ;  for,  in  that  case, 
its  action  would  be  necessitated  by  the  motive  or  object,  just 
as  it  always  happens  in  respect  to  the  powers  of  cognition. 
Hence,  the  theory  which  teaches  that  among  the  objects  which 
fall  under  election,  the  one  which  furnishes  the  greatest  motive 
to  the  will  is  thereby  predominant  and  ?iecessarily  determines 
the  will  to  choose  it,  is  repugnant  to  the  very  concept  of  liberty 
and  destroys  its  essential  character.  In  truth,  the  will  can,  in 
such  cases,  yield  to  the  less  motive;  nay,  it  can  abstain  from 
any  positive  action  at  all  in  respect  to  the  proffered  objects. 

THE    FREEDOM     OF    THE    WILL    IS    KNOWN    TO    ALL,    AS    AN 
EVIDENT    FACT. 

The  freedom  of  the  will  is  known  to  be  a  fact,  in  its  own 
immediate  or  objective  evidence,  to  every  rational  man,  on 
the  direct  testimony  of  his  own  consciousness,  just  as  every 
sane  man  knows  that  he  perceives,  reasons,  remembers,  etc. 
The  liberty  of  the  will  is,  therefore,  a  primitive  fact,  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  the  direct  acts  of  cognition,  of  conscious- 
ness, of  judgment,  of  sensation,  etc.,  are  primitive  facts. 

Facts  are  not  inaptly  denominated  "  stubborn  things ;  "  for 
they  are  independent  of  man's  trustless  words,  they  overturn 
his  most  specious  theories,  and  they  defy  his  keenest  sophistry. 

Any  difficulty  of  reconciling  the  evident  fact  of  man's  free- 
dom with  other  truths,  which  are  sometimes  artfully  made  to 
appear  as  contradicting  it,  can  proceed  only  from  ignorance  of 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  171 

those  other  truths,  or  else  from  failure  to  detect  a  logical  fallacy. 
But  a  full  treatise  on  the  will,  properly  pertains  to  Psychology. 

As  figure  and  color  constitute  the  object  of  vision,  sound 
that  of  hearing,  truth  the  object  of  the  understanding,  so,  the 
good*  forms  the  object  of  the  will.  As  man  has  many  appe- 
tites by  which  he  is  drawn  to  various  objects  presented  to  him 
under  the  form  or  respect  of  good,  sub  ratione  boni;  in  a  simi- 
lar manner,  his  highest  appetite,  that  is,  his  rational  appetite, 
or  will,  loves  the  good  which  is  of  a  corresponding  and  supe- 
rior order ;  and,  in  one  respect  or  another,  his  will  tends  neces- 
sarily to  that  good. 

The  good?iess  of  a  thing  is  founded  on  that  required  and 
befitting  perfection  which  renders  that  thing  desirable  to  the 
power  of  appetition,  whose  connatural  object  it  is.  Sensible 
good  is  the  connatural  object  of  sensible  appetite,  and  is  perfect  in 
its  species  when  the  sensible  appetite  is  satisfied  by  it,  and  rests 
quiet  in  its  enjoyment.  A  similar  proportion  exists  between 
the  superior  or  rational  appetite,  the  unll,  and  its  connatural 
objects. 

The  good  is  presupposed  to  the  appetition  of  it,  and  it  acts 
on  the  mind  by  way  of  a  final  cause.  When  good  is  thus  un- 
derstood ;  that  is,  absolutely,  as  ih.&  formal  and  essential  object 
of  the  will  or  rational  appetite,  without  which  it  cannot  act 
at  all,  under  this  respect  it  is  not  subject  to  choice  or  election ; 
but  the  will  tends  to  it  necessarily,  as  to  its  only  end.  The 
vieans  to  that  end,  however,  does  fall  under  the  election  or 
choice  of  the  will.  The  will  cannot  love  evil  as  evil,  malum 
uib  ratione  7nali  ;  its  only  object,  therefore,  is  good. 

When  all  objects  are  regarded  as  subordinate  to  this  end  ; 
that  is,  as  giving  connatural  exercise  to  the  powers  of  appeti- 
tion, the  good  that  is  in  those  objects  may  be  divided,  relatively 
to  that  end,  into  the  becomiyig,  the  useful.,  the  pleasant.  The 
good  that  is  becoming,  or  fit,  is  good  that  is  in  accordance  with 

*"  Bonitas  est  prior  nativva  quam  appetibilitas;  agit  per  modum  causae  fina- 
lis."  "  Finis  nott  eadit  sub  electione;  quia  electio  versatur  circa  media,  non 
autem  circa  ipsum  finem. ' '  Goodness  is  by  nature  prior  to  appetibility;  it  acts 
by  way  of  final  cause.  The  end  does  not  fall  under  election ;  for  election  regards 
the  means,  not  the  end  itsell. 


172  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

right  reason,  and  it  includes,  therefore,  moral  good;  good  z.% 
pleasant  supposes  cognition  and  power  of  fruition ;  the  useful, 
which  is  loved,  not  for  itself,  but  for  something  ulterior  to  it, 
is  a  means  to  that  end.  As  to  what  constitutes  the  summufn 
boniim*  or  chief  good  which  is  the  ultimate  end  of  man  as  a 
rational  being,  it  pertains  to  another  treatise  to  investigate. 

Hence,  it  follows,  \hdXgood\s  absolute,  or  relative/  physical 
or  moral.  Every  being  is  good;  both  in  itself  and  in  respect  to 
other  being  tha?t  itself^  Good  is  diffusive  of  itself ,  for  its  ejid  is 
to  be  possessed  and  loved.     All  good  is  from  GodX 

Evil  is  the  privation  of  good;  or,  it  is  the  want  of  some  due 
perfection  in  a  being.  Evil  is  physical  or  moral;  or,  it  is  the 
absence  of  some  due  physical  or  moral  perfection. 

Physical  evil  \?,  the  privation  of  some  natural  good;  as  sick- 
ness, blindness,  ignorance,  etc. 

Moral  evil  \s,  the  privation  of  moral  good,  and,  as  is  mani- 
fest, can  be  found  only  in  agents  that  are  intelligent  and  free. 
It  consists  in  a  defection  of  the  free  will  from  what  is  morally 
right  or  good. 

According  to  Leibnitz,  there  is  also  metaphysical  evil ;  which 
is  finiteness,  or  limitation  of  perfection.  But  this  is  not  pro- 
perly an  evil ;  for,  when  a  created  being  is  perfect  in  its  spe- 
cies, it  possesses  all  due  perfection  ;  and  it  is  confusion  of  lan- 
guage to  say  that  finiteness,  or  not  being  identical  with  God, 
is  evil,  when  viewed  under  such  a  respect. 

There  is  no  evil,  except  in  a  subject  that  is  good ;  and,  as 
already  seen,  every  being,  as  such,  is  good.  Since  evil  con- 
sists in  privation  of  good,  what  has  no  being,  can  have  no  evil; 
that  is,  it  must  be  nothing;  which,  properly,  is  neither  good  nor 
evil.  The  efficient  cause  of  evil  is  good,§  as  a  being;  and  no 
will  can  wish  evil  purely  as  such,  or  purely  for  itself;  but  it 
may  wish  evil  which  is  presented  to  it  as  good ;  v.  g.,  as  gain 
or  pleasure. 

•AldeDiv.  Th.  IP.,  Qu.  5,  Art.  G. 

t ' '  Boiium  est  diffusivum  sui . ' '     Good  is  diffusive  of  itself. 
\  ' '  Deus  est  omnis  boni  bonura. ' '    God  is  the  good  of  every  good. 
§  '*  Malum  non  agit  nisi  virtute  boni. "    Evil  does  not  act  except  in  virtue  of 
good. 


CJENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  173 

ARTICLE     IV. 

BEAUTY. 

As  the  goodness  of  an  object  depends  on  its  having  all  the 
perfections  of  its  species  or  essence,  together  with  all  the  qual- 
ities that  complete  and  adorn  it;  so,  the  beauty  of  that  object 
depends  on  the  same  conditions.  The  object  o{  love,  and  co?t- 
templation,  therefore,  is  the  same,  though  it  respects  different 
powers  of  the  soul ;  good  being  the  object  of  appetition,  and 
beauty  that  of  contemplative,  or  cognoscive  power.* 

Beauty  is  intellectual,  moral  and  sensible.  Philosophers  have 
found  it  difficult  to  give  a  definition  of  beauty,  which  clearly 
and  satisfactorily  includes  all  its  species.  Some  have  defined 
it  to  be,  "unity  with  multitude  and  variety."  But  we  can  con- 
ceive an  object  to  possess  "  unity  with  multitude  and  variety," 
which  is  yet  misshapen  or  deformed. 

Unity,  multitude  and  variety  may  be  necessary  conditions 
of  beauty  in  most  cases;  but  they  are  not  its  only  constituents. 
Nor  are  "  order  and  utility  "  its  specific  characteristics,  as  some 
allege  ;  since  "  order  and  utility  "  refer  to  perfection  and  good- 
tie  ss.\ 

Sir  Joshua  Reynolds,  in  his  admirable  lecture  before  the 
Royal  Academy,  December  14,  1770,  said,  that  in  each  of  the 
various  species  of  God's  works,  there  is  a  perfect  '■'-  central  form 
which  nature  most  frequently  produces,  and  always  seems  to 
intend  in  her  productions;  and  from  it,  every  deviation  is 
deformity."  This  central  form  is  more  or  less  beautiful,  accord- 
ing to  the  perfection  of  its  species. 

His  observation  is  acute  and  suggestive  of  happy  thoughts 
as  to  the  nature  of  beauty.  But  the  question  may  be  asked, 
what  constitutes  the  beauty  of  this  central  form  ?  In  accord- 
ance with  his  theory,  his  answer  should  be,  its  perfection  is  its 
beauty. 

*'  *  Pulchrum  ad  visum,  bonum  ad  appetitum  spectatur;  seu  quae  visa  placent. ' ' 
Beauty  pertains  to  vision,  the  good  to  appetite;  what  is  seen  gives  pleasure. 

t  ' '  Pulchrum  et  bonum  in  subjecto  sunt  idem;  quia  super  eamdem  rem  funclan- 
tur,  viz. :  super /or7rta?ft."  (Summa  1  p.,  qu.  5,  art.  4.)  The  beautiful  and  the 
good,  in  the  subject,  are  the  same  thing;  for  tliey  are  founded  upon  the  same 
thing,  namely,  the  form. 


174  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

Beauty  does  suppose  perfection  in  its  object,  and  hence,  it 
is  obvious  that  different  species  of  objects  have,  in  themselves 
considered,  greater  or  less  beauty,  according  to  their  degrees 
of  essential  and  accidental  perfection ;  v.  g.,  man  has  more 
specific  beauty,  and  that,  too,  of  a  higher  order,  than  the  brute 
has;  and  similarly  for  animals  in  comparison  with  inferior 
forms  in  material  nature. 

Since  beauty  pertains  to  cognoscive  potver,  and,  therefore,  to 
contemplation,  and  not,  as  such,  to  appetition,  we  may,  per- 
haps, with  some  appropriateness,  define  beauty  to  be  '■'■propor- 
tiofi,  that  is  perceived ;''  i.  e.,  proportion  and  light. 

Proportio7i,  in  its  proper  concept,  includes  unity,  together 
with  the  order  and  variety  of  parts,  appropriate  to  each  par- 
ticular object,  and  its  light  or  evidence  makes  it  an  object  of 
contemplation ;  since  a  thing  is  perceived  by  its  light  or  evi- 
dence. 

Moreover,  since  deformity  and  incompleteness  in  an  object 
are  incompatible  with  perfect  proportion ;  and  since  beauty  has 
that  clearness  or  brightness  which  is  essential  to  it,  when  the 
proportion  from  which  it  emanates  is  evident ;  it  follows  that 
the  pleasing  effect  which  we  attribute  to  the  beauty  of  an  ob 
ject,  proceeds  immediately  from  the  contemplation  of  its  lights 
2i\\d  proportion. 

Intellectual  beauty  exists  in  objects  of  the  intelligible  order. 

Plato  defines  beauty  to  be  the  "splendor  of  truth;"  ^'- splendor 
veri;""  or,  as  Boileau  interprets  it,  ^'-the  beautiful  is  the  true^ 

Truth,  as  a  relation  or  proportion  between  mind  and  object, 
and  between  object  and  its  essential  prototype,  is  beautiful. 
Truth  also  in  its  similitude  and  proportion  to  another  truth  is 
beautiful ;  this  proportion  of  truth  to  another  truth  is  expressed 
in  metaphors  and  similes,  and  it  attributes  to  them  their  exqui- 
site beauty ;  there  is  still  higher  beauty  also,  in  the  more  exact 
proportions  of  the  necessary  and  universal  truths  to  which  the 
sciences  and  philosophy  lead  the  mind. 

If  the  decision  made  by  authority,  in  matters  of  taste,  forbids 
the  denial  of  the  aesthetic  principle,  according  to  which  obscurity 
may  become  an  element  of  genuine  beauty  in  painting,  music, 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  175 

poetry,  and  other  works  of  fancy ;  it  must,  however,  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  concurrence  of  obscurity  in  the  production  of 
the  beautiful  is  merely  negative;  i.  e.,  it  terminates  or  hmits, 
and  thereby  diversifies  the  shades  or  the  proportion  of  hght 
and  color  as  to  quantity  and  intensity.  But  it  would  be  wholly 
absurd  to  apply  this  principle  to  truth^  in  which  any  obscurity 
which  lessens  certainty,  is  essentially,  or  by  its  very  nature, 
imperfection,  and  is,  therefore,  deformity. 

Beauty,  in  the  works  of  art,  as  such,  depends  upon  their 
verishnilitude ;  that  is,  their  truth  to  nature,  which  they  imitate 
or  reproduce. 

Sensible  beauty  *  2,%  visible,  hdiS  for  it?  vadXl^x.  figure  and  color; 
their  proportion  made  clear  to  the  vision,  justly  renders  the 
object  to  which  they  belong,  beautiful.  In  this  proportion, 
are  included  symmetry,  unity,  variety. 

Proportion  in  melody  and  harmony  constitutes  the  beautiful  in 
music.  A  particular  note  or  sound  has  its  pitch,  quality,  and 
intensity  \  and  when  in  a  certain  proportion,  they  cause  even 
that  single  sound  or  note  to  be  musical  in  its  undulations  or 
vibrations;  a  succession  of  such  notes,  of  various  pitch,  intensity, 
quality  and  motion,  all  of  which  preserve  a  certain  proportion 
to  the  key  note  or  tonica,  forms  a  beautiful  melody ;  beautiful 
harmojty  is  added  to  the  melody  by  accompanying  notes,  whose 
differences  of  pitch,  quality,  etc.,  are  always  according  to  some 
determined  proportion  which  they  bear  to  the  melody.  Hence, 
beauty  in  music  consists  in  proportion  of  sounds  which  have 
various  pitch,  quality,  and  intensity. 

The  other  senses  being  farther  removed  from  intelligence,  or 
being  less  perfectly  cognoscive,  their  objects  are  not  said  to  be 
beautiful ;  a  beautiful  taste,  beautiful  smell,  beautiful  feeling,  are 
expressions  that  are  not  used.  Sensible  impressions  which  are 
so  gross,  are  less  fitted  to  furnish  the  mind  suitable  objects  of 
contemplative  knowledge,  than  are  the  impressions  received 
through  the  sight  and  hearing. 

*  "  Sensus  est  quaedam  ratio;  cognoscit  ordinata,  quae  visaplacent."  (Sum. 
1  p. ,  qu.  5,  a.  4.)  The  sense  is  a  sort  of  reason;  it  knows  ordered  things,  which 
being  seen,  please. 


176  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

Moral  beauty  is  in  virtue^  or  moral  goodness.  The  law  com- 
manding some  things,  and  forbidding  others;  the  great  diffi- 
culties to  be  surmounted;  the  noble  soul,  the  heroic  will,  the 
pure  intention,  are  all  harmonized  in  the  acts  of  persevering 
virtue,  and  constitute  an  object  justly  considered  to  be  of  the 
highest  order  of  finite  beauty  which  can  be  contemplated  in 
this  world. 

The  eloquent  and  philosophic  Cicero,  pronounced  the  heroic 
acts  of  the  noble  virtues  to  be  divine^  in  their  beauty  and  gran- 
deur: "Animum  vincere,  iracundiam  cohibere,  victoriam  tempC' 
rare,  adversariuin  nobilitate,  ingenio,  virtute  praestantem  non 
modo  extollere  jacentem,  sed  etiam  amplificare  ejus  pristinam 
dignitatem,  hsec  qui  facit,  non  ego  eum  cum  summis  viris  com- 
parOjSed  simillimum  deo  judico."  (Oration  for  Marcus  Marcel- 
lus.)  "  The  man  who  conquers  his  own  soul,  who  suppresses 
resentment,  who  is  moderate  in  victory,  who  not  only  raises 
from  a  fallen  estate  an  adversary  illustrious  for  his  birth,  his  talent 
and  his  bravery,  but  even  amplifies  his  former  dignity:  I  do  not 
compare  the  man  who  does  these  things  to  the  greatest  of 
human  beings,  but  I  judge  him  to  be  most  like  to  a  god." 

The  science  of  the  beautiful  is  termed  (Esthetics ;  and  the 
power  of  rightly  discriminating  and  appreciating  beauty,  is 
called  taste,  from  its  analogy  to  the  palate  in  distinguishing 
objects  as  sweet,  bitter,  etc. 

The  sublime  is  akin  to  the  beautiful)  the  objects  that  possess 
it  are  grafid,  or  such  as,  by  their  greatness  and  power,  which  it 
exceeds  the  capacity  of  the  mind  to  comprehend,  excite  the 
strongest  emotions;  for  instance,  wonder,  astonishment  or  awe. 

Obscurity,  in  objects  which  are  fancied  to  be  great,  mighty 
or  awtul,  helps  to  intensify  the  strong  feelings  naturally  caused 
by  what  is  thus  conceived  to  be  grand,  wonderful  or  terrible ; 
ig7iotum  pro  inagiiifico;  "  the  unknown  is  viagnifiedr  But  ob- 
serve, however,  that  emotions  which  arise  merely  from  obscur- 
ity in  the  object,  or  ignorance  of  its  nature,  are  ignoble  in 
their  species,  and,  therefore,  it  is  only  evident  grandeur  of  the 
object,  at  least  as  manifested  in  the  effects,  or  action  of  the 
object,  that  constitutes  sublimity,  properly  so-called. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  177 

Here  it  might  be  asked,  what  definitively  constitutes  that 
proportion  which  renders  an  object  beautiful?  It  is,  perhaps, 
not  possible  to  assign  more  precisely,  in  a  general  proposition, 
the  degrees  and  relations  that  constitute  it,  than  is  done  by  the 
term  as  above  explained ;  for  its  combinations  are  too  numer- 
ous and  various.  But  the  proportion  in  which  beauty  consists, 
is  that  which  supposes  a  high  degree  of  perfection  in  the  beau- 
tiful object;  and  yet,  variation  in  that  degree  of  perfection 
may  make  the  same  object,  under  different  respects,  better 
fitted  to  the  capacity  of  different  tastes.  Perfect  proportion 
requires  unity,  variety,  order  and  fitness,  which  are  according 
to  the  nature  or  S[)ecies  of  the  object. 

No  definition  of  the  beautiful  has  yet  been  given,  which 
reduces  its  constituents  to  unity;  or,  in  other  words,  no  gen- 
eralization of  Its  properties  has  ever  been  made,  which  enables 
us  to  define  its  essence  by  one  distinctive  mark  or  attribute. 
Some  great  minds  have  concluded  that  such  generalization  is, 
therefore,  not  possible.  But  the  proof  of  this  conclusion  is 
negative  only;  and  hence,  it  is  perhaps  too  much  to  affirm 
absolutely  that  a  specific  definition  of  beauty  is  simply  impos- 
sible, or  is  a  work,  the  ullunate  accomplishment  of  which,  has 
been  demonstratively  proved  to  transcend  the  natural  power 
of  human  reason. 


12 


CHAPTER  11. 


ARTICLE     I. 

substance;  accidents;  substance  as  opposed  to 
accident. 

Substance  is  a  being  that  exists /<fr  se^  i.  e.,  by  itself^  ox  alone. 
without  inhering  in  another  being  as  a  subject  that  sustains  it. 
Sub-staiis^  here  expresses  that  which  stands  lender  all  the  qual- 
ities or  accidents  which  the  mind  perceives  through  the  differ- 
ent powers  of  cognition,  in  various  concrete  beings,  and  which 
is  constant,  though  its  accidents  are  mutable.  The  notion  of 
substance,  which  is  acquired  by  experience,  is  first  learned  at 
the  dawn  of  reason.  A  child  in  its  earliest  exercise  of  judg- 
ment can  practically  and  truly  distinguish  between  substance 
and  accidents,  in  familiar  objects;  v.  g.,  that  apples  of  different 
sizes,  taste,  smell,  ripeness,  are  still  apples. 

The  concrete  nouns,  and  adjectives,  which  are  essential  to  the 
framework  of  human  language,  show  how  universal  and  invin- 
cible this  judgment  is,  that  accidents  exist  dependently  upon 
their  subject,  and  that  substance,  as  it  were,  stands  a/one*  or 
does  not  depend  on  a  subject  to  support  it.     The  testimony  of 

*  ' '  Substantia  est  ens  quod  per  se  est,  seu  quod  non  indiget  alio  entetanquam 
subjecto  cui  inhaereat."  Per  se,  has  four  distinct  senses;  but  when  applied  to 
existence,  or  when  it  defines  a  mode  of  existing,  it  means  alone;  or,  without  a 
companion. 

"  Res  est  per  se,  quaj  sedet  solitarie;  id  est;  qu£e  non  eget  alterius  consortio, 
cui  inexistat.  Per  se,  in  aliis  modis/)ersej7ft/js,  respicit  modum  pviedicandi,  vel 
causandi;  sed  per  se  in  hoc  casu,  respicit  modum  existendi." 

To  exist  ase,  means  to  exist  independently  of  all  cause:  this,  of  course,  is 
verified  only  in  Infinite  Being,  in  God;  hence  distinguish  between  <'xistencejoer 
se,  and  existence  a  se.    To  vxist  per  se  is  to  exist  without  inhering  in  a  subject, 
to  exist  a  se,  is  to  exist  independently  of  any  cause. 
178 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  179 

consciousness  affords  us  complete  certainty  that  the  mutations 
which  occur  in  ourselves,  i.  e.,  of  thoughts,  feelings,  difterent 
states  of  the  body,  etc.,  are  extrinsic  to  essence,  and  are  acci- 
dental ;  and  that  they  depend  for  their  existence  on  something, 
as  a  subject,  which  exists  independently  of  them,  and  is  in 
itself  immutable  or  constant  under  them.  Nay,  the  line  of 
distinction  between  substance  and  accident  is  clearly  traced  by 
the  mind,  and  it  does  not  confound  one  with  the  other.  As 
we  are  now  constituted,  the  mind  does  not  immediately  per- 
ceive any  substance  at  all,  but  sees  it  only  through  its  opera- 
tions or  accidents.  Yet,  the  mmd  perceives  that  this  substance 
is  essentially  distinct  from  its  accidents,  and  is  presupposed  to 
them.  Locke  errs  when  he  says,  that,  in  our  idea,  substance  is  a 
mere  ''collection  of  qualities  perceived  by  the  senses,  the  mode 
of  their  existence  being  entirely  unknown  to  us."*  The  distinc- 
tions between  substance  and  accident  are  the  clearest  cogni- 
tions which  the  mind  has  of  singular  and  sensible  objects. 

Substance  is  simple  or  compound ;  complete  or  incomplete.  Simple 
substance  does  not  consist  of  parts  annexed  to  parts,  and  is, 
therefore,  indivisible  and  unextended. 

The  compoujid  substance  consists  of  parts  joined  to  parts, 
which,  by  their  union,  form  a  whole;  and,  as  each  part  is  in 
itself  a  whole,  the  compound  can  be  .resolved  or  divided  into 
its  component  parts. 

A  complete  substance  is  one  whose  nature  does  not  require 
union  with  another  substance,  but  contains  all  m  itself  which 
is  necessary  for  its  natural  action ;  as  tree,  man,  angel. 

Incomplete  substance  is  one  which  connotes,  and  requires 
another  substance  in  order  to  complete  it  for  natural  existence 
and  normal  action;  v.  g.,  the  members  of  the  body;  the 
branches  of  the  tree ;  the  soul  and  the  body  in  man. 

It  is  evident  that  it  is  not  naturally  possible  for  the  sensible 
qualities  or  accidents  of  material  substance  to  exist  apart  from 
their  subject,  which  is  the  substance  in  which  they  physically 
inhere.  But,  is  their  separate  existence  intrinsically  impossible, 
so  that  even  Divine  Omnipotence  could  not  effect  it  ? 

It  is  by  no  means  impossible  for  God  to  preserve  accidents, 
*  Locke,  Bk.  XL,  ch.  23,  No.  37. 


180  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

at  least  such  as  are  in  themselves  positive  realities^  in  existence 
separate  from  the  substance  to  which  they  belong.  Because, 
what  a  second  and  dependent  cause  can  do,  for  a  still  greater 
reason  can  tlie  first  cause  effect ;  if  substance,  which  depends 
both  for  its  existence  and  for  its  efficiency  on  God,  can  sustain 
the  accidents,  it  is  still  more  obvious  that  God  can  do  it  by  a 
direct  and  immediate  exercise  of  his  power.  To  deny  this 
reasoning  in  respect  to  that  class  of  accidents  that  have  a  spe- 
cific reality  of  their  own,  would  be  absurd. 

With  regard  to  those  accidents  that  are  purely  modal,  and, 
therefore,  have  no  positive  and  distinct  entity,  as  rest,  relation, 
motion;  as  also  those  attributes  or  properties  that  flow  imme- 
diately from  the  essence,  as  their  principle;  v.  g.,  vital  power, 
intellect,  etc.,  there  is  no  question  ;  they  cannot  exist  apart 
from  the  subject  on  which  they  intrinsically  depend,  and  they, 
therefore,  have  no  real  entity  apart  from  the  subject  to  which 
they  belong.  The  positive  effects,  or  actual  impressions  and 
immutation,  produced  upon  the  senses,  by  corporeal  substance, 
are  proximately  from  real  and  distinct  accidents,  or,  such  as 
have  distinct  and  positive  reality;  v.  g.,  color,  taste,  smell, 
quantity,  etc.  These  properties,  at  least  with  the  exception 
of  quantity,  have  a  peculiar  activity,  which  affords  proof  con- 
clusive that  they  have  real  and  distinct  entity,  apart  from  the 
substance  in  which  they  naturally  inhere;  and  that  they  are, 
therefore,  really  added  to  substance. 

It  may  be  said,  consequently,  that  there  are  two  classes  of 
accidents  which  are  distinguishable  in  reference  to  the  preced- 
ing questions:  ist,  there  are  certain  accidents  which  have  no 
entity  apart  from  a  subject — "  sunt  entitates  adeo  debiles  " — and 
cannot  exist,  therefore,  unless  in  a  substance,  or  in  another 
accident  as  ^w^j-/  subject;  v.  g.,  motion,  union,  relation,  etc. 
Also,  vital  powers  and  other  essential  attributes  are  inseparably 
affixed  to  their  subject,  and  could  have  no  existence  or  entity 
apart  from  it.  2d,  Those  accidents  which  naturally  inhere, 
but  which,  by  infinite  power,  can  exist  apart  from  their  sub- 
ject :  quantity,  qualities  such  as  color,  taste,  smell,  etc. 
•  From  the  preceding  observations  it  is  manifest  that  substance 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  181 

and  accident  differ  essentially  or  specifically.  Therefore,  being 
cannot  be  predicated  of  them  iinivocally ;  but  only  atiahy^i- 
cally;  v.  g.,  as  being  is  predicated  only  by  analogy  of  spirit  and 
matter. 

PROPERTY    IS    AN    ACCIDENT;    BUT    IT    DIFFERS    FROM    COMMON 
ACCIDENT. 

Property  is  an  aecide?it  that  is  proper;  or,  it  belongs  to  its 
subject ;  hence  its  name,  property.  It  differs  from  accident 
that  is  com7non,  in  this :  property  belongs  to  the  species  of  the 
object;  i.  e.,  agrees  with  an  object  on  account  of  its  specific 
nature  or  form;  the  common  accident  agrees  with  an  object  or 
individual  in  virtue  of  its  matter,  or  quasi  matter;  v.  g.,  '■^  Man 
limps,  because  Feter  is  lame;  Peter  laughs,  because  man  is  a 
laughing  being''  Lameness  is  an  accident  that  is  conwion  to 
individuals  of  many  species  of  animals  that  walk;  laughter, 
strictly  so-called,  is  peculiar  ox  proper  only  to  man. 

Property  is  said  to  fiow  from  the  essence  or  form  ;  as  do  the 
powers  of  intelligence,  sensation,  volition  ;  in  this,  it  differs 
from  conunon  accident,  which  accedes  from  without  or  extrinsi- 
cally,  and  is  common  to  many  species  on  account  of  their 
matter;  v.  g.,  quantity,  in  man,  wood,  mineral,  etc. 

'^kviO.^  property  necessarily  flows  from  the  essence  of  its  sub- 
ject, wherever  the  essence  is,  there  is  the  property  ;  "  convenit 
omni,  soli,  semper."  It  is,  on  that  account,  regarded  as  con- 
vertible with  essence,  and  may  be  employed  to  define  essence 
or  species. 

Property,  thus  explained,  is  found  only  in  the  proximate  or 
lowest  species  of  things ;  for,  only  in  the  individuals  of  a  spe- 
cies is  found  the  form  or  specific  principle  which  really  consti- 
tutes substantial  and  actual  essence;  yet,  by  a  certain  analogy, 
higher  genera  are  said  to  have  properties;  v.  g.,  one,  true,  good, 
are  termed //'<'^/<?;'//<?j'  ol  being* 

*  ' '  Juxta  aliquam  analogiam,  unum,  boniun,  verum,  dicuntur  entis  proprie- 
tates;  suscipere  contraria,  est  substantiaj  proprium;  progressio,  animalis  per- 
fecti:  motus  ab  infrinseco,  viventis;  quantitas,  corporis,"  etc.  By  a  certair 
analogy,  one,  good,  true,  are  ternaed  properties  of  being;  to  receive  contraries 
is  a  property  of  substance;  progressive  motion,  a  property  of  the  perfect  ani- 
mal; quantity  is  a  property  of  bodies,  etc. 


182  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

Though,  in  strictness, /r^/<?;'/y  stands  for  an  attribute  that  is 
always  found  in  every  individual  of  the  whole  species,  yet  the 
term  is  often  applied  to  one  that  is  more  purely  accidenialj  v. 
g.,  to  be  an  orator,  in  respect  to  vian,  which  is  proper  to  tnaii, 
but  not  to  all  men;  to  be  biped^  which  is  proper  not  only  to  all 
men,  but  to  some  other  animals,  etc. 

But  \.\\Q  proper  and  the  cofnmon  accidents  agree  in  this,  that 
they  are  both  extrinsic  to  essence;  "  sunt  extra  essentiam  rei ; " 
hence  it  is  that  they  both  agree  in  being  accidents. 

Although  property  or  the  proper  accidejit  is  sometimes  made 
convertible  with  essence^  is  necessarily  and  intimately  con- 
nected with  it,  and  defines  it;  yet  it  is  only  adjacent  to  essence, 
not  its  cofistitueftt. 

The  common  accident  can  never  define  an  object,  from  the 
fact  that  it  is  commo?i  to  many  species  of  things  on  account  of 
their  matter. 

Properties,  which,  as  already  observed,  flow  from,  or  result 
immediately,  from  the  essence  of  objects,  are  the  same  in  fact 
as  the  specific  difference*  of  those  objects;  they  most  inti- 
mately inhere  in  their  objects,  and  are  inseparable  from  them. 
Hence,  properties  are  said  to  be  predicated  per  se  of  their  sub- 
jects; i.  e.,  they  fiecessarily,  or  of  their  ?iature,  inhere  in  their 
subjects,  and  are  not  in  them  per  accide?ts,  or  accidentally,  as 
happens  in  the  common  accident,  which  is  a  predicate  of  this  or 
that  subject,  not  per  se,  2.^  flowing  fro7n  its  essence,  but  per  acci- 
dens,  or  accidentally. 

COMMON  ACCIDENT  THE  SAME  AS  THE  FIFTH  UNIVERSAL  PRE- 
DICABLE,  CALLED  ACCIDENT;  ACCIDENT  AS  OPPOSED  TO 
SUBSTANCE,    IS    PREDICAMENTAL    ACCIDENT. 

The  word  accident  is  used  not  only  as  expressing  one  of  the 
five  universals,  in  which  sense  it  means  common  accidefit,  and 
is  distinguished  from  property  or  proper  accide?it;  but  it  is  em- 
ployed also  to  express  all  that  is  not  substance,  or  as  opposed 
to  substance.     In  this  sense,  it  not  only  includes  all  property, 

*"  Differentia  esseiitiae  et  propi'ietas,  sunt  idem  re."  (S.  Thorn.  Metaph.  61, 
lect.  2,  lit.  c.)  Essential  difference,  and  property  or  attribute,  are  really  the 
game  thing. 


GENERAL    METAPHYSICS.  183 

but  it  likewise  comprehends  ni7ie  out  of  the  ten  categories^  or 
ultimate  genera,  substance  alone  being  excepted.* 

Therefore  substance  and  accident,  as  thus  opposed  to  each 
other,  reduce  all  the  ten  categories  or  predicaments,  i.  e.,  all 
real  things,  to  two  categories;  namely,  to  substance,  and  the 
category  or  predicament  accident,  which  in  this  division  includes 
under  it,  as  just  said,  nine  out  of  the  ten  categories  or  ultimate 
genera.t 

Actual  inhering  in  a  subject  is  essential  to  the  existence  of 
properties  which  diVQ  predicated  per  se,  and  which  are,  therefore, 
convertible  with  specific  differe7ice;  but  aptitude  for  inhering  in 
a  subject  is  all  that  is  absolutely  essential  for  other  accidents,  as 
such;  for  they  can  absolutely  be  sustained  in  existence  without 
their  actually  inhering  in  their  subject,  at  least  such  of  them  as 
have  positive  entity  or  reality  of  their  own;  i.  e.,  those  accidejtts 
that  are  not  purely  7?iodal. 

In  further  elucidation  of  this  doctrine  it  may  be  said,  that 
the  subject  of  properties  is  for  them  really  d.  priticiple  ;  from  it 
they  result,  or  take  their  origin;  on  it  they  depend  for  begin- 
ning, and  continuing  to  exist. 

But,  since  the  common  accidents  accede  extrinsically  to  their 
subject,  the  subject  is  not,  in  the  same  sense,  \\\€\r  principle  ; 
and  hence  their  connexion  with  it,  and  dependence  on  it,  are 
not  intrinsic,  but  extrinsic,  and  they  are,  therefore,  more  purely 
contingent  J  i.  e.,  they  are  more  immediately  and  completely 
dependent  on  the  free  cause  of  their  subject. 

*  "  Accidens  est  yel  prcedicabile,  vel  prcedicamentale;  accidens  praedicabile  per- 
tiuet  ad  om7ie  prmdicamentum ;  accidens  praedicamentale,  pertinet  ad  uniun 
aliumve  novera  pried icamentorum. ' ' 

t  When  it  is  said,  "  substantia  categorica  est  univoca,  respectu  inferioriim;" 
"accidens  est  analogum;"  "substance  is  univocal  throughout  its  category; 
accident  is  analogical^"  this  holds  of  accident  as  distinguished  from  substance, 
or  as  predicamental,  not  of  accident  as  one  of  the  live  universals,  or  as  a  prct 
dicable,  for  as  the  universal  it  is  predicated  univocally  of  its  inferiors. 


184  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

ARTI  CLE     II. 

quantity;    quality. 

All  the  ten  categories,  or  predicaments,  except  substance^ 
have  only  accidents  as  their  inferiors;  for  every  real  being  that 
is  not  substance^  is  accident. 

Quantity,  as  extended,  consists  of  parts  adjoined  to  parts,  in 
which  case  it  is  called  contimwus  quantity,  or  extension.  The 
parts  are  either  actually  such,  or  potentially  such;  i.  e.,  parts 
into  which  the  object  having  quantity  can,  absolutely,  be 
divided. 

The  old  philosophers  maintained  that  quantity*  is  the  nearest 
or  most  adjacent  accident  to  matter;  that  it  is,  in  some  sense, 
presupposed  to  the  other  accidents,  which  pertain  to  \\sforni, 
or  that  which  perfects  the  matter  in  its  species,  and  determines 
its  nature. 

EXTENSION. 

Perfect  extension  consists  of  length,  breadth,  and  thickness, 
or  has  three  dimensions;  but  length,  or  length  and  breadth, 
also  form  quantity.  The  termini,  or  limits  of  continuous  quan- 
tity, are  not  positive,  but  privative  being.  Extension  in  space, 
is  a  property  of  matter,  but  it  is  not  so  essential  to  it,  that  the 
separation  of  material  substance  trom  it  in  existence  is  intrin- 
sically impossible. 

In  other  words,  it  is  not  repugnant  to  reason  that  material 
substance  should  exist  in  a  more  simple  and  perfect  species  of 
relation  to  space,  than  bodies  possess,  as  they  now  actually 
exist,  subject  to  our  senses.  But  the  full  explanation  of  this 
subject  belongs  to  another  treatise. 

Extension  is  of  two  species,  circumscriptive  and  definitive  ; 
in  the  circufnscriptive  extension  the  extended  object  occupies  the 
whole  place  included  within  its  boundary,  and  each  part  of  the 
object  fills  a  proportionate  part  ot  the  whole  place;  v.  g.,  a 

*  "  In  matcrialibus,  quantitas  sequitur  niateriam;  qnnlitas  sequitur  formam." 
"In  viventibus  quantitas  sequitur /or?nrtni,  saltern  quoad  tevminum  magnitu- 
dinis  seu  parvitatis. "  (Suarez  Metaph. ;  Disp.  42,  sect.  1.)  In  material  things 
quantity  follows  the  matter,  qualitij  follows  the  form.  In  living  things  quantity 
follows  the  form,  at  least  as  to  the  limit  of  its  size,  as  great  or  small. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  185 

cubic  block  of  marble  occupies  a  cubic  space  of  the  same  size 
or  extension,  and  a  fourth  part  of  it  fills  a  fourth  part  of  that 
extent,  a  half  occupies  a  half,  etc. 

In  definitive  extensio7i^  the  substance  is  complete  in  the  whole, 
and  is  whole  in  each  part  of  its  extension ;  v.  g.,  the  soul  is 
whole  in  the  entire  body,  and  whole  in  each  part  of  it. 

Quantity  is  either  conti?iuous,  as  above  defined,  or  it  is  dis- 
crete; if  extension  be  divided  into  parts,  the  number  which 
expresses  or  includes  the  whole  collection  of  those  parts,  is 
discrete  quantity.  But  abstract  number,  or  that  which  does  not 
express  actual  parts  of  a  divided  quantity  numerically,  does  not 
belong  to  the  category  or  predicament  that  is  called  quantity  ; 
but  is  transcendental,  i.  e.,  may  enter  any  of  the  categories,  ex- 
press their  units,  or  unities,  or  be  applied  to  any  beings. 

To  say  with  Zeno  of  old,  that  lines  consist  of  indivisible 
points;  surfaces  are  formed  by  lines,  and  solids  by  surfaces, 
would  be  erroneous;  continuous  extension  cannot  be  thus  gen- 
erated. 

IS    QUANTITY    INFINITELY    DIVISIBLE  ? 

Quantity  is  infinitely  divisible  in  potentia,  or  potentially.  To 
this  proposition  the  objection  will  at  once  occur:  "what  is 
infinitely  divisible,  can  be  thus  divided  actually,  at  least  by 
infinite  power;  and  thereby  it  can  be  resolved  into  an  infinite 
number  of  parts." 

But  if  its  divisibility  were  thus  exhausted,  then  it  was  not 
infi?iitely  divisible  by  hypothesis ;  since  that  which  is  finished 
is  not  ifififiite  potentially.  Similarly,  quantity  may  be  increased 
infinitely  in  potentia  or  potentially,  by  addition  or  multiplica- 
tion ;  but  yet  infinite  extension,  or  infinite  number,  cannot  be 
actually  generated  by  successive  increments ;  for  that  which 
begins  and  ends,  is  not  actually  infinite,  but  may  receive  further 
increase. 

Hence,  to  conclude  from  the  potential  infinite,  to  the  actual 
infinite,  is  not  valid  illation ;  for  the  infinite  i7i  potentia  cannot 
pass  to  the  infinite  in  actu,  and  thus  become  completed ;  as  that 


186  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

would  destroy  the  hypothesis ;  i.  e.,  the  supposition  that  it  may 
be  increased  sine  fine  ^  or  without  end  of  increase* 

The  actual  infinite  is  all^  without  the  possibility  of  more ;  or, 
as  the  axiom  expresses  it,  tot  ut  ?io7i  pliira;  the  potential  infinite 
does  not  actually  contain  all^  without  the  possibility  of  more; 
it  is  710 n  tot  quill  plura. 

QUALITY. 

Qualities  are  accidents  which  are  superadded  to  created  sub- 
stance in  order  to  perfect  it,  both  in  its  existence,  and  its  action; 
or,  qualities  intrinsically  ornament  and  perfect  actually  existing 
substance.  Quantity  pertains  rather  to  the  matter^  as  such ; 
quality  follows  the  specific  essence^  of  the  matter,  its  form.  It 
is  the  specific  essence  of  a  rose  which  makes  it  different  from 
a  pi?tk^  as  it  is  also  the  specific  essence  of  the  pink  that  makes 
it  what  it  is,  and  not  some  other  form  of  matter. 

It  may  be  said,  then,  that  qualities  follow  the  species  of  sub- 
stantial objects.  It  is  on  this  account  that  substances  are  often 
defined  by  their  qualities,  which  is  legitimate,  when  the  genus 
and  specific  difference  are  not  known,  or  cannot  be  assigned. 

Figure\  pertains  to  quality  when  it  is  considered  as  determin- 
ing an  object  as  to  its  proper  and  specific  form,  or  shape  ;  but 
considered  as  extended,  it  is  quantity.  Material  objects  depend 
much  for  their  specific  nature,  on  their  figure  or  shape ;  it 
beautifies  them,  and  perfects  them  also  in  action  as  well  as  in 
strength.     Hence,  figure  or  shape  is  intimately  connected  with 

*  "  Ab  infinito  syncategorimattce,  sen  in  potentia,  ad  infinitum  cntegorima' 
tice,  seu  actu,  non  valet  illatio."  "  Infinitum  actu  est,  tot  ut  non plura;  inlrni- 
tum  in  potentia  est,  non  tot  quin plura."  From  the  infinite  syncategorimatic- 
ally,  or  the  potential  infinite,  to  the  infinite  categorimatically,  or  the  actual 
infinite,  illation  is  not  valid.  The  actual  infinite  is  all  without  more;  the  poten- 
tial infinite,  is  not  all  loithoutmore. 

t  "  Qualitas  sequitur  formani,  quia  forma  complet  et  perficit  essentiara  rei  et 
confert  principalem  vimagenui."  (Suiirez  Met.,  Disp.  42.)  Quality  follows 
the  form,  because  the  form  completes,  and  perfects  the  essence  of  a  thing,  and 
cif)nlers  on  it  its  principal  power  of  action. 

|"Figura,  quatenus  materialiter  extensa,  pertinet  ad  quantitatem;  sed  qua 
tenus  ornamentum  substantia?,  et  quatenus  dcserviens  ad  actiones  et  naturales 
motus,  pertinet  ad  formam. ' '  (Suarez  Met.  Disp.  42,  sect.  1 .)  Figure,  as  mate- 
rially extended,  pertains  to  quantity;  but  as  ornament  of  substance,  and  assist- 
ing action  and  natural  motion,  it  pertains  to  form;  i.  e. ,  to  the  formal  principle 
of  the  substance. 


GENEEAL     METAPHYSICS.  187 

specific  nature,  and  results  from  that  specific  nature,  as  one  of 
its  distinctive  qualities;  v.  g.,  organic  beings,  also  crystals,  all 
have  their  peculiar  and  determinate  figures  or  shapes. 

Sensible  qualities  are  either  permanent  or  transient ;  the  ruddy 
hue  of  the  cheeks,  when  lasting,  is  ordinarily  a  sign  of  health, 
and  is,  in  that  case,  2, permanent  quality;  a  blush,  from  sudden 
emotion,  is  ira?isient.  A  happy  combination  of  the  sensible 
qualities,  figure  and  color,  makes  visible  beauty. 

NATURAL    POWDERS    OF    SUBSTANCE;    THEIR    ACTS. 

Natural  powers  are  qualities  that  perfect  a  substance  for 
action.  Power  is  either  active,  ox  passive;  as  active,  it  can  cause 
a  mutation  in  another  object,  as  when  you  move  your  book. 
Ks passive,  the  power  receives  an  action;  v.  g.,  the  senses,  which, 
under  different  respects,  are  both  active  and  passive,  receive  the 
impressions  which  external  objects  make  on  them.* 

Immanent  acts,  are  such  as  remain  in,  and  perfect  their  sub- 
ject; V.  g.,  acts  of  the  understanding,  as  perceiving,  judging, 
reasoning;  these  acts  do  not,  as  such,  pass  out  oi  the  mind, 
but  physically  \\\^y  remain  in  the  powers  that  ^'//r//  them.  None 
but  living  agents  are  capable  of  immanent  action ;  the  action 
of  lifeless  objects  is  transient;  i.  e.,  \t  passes  from  them  to  the 
extrinsic  object  which  is  its  term ;  and  they  must  be  moved  to 
action  by  an  efficient  cause  which  is  really  distinct  from  them ; 
for,  having  no  immanent  action,  they  are  absolutely  inert,  or, 
are  incapable  of  self-motion. 

Hence,  it  may  be  said :  all  im?nanent  action  is  vital,  and  all 
vital  action  is  immaneftt;  or,  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  vital 
action  is  that  it  is  immanent.  But  observe  that  the  term,  life,  t  is 

*  •'  Actio  aliquando  dicta  effectus,  quatenus  est  ab  agente,  tamen  magis  pi'o- 
prie,  est  via  ad  eflfectum. "  Action  is  sometimes  termed  an  eflfect,  inasmuch  as 
it  is  from  an  agent;  yet,  more  properly,  it  is  the  way  to  the  effect. 

t  "  Vita  aut  sumitur  in  acta  secundo,  et  sic  dicit  operatiouem;  aut  in  actu 
i»rimo  principal!  et  radicali,  et  sic  est  ipsa  natura  sen  substantia  rei  viventis 
Nos  non  aliter  possumus  intelligere  rem  viventem,  nisi  in  ordine  ad  efRcien- 
fiam,  quatenus  scilicet  potest  sese  movere  aut  agere  aliquo  modo;  et  censemus 
rem  aliquam  antea  viventem  amisisse  vitam,  quando  omnem  intrinsecam  motio- 
nem  amisit."  (Suarez  Metaph.  disp.  30,  sect.  34.)  Life  is  either  taken  as 
something  actual,  and  thus  it  says  operation;  or,  it  is  taken  as  something  pri- 
mary and  radical,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  the  nature  or  substance  of  the  living 


188  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

understood  in  two  senses  :  ist,  as  expressing  the  living  sub- 
stance itself;  2d,  as  expressing  vital  act  or  operation.  We 
usually  conceive  life  as  the  living  act,  and  when  we  actually 
form  a  concept  of  it  as  a  substance,  it  is  always  by  the  relation 
of  that  substance  to  its  living  operation  or  action.  Life,  there- 
fore, which  is  directly  known  to  us  only  as  action,  pertains  exclu- 
sively to  those  agents  that  can  move  themselves;*  and  capability 
of  being  moved  only  by  an  extrinsic  efficieiit  cause,  is  peculiar 
to  non-living  agents.  Motion  is  here  used  in  its  widest  sense, 
and  includes  all  imjnanent  operation  of  any  principle  which  is 
intrinsically  active,  i.  e.,  which  can  proximately  or  immediately 
move  itself  to  act.j 

The  principal  acts  of  life f  are,  ist,  self-movement;  2d,  fititri- 
tion  by  the  intus-susception  of  food;  3d,  sensation;  4th,  intel- 
lection. The  first  named  may  be  regarded  as  generic,  and, 
therefore,  as  including  all  tital  action ;  vegetable  life  is  limited 
in  its  sphere  of  operation  to  nutrition,  growth  by  assimilation 
of  food  received,  and  reproduction;  animal  life,  in  addition  to 
these  operations,  is  capable  of  acts  of  sensation ;  man,  besides 
all  these  operations,  has  acts  of  intelligence,  which  absolutely 
transcend  the  sphere  of  sensible  or  orga?iic  action,  as  is  proved 
in  Article  I  of  the  preceding  chapter. 

It  may  be  said,  therefore,  ist,  power  of  action  is  common  to 
all  substance;  2d,  vital  ox  i?nmafie?it  action  is  common  to  all 
//W;/^  substance,  and  is  limited  to  the  powers  of  living  ageiits ; 
3d,  the  im7nane?it  or  vital  action  merely  sufficient  for  knowing 

thing.  We  understand  a  living  thing  only,  by  its  having  order  to  efficiency: 
namely,  as  capable  of  moving  or  actuating  itself  in  some  manner;  and  we  judge 
a  thing  that  once  lived,  to  have  lost  life,  when  it  has  lost  intrinsic  motion. 

*  "  Ilia  proprie  sunt  viventia  qu£e  seipsa,  secundum  aliquam  speciem  motus, 
movent."  (Div.  Thom.  I  p.,  qu.  18,  art.  3.)  Those  things  are  properly  living 
things,  which,  according  to  some  species  of  motion,  move  themselves. 

t  *  *  Vivens  efficit  suam  operationera  per  veram  causalitatem  et  motionem,  qua 
seipsum  movet."  (Suarez  Disp.  30,  sect.  14.)  A  living  thing  eflfects  its  own 
operation  by  a  ti-ue  causality  and  motion,  for  it  moves  itself. 

X  ' '  Vita  dicitur  et  substantia vitalis,  ut  est  anima,  et  natura  angelica;  et  opera- 
tio  vitalis,  quae  nimirum  in  operante,  a  qiio  emanat,  manet;  quaiis  est  intelligere, 
amare,  sentire,  etc."  (Lessius  de  Perfect.  Divin.)  Life  means  both  vital  sub- 
stance, as  the  soul,  angelic  nature;  and  also  vital  operation;  namely  that  opera, 
tion  that  remains  in  the  agent  which  elicits  it;  as,  to  understand,  love,  feel,  et«. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  189 

singular,  concrete  and  material  things  is  proper,  as  such,  to 
Animals  only ;  4th,  the  power  which  elicits  the  immanent  acts 
of  knowing  universal  or  abstract  t?'uth,  distinguishes  intellectual 
substances  from  all  the  rest. 

The  posver  of  action  which  is  common  to  lifeless  substance, 
is  pure  potentiality;  i.  e.,  it  has  no  power  of  motion  except  that 
which  is  implied  in  a  mere  capability  of  being  efficiently  deter- 
mined or  moved  to  act  by  an  extrinsic  cause,  the  state  of  rest,  or 
inaction,  being  cojinaturaljao  it.  On  the  contrary,  in  respect  to 
iiviftg  beings,  actuality,  or  immanent  action  positively  going  on, 
and  which,  therefore,  excludes  complete  rest  or  non-action,  is 
essential  to  their  life,  so  that  its  total  absence  is  evidence  of 
death.  Power  is  defined  by  its  act;  the  act  is  known  by 
means  of  its  object. 

HABIT. 

Habit,  in  its  general  sense,  pertains  to  operative  nature,*  and 
it  gives  facility  of  action  to  the  power  in  which  it  resides.  In 
its  species,  it  is  a  quality  which  is  stable,  or  which  cannot  be 
removed  from  its  subject  without  difficulty,  f  Because  all 
created  substance  acts  only  through  the  powers  of  that  sub- 
stance, it  is  justly  inferred  that  the  proper  subjects  of  all  opera- 
tive habit  are  only  the  powers  of  substance. J 

*"  Alia;  qiialitutes,  v.  g.,  sanitas,  piilchritiulo.  etc.,  disponimt  subjectum  ad 
bene  esse;  sed  virtutes  animi  sen  habitus  operativi  disponunt  ad  bene  operari.  " 
(Gotti.  torn,  vii.)  Othei*  qualities,  v.  g.,  health,  beauty,  etc.,  dispose  their 
subject  for  existing  well ;  but  the  virtues  of  the  soul  or  the  operative  habits,  dis- 
pose it  for  operating  well. 

\  Disposition,  in  its  general  signification,  imports  order  in  objects  which,  in 
some  respect  or  other,  consist  of  parts.  When  active  power  is  its  subject, 
it  also  gives  facility  of  action.  But  it  differs  from  habit  in  this,  that  it  is  easily 
removed  from  its  subject,  for  it  is  per  se,  or  in  itself,  unstable,  or,  it  is  never 
firmly  radicated  in  a  power.  In  the  acquisition  of  a  habit  by  repeated  acts,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  first  acts,  with  the  accompanying  preparation,  dispose  tho 
subject  for  the  subsequent  permanent  effect;  i.  e. ,  for  the  habit.  (Div.  Thorn. , 
1,  2,  qu.  49.) 

X  "  Subjectum  habitus  operativi,  est  potentia  operativa."  (Philos.  passim.) 
"In  ipsa  essentia  auimre  immediate  nullus  est  habitus  ad  naturamnaturaliter 
ordinatiis,  quia  substantia  non  est  immediate  operativa;  sed  tamen  est  in  ea 
habitus  supernaturalis,  nerape gratia  sanctiflcans. "  (Div.  Thom.)  The  subject 
of  operative  habit,  is  operative  power.  There  is  no  habit  naturally  designed 
for  nature  which  is  immediately  in  the  essence  itself  of  the  soul,  because  sub- 
stance is  not  immediately  operative;  but  yet  there  is  in  the  essence  of  the  soul  a 
supernatural  habit;  namely,  sanctifying  gi-ace. 


190  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

The  powers  which  are  most  susceptible  of  the  superadded 
perfections  termed  habits^  are  the  imdersiajiding,  the  will^  and, 
in  an  inferior  degree,  the  imaginaHon,  the  sensile  memory,  and 
also  the  senses  in  general,  at  least  for  that  action  in  them  which 
is  under  the  direct  control  of  reason. 

Habits  are  either  infused,  or  acquired.  The  knowledge  which 
Adam  received  immediately  after  his  creation,  was  infused  into 
his  mind;  Christian  Faith,  Hope  and  Charity  are  infused  habits. 

Intelligence,  regarded  as  a  natural  ability  in  the  understand- 
ing to  see  clearly  and  promptly  the  truths  that  are  known  per 
se,  or  are  self  evident,  was  termed  by  the  old  philosophers,  a 
7iatural  habit;  a  much  higher  degree  of  which  may  be  acquired 
by  prudent  exercise  of  the  intellect.  But  this  is  less  properly 
termed  habit;  for  the  capability  of  immediate  action  pertains 
to  the  very  essence  and  entity  of  a  natural  power.* 

Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intellect  is  capable  of  receiving 
superadded  perfection  which  gives  it  increased  facility  of  action, 
and  this  increased  facility  of  action  has  the  nature  of  the  virtue 
which  is  termed  habit,  whether  it  be  acquired  by  exercise,  or 
be  in  itself  the  gift  of  nature. 

Acquired  habits  are  permanent  effects  usually  produced  in  a 
power  by  repeated  acts  or  continued  exercise  of  that  power. 

*  "  Omnis  naturalis  propensio  et  incliiiatio  potentiaj  ad  actum,  est  pel-  ipsam- 
met  naturam  et  entitatem  potentiae:  et  noii  per  habitiim  distiuctum,  et  ill!  a 
natiira  iuditum."  (Suarez  Met.,  Disp.  41,  sect.  13.)  All  natural  propensity 
and  inclination  of  a  power  to  action,  is  of  the  very  nature  and  entity  of  the 
power,  and  not  by  a  distinct  habit  which  is  given  to  it  by  nature. 

"  Intelligentia  (seu  intellectus)  est  habitus  primorum  principiorum."  In- 
telligence (or  intellect)  is  the  habit  of  first  principles. 

"  Prudentia  etarssunt  in  operativa  parte  aninaa),  et  circa  contingens  alitcr 
sehabent;  sapientia,  scientiaet  intellectus  sunt  habitus  speculativi,  et  conside- 
rant  necessaria  quae  impossibile  est  aliter  se  habere."  (Div.  Thorn.,  I,  2,  qu. 
57.)  Prudence  and  art  pertain  to  the  operative  part  of  the  soul,  and  they  have 
for  their  object  the  contingent,  AVhich  they  consider  under  different  respects; 
wisdom,  scientific  knowledge,  and  intelligence,  are  speculative  habits,  and  they 
consider  necessary  things,  or  those  which  cannot  be  otherwise  than  they  are. 

' '  Prudentia,  magistra  virtutum,  est  agibilium;  ars,  factibilium. "  Prudence, 
the  ruler  of  virtues,  concerns  those  things  which  can  be  done,  morally;  art, what 
can  be  done,  physically. 

' '  Habitus  alii  dant  simpliciter  posse,  alii  dant  facilius  posse. ' '  Some  habits 
are  essential  for  acting  at  all;  others,  give  facility  of  action. 

* '  Inluitio  primorum  principiorum  est  intellectus. ' '  Intelligence  is  the  intui- 
tion of  first  principles.    Intuition  is  the  actual  exercise  of  intelligence. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  191 

In  the  understanding,  intelligence,  kfioivledge,  wisdom,  M'hich 
are  speculative;  prudence  and  art,  which  are  practical  in  their 
objects,  are  all  habits  or  intellectual  virtues  which  may  be  ac- 
quired in  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  perfection.  In  the  will, 
all  the  moral  virtues,  and  also  their  opposite  vices,  may  exist  as 
acquired  habits,  but  not  simultaneously  ;  for,  moral  virtue  and 
vice  are  opposites,  or  are  contraries,  and,  therefore,  the  one  ex- 
cludes the  other. 

Habit,  on  account  of  its  stability,  or  the  difficulty  of  eradi- 
cating it  from  its  subject,  is  sometimes  called  "  a  second  nature." 
The  capability  of  the  natural  powers  of  cognition,  and  superior 
appetite,  to  acquire  these  habits,  or  superadded  qualities  by  exer- 
cise, is  one  of  the  peculiar  perfections  of  those  powers  as  they 
exist  in  rational  natures. 

Though  brutes  are  not  capable  of  habits,  in  the  sense  in 
which  habits  are  conceived  to  pertain  necessarily  to  rational 
powers,  or,  at  least,  to  powers  which  are  immediately  subject 
to  the  enipire  of  reason,  as  expressed  by  the  old  philosophical 
axiom,  "habitus  est  quo  utimur  cum  volumus,"  "habit  is  some- 
thing which  we  use  at  will ; "  yet,  the  perfect  brute  animals, 
or  such  as  have  memory,  and  are  capable  of  learning  some 
things  by  experience,  can  be  made,  at  least  when  under  the 
tuition  and  control  of  man,  to  acquire  what  seems  to  possess 
the  physical  requisites  of  habit. 

The  axiom  in  respect  to  habits,  "habitus  quo  utimur  cum 
volumus,"  appears,  as  Suarez  remarks,  to  regard  rather  the 
moral  character  which  habits  may  have,  than  to  express  their 
physical  nature.     (Metaphysics,  disp.  44,  sect.  3.) 

It  will  be  useful  for  better  understanding  the  nature  and 
function  of  habits,  to  distinguish  more  precisely  between  the 
subjects  capable  of  them,  and  those  which  are  not  susceptible 
of  habit  at  all. 

God  cannot  receive  habit;  for,  being  infinitely  perfect,  he 
cannot  be  the  subject  of  additional  perfection;  and  h^mgpure 
act,  he  cannot  be  in  a  state  of  potentiality,  i.  e.,  he  cannot  pass 
from  the  condition  of  non-action  to  action,  as  is  possible  to 


192  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

beings  that  are  perfectible,  or  which  can  pass  from  the  state 
oi poteiitiality  into  that  of  action. 

Habits  can  be  acquired  by  those  agents  only  which  are  per- 
fectible by  imma?ient  action;  i.  e.,  agents  which  intrinsically 
elicit  their  own  action,  it  remaining  in  them,  and  perfecting 
them.  The  powers  of  such  agents  are  not  only  the  proximate 
and  active  principle  of  their  own  operation ;  but  they  are,  at 
the  same  \ax^^* passive  in  respect  to  this  same  operation;  i.  e., 
their  immanent  action  affects  them,  for  it  perfects  them.  Hence, 
it  is  quite  natural  that,  in  powers  whose  action  is  immafioit^  the 
repetition  of  acts  having  the  same  or  similar  objects  for  their 
term,  should  gradually  produce  and  complete  for  them  the 
permanent  effect,  which  we  call  habit,  whose  peculiar  virtue  is 
to  give  strength,  promptness,  and  facility  of  action. 

Those  objects  whose  action  is  wholly  transient,  or  which 
have  no  immane?it  action,  do  not  receive  any  increase  of  perfec- 
tion from  their  own  acts,  but  they  rather  give  it  to  the  exterior 
object  which  is  the  term  of  their  operation.  Hence,  such 
agents  are  not  susceptible  of  that  influence  of  immanent  action, 
which  causes  the  acquisition  of  habit. 

*  "  It  is  necessary  that  the  power  in  which  habit  resides,  be  both  active  and 
passive;  for,  it  cannot  be  the  proximate  principle  of  eliciting  acts,  nnless  it  be 
active;  nor  can  it  receive  into  itself  habits,  nnless  it  be  passive.  Bnt  only  that 
power  is  at  the  same  time  active  and  passive,  which  is  able  to  elicit  immanent 
acts:  hence  the  snbject  of  habit,  mnst  be  capable  of  immanent  action.  This  is 
confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  act  leaves  the  habit  in  that  power  in  which  the  act 
is;  because,  it  renders  that  very  power,  and  not  another  one,  prompt  to  operate. 
But,  the  habit  remains  in  that  power  which  is  the  proximate  principle  of  such 
act;  and,  therefore,  the  act  remains  in  the  same  also;  hence,  both  the  act  itself 
is  immanent,  and  tlie  power,  which  is  its  principle,  elicits  immanent  action. 
Whence  it  follows  that  the  acts  by  which  habits  are  produced,  are  such  as,  strictly 
speaking, have  no  eflfectoutside  of  their  own  powers ;  which  is  proper  to  immanent 
acts." 

* '  In  brutes  there  are  not  habits  distinct  from  the  images  in  their  fancy  or  their 
Bensil)le  impressions.  The  general  reason  of  this  is,  that  in  all  their  acts  they 
are  determined  toone  thing  (i.  e.,  are  necessitated  to  one,  imiform  mode  of  action, 
over  which  they  have  no  real  choice,  or  rational  empire,)  by  force  of  theobjects, 
just  according  as  those  objects  are  presented  to  them.  But  it  seems  more  i)ro- 
bable  that  the  i«?crftflZ  sc/ise  of  man,  cogitative  power,  (see  page  87  of  Applied 
Logic,)  can  acquire  habit  distinct  from  sensible  ideas,  giving  facility,  and  in- 
clining the  power  detei-minately  to  some  acts.  The  reason  is,  because  this  sense 
in  man  is  not  absolutely  determined  to  one  thing,  like  fancy  in  the  brute;  for,  it 
can  be  made,  obediently  to  reason,  to  operate,  or  can  be  moved  to  determinate 
action."     (Suarez  Metaph.,  Disp.  44,  sees.  1  and  3.) 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  ]  93 

It  must  be  observed,  however,  that  not  all  beings  which 
have  vital  or  immanent  action,  are  susceptible  of  habits,  in  any  ■ 
univocal  sense  of  the  term.  It  is  a  fact  well  proved  by  general 
experience  that  the  capability  of  acquiring  habit,  necessarily 
implies  also  the  capability  of  experimental  knoivledge  ni  the 
subject.  Hence,  since  man  has  intellectual  cognition,  and 
brutes  have  that  of  sense  alone,  it  is  manifest  that  acquired 
habits  in  them  can  resemble  only  by  analogy;  or,  these  habits 
m  them  are  proportioned  in  perfection  to  the  respective  cog- 
noscive  powers  of  man  and  brute. 

It  is  manifest  that  when  we  consider  the  different  powers  in 
man  as  subject  to  his  will,,  or  to  the  empire  of  his  rational 
nature,  even  his  senses,  under  that  respect,  are  less  determijied 
to  one  mode  of  action,  or  are  less  limited  in  the  sphere  of  their 
action,  and  less  subject  in  regard  to  their  objects,  than  are  the 
corresponding  sensible  powers  of  those  agents,  which  have 
not  this  rational  empire  over  their  own  acts.  On  this  account, 
men's  sensible  powers  are  more  susceptible  of  the  acquired  vir- 
tues, termed  habits,  than  are  those  powers  as  they  are  in  irra- 
tional animals. 

INTENSITY    OF    QUALITIES,    ACTS,    ETC. 

Compound  sensible  qualities,  i.  e.,  such  as  beauty  or  orna?ne?tts, 
which  consist  of  several  qualities,  as  color,  figure,  order,  etc., 
coalescing  into  one;  or,  quality  which  is  composed  of  them; 
also,  habits  and  acts  are  all  capable  of  degrees,  or  of  more  or 
less  intensity  * 

The  intensity]  or  intension  of  a  quality  is  said  to  be  increased 
in  degree  when  it  is  augmented  or  becomes  more  deeply  radi- 

*  ' '  Intensio  actus  fit  per  additionem  gvadus  ad  gradum. ' '  Action  is  intensi- 
fied by  the  addition  of  degree  to  degree.  It  is  convenient  thus  to  conceive  in- 
tensity to  be  increased,  though  it  does  not  take  place  by  degrees  of  increment 
which  are  actually  distinct. 

t ' '  Intensio  accipitur,  prius  et  raaxime  iisitato,  pro  mutatione  ilia  per  quanti 
eadem  qualitas  magis  ac  magis  in  eodem  subjecto  secundum  eamdem  partem  seu 
entitatem  perticitur."  (Snarez  Metaph.  Disp.  46.)  Intensity,  in  its  primary 
and  most  usual  sense,  stands  for  that  mutation  by  which  the  same  quality  is 
more  and  more  perfected  in  the  same  subject,  according  to  the  same  part  or  entity 
of  that  subject. 
13 


194  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

cated  in  the  same  subject,  or  in  the  same  part  of  the  subject; 
as  when  heat  is  increased  in  a  part  only  of  the  hand.  But  it 
iS  remission  of  the  quaHty  when  the  quahty  is  correspondingly 
diminished  m  the  same  subject.  There  is  increased  extension 
of  a  quahty,  when,  without  leaving  the  former  part  of  its  subject, 
it  passes  or  spreads  to  other  parts;  v.  g.,  when  heat  spreads 
from  the  hand  to  the  arm,  without,  however,  leaving  the  hand; 
if  it  leave  the  hand,  and  go  to  the  arm,  this  would  not  be  ex- 
tension, but  transmigratiofi  of  quality;  if  the  quality  leave 
some  part,  or  parts  of  a  subject,  without  leaving  the  whole 
subject,  it  would  be  restrictio?i  of  quality.  Hence,  color,  sound, 
etc.,  may  be  more  or  less  inte?ise,  or  remiss,  may  extend,  7?iigrate, 
etc. 

General  experience  attests  the  fact  as  evident  to  all  minds, 
that  the  vital  acts  whose  direction  is  immediately  under  the 
will's  control,  are  susceptible  of  a  higher  or  lower  degree  as 
to  intensity;  and  that  their  intensity  or  remissness  much 
depends,  in  general  at  least,  on  the  free  action  of  the  will 
itself.  But  since,  as  before  observed,  the  action  of  the  will  is, 
by  its  nature,  less  evident  to  the  understanding,  cceteris  pari- 
bus, than  are  the  acts  of  cognition,  it  may  often  happen  that, 
even  when  we  know  the  species  of  its  act,  we  are  unable  to 
see  precisely  and  determinately  the  degree  of  its  intensity; 
this  does  not  occur  in  the  same  manner  as  regards  the  acts  of 
cognition,  which,  being  more  evident,  are  more  fully  and  accu- 
rately perceived.  Yet,  whenever  the  will's  act  is  positively 
put,  although  remiss  in  degree,  the  nature  or  species  of  the  act 
is  completely  determined,  as  is  also  its  essential  moral  charac- 
ter, according  to  the  nature  of  the  objects.  It  is  Hkewise  im- 
possible, in  many  cases,  to  decide  with  certainty  as  to  whether 
the  will  has  positively  consented  or  acted  at  all,  even  when  the 
objects  proposed  to  its  choice  are  evident  before  the  mind.  In 
important  and  practical  matters,  however,  obscurity  or  rational 
doubt  as  to  the  will's  fully  deliberate  choice,  is  scarcely  possible. 

The  study  of  these  obscure  operations  of  the  will  is  fre- 
quently called  the  study  of  the  heart;  and  it  is  the  chief  means 
of  becoming  proficient  in  the  knowledge  of  human  nature. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  195 

Figure^  as  such,  is  incapable  of  degree;  it  may  be  larger  or 
smaller ;  but  this  is  difference  of  quantity,  not  a  change  in  the 
degree  of  the  figure  as  such.  It  requires  no  proof  that  habits 
and  acts  may  be  more  or  less  intense ;  or,  more  or  less  exten- 
sive, in  respect  to  their  objects. 

Substance^  as  such,  is  incapable  of  degree,  but  it  may  be 
greater  or  less  in  quantity;*  and  is  capable  of  receiving  suc- 
cessively contrary  qualities;  this,  however,  does  not  imply  a 
difference  of  degree  in  the  matter  or  essence  of  the  object 
extended. 

Difference  of  degree  f  does  not  change  or  destroy  the  essence 
of  the  quality  of  which  it  is  predicated,  or  in  which  it  obtains ; 
no  more  than  difference  of  quantity  destroys  or  changes  the 
essence  of  matter,  \ 

*  "  Substantia  non suscipit  magis  et minus ;  est  substantive  suscipere contraria." 
Substance  is  not,  as  such,  susceptible  of  more  or  less,  but  it  is  capable  of  receiv- 
ing, contraries . 

t ' '  Gradus  non  mutat  essentiam  rei. ' '  The  degree  does  not  change  the  essence 
of  a  thing. 

"Magis  et  minus,  secundum  quod  causantur  ex  intensione  et  reniissione 
unius  formas,  non  diversilicant  speciem.  Sed  secundum  quod  causantur  ex 
formis  diversorum  graduum,  sic  diversiticant  speciem."  (Div.  Thom.  Sum.  I 
p.,  qu.  50,  a.  4,  ad.  2.)  More  a?id  less,  when  caused  by  the  intension  and  remis- 
sion of  one  and  the  same  form  (quality  or  property) ,  do  not  change  the  species  of 
the  object.  But  when  they  are  caused  by  forms  in  dillerent  grades  (different 
species)  of  being,  they  do  diversify  the  species.  As  for  example,  the  different 
degrees  of  density  in  air  and  Avater  arise  from  the  specific  difference  of  air  and 
water;  so,  in  other  words,  the  same  quality  may,  in  different  objects,  have  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  intensity,  arising  from  the  essential  or  specific  difference  of 
those  objects,  and  thus  furnish  a  means  of  distinguishing  the  species  of  those 
objects.  But  greater  or  less  degree  of  the  same  color,  v.  g. ,  iu  the  same  object, 
does  not  imply  a  change  of  the  subject  of  that  color  iu  its  specific  nature;  greater 
or  less  density  of  air  under  different  degrees  of  pressure,  does  not  imply  a 
change  in  the  nature  of  air;  the  same  .habit  is  not  changed  in  its  nature  or  spe- 
cies by  being  more  or  less  deeply  radicated  in  its  subject,  etc. 

JMr.  Darwin,  in  his  "Descent  of  Man,"  part  1,  chap.  2,  says:  "  We  must 
iidmit  that  there  is  a  much  wider  interval  of  mental  power  between  one  of  the 
lowest  fishes,  as  a  lamprey,  or  a  lancelet,  and  one  of  the  higher  apes,  than 
between  an  ape  and  man. ' '  In  this  he  assumes  the  power  of  sensation  and  that 
of  intelligence  to  be  different  degrees  of  the  same  power ;  whereas,  in  fact,  they 
have  a  spec  (/I  c  difference.  Tlie  organis  material  in  its  functions,  y^hxle  intelli- 
gence is  absolutely  immaterial,  and  entirely  super-sensible.  A  more  rational 
contrast,  and  one  founded  on  plain  facts,  could  be  made  between  a  metallic  toy 
monkey,  and  a  real  one,  on  the  one  hand ;  and  a  real  monkey  and  a  man  on  the 
other;  in  both  cases  the  contrast  would  be  very  wide;  but  it  would  prove  nothing 
in  favor  of  his  hypothesis.  This  is  not  the  only  instance  in  which  Mr.  Darwin 
is  at  fault  in  elementary  first  principles. 


196  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

The  doctrine  of  quantity  and  quality  may  here  be  summed 
up  in  terms  that  will  now  be  readily  comprehended :  quantity, 
in  the  primary  and  general  acceptation  of  the  word,  is  an  acci- 
dent which  is  extensive  of  the  substance  wHich  is  its  subject, 
giving  it  parts  placed  outside  of  parts,  whence  result  greater  or 
less  size,  and  equality  or  inequality.  As  thus  understood,  it 
can  properly  be  said  to  exist  only  in  bodies  which  have  dimen- 
sion, or  in  material  substance;  from  it  there  results  real  and 
substantial  size,  "  quantitas  molis,"  in  these  bodies,  as  greater 
or  smaller.  By  translation,  however,  quantity  is  attributed  to 
other  objects,  as  virtue,  habit,  act,  power,  etc.;  it  is  then  qiiaji- 
iity  of  perfection^  "quantitas  virtutis;"  v.  g.,  "Aristotle's  genius 
was  greater  than  that  of  Pyrrho." 

But  in  the  explanation  here  given,  quantity  is  defined  and 
described  rather  by  its  properties  or  accidents,  than  by  its 
intrinsic  essence.  Quantity,  stricdy  as  such,  or  quantity,  con- 
sidered as  to  its  essence,  requires  for  the  precise  concept  of  it, 
only  extension  of  parts,  or  parts  outside  of  parts,  in  respect  to 
themselves,  not  as  circiimscriptively  occupying  actual  extension 
in  space,  though  this  circumscriptive  extension  in  space  is 
requisite  for  it  to  become  subject  to  our  senses :  "  quantitas,  in 
essentia  sua,  est  extensio  partium  in  ordine  ad  se,  non  in 
ordine  ad  locum." 

Quality  includes  under  it  all  the  positive  accidents  which 
are  superadded  to  created  substance,  the  effect  of  which  is  to 
give  to  it,  when  constituted  in  being,  perfection  and  complete- 
ness in  its  mode,  both  of  existing  and  operating.  Powers,  vir- 
tues, habits,  and  the  like,  which,  it  is  evident,  are  necessary 
appendices  of  the  substances  to  which  they  are  connatural,  are 
nevertheless  extrinsic  to  the  essence  of  the  substance  in  which 
they  reside,  and  are  qualities,  or  they  pertain  to  the  category 
of  quality.  Quality,  is  by  some  defined  to  be;  a  certain  abso- 
lute accident,  adjoined  to  created  substance,  as  the  comple- 
ment of  its  perfection,  both  in  existing  and  acting:  "  qualitas 
est  accidens  quoddam  absolutum,  adjunctum  substantias  creatae 
ad  complementum  perfectionis  ejus,  tam  in  essendo,  quam  in 
agendo." 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  197 

Hence,  qiiatiiity  may  be  aptly  termed  the  measure  of  sub- 
stance ;  quality^  the  disposition  of  substance.*  Quality  is  the 
disposition  of  substance,  in  that  it  disposes  or  constitutes  it  in 
such  condition,  that  it  is  thereby  perfected  both  in  existing 
and  operating. 

RELATION, 

Relation  is  the  respect  which  one  thing  has  to  another;  or, 
it  is  the  order  in  which  one  thing  is  referred  to  another.t  A 
relatio7i  impHes  a  subject  which  is  related  or  referred  to  another, 
the  term  to  which  the  subject  is  related;  and  xh^  foundation  or 
basis  of  the  relation ;  from  it  the  relation  really  results ;  v.  g., 
suppose  two  different  bodies  that  have  the  same  shape  or  figure; 
then  the  two  bodies  are  respectively  the  subject^  and  the  term 
of  the  relation;  and  the  same  figure  or  shape  is  i\\Q  foundation 
or  basis  of  the  relation;  v.  g.,  "this  orange  has  the  shape  of 
that  lemon;"  orange  is  the  subject,  lemon  the  term  and  shape, 
the  foundation  or  basis  of  the  relation,  and  the  relation  con- 
sists in  the  two  being  alike. 

Relation  is  either  real  or  logical.  Real  relation  is  that  which 
objects  have  to  each  other  independently  of  any  knowledge  or 
judgment  we  may  have  of  it;  as  the  relation  of  cause  and  its 
effect.  The  order,  connexion,  and  mutual  dependence,  which 
exist  among  the  works  of  creation  are  real  relations,  which 
exist  independently  of  our  knowing  or  understanding  them. 

Logical  relation  is  one  which  the  mind  devises;  as  when  it 
compares;  v.  g.,  a  real  thing  to  itself;  or,  conceives  a  thing  as 
related  to  itself  In  this  case,  the  mind  apprehends  one  object 
twice,  and  refers  it  to  itself,  as  if  it  were  two. 

When  the  relation  is  real  and  identical  in  the  subject  and  the 
terjn,  it  is  mutual;  v.  g.,  "this  lily  and  this  rose  are  alike,  since 
both  are  white;''  "  white,"  is  really  in  both,  and,  therefore,  the 
relation  is  mutual,  and  is  said  likewise  to  be  of  the  sa?ne  denom 
(nation.     The  mutual  relation  between  cause  and  effect,  father 

*  "  Quautitas  est  mensura  substantise  ;  qualitas  est  dispositio  substantiae." 
(Div.  Th.,  1  p.,  qu.  28,  a.  2.) 

t ' '  Esse  relativi  est  ad  aliiid  se  habere. ' '  The  essence  of  the  relative  is  that 
it  is  referred  to  another. 


198  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

and  son,  which  are  also  said  to  be  co-related,  is  not  of  the  same 
denomination. 

Relation  as  predicamental,  or  as  one  of  the  ten  categories, 
includes  only  those  relations  which  are  between  real  objects. 
All  the  relations,  likenesses,  or  respects  of  one  real  thing  to 
another,  which  properly  pertain  to  this  category,  are  reduced 
by  metaphysicians  to  three  principal  classes:  ist,  relation  of 
unity  and  number  ;  2d,  of  action  and  passion  ;  3d,  of  measure 
and  measured. 

Observe  that  all  the  ten  categories  or  ultimate  genera,  in- 
clude none  but  real  entities;  and  hence,  from  among  their 
proper  subjects  are  excluded  all  entia  rationis,  or  those  entities 
that  are  merely  creatures  of  the  mind,  though  they  be  virtually 
founded  in  real  objects;  also  such  as  have  only  objective  being, 
i.  e.,  which  exist  only  in  the  intelligible  concepts.  Whence  it 
follows  that  the  relations  that  are  devised  by  the  mind,  but 
which  have  no  real  being,  as  that  between  genus  and  species, 
between  a  thing  and  itself,  and  all  the  transcendental  relations, 
are  to  be  regarded  as  not  properly  pertaining  to  the  category 
of  relation. 

Transcendental  relations  regard  terms  that  transcend  actual 
existence,  or  they  are  nietaphysical;  and,  therefore,  they  run 
through  all  the  categories.  The  relation  between  scientific 
knowledge  and  its  objects,  is  transcendental;  and  by  some  it  is 
also  termed  a  /<?^/V^/ relation ;  but  the  rektion  between  a  power 
apprehending,  and  the  real  object  that  determines  its  act,  is 
real. 

Much  of  our  most  valuable,  as  well  as  most  interesting 
knowledge,  regards  these  different  species  of  relation.  One 
of  the  most  important  of  all  these  relations  which  furnish  the 
mind  objects  for  congenial  exercise,  is  that  of  cause  and  effect, 
under  the  head  of  action  and  passion ;  it  will  be  explained  at 
some  length,  in  the  following  chapter. 


CHAPTER  III. 


ARTICLE     I. 

PRINCIPLE    OF    CAUSATION  ;    OR,    CAUSE    IN    GENERAL. 

Whatever  influences  efficaciously  in  the  production  of  a  being, 
or  a  mutation  in  being,  is  a  cause;*  and  the  result  which  is 
brought  about  by  its  agency  or  concurrence,  is  its  effect. 

The  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  not  that  of  mere  succes- 
sion in  time,  or  place,  but  it  is  that  of  dependence  of  the  one 
on  the  other.  The  fact  that  the  simplest  minds  can  distinguish 
between  mere  seque?ice  in  time,  or  order,  and  the  dependence  of 
one  thing  upon  another  as  its  cause,  shows  how  obvious  to  the 
human  understanding  is  that  distinction.  It  is  not  only  evi- 
dent that  an  effect  cannot  exist  without  a  cause,  effect  and 
cause  are  co-relatives ;  but  it  is  also  evident  to  the  mind  that 
many  things  which  are  perpetually  under  our  observation, 
actually  have  that  relation  of  dependence. 

Hume  and  other  sceptics  have  denied  all  causation,  and 
affirmed  that  what  is  thus  understood  is  mere  succession  with- 
out any  agency  in  what  precedes,  or  any  dependence  in  what 
follows  after  it. 

The  Occasionalists  deny  all  efficiency  in  second  causes,  or 
creatures;  and  maintain  that  the  reason  or  necessity  for  the 
existence  of  the  effect,  gives  the  occasion  for  God  to  produce 
that  effect. 

We  know,  however,  on  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  that 
we  can  act  so  as  to  produce  results,  or  mutations,  that  really 
proceed  from  us;  our  senses  receive  influences  that  produce 

*  ' '  Causa  est  principiiun  per  se  iiifluens  esse  in  aliud. ' '  Cause  is  a  principle 
which  per  *e,  i.e.,  by  its  own  real  operation,  influences  the  existence  of  another 
thing. 

199 


200  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

changes  or  effects  in  them,  and  they  give  testimony  to  similar 
action  and  change  in  objects  distinct  from  us.  Since  these 
facts  are  so  manifest,  and  the  conclusion  so  immediate,  it  is 
not  wonderful  that  even  a  child  understands  clearly  what  is 
meant  by  ^^  7nake"  ^^do,''  or  ^^  caused 

While  we  have  so  distinct  a  notion  of  cause  and  effect  as  to 
their  relation,  we  do  not  know  in  what  the  causality  intrin- 
sically consists.  As  substance  and  its  powers  are  hidden  from 
us,  except  so  far  as  they  are  manifested  by  their  operations,  we 
can  perceive  their  efficiency  or  causality  in  results  only.  We 
clearly  distinguish  between  the  two  facts,  "  this  comes  after 
that,"  and  "  this  comes  from  that,"  without  being  able  to  see 
how  the  action  intrinsically  proceeds  from  the  power  that  pro- 
duces it.  But  to  deny  this  principle  of  causality,  which  is  so 
clearly  known  under  other  respects,  is  to  upset  not  only  all 
science,  but  all  our  knowledge  of  anything. 

Experience  and  the  exercise  of  reason  give  among  their  first 
conclusions,  the  notion  of  dependence  of  one  thing  on  an- 
other ;  and  this  relation  is  that  of  cause  and  effect.  But  limited 
reflexion  suffices  for  coming  to  the  general  conclusion,  "  nothing 
is  done  without  a  cause ;  whatever  has  a  beginning,  must  have 
had  a  cause."  For,  the  mind  readily  perceives  that  whatever 
begins  to  exist,  thereby  acquires  what  it  had  not  before;  and 
this  thing  that  it  had  not  before,  and  which  it  acquires,  must 
come  to  it  from  some  agent  that  is  distinct  from  itself;  i.  e.,  it 
comes  from  a  cause.  The  peculiar  and  distinctive  action  of  a 
catise,  therefore,  is,  that  it  gives  to  another  being  what  that  be- 
ing had  not  in  itself,  and  which  it  thereby  receives  from  with- 
out  itself 


ARTICLE     II. 

DIFFERENT    SPECIES    OF    CAUSES. 

Since  the  influence  of  causality  is  exerted  in  very  diflterent 
manners ;  or,  because  the  objects  of  its  influence  are  specifi 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  201 

cally  different,  cause  is  divided  into  four  distinct  species,  cor 
responding  to  the  modes  in  which  it  produces  its  effect : 
namely,  the  efficient  cause,  the  final  cause,  the  formal  cause, 
the  material  cause.  They  all  agree  in  the  general  concept  of 
causality,  inasmuch  as  they  all  concur  or  infiuence  in  the  pro- 
duction of  effect ;  but,  as  said,  their  modes  of  influencing  are 
specifically  different. 

The  general  distinction  between  the  four  causes  will  be  best 
understood  by  an  example  in  which  their  different  modes  of 
effecting  or  influencing  will  clearly  appear;  we  shall,  therefore, 
repeat  a  little  more  expliciuy  an  illustration  already  given  :  A 
man  makes  a  statue;  ist,  he  has  an  end  in  view  which  causes 
him  to  make  the  statue ;  2d,  he  must  have  material  out  of 
which  to  make  the  statue,  and  that  i?iaterial  or  marble  helps 
in  its  way  to  the  making  of  the  statue :  it  is  the  material  cause 
of  the  statue;  3d,  there  must  be  an  agent  \\\\o  can  make  or 
produce  this  statue  out  of  the  matter;  this  agent,  or  artist,  is 
\.\\t  efficient  cause;  4th,  the  agent  must  put  into  that  marble 
the  perfect  form  which  ??iakes  of  it  a  statue;  or,  in  other 
words,  which  determines  its  specific  nature^  as  statue ;  and  it  is 
obvious  that  this  form  infiuences^  in  its  way  and  degree, 
towards  the  making  of  the  statue ;  it  thereby  becomes  the  for- 
mal  cause  of  the  statue.  Hence,  the  end  intended,  the  agent^ 
the  matter,  and  the  form,  all  effectually  help  to  produce  the 
statue ;  but  as  their  modes  of  concurring  in  the  production  of 
the  effect  are  quite  different,  this  gives  rise  to  a  division  of 
cause  in  general  into  the  four  species  above  named.  The  statue 
is  made  by  the  agent,  of  the  marble,  through  {by  means  of) 
the  form,  for  the  end  intended  or  proposed. 

The  efficient  cause  is  extrinsic  to  the  effect ;  it  is  the  first  one 
that  xnoYQS  physically;  for  the  e?id  acts  only  ??torally,  and  the 
matter  and  form  are  dependent  on  the  action  of  the  efficient 
cause  for  their  union ;  that  is,  for  the  effect.  Hence,  :"n  mate- 
rial action,  the  efficient  cause  is  that  agent  whose  physical  ac- 
tion begins  the  mutation  in  the  object  extrinsic  to  itself,  which 
we  term  the  effect.  The  subsequent  union  of  the  formal  and 
material  causes  is  dependent  on  this  action  of  the  efficient 


202  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

cause ;  therefore,  as  said,  it  begins  the  physical  action,  whose 
final  term  is  the  effect  mtended. 

Hence,  in  material  action,  all  four  causes  always  unite,  the 
final,  efficient,  formal  and  material. 

In  the  action  of  simple  or  immaterial  substance,  only  two 
causes  may  concur:  namely,  i\\Q final,  and  efficient;  but  an  effect 
can  not  be  produced  by  one  cause  alone. 

The  efficient  cause  must  be  either  immediately,  or  mediately 
and  virtually  present  to  the  object  on  which  it  acts,  for  nothing 
acts  at  a  distance,  "  nihil  agit  in  distans."  It  is  evident  that 
an  agent  cannot  act  where  it  is  not,  any  more  than  it  can  act 
whe?i  it  is  not ;  for  in  either  case  it  is  really  non-existent  in 
respect  to  that  object  as  a  term  of  action  Hence,  since  nothing 
can  act  when  and  where  it  absolutely  is  not,  a  cause  must  be 
either  immediately  or  mediately  and  virtually  present  both  in 
time  and  place  to  the  object  on  which  it  efficiently  acts.* 

Substantial  mailer  Sin^form  cannot  really  compose  the  effect 
of  man's  spiritual  or  intellectual  action;  i.  e.,  the  mind  cannot 
per  se,  by  its  own  physical  action,  transform  material  substance. 
Judgment  and  reasoning  have  for  the  object  of  their  action 
truth,  which  by  analogy  is  called  matter,  and  the  understand- 
ing attributes  to  it  logical  form  by  action  which  is  analogous  to 
that  by  which  an  agent  produces  effects  upon  substantial  sub- 
ject matter. 

A  created  agent  cannot  produce  t  new  being,  or  cause  a  real 

*  * '  Motum  et  inoA'ens  sunt  simul. ' '  That  -which  moves,  and  the  agent  moving 
it,  are,  as  such,  simultaneous. 

"  Agens  et  i)atiens  sunt  Immediata,  i.  e.,  immediatione  vel  suppositi  vel  vir- 
tutis."  That  wliich  acts,  and  that  which  receives  the  action,  QX*i  immediate , 
either  substantiall}'  or  virtually. 

t  "  Deus  solus  causat  gradum  essendi;  quia  primus  omnium  cffcctus  est  esse 
quod  supponitur  a  ca3teris  tanquam  lundamentum :  sed  Deus  solus  producit  esse; 
sen  illud  esse  quod  diffusum  est  per  omnes  omnino  perfectiones  debet  procedere 
ab  altiori  principio  quam  creatura.  Agens  particulare  fiicit  hoc  ex  non  hoc,  sed 
non  tacit  ens  a  non-ente."  (Div.  Thom.,  Summ.  1  p.,  qu.  105,  art.  5.)  God 
alone  causes  a  degree  of  being  ;  for  the  lirst  of  all  eflVcts  is  being,  which  is  pre- 
supposed as  the  Ibundation  of  all  else:  God  alone  produces  being;  or,  that  being 
■which  is  diffused  throughout  all  perfections  whatever,  must  proceed  from  a 
higher  principle  than  a  creature.  A  dependent  ageht  can  make  this  out  of  non 
this;  (or  transform  one  thing  into  another);  but  it  cannot  produce  6ein</ /row 
non-being. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  203 

grade  or  degree  of  essence ;  for  this  is,  in  its  strict  sense,  crea- 
tion^ which  is  pure  efficiency^  or  the  action  of  the  first  cause,  i. 
e.,  God.  Second  causes,  i.  e.,  created  causes,  being  dependent^ 
are  not  purely  efficie7it;  they  can  only  change  or  transform  sub- 
ject matter;  in  other  words,  they  require  an  object  whicli 
actually  determines  and  specifies  their  acts  or  efficiency. 

The  various  manners  in  which  the  efficient  cause  acts  will 
be  readily  and  clearly  understood  if  they  be  contrasted ;  for 
this  purpose  consider  the  following  opposite  modes  in  which  it 
may  operate :  ist,  as  principal,  and  as  instrumental  cause,  which 
acts  in  virtue  of  its  principal;  2d,  as  7iecessa7y  and  f7'ee ;  3d, 
physical  2ir\di  77ioral;  4th,  re77iote  2,r\A  p7'oximate ;  5th,  total  and 
partial;  6th,  adequate  and  i7iadequate;  7th,  first*  and  second; 
8th,  tmivocal;  i.  e.,  whose  effect  is  of  its  own  species,  as  father 
and  son ;  equivocal,  i.  e.,  whose  effect  differs  from  it  in  species, 
as  architect  and  the  house  which  he  builds;  9th,  cause /<?r  j<f, 
i.  e.,  which  directly,  and  of  its  own  real  action,  p7'oduces  its 
effect;  v.  g.,  "a  vocalist  sings;""  ''a  penman  W7'ites;''  accide7ital 
cause,  or  cause  per  accidens ;  as  when  a  vocalist  paints ;  he 
does  not  directly  as  vocalist  paint,  for  vocalist  is  only  accidental 
to  one  2iS  painti7ig,  and  has  no  influence  at  all  on  the  effect. 

The  cause  per  se,  t  which  really  i7ifiuences  in  the  production 
of  an  eff'ect  is  07ie;  but  the  C2iuse  per  accidens  or  accidental  cause, 
which  does  not  7rally  i7iflue7ice  the  effect,  is  said  to  be  infinite; 
the  meaning  of  which  will  be  readily  understood  by  an  example 
of  it :  if  one  should  go  from  home  for  the  pu7pose  of  buying 
something  in  the  market,  and  on  his  way  be  attacked  by  robbers, 
his  i7ttention  0/  buying  could  not  be  considered  as  the  07ie,  cause 
per  se,  of  his  falli7ig  i7ito  the  ha7ids  of  robbers;  for,  a7iy  7iu77iber 

*  "  Causa ^rimff,  quae  nulli  subordinatur;  secunda,  quaeprimiesuboi-dinatur." 
The  first  cause  is  subordinate  to  no  cause;  a  second  cause  is  subordinate  to  the 
first. 

t  * '  Causa  per  se  est  una,  etproprie  dicta  causa;  causa  per  accidens  uec  est  una, 
sed  infi7iita,  sed  nee  propria  dicta  causa,  sed  secundum  quid,  seu  per  accidens : 
non  est proprie  dicta  causa,  quia  cff'ectus  per  accidens  non  habet  esse  pi'oprie  dic- 
tum." (Philos.  passim.)  The  cause  j3cr  se  is  one,  and  is  properly  termed  a 
cause;  the  cause  per  accidens  is  not  one,  but  infinite,  nor  is  it  properhj  called  a 
vause,  but  is  such  only  under  some  respect,  or  by  accident ;  it  is  not  properly 
termed  a  cause,  lor  the  accidental  effect  has  not  any  existence  properly  so-called. 


204  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

of  reasons  could  have  induced  him  to  go  to  the  market  at  that 
time ;  i.  e.,  the  cause  per  accidens  of  his  being  then  attacked 
by  robbers  is  not  liinitcd  to  this  or  that  motive  for  his  going 
from  home. 

It  is  in  this  sense  that  an  occasion  is  sometimes  rightly  called 
an  accidental  cause*  But  it  not  unfrequendy  happens  that  an 
occasion  or  opportunity  approaches  more  nearly  to  the  nature 
of  a  cause  per  se,  yet,  however,  without  actually  becoming  a 
complete  cause ;  in  this  case  it  is  said  to  be  an  imperfect  cause, 
since  it  induces,  or  persuades  to  action  ;  but  it  is  not  a  perfect 
cause,  for  it  does  not  produce  the  effect.  (D.  Th.,  2.  2.,  qu 
43,  a.  I,  ad.  3.) 

The  only  reason  why  cause  per  accide?is  is  denominated 
cause  at  all  is  that,  whenever  it  occurs,  it  is  in  such  case  always 
conjoined  with  the  thing  which  is  really  2.w  A  properly  \\\^  cause, 
and  is  then  not  separable  from  it.  But  neither  the  cause  per 
accidens,  as  such,  nor  the  effect  per  accidens,  as  such,  has  any 
real  entity;  f  it  is  more  correctly  a  certain  respect  only,  of  that 
which  lias  reality  and  is  a  cause  properly  so-called. 

The  fiJial  cause,  or  e7id  inteiided.\  which  is  objective  good,  ap- 
prehended as  such,  acts  first  as  a  cause  on  the  will,  or  rational 
appetite ;  for  the  etid  is  an  object  of  appetition,  on  account  of 
its  goodness,  or  it  is  a  good  which  is  desired  and  sought  for, 
•when  it  becomes  an  object  of  cognition. §  The  e)id  intended 
for  irrational  or  necessary  agents,  mifst  be  referred  to  the  author 

*  "  Omne  quod  est  per  se,  habet  caiisam  ;  quod  antem  est  per  accidens,  noii 
hubet  caiisain,  quia  uon  est  vere  ens,  cum  non  sit  vere  unum.  Album  enim 
causum  habet,  similiter  et  musicum;  album  musicum  non  habet  causam,  quia  non 
est  vere  ens,  neque  vere  unum."  (Div.  Thom.,  I  p.,  qu.  115,  art.  6.)  What- 
ever truly  is,  has  a  cause;  what  is,  only  as  accidental,  has  no  cause,  for  it  is  not 
truly  being,  since  it  is  not  truly  one.  White,  has  a  cause,  and mrmc  has  a  cause; 
but  white  music  has  no  cause,  for  it  is  neither  truly  being,  nor  truly  one. 

t  * '  Effectus  Y>°r  accidens  proiu'ie  non  generantur,  nee  corrumpuntur ,  nee  sunt 
Bimpliciter,  sed  secundum  quid. ' '  Effects  per  accidens,  are  not,  proi)erly  speak- 
ing, produced,  nor  destroyed,  nor  do  they  simply  exist,  but  only  under  a  certain 
i-espect. 

X  "  Finis  est  potissimum  in  unoquoque;  i.  e.,  finis  est  id  quod  principaliter 
intenditur  in  unoquoque."  The  end  is  chief  in  every  thing;  i.  e.,  the  end  is 
What  is  principally  intended  in  every  thing. 

§  ' '  Nikil  volitum  nisi  prsecognitum. ' '    Nothing  is  wished,  unless  first  known 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  205 

of  their  nature,  by  whom  //  is  determined  for  them.  The  end 
or  the  final  cause  is  the  first  of  the  four  to  act,  and  it  causes 
the  others  to  concur  and  to  execute,  the  efficient  cause  being 
the  second  to  operate.  The  end  is  the  first"^  in  the  intention; 
but  it  is  the  last  in  the  execution  ;  i.  e.,  it  is  the  efifect  intended, 
and  the  effect  intended  is  the  end  which  is  last  attained,  and 
in  which  all  rest. 

The  end,  when  considered  as  to  the  different  relations  it  may 
have  to  the  intention,  \s  proximate  or  remote;  mediate  or  imme- 
diate; and  ultimate  or  not  ultimate.  These  opposite  relations 
will  be  easily  understood,  if  it  be  borne  in  mind,  that  an  end 
may  be  desired  either  for  its  ow?i  sake ;  or,  on  account  of  some- 
thing else,  that  is  desired;  in  the  first  case,  it  is  strictly  and 
properly  an  end ;  in  the  second,  it  is  really  a  means  to  an  end. 

As  the  will  by  its  own  spontaneous  natural  action  can  wish 
good  only,  since  good,  as  such,  is  its  essential  object ;  it  is  not 
free  to  wish  evil,  as  such ;  or,  in  other  words,  by  its  nature  it  is 
necessarily  determined  to  desire  good;  and,  as  regards  the  de- 
sire of  this  good  in  general,  it  is  not  free,  but  obeys  the  neces- 
sary law  of  its  nature.t  Hence,  it  is  evident  that  this  good  as 
absolute,  or  good  in  ge/ieral,  is  strictly  an  ultimate  end,  which  is 
presupposed  to  all  other  ends,  which  can  be  intended  or 
desired  by  the  will.  These  truths  being  understood,  it  will  be 
easy  to  perceive  the  consequent  truth,  that  there  can  be  no 
choice  or  election  as  to  this  ultimate  end,  since  the  will  is  pre- 
determined to  it  by  the  necessary  law  of  its  nature  as  a  power 
of  appetitio:!.  The  will  is  physically  unable  to  love  evil  for 
itself  or  as  evil;  it  can  love  evil  only  when  apprehended  and 
presented  to  it,  as  good,  under  some  respect.  In  respect  to  this 
ultimate  end,  all  other  ends  are  mediate,  or  have  the  nature  of 
means  in  reference  to  it.  In  regard  to  certain  intermediate  ends, 
the  will  can  dehberate,  suspend  or  change.  Hence,  man's 
responsibility  for  his  actions  depends  upon  the  use  he  makes 

*  "  Primura  in  intentione,  est  ultimum  in  executione."     What  is  first  itt  the 
intention,  is  hist  in  the  exectition. 

t  "  Minus  mahim,  est  iiliquod  bonum. ' '    Less  evil,  is  some  good. 
'    Muhim  sub  riitione  boni,  potest  tieri  objectum  volitionis."    Evil,  undei 
the  respect  of  good,  can  be  the  object  of  volition. 


206  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

of  his  power  freely  to  choose  the  mearis  of  good;  and  he 
becomes  morally  good,  or  bad,  accordirg  as  there  is,  or  is 
not,  real  rectitude  in  his  intention  as  regards  those  means 
which  he  employs  for  the  attainment  of  this  good.  Hence, 
the  obligation  arises  also  for  him  to  know  what  is  good,  and 
what  is  evil,  in  all  the  objects  thus  subject  to  election  or 
choice. 

Distinguish  between  the  e?id  of  the  act  or  work,  and  the  e?id 
intended,  or  the  good  to  be  gained  by  the  work. 

Distinguish,  also,  between  the  end  which  necessitates  action 
in  the  will,  and  the  end  which  it  can  freely  elect  or  choose.  It 
is  good  which  causes,  as  an  end ;  but  its  apprehension  is.  an  in- 
dispensable co7idition.* 


ARTICLE     III. 

MATERIAL    CAUSE;    FORMAL    CAUSE. 

As  the  terms,  matter  and  fortn,  material  cause  and  formal 
cause,  are  much  used  in  philosophy,  law  and  ethics,  for  the 
most  subtle,  as  well  as  for  the  most  important  distinctions,  it 
is  necessary  that  they  should  be  clearly  understood.  For  this 
object,  it  is  deemed  useful  briefly  to  state  in  this  place  the 
philosophical  theory  that  gives  origin  and  meaning  to  these 
terms. 

According  to  the  Aristotelian  ox  peripatetic  philosophy,  which 
has  had  much  to  do  in  moulding  both  the  thougl\t  and  the 
higher  language  of  all  civilized  nations,  material  substance,  of 
which  the  earth  is  made,  consists  essentially  of  two  principles, 
matter  and  farm.  Matter^  without  the  form,  could  have  no 
determinate  existence  at  all;  it  would  be  a  mere  potentiality 
for  actual  existence;  but  could  not,  as  such,  really  exist.  The 
form,  which  is  the  principle  of  activity,  and  of  all  specific 
fiature  or  essence,  unites  by  composition  with  matter,  and  actu- 
ates it  into  real  existence ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  gives  to  it 

*  "  Bomim  ut  apprehonsiim  est  objectum  appetitus."  Good  as  apprehended 
is  the  object  of  appetition. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  207 

its  determined dA\^  specific  essence;  i.  e.,  makes,  by  union  with 
it,  material  substance.* 

At  the  beginning  of  the  world  matter  and  form-  were  con- 
created;  i.  e.,  passed  from  their  causes  into  existence  at  the 
same  time.  Taken  separately,  they  are  both  incomplete  being; 
they  are  for  each  other,  and,  when  they  have  the  essential 
conditions  for  actual  existence,  they  necessarily  unite ;  and, 
being  united,  they  remain  in  union,  unless  separated  by  force. 
Some  forms  are  more  deeply  radicated  in  matter  than  others 
are. 

Matter,  as  such,  therefore,  has  no  species;  it  is  i\\Q  form 
that  determines  species,  and  constitutes  it  such.  Hence,  since 
there  exist  many  species  of  inaterial  substance,  there  must  be 
many  species  oi  forms,  that  are  actually  existing.  To  under- 
stand this,  it  must  be  observed  that,  when  the  world  was  first 
created,  material  substance  was  diversified  with  many  species 
or  forms,  and  made  to  possess  within  itself  at  the  same  time 
many  other  \orn\s  potefitially ,\  which  may  be  educed  from  it  by 
a  competent  efficient  cause. 

Matter,  therefore,  is  the  subject  in  which  are  contained /^/^/z- 
tially,\  like  an  effect  is  precontained  in  its  actually  existing  cause, 
many  substantial  forms,  which  may  be  educed  from  it  by  an 
efficient  cause;  and  these  forms  that  are  educed  from  the  mat- 
ter, where  they  existed  potetitially,  take  the  place  of,  or  displace 
actual  forms;  which  actual  forms  are  not  thereby  simply  anni- 
hilated, but  are  re-immersed  in  the  matter,  or  they  revert  to  the 
state  of  potential  being,  in  matter. 

The  vital  principle  in  organic  beings,  is  a  substantial  form; 
V.  g.,  the  vegetative  princ'ple  in  plants,  the   brute  soul,  atiima 

*  ' '  Materia,  quatenus  est  primum  subjectiim,  est  una  et  eadem  in  omnibus 
rebus."  (Suarez  Metaph.)  MaUer  as  the  first  subject  in  material  substance, 
is  one  and  the  same  in  all  things. 

t  ' '  Materia  est  infinita  in  potentia  ad  formas. ' '  (Summ.  I  p. ,  qu.  7,  art.  2.) 
Matter  is  infinitely  capable  of  receiving  its  forms. 

J  ' '  Esse  in  potentia,  hie  non  est  ea  mera  possibilitas,  qms  est  potentia  ohjectiva  ; 
Bed  esse  in  potentia  involvit  subjection  aliquod  reale,  cujus  sinn  res  sit  contenta, 
qute  dicitnr  esse  in  potentia."  To  exist  poteiitiallij,  is  not  that  mere  possibility, 
which  is  only  objective,  (exists  only  in  the  concept  of  it) ;  but  to  be  potentially, 
involves  a  real  subject,  in  which  it  is  actually  contained. 


208  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS^ 

belluina  in  brutes,  or  animals  of  every  species,  man  excepted, 
are  substantial  forms  educed  fro?n  n'lafter:  as  also  the  principle 
that  gives  to  crystals  their  specific  nature,  is  substantial  form. 
They  return  to  matter,  or  are  re-immersed  in  it,  when  dissolu- 
tion, or  death  takes  place.  This  eduction  of  new  forms  from 
matter,  and  the  re-immersion  of  old  ones  into  it,  always  sup- 
pose the  agency  of  an  efficient  cause. 

Since  the  operations  of  the  brute  soul,  a?iima  belluifia,  are 
purely  orgastic  *  brute  actions  do  not  transcend  the  power  of 
purely  material  substance ;  and,  therefore,  they  are  entirely 
from  matter,  and  wholly  for  matter ;  and  hence,  brute  souls 
cannot  exist  separate  from  matter.  But  the  actions  of  intel- 
ligence and  volition  in  the  human  soul,  are  from  a  principle 
that  is  not  organic;  they  are  inorganic  or  entirely  super'Sensible\ 
in  their  species,  or  transcend  the  powers  of  material  nature;  and, 
therefore,  the  substance  that  possesses  intellect  and  will,  is 
essentially  and  specifically  immaterial.  Hence,  though  the 
human  soul  does  inform  or  actuate  matter  by  entering  into 
composition  with  it,  yet  it  is  not  educed  f-om  matter,  and 
at  death  by  dissolution,  it  is  not  re-immersed  into  matter  ;  but 
it  is  a  substantial  form  that  can  and  does  exist  separate  from 
matter,  or,  then  exists /<fr  ^<fy  or,  to  use  the  term  by  which  this 
mode  of  existing  is  expressed,  it  subsists ;  it  is  not  said,  how- 
ever, in  that  state  of  existence,  to  be  a  person,  because  it  does 
not  completely  subsist,  being  by  its  nature  ordained  to  union 
with  the  body. 

The  human  soul  is  by  its  nature  fitted  and  ordained  to  unite 
in  composition  with  matter;  but  yet  it  does  not,  like  inferior 
substantial  forms,  completely  depend  for  its  existence  on  matter. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  there  Sixe  forms  which  are  complete, 

*  ' '  Natura  iiniuscujusque  rei  ex  ejus  operatione  ostenditur . ' '  (Phil,  passim.) 
The  nature  of  a  thing  is  known  by  its  action. 

t"  Anima  humana  nou  est  forma  in  materia  immersa,  vel  ab  ea  totaliter 
comprehensa,  propter  suam  i)erfectioiiem.  Ideo  nihil  prohibet  aliquam  ejus 
virlutem  non  esse  corporis  actum. ' '  (Div.  Thorn. ,  1  part,  qu.  76,  art  1,  ad.  4.) 
The  human  soul  is  not  a  form  that  is  immersed  in  matter,  or  that  is  totally  com- 
prehended by  it,  on  account  of  its  perfection.  Therefore,  nothing  prevents 
some  of  its  virtue  from  being  no  act  of  the  body;  i.e.,  some  of  its  action  is  not 
action  of  tlie  body ,  or  the  body  has  no  share  in  it. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  2C9 

q.nd  subsist,  but  do  not  inform  matter,  and,  therefore,  have  no 
relation  to,  or  dependence  on,  matter;  as,  angels.  For,  if  there 
are  incomplete  fcrrms,  a  fortiori,  complete  ones  should  actually 
exist;  and  there  are  forms  that  are  incomplete,  d^wA  yet  can  sub- 
sist, but  they  inform  matter,  and  are  by  their  nature  or  essence 
ordained  for  union  with  matter;  as,  the  human  soul;  it  can 
exist  separate  from  matter,  but  its  only  connatural  and  normal 
state  is  that  of  union  with  matter. 

All  accidents  whose  presence  in,  or  absence  from,  material 
substance  does  not  change  the  species  of  their  subject,  are 
accidental  forms;  as,  quality,  greater  or  less  extension,  figure, 
features,  etc. 

From  this  brief  and  incomplete  outline  of  the  peripatetic 
theory  of  material  substance,  it  must  appear  evident  that  matter, 
as  a  cause,*  is  receptive,  and  passively  retentive;  or  it  sustains, 
as  a  subject;  and  that/^;7;/,t  causes  by  giving  determinate  exist- 
ence, nature  and  action  to  the  compound  which  it  constitutes 
by  union  with  matter;  and  thence  it  is,  that  all  specific  nature, 
and  all  action,  are  attributed  to  \h^  form. 

Hence,  the  ??iaterial  cause,  is  the  subject  upon  which  the 
efficient  cause  acts,  to  produce  its  intended  effect. 

"WiQ  formal  cause,  is  that  reality,  of  whatever  kind  it  may  be, 
which  the  efficient  cause  by  its  action  induces,  or  brings  into 
actual  being  in  that  subject  matter. 

The  change  produced  in  the  subject  by  the  efficient  cause, 
may  be  either  substantial  or  accidental,  i.  e.,  the  form  induced, 
may  be  either  substantial  or  accidental. 

By  analogy,  other  objects,  as  metaphysical  and  logical  truth, 

♦  "  Quemadmodum  materia  est  in  toto  (composito)  principium  patiendi;  itaet 
forma  est  principium  agendi ;  sen  totum,  ratione  materiie,  patitur,  et  ratione 
forma}  agit,  sen  totum  agit  ut  quod,  forma  ut  quo.  Est  totum  quod  existit,  est, 
subsistit.  etc. "  As  matter  is  the  principle  that  receives  action,  in  the  compound; 
so,  the  form  is  tlie  principle  of  action;  or,  the  whole  object,  acts,  iu  virtue  of 
the  foi  m,  suffers  action  in  virtue  of  its.  matter;  or  the  whole  is  that  which  acts, 
the  form  that  by  "which  it  acts;  the  whole  is  Avhat  exists,  subsists,  etc. 

t  * '  Omnisratio  boni.  pulchri,  ordinis,  perfectique  a  forma  venit;  quia  eo  ipso 
quod  est  actus  substantialis  hajc  omnia  ipsi  conceduntur. ' '  (Div.  Thom. ,  1  p. , 
qu.  76,  art.  1.)  The  whole  nature  of  the  good,  beautiful,  order,  perfection, 
somes  from  the /orm;  for,  since  it  is  the  substantial  act,  these  are  all  attributed 
to  it. 

14 


210  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

genus,  species,  etc.,  are  termed  7?iattej',  and,  therefore,  are  con* 
ceived  as  susceptible  oiform;  v.  g.,  "rational  animal,"  may  be 
regarded  as  having  ajiimal  as  matter,  and  rational  as  form; 
since  "  rational  "  constitutes  with  animal  as  quasi  matter,  fnan. 
Hence,  matter  and  form  are  regarded  by  analogy  as  likewise 
having  causal  influence  in  objects  of  the  intelligible  order. 

These  terms,  therefore,  have  extensive  application;  but  the 
mode  in  which  the  ^natter  and  form  cause,  is  always  the  same; 
i.  e.,  by  composing  the  effect;  the  form  giving  its  denomination 
or  specific  name  to  the  effect,  and  the  ?natter  receiving  and 
sustaining  the  form. 

An  example  will  illustrate  the  analogical  use  of  these  terms : 
a  man,  who  is  unintentioftally  unjust  to  another  person,  does 
material  injustice,  but  i\otfor?7ial  injustice;  for,  it  is  the  inten- 
tion, as  right  or  wrong,  that  gives  to  actions  their  specific  moral 
or  formal  nature. 

From  the  preceding  observations,  it  is  manifest  that  the 
definition  of  cause  has  its  most  proper  application  to  the  efficie7it 
cause.  It  was,  perhaps,  on  this  account  that  the  ancient  stoics 
contended  that  the  efficient  cause  is  the  only  one  which  is 
truly  and  properly  a  cause  at  all.  But  it  is  undeniable  that,  as 
already  shown,  there  are  more  causes  than  one,  truly  distinct 
from  each  other,  and  which  have,  in  their  mode  and  degree, 
real  influence  in  producing  many  effects. 

There  cannot  be  an  actual  effect*  which  is  produced  by  only 
one  cause  ;  for  there  can  be  no  effixient  cause,  without  tht  final 
cause ;  and  vice  versa,  there  can  be  no  fjial  cause  without  the 
efficient  to  which  it  is  presupposed,  as  the  first  of  all  causes ; 
and  hence,  for  the  production  of  an  actual  effect,  both  must 
concur. 

The  cause,  by  its  nature,  is  prior  to  its  effect  ;t  but  as  to  the 

•  "  Nullus  est  effectus  in  rerura  nalura  qui  unicam  tantum  liabet  causam,  for- 
maliter  loquendo."  (Suarez  Met.  disp.  26,  sect.  3,  no.  3.)  There  is  no  effect 
■vrhich  strictly  has  but  one  cause. 

t  "  Causa  est  prior  effectu  prioritate  a  quo,  sen  ratione  dependentiae."  The 
cause  is  prior  to  the  effect,  in  the  relation  of  dependence. 

' '  Causa  in  actu,  et  effectus  actu,  sunt  simul. ' '  The  cause  and  effect  as  actual, 
are  simultaneous. 

• '  Posito  fundamento  et  termino ,  cousurgit  relatio . ' '  When  the  basis  and  terro 
are  put,  the  relation  simultaneously  regards  them. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  211 

relation  actually  existing  between  them,  they  are  simultaneous ; 
or  they  begin  to  exist  formally  as  such  at  the  same  time ;  for, 
when  the  basis  and  term  of  a  relation  are  put,  it  simultaneously 
relates  the  two  to  each  other ;  or,  it  arises  at  the  same  time  for 
both  the  actual  cause  and  its  actual  effect. 

Every  effect  has  withm  it  some  degree  of  perfection,  which 
gives  to  it  a  certain  similitude  to  its  cause ;  but  the  resemblance 
may  be  only  that  of  analogy,  as  when  the  cause  is  equivocal; 
V.  g.,  the  architect  and  the  house  which  he  builds  with  its 
design;  the  perfection  which  is  in  the  house^  resembles  the  intel- 
ligent mind,  by  analogy  only. 

The  effect  is  either  virtually  or  fonnally  precontained  in  its 
cause  ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  really  from  the  cause.  In  the  first 
case,  the  cause  is  equivocal,  i.  e.,  of  a  different  species  from  the 
effect ;  in  the  second  case,  the  cause  is  univocal,*  i.  e.,  of  the 
same  species  as  the  effect. 

An  effect  that  has  the  material  cause,  requires  the  three  others 
also.  But  we  may  actually  know  one  or  two  causes,  and  yet 
be  ignorant  of  the  remaining  ones.  Since  no  being  can  act  at 
a  distance,  "  nihil  agit  in  distans,"  it  is  an  essential  conditio?i,  or 
a  conditio  sifte  qua  no?i,  that  the  agent  and  object  acted  on,  be 
either  fnediately  or  immediately  connected.  But,  take  care  to 
observe  that  a  conditioti,  how  essential  soever  it  may  be  for  the 
action  of  a  cause,  has  not  itself  any  real  causality;  and,  there- 
fore, it  is  an  error  to  confound  a  conditio?i  with  the  cause  that 
depends  on  it ;  or  to  attribute  to  it  any  real  age?icy  in  produc- 
ing the  effect. 

The  exemplary  cause,  or  the  ideal  or  type  in  the  mind,  by 
which  an  intelligent  efficient  cause  is  directed  in  producing  an 
effect,  may  be  referred,  under  different  respects,  to  the  efficient 

*  '  *  Causa  univoca,  aeqnalis  est  eflTectui  in  essendo,  nobilior  ratione  dependen- 
tiaj;  causa  tequivoca,  est  vel  'principalis,  vel  instrumentalist  principalis  superat 
effectum  in  essendo;  instrumentalis  superatur  ab  eflfectu,  nisi  suraatur  ut  condi- 
visa principali,  tune  enim  influit  per  virtutera  inferioris  ordinis. ' '  (Suarez  Met. 
Disp.  17,  sec.  2,  no.  19.)  The  univocal  cause  is  equal  to  its  eflfect  in  essence, 
but  more  noble  as  regards  dependence;  the  equivocal  cause  is  either  principal, 
OY  instrumental;  the  principal,  exceeds  its  effect  in  essence;  the  instrumental  is 
inferior  to  its  effect,  unless  as  precisehj  distinguished  from  the  principal,  for, 
thus  taken,  it  influences  by  virtue  of  an  inferior  order,  and  is  a  partial  cause 
only.    It  is  more  noble  than  its  ovfn proper  effect. 


212  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

and  to  the  formal  cause;  namely,  either  as  perfecting  the  agent 
for  action ;  or  as,  in  some  manner,  extrimically  forming  the 
effect.* 


ARTICLE    IV. 

PERFECTION  OF  BEINGS;  THE  FINITE  AND  INFINITE;  THE 
KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  INFINITE  IS  LOGICALLY  DERIVED 
FROM    THAT    OF    THE    FINITE. 

A  thing  is  perfect,  when  nothing  is  wanting  to  complete  it  in 
fulfilling  the  proper  endt  of  its  being ;  due  respect  being  had 
as  to  whether  that  endhQ  temporary,  i,  e.,  byway  of  transition 
to  another;  or,  fixed,  and  unchangeable,  as  a  state.  T\\q per- 
fection, and  the  goodness  of  a  thing,  are  rea/ly  the  same ;  yet, 
m  the  concept,  or  logically,  the  perfect  is  presupposed  to  the 
good-;  for,  in  thought,  we  found  the  idea  of  a  thing  as  being 
good,  upon  its  perfection. 

Perfection  is  absolute  or  relative;  absolute  perfection  includes 
all  realities  that  can  enter  into  the  concept  of  ififi?iite  perfec- 
tion; relative  perfection  includes  all  those  realities  that  are  re- 
quired to  constitute  any  particular  species  of  complete  finite 
perfection. 

Simple  perfection  is  that,  from  the  very  concept  of  which 
is  excluded  all  positive  imperfection;  as  "justice,"  "intelli- 
gence," etc.  The  mixed  perfection  includes  in  its  essential  con- 
cept the  idea  of  perfection  which  is  mixed  with  imperfection; 
as,  V.  g.,  reasoni7ig,  which  implies  the  absence  of  simple  intel- 
ligence. Hence,  reasoning  is,  under  different  respects  both  a 
perfection  and  an  imperfection.  Reason  can  come  to  the 
evident  knowledge  of  truth,  not  known  as  self-evident,  only  by 
demonstration,  or  by  discourse  of  reason;  simple  intelHgence  per- 
ceives the  same  truth  intuitively,  i.  e  ,  without  the  less  perfect 

*  "  Dispositio  concurrit  in  genere  causae  materialis:  subjectum  facit  magis 
receptivum."  Disposition  concurs  by  way  of  the  material  cause:  it  makes  tlie 
subject  move  receptive. 

t  "  Ultima  perfectio  rei  est  in  consecutione  finis."  The  ultimate  perfeclioc 
of  a  thing,  is  in  the  attainment  of  its  end,  or  reaching  its  destined  end. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  213 

process  of  reasoning''^  to  it ;  by  the  simple  apprehension  of  an 
essence  it  acquires  a  knowledge  of  all  that  can  be  affirmed,  or 
denied,  by  way  of  real  property,  in  respect  to  the  object.  In 
other  words,  simple  intelligence  does  not  know  truth  by  com- 
position and  division,  as  reason  does ;  or,  what  is  the  same,  by 
synthesis  and  analysis,  for  it  does  not  know  predicate  and  subject 
first  as  separate,  but  sees  the  one  in  the  other.  Distinguish, 
therefore,  between  knowing  a  thing  after  another,  in  another, 
and/;w//  another;  the  first  is  common  to  finite  intelligence  and 
reason ;  the  second,  pertains  to  simple  intelligence ;  the  third, 
is  the  peculiar  and  distinctive  operation  of  reason. 

The  fi/iite  is  what  has  limits;  the  infinite,  is  what  has  no 
limits. 

The  infinite  is  either  actual,  or  it  is  potential  infinite.  The 
actual  infinite  actually  has  all  perfection  without  ///;///.  This  is 
possible  only  in  o?ie  God.  The  infinite  potentially,  is  actually 
fi?iite,  but  can  be  increased  without  limit.  The  infinite  actually, 
cannot  be  increased,  and  cannot  be  subjected  to  measure,  or 
number. 

Finite  added  to  finite  cannot  produce  infinite  ;  and,  therefore, 
the  actual  infinite  does  not  consist  of  extension  or  multitude. 

No  finite  being  can  be  conceived  so  great,  but  that  a  greater 
one  may  be  conceived  as  possible. 

Creation  actually  infinite  is  impossible:  ist,  because  that 
which  begins  cannot  become  infinite;  2d,  because  potential  in- 
finite cannot  become  actual  infinite;  or,  neither  that  which 
can  \>Q  finished,  nor  that  which  cannot  h^  finished,  can  become 
infinite. 

*  '  'Ad  discursum  intellectualem  propriiim,  et  formalem,  requiritur  quodunum 
cognoscatur  ex  alio;  id  est,  quod  ex  alio  prius  noto  deveniatur  in  cognitionera 
alterius  posteriusiioti  quod  erat  prius  iguotum;  sicquequod  una  prior  eognitio 
sit  causa  posterioris,  sive  quod  ex  priori  unius  cognitioue  pariatur  coguitio  alte- 
rius, prajcedatque  prior  eognitio  posteriorem,  si  non  in  tempore,  saltern  natura 
et  causalitate."  (Billuart  de  Angelis,  Tract.  3,  art.  3,  sect.  3.)  For  discourse 
of  reason,  properly  and  formally  such,  it  is  required  that  one  thing  should  be 
known  from  another;  i.  e.,  from  one  thing  previously  known  we  com^  to  the 
knowledge  of  another  thing  afterwards  known,  but  Avhich  was  previously  un- 
known; and  thus  that  a  prior  cognition  is  the  cause  of  an  after  one,  or  that  from 
the  prior  knowledge  of  one  thing  is  born  the  knowledge  of  another,  and  that  the 
prior  cognition  precede  the  posterior  one,  if  not  in  time,  at  least  by  nature  and 
causality. 


214  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

The  philosophers,  who  teach  that  the  human  mind  has  natu- 
rally a  more  or  less  immediate  intuition  of  God,  deny  the  possi- 
bility of  knowing  the  infinite  through  the  finite. 

The  chief  reason  a  priori  which. they  allege  for  this  impossi- 
bility of  concluding  the  infinite  from  the  finite,  is  that  "  the 
conclusion  cannot  be  greater  than  the  premises  from  which  it 
follows  as  a  consequent." 

But  their  proof  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  human  mind  natu- 
rally has  an  immediate  intuition  of  God,  seems  to  rest  mainly 
on  two  erroneous  arguments  :  ist,  the  misapplication  of  a  canon 
of  logic;  2d,  a  misconception  of  the  fact  of  actual  experience. 
They  argue,  that  since  the  idea  of  an  infinite  being  cannot  be 
derived  a  posteriori,  for  the  conclusion  cannot  exceed  the  pre- 
mises, therefore,  because  as  a  fact,  we  have  that  notion,  we 
must  have  it  as  an  a  priori  intuition. 

But  the  canon  of  logic  referred  to,  forbids  a  greater  exten- 
sion as  to  quantity  in  the  conclusion  than  was  in  the  premises  ; 
but  not  greater  comprehensio7i.  If  the  prohibition  held  true  of 
both,  then  there  could  be  no  reasoning  at  all  from  truth  known, 
to  truth  unknown.  Since  the  conclusion  attributes  to  a  subject 
a  predicate  which  is  .not  attributed  in  the  premises,  the  subject 
of  the  conclusion  has  greater  compreheiision  in  the  conclusion, 
than  it  had  in  the  premises,  especially  when  the  predicate  affirms 
perfection,  or  denies  imperfection. 

Also,  when  we  reason  a  posteriori,  or  from  effect  to  cause, 
the  eftect  may  have  been  either  virtually,  or  formally  precon- 
tained  in  the  cause ;  in  the  case  in  which  we  reason  from  an 
effect  to  its  equivocal,  or  super-eminent  cause,  we  pass  from  what 
is  inferior  in  species,  to  what  is  enmiently  superior  in  species ;  v. 
g.,  when  we  reason  from  the  house  to  the  architect,  from  the 
painting  X.0  the  artist,  which  is  legitimate  reasoning,  we  always 
conclude  from  an  inferior  to  a  superior  species  of  being. 

Hence,  conclusion  from  t\\e  finite  to  the  infinite,  as  its  stiper- 

eminent c^wsQ,  gives  a  conclusion  oi  grediitr  comprehension,  though 

of  less  logical  extension,  than  the  premises  explicitly  and  directly 

expressed,  but  yet,  it  is  both  consequent  and  legitimate  illation. 

It  is  to  be  assumed  that  no  sane  philosopher  denies  that  the 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  215 

human  mind,  as  a  fact,  does  reason  a  posteriori,  or  from  effect 
to  cause,  by  means  of  the  real  relation  between  cause  and 
effect. 

There  is  no  object  of  cognition  which  the  mind  perceives 
with  more  facility,  or  which  is  more  connatural  to  human  in- 
tellect, than  the  real  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  Evidences 
of  dependence  lead  us  daily  to  refer  numberless  effects  to  their 
causes,  and  this  we  have  done  from  the  earliest  exercise  of 
reason.  In  the  same  manner,  the  mind  can  see  evidences  in 
the  visible  world  around  us,  of  its  dependent  and  contingent 
existence ;  and,  as  the  idea  of  limitation  or  finiteness  is  most 
simple,  its  object  being  so  immediate  and  so  obvious  to  the 
mind,  it  is  clearly  within  the  powers  of  human  reason,  to  prove 
to  itself  the  finiteness  of  the  visible  world,  in  the  same  manner 
in  which  it  proves  any  object  to  be  limited  or  finite. 

Hence,  the  mind  of  man,  by  its  native  power  of  reasoning, 
and  without  any  intuition  of  God,  can  argue  from  what  it 
knows  and  sees  for  itself:  "There  is  ro  effect*  which  is  not 
produced  by  a  sufficient  cause  ;  the  visible  world  is  an  effect,  and, 
therefore,  the  visible  world  is  produced  by  an  adequate  cause." 

The  intellect,  then,  is  naturally  competent  to  perceive  by 
its  own  light,  both  that  the  visible  world  vs,  finite,  and  that  it  is 
an  effect ;  for  it  is  mutable,  therefore,  contingent,  and,  conse- 
quently, may  lose  or  acquire  being,  which  are  distinctive  marks 
of  the  finite.  It  may  ask  itself,  what  is  a  "sufficient  cause" 
for  such  an  effect. 

Reason  would  lead  the  mind  to  attribute  to  that  "  sufficient 
cause "  t  perfections  pre-eminently   superior  to  those  of   the 

*"Nondatur  effectus  sine  causa:  nihil  est  quod  rationem  sufficientem  cur 
sit  non  habeat;  haecaxiomatanonconfnndendasunt.  Juxtaprimum,  nihil  ellici- 
tur  sine  causa;  juxta  secundum,  nihil  est,  sen existit  sine ratione  sufticiente:  pri- 
muin  non  pertinet  ad  Deum,  cum  Deus  non  habeat  causam;  secundum  pertinet 
ad  Deum,  cum  sit  ratio  sufliciens  cur  debeat  admitti  quod  Deus  existit."  There 
is  not  given  an  effect  without  a  cause;  there  is  nothing  which  has  not  a  sufficient 
reason  why  it  exists;  these  axioms  should  not  be  confounded.  By  the  lirst,  no- 
thing is  effected  without  a  cause;  by  the  second,  nothing  is,  or  exists  without  a 
a  sufficient  reason:  the  first  does  not  apply  to  God,  since  God  has  no  cause;  the 
second  does  pertain  to  God,  since  the^e  must  be  a  sufficient  reason  why  it  ought 
to  be  admitted  that  God  exists. 

t  "  Si  objiciatur,  'effectus  tinitos,  quales  sunt  cx-eaturse,  non  exigere  causam 
'.nflnitam;'  id  conceditur  deeorum  Ciiusa  secundaria,  sed  non  de  causa  primaria. 


216  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

effect  argued  from;  v.  ^.^  priority  to  all  other  causes,  therefore, 
existence  a  se,  and  the  infinite  perfections  of  all  kinds,  which 
flow  logically  from  admitting  d.  first  cause  that  is  indepe)ident  or 
absolute. 

The  very  words,  infinite^  immense,  and  all  the  names  of  God 
which  are  negative  in  form,  indicate  the  natural  process  by 
which  the  human  mind  forms  its  concept  of  absolute  perfec- 
tion, as  expressed  in  the  very  structure  of  language ;  for,  the 
negative  names  of  God,  show  that  the  positive,  out  of  wdiich 
they  are  formed,  was  presupposed  as  affirming  the  finite  prem- 
ises of  which  they  express  the  conclusion. 

Suarez*  observes  the  fact  that,  "  in  all  things  pertaining  to 
God,  it  is  more  difficult  to  know  the  manner  in  which  they  are 
in  him,  than  it  is  to  know  the  manner  in  which  they  cannot  be 
in  him;  "  i.  e.,  it  is  easier  to  know  what  God  is  not,  than  i-t  is 
to  know  what  he  is.  This  is  the  reason  why  it  not  unfrequently 
happens  that  negative  terms  are  employed  to  enunciate  the 
divine  perfections. 

The  accepted  significance  of  these  negative  names,  shows 
also,  that  the  concepts  for  which  they  stand,  were  formed  in 
the  mind  by  the  removing  of  imperfection,  and  the  consequent 
additio7i  of  perfection.  This  concept  of  infiiiite  perfection  in 
God,  as  the  first  cause,  we  actually  make  more  and  more  com- 
prehensive by  study,  reflexion,  and  meditation,  as  we  grow  in 
years. 

As  a  matter  of  experience,  we  have  not  that  primitive  intui- 
tion of  the  infinite,  or  immediate  intuition  of  God. 

Had  the  human  mind  naturally  any  such  intuition  of  ens 
creans  existefitias,  as  the  first  great  thought,  which  is  the  foun- 
dation of  all  other  thoughts,  it  should  have,  it  would  seem,  its 
own  proper  name  in  every  language,  which  would  be  known  to 

quae  sit  omnium  causa  a  nulla  causata  ;  hanc  enim  esse  infinitaninecesse  est." 
Distinguish  the  effects  in  visible  nature  as  proceeding/rom  second  causes,  from 
that  respect  of  them  which  exacts  for  them,  moreover,  a  Jirst  and  unproduced 
cause.  No  effect  absolutely  depends  on  a  second  cause,  for  the  second  cause  is 
itself  dependent  on  the  first  cause. 

*  "  In  omnibus  divinis  rebus,  difllcilius  est  cognoscere  quomodo  sint,  quam 
quoraodo  nou  sint. "     (Suarez,  2  opuscul,  l]b  .  1,  cap.  8.) 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  217 

all,  and  understood  by  all;  for  it  would  necessarily  and  most 
distinctly  be  seen  as  constituting  the  basis  of  all  human  thought, 
of  perception,  judgment  and  reasoning.  But,  as  a  fact,  it  has 
no  such  name^  commonly  recognized  as  pertaining  to  it,  in 
languages,  and  it  fulfills  no  such  function  in  human  thought ; 
on  the  contrary,  the  terms  employed  to  enunciate  it,  which  are 
not  agreed  upon,  even  in  philosophy,  offer  to  us  an  hypothesis 
which  is  obscure  and  difficult  to  be  comprehended,  because 
not  only  it  does  not  declare,  but  it  even  contradicts,  the  facts 
of  experience. 

Whatever  may  be  the  best  philosophical  explanation,  the 
fact  of  experie7ice  is,  that  the  progress  of  the  mind  is  from  the 
singular  and  concrete  objects  that  through  the  senses  determine 
its  action,  to  the  intelligible^  expressed  to  it  by  the  idea  or  con- 
cept; from  the  indeterminate  idea  of  essence*  and  being  in  general 
to  the  indefinitely  great;  and,  by  re??iotion  of  all  limit,  and  the 
addition  of  all  positive  perfection,  to  the  infinite,  or  to  absolute 
being,  as  the  only  sufficient  cause  of  all  else. 

Hence,  to  affirm  that  the  human  mind  cannot  naturally  infer 
the  infinite  from  ih^  finite,  is  not  logically  cori'ect;  and  to  affirm 
that  the  human  mind  has  naturally  and  originally  the  immediate 
intuition  of  God,  or,  of  absolute  beitig,  or,  ens  creans  existetitias, 
is  not  true  as  a  matter  of  fact. 

In  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism,  the  terms  may  have  more 
cojnprehensio7i,  or  their  concepts  include  more  essential  perfec- 
tion,  than  they  expressed  in  the  premises.  The  infnite,  as  a 
conclusion  from  the  fijiite,  expresses  less  logical  extension,  but 
more  compreheiision,  ox  pe7fection,  than  is  explicitly  in  the  prem- 
ises: for,  whether  the  predicate  attribute  something  positive, 
or  deny  some  imperfection,  the  conclusion  is  the  synthesis  of  a 
subject  and  predicate  not  made  in  the  premises ;  and  its  sub- 

*  '  *  Intellectus  noster ;  dura  de  potentia  in  actiun  reducitar,  pertingit  prius  ad 
cognitionem  imiversalem  et  confusam  de  rebus  quam  ad  propriam  et  specialem 
rerum  cogiiitionem :  sed  perfectus  modus  cognoscendi,  non  prius  attingit  uni- 
versal em  quam  specialem  cognitionem. ' '  (Vide  Div.  Thom. ,  1  p. ,  qu.  14,  art. 
6.)  Cm'  intellect,  when  it  goes  into  action,  attains  to  a  imiversal  and  confused 
knowledge  of  things  before  it  does  to  proper  and  special  knowledge;  but  the 
perfect  method  of  knowing  does  not  first  attain  to  universal,  and  then  to  special 
cognition. 


218  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

ject  is  thereby  increased  in  comprehension.  The  absolute 
infinite  is  not  such  by  extension;  i.  e.,by  continuous  or  discrete 
or  logical  qua?iiity ;  but  it  is  such  by  compreJmision  of  all  per- 
fection. 

A  desire  to  effect  a  unification  of  knowledge,  or  a  coordina 
tion  of  all  cognitions,  by  a  simple  principle,  has  led  many  t(' 
adopt  a  theory  that  identifies  the  o?itological  and  the  psycho 
logical  orders;  but,  as  a  fact,  they  are  not  identical  in  th<; 
actual*  nature  of  things;  i.  e.,  the  order  of  our  cognitions  i;- 
not  from  the  first  Being,  to  the  works  of  that  being;  but  it  v.^ 
naturally  just  in  the  reverse  order ;  that  is,  it  proceeds  fron 
his  works  to  Him. 

The  argument  by  which  the  existence  of  absolutely  perfeci 
and  real  bei?ig,  entis  realissimi,  is  claimed  to  be  validly  deducec 
from  the  idea  of  such  a  being,  involves  a  double  middle  term 
V.  g.,  "he  that  has  a  true  idea  of  absolutely  perfect  and  rea 
being,  thereby  knows  that  being  to  exist ;  but  there  is  in  ever; 
mind,  which  comprehends  the  expression,  absolutely  perfect  am 
real  beings  the  true  idea  of  such  a  being;  therefore,  from  thi 
very  idea  of  such  a  being,  it  follows  that  the  mind  may  an(  1 
does  know  it  as  really  existing." 

The  phrase,  '-true  idea,"  is  here  ambiguous;  and,  in  fact,  i. 
has  two  objects  in  the  premises  ;*  in  the  first,  or  in  one  mint" 
the  idea^  it  must  be  supposed,  formally  connotes  its  object  a 
actual  or  real;  in  the  second,  or  in  the  other  mind,  it  legiti 
mately  expresses  only  the  concept  of  an  intelligible  object^  \\ 
which  actual  existence  is  neither  affirmed  nor  denied;  i.  e.,  i 
exists  in  the  second  mind  only  objectively^  as  it  is  termed;  oi 
for  one  mind,  the  existence  is  real ;  in  the  other,  it  is  idea. 
only  :  it  needs  not  to  be  said  that,  if  the  existence  of  the  ob 
ject  were  merely  ideal  in  both  minds,  then  the  argumen 
would  be  simply  nugatory. 

*  "  Ex  hoc  (ex  idea  Entis  quo  majus  et  melius  cogitari  nequit) ,  non  sequitu 
quod  intelligat,  id  quod  signilicatur  per  hoc  noraen,  esseinreru7n  natura,  seu 
ut  dicunt,  existere  in  actu  exercito;  sed  existere  dumtaxat  in  apprehensione  intel 
lectus,  seu,  ut  dicunt,  in  actu  signato."  (Billuart,  1  p.,  qu.  1,  art.  1.)  Fron 
this  idea  it  does  not  follow  that  the  intellect  perceives  its  object  as  real,  or  a 
actually  existing;  but  it  exists  only  in  the  apprehension  of  the  intellect,  or  onb 
in  its  sign,  the  concept. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  219 

Since  the  conclusion  must  follow  the  weaker  part  of  the 
argument,  it  can  affirm  nothing  more,  in  this  case,  than  the 
concept  of  an  intelligible  object,  whose  objective  truths  or  esse 
in  reriim  natura,  actual  being,  remains  to  be  proved.  Illation 
from  the />ure/y  idea/,  as  such,  to  the  /'ea/,  is  not  valid;  if  it 
were,  then  any  absurdity  could  be  logically  demonstrated  a 
priori,  or  from  the  idea  of  it,  to  be  truth. 

An  object  in  the  mind  is  purely  ideal,  when  the  notion  of  it 
Vv'hich  the  mind  has  is  merely  a  concept  of  what  is  not  known 
by  it  as  real;  the  mind  acquires  this  idea  by  simply  appre- 
hending the  term  or  terms  by  which  the  object  is  expressed  in 
language,  and  its  idea  is,  therefore,  not  derived  from  the  object, 
as  it  is  in  itself  really  and  extrinsically  to  the  intellect,  whether 
by  means  of  evidence  or  testimony. 

If,  in  the  syllogism  given  above,  we  suppose  the  idea  to  con- 
note the  object  as  in  acta  exercito,  or  real  in  each  mind,  then, 
considered  as  reasoning,  the  argumoit  is  still  more  absurd; 
for,  it  is  a  vicious  circle  in  which  the  same  thing,  though 
assumed  to  be  self-evidejit,  is  proved  by  itself  as  reason, 
idem  per  idem,  and  it  would  be  equivalent  to  this  :  "  He  that 
knows  God  to  exist,  knows  God  to  exist;  but  Peter  knows  God 
to  exist,  therefore,  Peter  knows  God  to  exist."  In  fact,  truth 
which  is  intuitively  evident,  neither  requires  nor  admits  proof; 
nor,  therefore,  can  it  be  directly  subject  to  rational  discussion. 

"  But,"  it  is  further  said,  "  he  that  has  the  idea  of  absolutely 
perfect  being,  in  which  the  existence,  in  acta  exercito,  actual 
existence,  of  such  a  being,  is  not  affirmed,  but  it  is  included  only, 
in  actu  sig?iato,  i.  e.,  only  ideally,  has  a  false  idea;  and  thus 
the  mind  would  err  per  se^  The  idea  in  the  case  supposed, 
would  be  false  hy  privation,  or  negatively;  but  it  would  not  be 
{dXsQ  positively;  therefore,  the  mind  would  not  err  perse;  for, 
it  would  simply  be  ignorant  of  a  truth  which  is  not  yet  mani- 
fested to  it  by  the  evidence  of  that  truth ;  this  would  be  igno- 
ratice,  but  not  error.  From  this  it  would  merely  follow  that 
the  existence  of  God  is  not,  as  regards  us,  per  se  known,  or 
self-evident,  but  requires  proof 

The  old  philosophers    acutely  and  precisely  enunciate  the 


220  GENEPwAL     METAPHYSICS. 

distinction  between  that  necessity  of  actual  existence,  as  it  is  ir* 
absolutely  perfect  being,  in  ente  realissimo,  i.  e.,  in  God ;  and 
as  it  actually  is  in  relation  to  our  intellects  or  our  cognition  of  it, 
in  the  following  terms :  "  propositio,  Deus  est,  per  se  nota  est 
quoad  se,  sed  non  quoad  nos;  "*  the  proposition,  God  exists,  is 
per  se  known,  as  regards  itself,  but  not  as  regards  us. 

A  proposition  \s  per  se  known  as  regards  itself,  but  not  per  se 
known  as  regards  us,  when  it  has  no  medium  of  proof  a  priori, 
nor  is  its  truth  directly  and  immediately  evident  to  us  on  first 
apprehending  the  terms.  Such  proposition  is  also  said  to  be 
immediate,  in  the  sense  that  its  predicate  is  immediately  of  the 
subject,  or  there  is  no  medium  between  it  and  the  subject, 
through  which  it  agrees  with  the  subject ;  but  the  predicate  is 
included  in  the  very  nature  of  the  subject,  as  its  definition,  or 
as  a  part  of  its  definition.  In  case,  however,  that  it  is  not  self- 
evident  to  us,  or  per  se  known  as  regards  us,  the  essence  or 
quiddity  of  the  object  does  not  become  known  to  us,  by  the 
mere  first  apprehension  of  the  terms  that  enunciate  it;  but  it 
must  be  demonstrated  to  us  by  means  of  something  extrinsic  to  it, 
which  is  better  known  to  us.  //  evidences  itself,  though  our 
minds  are  not  capable  of  i?n?nediately  and  directly  receiving 
that  evidence,  but  it  must  be  conveyed  to  them  through  a 
medium  which  is  extrinsic  and  a  posteriori  by  which  this  evi- 
dence is.  in  some  respect,  reflected  upon  our  minds. 

That  which  \s  per  se  known,  as  regards  us,  or  is  self-evident 

*  "  Propositio,  Deus  est,  est  per  senota  quoad  se,  sed  nonquoad  nos:  ilia  pro- 
positio  non  est  per  se  nota  quoad  nos,  in  qua  quidditas  subjecti  ex  prima  et  com- 
muni  appreheusione  termiuornm  nobis  non  innotescit,  sed  indiget  discursu  ut 
nobis  inuotescat,  quia  tunc  non  potest  statira  nobis  innotescere  an  prxdicatum 
conveniat  subjecto ;  atqui  quidditas  Dei  nobis  non notescit  nisi  per  discursum. ' ' 
(Billuart  1  p,  qu.  1,  art.  I;  vide  page  139.) 

' '  Cum  ergo  propositio  per  se  nota  et  immediata  idem  sint,  dubitari  nou 
potest  quin  niulta  sint  per  se  nota  in  se,  qua?  non  sunt  per  se  nota  nobis.  .  .  Sunt 
quajdam  veritates  in  se  immediatas;  i.  e.,  sine  ullo  medio  inter  praedicatum  et 
subjectum,  quas  non  nisi  per  aliquod  medium  (extrinsecuni)  intelligere  vale- 
mns:  v.  g.,  quantitas  est  entitas  accidental  is."  (Suarez  Met.  Disp.  29,  set.  3, 
no.  32.)  Since  a  proposition  which  is  per  se  known,  and  a  proposition  which  is 
immediate,  are  the  same  thing,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  tliere  are  many  things 
per  se  known,  as  regards  themselves,  but  which  are  not  per  se  known  as  regards 
us;  there  are  certain  truths  which  are  immediate  in  themselves,  i.  e.,  without 
.iny  medium  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate,  which  we  are  not  able  to 
understand  unless  through  some  medium;  v.  g.,  quantity  is  accidental  entity 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  221 

to  us,  is  seen  and  assented  to  by  our  minds,  on  first  appre- 
hending the  terms,  and  without  any  reasoning,  whether  a  priori 
or  a  posteriori;  v.  g.,  "A  whole  is  greater  than  its  part."  But 
while  the  proposition  which  is  per  se  known  as  regards  itself 
but  not  as  regards  us,  possesses,  in  itself,  the  most  perfect  of 
all  objective  evidence^  and  the  most  absolutely  necessary  truth, 
in  itself;  yet,  our  imperfect  intellects  do  not  attain  to  it  imme- 
diately, but  do  so  only  by  reflex  knowledge  from  other  things, 
which  are  connected  with  it  logically.  Of  this  kind  is  the  pro- 
position, "God  exists;"  and  of  this  kind,  also,  are  many  of 
the  highest  and  most  universal  truths,  as  remarked  in  respect 
to  the  proper  object  of  wisdom  or  philosophy,  on  page  139. 

Hence,  to  sum  up  what  was  said  in  regard  to  the  argument 
by  which  the  existence  of  God  is  claimed  to  be  proved  from 
the  mere  idea  of  absolutely  perfect  being,  cfitis  realissimi; 
either  this  idea  connotes  its  object  as  actually  existing,  i7i  actu 
exercito,  or  it  does  not ;  if  it  does,  the  argument  in  proof  of  it 
is  useless,  and  is  nothing  more  than  a  vicious  circle.  If  the 
idea  does  not  thus  connote  the  object  in  both  minds,  then 
either  it  thus  connotes  the  object  in  neither,  or  in  one  mind 
only ;  in  the  first  case,  the  argument  is  simply  nugatory ;  in 
the  second,  it  is  merely  an  equivocation,  as  is  every  argument 
which  concludes  from  the  ideal,  as  such,  to  the  real. 

The  existe?ice  of  absolutely  perfect  being,  or  of  the  infinite, 
must  be  learned  otherwise  than  from  the  7nere  idea  of  it, 
or  by  the  equally  preposterous  argument  from  the  possibility 
of  such  a  being;  and,  in  fact,  it  is  strictly  demonstrable  only  a 
posteriori,  or  by  reasoning  from  effect  to  cause.*  The  existence 
of  absolutely  perfect,  ?iecessary  or  infi?iite  being,  cannot  be  demon- 
strated a  priori;  for,  there  is  no  principle  prior  to  such  being 
from  which  it  comes,  it  being  the  first  of  all  principles. 

All  the  demonstrative  proofs  of  God's  existence  by  natural 
reason  are  a  posteriori  ;*  and  they  are  all  reducible  to  the  argu- 

*  "  Deum  esse  est  demonstrabile  non  a  priori,  seu  per  causas,  sed  a  posteriori 
Beu  per  effectus:  prima  demonstratio  dicitur  propter  quid;  secunda,  demonstratio 
quia.  (Philos.  passim.)  The  existence  of  God  is  not  demonstrable  a  priori,  01 
throiigli  causes,  but  a  posteriori,  or  by  eSfects;  the  first,  is  called  demonstration 
propter  quid;  the  second,  demonstration  quia. 


222  GENERAL     METAPHYSICS. 

ment  for  the  necessity  of  a  first  and  independent  cause.  The 
proof  derived  from  7notio?t,  the  argument  for  the  necessity  of 
unproduced  beings  for  absolute  bei?ig,  etc.,  are,  in  reahty,  but  dif- 
ferent modes  of  showing  the  necessity  of  a  first  cause  that  ex- 
ists a  se. 


ARTICLE     V. 

NECESSARY   AND    CONTINGENT    BEING;    OF    ORDER;     IT    CAN    BE 
INTENDED    BY    NONE    BUT    AN    INTELLIGENT    BEING. 

A  thing  is  absolutely  necessary*  whose  non-existence  is  in- 
trinsically impossible ;  a  thing  is  co?itingent,  whose  non-exist- 
ence is  possible. 

God  alone  is  absolutely  necessary,  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  words;  all  other  necessary  being  or  truth,  the  eternal 
essences  of  things,  metaphysical  truth,  as,  v.  g.,  "a  part  is 
less  than  the  whole,"  etc.,  must  be  conceived  as,  in  some 
manner,  driving  their  necessity,  or  depending  for  it  on  a 
presupposed  Being  whose  necessity  is  still  more  strictly  abso- 
lute, as  it  is  under  all  respects  underived  and  independent ; 
and,  therefore,  their  necessity,  immutability,  etc.,  are  less 
stricdy  absolute.  The  necessity  which  is  predicated  of  them 
is  by  some  appropriately  styled,  metaphysical  necessity. 

Hence,  metaphysical  necessity  belongs  to  objects,  which,  in 
their  very  nature,  could  not  be  otherwise  than  they  are ;  v.  g., 
the  triangle)  the  circle;  or  necessary  truths  in  general.  It  is  an- 
tecedently and  absolutely  required  that,  if  they  really  exist,  they 
be  conformable  to  their  essential  concept;  but  their  actual  ex- 
istence as  real  things,  "in  rerum  natura,"  is  co?iti?igent ;  i.  e., 
depends  on  a  free  cause. 

Physical  7tecessity,  is  that  which  is  cottsequent  upon  physical 
law;  and  is,  therefore,  conti7igent  2\^o^  in  some  respect;  v.  g., 

*  "  Necessarium  est  quod  ita  existit  ut  deficeve  non  possit.  Contingens  est 
quod  pote.st  esse  et  non  esse. ' '  A  thing  is  neccsf.ary,  which  so  exists  that  it  can- 
not cease  to  exist.  A  thing  is  contingent,  VA'hich  so  exists  that  it  can  ceaf  o  to 
exist. 


GENERAL     METAPHYSICS.  223 

it  is  physically  necessary  that  fire  burn,  that  the  sun  rise  to- 
morrow, if  the  stabiUty  of  their  physical  laws  be  not  suspended 
oy  Divine  intervention.  It  is  a  physical  fact  that  the  sun  rose 
yesterday  morning ;  and,  as  it  now  has  consequent  necessity,  and 
is  no  longer  actually  contingent  being,  the  truth  of  that  fact 
is  really  metaphysical,  under  this  respect  of  it. 

Absolutely  necessary  being,  can  neither  have  abeginnmgnor 
an  end.  For,  what  begins  to  exist,  depends  upon  some  condi- 
tion for  its  existence ;  and,  therefore,  its  being  was  not  abso- 
lutely necessary)  and  also,  if  it  cease  to  exist,  its  being  is  not 
absolutely  necessary  either;  for,  what  comes  to  an  end,  could 
have  only  conditional  or  dependent  being.  Hence,  being  that 
is  absolutely  necessary,  cannot  be  conceived  as  actually  in  a 
state  of  possibility,  and  it  is,  therefore,  eternal.  But  all  contin- 
gent being  was  in  a  state  of  possibility  before  it  began  to  exist. 

Necessity  is  either  a?itecedent  or  co?tsequent;  v.  g.,  it  is  antece- 
dent necessity  for  every  circle  to  be  round ;  every  rectilinear  tri- 
angle to  have  three  angles,  whose  sum  is  equal  to  the  sum  of 
two  right  angles ;  it  is  consequent  necessity  that  the  sun  rose  this 
morning,  and,  under  another  respect,  it  is  also  necessary  that 
it  will  rise  to-morrow;  the  necessity,  in  the  latter  case,  is  conse- 
quent upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  law  of  the  world's  motion 
will  not  be  changed  before  that  time.  The  circle  and  triajigle 
are  contifigent,  in  respect  to  their  actually  existing,  as  real 
beings. 

No  contingent  being  can  exist,  unless  brought  into  existence 
by  some  cause,  i.  e.,  some  being  distinct  from  itself.  The  effi- 
cient cause  of  its  beginning  to  exist,  must  be  extrinsic  to  itself; 
for,  if  the  sufficient  reason  of  its  existence  were  within  itself, 
or  intrinsic  to  it,  then  its  existence  would  not  be  coritijigent,  but 
absolutely  necessary  \  or,  in  other  words,  the  supposition  can  be 
made  only  of  unproduced  being. 

A  thing  may  \)Q produced m  two  ways:  ist,  by  c?'eation  from 
nothing;*  2d,  by  being  formed  or  made  put  of  something  else. 

♦  "  Creatio  est  rei  prorluctio  ex  uihilo  *'?«,  et  subjecti."  Creation  is  the  pro- 
duction of  a  thing  from  nothing  absolutely;  i.  e.,  from  nothing  that  is  presup- 
posed as  subject  matter  out  of  which  it  is  formed,  or  educed. 


224  GENERAL  METAPHYSICS. 

A  being  is  made  or  produced  out  of  something  else,  when 
it  is  made  by  the  efficient  cause,  out  of  some  subject  matter 
which  is  extrinsic  to  the  cause;  v.  g.,  an  oak  produces  another 
oak ;  an  architect  builds  a  house,  etc. 

A  being  may  be  destroyed  also  in  two  ways :  ist,  by  ajinihi- 
latioft  or  absolute  reduction  to  nothing;  and  2^^  by  dissolution 
into  the  elements  out  of  which  it  is  made,  by  which  the  whole, 
as  such,  perishes. 

Simple  substance,  or  a  being  that  does  not  consist  of  parts, 
and  that  exists  per  se,  i.  e.,  alone,  or  not  as  inhering,  cannot 
be  produced  out  of  pre-existing  substance.  For,  by  reason 
of  its  simple  essence,  it  cannot  be  formed  out  of  pre-existing 
parts,  since  parts  are  incompatible  with  its  simple  nature ;  it 
cannot  be  produced  from  material  substance  ;  for  that  would 
not  be  its  production,  since  its  existence  per  se  in  that  substance 
must  be  presupposed  to  its  eduction  from  it ;  and  in  which,  not 
being  an  accident,  it  did  not  inhere ;  and  on  which,  not  being 
a  constituent  part,  it  did  not  depend  for  being.  Finally,  it  can- 
not be  educed  from  another  si?7iple  substafice;  for  since  a  simple 
substance  is  not  compounded,  it  cannot  separate  a  substantial 
part  from  itself.  Hence,  simple  substance  that  exists  per  se, 
can  begin  to  exist  only  by  creation  from  nothing. 

Order*  is  a  perfection,  by  which  multitude  is  reduced  to 
complete  unity ;  it  so  disposes  of  its  hke  and  unlike  constit- 
uents, that  each  has  its  appropriate  place  in  respect  both  to 
the  parts  and  to  the  whole.  When  the  proportion  of  relations, 
on  which  order  is  founded,  is  perfect,  according  to  the  specific 
nature  of  the  object  thereby  formed;  then  that  object  is,  under 
different  respects,  perfect,  good,  or  beautiful  in  its  own  species. 

Order  is  referable  to  the  relations  of  time,  place,  material 
substance;  to  things  moral,  social,  and  intelligible;  and,  in 
general,  to  any  object  in  which  we  conceive  relations  of  parts 
among  themselves,  and  to  the  whole. 

*"Ordo  pariiira  dispariumque,  sua  cuique  loca  tribuens  dispositio."  (S. 
August.)  Order  is  the  dispositiou  oflike  and  uulike  things,  giving  to  each  ita 
oroper  place. 

"  Compositio  rerum  aptis  et  deterrainatis  locis."  (Cicero.)  Order  is  the 
nrraagemeut  of  things  in  apt  and  determinate  places. 


GENERAL  METAPHYSICS.  225 

Any  order  in  action,  proves  the  author  of  it  to  be  mtelHgent; 
because  th'e  intention  and  production  of  it  require  the  exercise 
ol  judgment.  By  the  order  in  men's  actions  and  conversation 
we  perceive  daily  the  evidences  of  judgment  exercised  by 
them ;  of  e7ids  dehberately  intended^  and  of  means  compared, 
selected,  and  coordinated  for  their  accomplishment. 

To  mte?td,  is  properly  an  act  of  the  will ;  it  is  an  efficacious 
desire  of  an  end,  which  is,  therefore,  formally  sought  for  by 
appropriate  means ;  or,  it  is  an  act  by  which  the  mind  tends 
to  an  end  wished  for.  The  selection  and  arrangement  of  the 
means  to  that  end,  require  practical  judgment. 

The  ape  can  warm  himself  at  the  fire  which  is  made  for 
him ;  the  dog  can  mount  upon  the  chair  that  is  already  near 
the  window,  and  thence  jump  to  the  window ;  but  neither  can 
the  one  select  means  to  keep  the  fire  alive ;  nor  can  the  other 
combine  separated  and  absent  objects,  so  as  to  put  them  in  the 
relation  to  each  other  of  stiles  ;  for  both  acts  would  require  a 
comparison  of  abstract  and  concrete  relations;  i.  e.,  judgment. 

Instinct  deals  with  certain  actually  established  and  conci'eie 
relations  of  things,  and  when  those  relations  cease  to  exist,  or 
are  essentially  changed,  it  is  pow^erless  to  devise  entirely  differ- 
ent means  from  its  determined  ones,  or  to  combine  and  employ 
a  new  species  of  means. 

To  select  and  combine  means,  to  establish  new  relations,  to 
devise  means  to  an  end  which  were  not  employed  before,  are 
acts  of  judgment  that  are  proper  only  to  rational  natures. 
Hence,  order  or  design  gives  complete  evidence  that  its  proper 
cause  was  an  mtelligent  agent. 

There  is  order  also  in  the  works  of  the  beaver,  the  bee,  etc.; 
but  they  give  no  evidence  whatever  of  intending  it,  which  is  an 
act  of  intelligence ;  or  that  they  exercise  judgment  in  the  selec- 
tion  and  use  of  the  means. 

Cognition  which  is  purely  of  sense,  or  organic,  and  limited 
to  singular  objects,  and  concrete  relations ;  action,  which,  in 
respect  to  the  production  of  order,  as  such,  is  merely  mechan* 
ical;  fully  explain  their  causality,  and  are  all  that  can  be  attri- 
buted to.  them  as  agents.  The  intelligence  and  judgment, 
15 


226  GENERAL  METAPHYSICS. 

clearly  discernible  in  their  work,  we  must  refer,  through  the 
law  of  their  nature,  to  the  author  of  that  nature.  They  can 
accomplish  an  end  determined  for  them,  by  determined  means;* 
but  they  cannot  substitute  means  of  different  species ;  or,  as 
their  action  is  determined  to  one  thing  by  natural  law,  they  can- 
not seled  another  end,  or  other  means,  equally  good,  or  better, 
but  must,  circumstances  being  the  same,  always  do  the  same 
thing,  in  tTie  same  specific  manner  and  degree,  and  by  the  same 
means;  for  they  can  know  only  the  sifigular,  and  can  appre- 
hend and  retain  only  concrete  relations ;  they  are  not  capab'ie 
of  transmitting  improvement  as  a  species,  are  not  perfectible, 
either  in  their  knowledge,  or  their  mode  of  action. 

"  Determinatum\  ad  unum^''  means  limited  or  deternwied  to 
one  mode  of  acting,  without  any  real  choice  or  rational  empire 
over  the  agent's  own  action ;  when  the  object  is  actually  pre- 
sented, it  cannot  remain  really  indifferent  as  to  action  or  non- 
action, or  be  free  to  choose  the  object,  or  choose  the  contrary, 
but  is  necessitated  by  the  object  to  do  what  it  does. 

There  is,  indeed,  order  in  the  action  of  all  natural  agents ; 

*  "  Cognitio  et  appetitio  animcz  rationalis,  sunt  illimitatae  ;  dum,  e  contra, 
ma/eria  determinata  est  ad  unum;  anima  autem  belluina  est  materialis."  Ra- 
tional cognition  and  appetite,  are  unlimited;  but  matter  is  determined  to  one 
thing;  its  capacity  to  receive  and  contain,  is  determinate  and  limited;  of  sucli 
is  the  brute  soul,  which  is  material. 

t ' '  Natura  determinata  est  ad  unum  ;  sed  voluntas  se  habet  ad  opposita. 
Voluntas  dividitur  contra  naturam,  sicut  una  causa  contra  aliam,  quaidam  enim 
Bunt  naturaliter,  qusedam  voluntarie.  Est  autem  alius  modus  causandi  proprius 
voluntati  quae  est  domina  sui  actus,  praeter  modum  qui  couvenit  naturte,  quae 
est  determinata  ad  unum.  Semper  naturaj  respondet  unicin,  proportiouatum 
naturae:  naturae  enim  in  gcnere  respondet  aliquid  unum  in  genere,  et  natm-«  in 
specie  acceptoa  respondet  unum  in  specie ;  naturae  autem  individuatJB  respondet 
aliquid  unum  individuale.  Eorum  igitur  voluntas  principium  est,  quae  possunt 
sic,  vel  aliter  esse.  Eorum  autem  quae  non  possunt  nisi  sic  esse,  principium 
natura  est."  (Div.  Th.,  1  p.,  qu.  12,  a.  1,  et  1,  2  p.,  qu.  10,  a.  1,  ad.  3.) 
Nature  is  determined  to  one  thing;  the  will  is  capable  of  opposites.  The  will  is 
the  opposite  of  nature,  as  one  cause  is  the  opposite  of  another,  for,  some  things 
are  natural,  some  things  are  voluntary.  There  is  also  one  mode  of  causing, 
proper  to  the  will  as  supreme  over  its  act;  a  different  one  agrees  with  nature 
which  is  determined  to  one  thing.  There  is  always  one  object  corresponding  to 
nature,  proportioned  to  nature:  to  nature  in  general,  corresponds  some  one 
thing  in  general;  to  nature  taken  as  a  species,  answers  a  species  of  object;  to 
individual  nature,  corresponds  an  individual  thing.  The  will,  therefore,  is  the 
principle  of  those  things  that  can  be  either  one  way,  or  another  nature  is  the 
orinciple  of  those  things  that  can  be  only  one  way. 


GENERAL  METAPHYSICS.  227 

the  intention  of  it,  however,  is  not  referable  to  them,  but  to  an 
intelHgent  cause  which  is  above  them,  and  anterior  to  them.* 
Order  and  unity,  attained  by  appropriate  means,  are  manifest 
in  the  crystal,  the  mineral,  the  vegetable,  the  brute  animal,  in 
all  objects  around  us ;  but  the  true  cause  and  design  of  it,  we 
cannot  ascribe  to  those  objects.  For  order,  as  such,  can  be 
intended  diiid  formally  effected  oxAy  by  an  intelHgent  cause;  and 
the  concurrence  of  irrational  agents  in  producing  it,  is  only 
instrumental  and  mechanical. 

Hence,  none  but  an  intelligent  cause  can  per  se  produce 
order;  for  order  essentially  impHes  judgment;  man,  by  the 
exercise  of  reason,  produces  order  in  thought,  word,  and 
work ;  but  the  order  that  is  in  his  physical  nature  as  a  sub- 
stance, is  from  God :  "  Ordo  rectae  rationis  est  ab  homine, 
ordo  naturae  est  a  Deo." 

To  investigate  this  order  with  the  design  which  it  evinces, 
as  manifested  in  the  works  of  creation,  in  the  means  appor- 
tioned and  directed  to  ends  which  are  discernible  in  all  of 
them,  constitutes  what  is  termed  the  study  oi  fi7ial  causes.  As 
before  remarked,  the  final  cause  is  the  highest  and  the  most 
noble  of  the  causes ;  for,  it  bespeaks  the  intelligent  principle 
that  gives  motion,  direction  and  efficacy  to  all  the  other  causes, 
since  they  are  subordinate  and  subject  to  it,  and  are,  there- 
fore, dependent  on  it  in  operating.  Hence,  its  objects  fur- 
nish the  mind  congenial  and  elevated  knowledge,  since  they 
acquaint  it  with  the  ends  for  which  the  different  works  of  cre- 
ation are  destined,  as  shown  by  their  action ;  and,  by  conse- 
quence, no  study  depending  on  the  mere  light  of  reason,  can 
give  us  more  perfect  views  of  the  author  of  their  existence. 

When  Bacon  and  others  say  that  the  study  oi  fifial  causes^ 
according  to  the  manner  in  which  they  are  discernible  in  the 
nature  of  things  around  us,  is  arrogant,  and  tends  to  atheism, 
their  fear  and  warning  come,  perhaps,  from  misguided  reverence 

*  ' '  Ovis  fugit  lupum  ex  quodam  arbitrio  quo  existiraat  eum  sibi  noxium ;  sed 
hoc  judicium  non  est  sibi  liberum  sed  a  natura  mditiun."  (Div.  Thorn.  1  p., 
qu.  59,  art.  3.)  The  sheep  flees  from  the  wolf  by  a  certain  choice  in  which  i 
esteems  the  wolf  hurtful ;  but  this  judgment  is  not  free,  but  is  implanted  in  it  by 
nature. 


228  GENERAL    METAPHYSICS. 

to  God ;  "  aemulationem  Dei  habent,  sed  non  secundum  scien- 
tiam."*  All  things  are  parts  of  the  volume  which  creation 
forms,  and  it  is  open  before  us  that  we  may  read,  and  learn  to 
know  the  existence  and  the  perfections  of  its  Author,  as  shown 
in  his  works.  As  the  bees  of  Mount  Hybla  sip  honey  from 
the  very  flowers  that  give  to  reptiles  deadly  venom,  so,  that 
which  teaches  wisdom  to  the  well  meaning,  may  be  turned  to 
evil  aims  by  the  ill-disposed. 

In  the  operations  of  natural  law,  there  is  never  mere  acci- 
dent, or  purely  fortuitous  event ;  for,  irrational  agents  have  no 
action  except  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  their  nature,  imposed 
on  them  by  the  author  of  their  being.  Their  action,  though 
various,  is  orderly;  their  mechanism,  though  complex,  has 
unity,  and  nature  never  fails  either  in  the  coordination  of  her 
means  or  in  the  attainment  of  her  ends;  "natura  nunquam 
deficit  in  necessariis."  Hence,  such  study  of  the  creatures 
around  us  not  only  tends  to  knowledge  that  is  true,  and  high, 
and  wise,  but  at  the  same  time  gives  us  conclusions  that  are 
mfallibly  certain. 

*  ' '  They  have  a  zeal  of  God,  but  not  according  to  knowledge.  *  *    (Rom.  x.) 
See  page  56. 


END  OF  ONTOLOGY,  OR  GENERAL  METAPHYSICS. 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Absolute 20 

Abstract  and  Concrete 18,  19 

Accident 26,  182 

Accident,  Proper  and  Common 181 

Accident,  Fallacy  of 56 

Accident,  Separable  from  Subject 180,  183,  196 

Accidental  Cause 204 

Act,  the  Pure 124 

Action,  Immanent,  Transient 187 

Actio  in  Distans 211 

Acts  Specified  by  Objects 71,  154 

JEstimativa  Potentia 86 

Analogy 21,  162 

Analogy  Can  Found  Demonstration 54,137,  162 

Analogy  not  Parity 22 

Analysis 48 

Appetite,  Appetition. 166 

Appodictic  Demonstration no 

Apprehension 16,  64,  108 

A  se.  Per  se  {7iote) 178 

Assent,  Consent 72 

Attention „ 18,  126 

Attribute  or  Property 25 

Authority  of  Learned  Men 132 

Being,  Notion  of 151 

Being,  Degree  or  Grade  of 202 

Beauty 173 

Begging  the  Question 57 

229 


230  ALPHABETICAL   INDEX. 

PAGB. 

Brute  Soul : 90 

Categories,  the  Ten 23 

Causation,  Principle  of 199 

Cause,  Kinds  of. 200 

Cause,  Efficient,  Final 200 

Cause,  Material,  Formal 206 

Cause  per  se,  per  accidens 204 

Cause,  Exemplary 211 

Cause,  Univocal,  Equivocal 211 

Certainty 67  (et  seqq.) 

Certainty,  Criterion  of 78 

Circle,  the  Vicious 58 

Comprehension  of  Terms 18 

Comprehension  in  Conclusion  of  Syllogism 40,  214 

Composition  and  Division 56 

Conceived,  What  Cannot  be  is  Nothing 22 

Concept 16 

Conclusion  of  Syllogism  a  Synthesis 40,  217 

Concrete 19 

Condition,  not  a  Cause 2H 

Connotative 20 

Consciousness 82 

Consequence,  Consequent,  Sequence 2>^ 

Contingent 52,  75,  222 

Contrary,  Contradictory 34 

Conversion,  Mutation 155 

Creation,  Act  of 158 

Definition 28,  135 

Demonstration 50 

Determinatum  Ad  Unum 226 

Difference,  the  Specific 24 

Dilemma,  the 46 

Disposition 189,  212 

Disputation 141 

Distinction  of  Reason 163 

Divisibility,  How  Infinite 185 

Division,  Rules  of 27 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX.  231 


PAGE. 


Double  Middle  Term 54,     59 

Doubt 66 

Election,  End  not  Subject  to 187,  205 

Elicited  Acts 166 

End 204 

Enthymeme,  the 45 

Ens  Rationis 163 

Equivocal 21 

Equivocal,  Univocal  Cause 211 

Error 63 

Essence,  Nature 22,  153,  158 

Evidence 69 

Evidence,  in  Civil  Courts  {iiote) , 129 

Evil 165,   172 

Existence 158 

Extension  of  Terms 18 

Extension,  Definitive  and  Circumscriptive 184 

Faith,  ijelief. 70,     74 

Fallacy 55 

Fancy,  Same  as  Imagination 86 

False,  Falsehood 63 

Figure 186,   195 

Final  Causes,  Study  of 227 

Finite 213 

Finite  Founds  Knowledge  of  the  Infinite 213 

Form  and  Matter,  Theory  of 206 

Genus 24 

Good 165,  171 

Habit 189 

Hypothesis,  only  Probable 54 

Hypothetical  Argument 43 

Hypothetical  Proposition., t^t^ 

Idea,  not  Image  of  the  Fancy 17,    108 

Ideal  to  Real,  not  Valid  Illation 219 

Ideas,  Objective  Reality  of 112 

Ideas,  Universal,  Founded  on  Objects 115 

Identity 54,  161 


232  ALPHABETICAL   INDEX. 


PACK, 


Ignorance 64,  66 

Imagination,  an  Organic  Power 92 

Imagination,  How  it  is  Essential  for  the  Intellect 84,  loi 

Immanent  Acts,  Transient  Acts 187 

Impossibility 1 60 

Induction 52 

Infinite  (et  seqq.) 213 

Infinite,  Known  fi-om  the  Finite 214 

Infinite  /;/  Fotentia,  cannot  become  Actual  Infinite 185 

Instinct 89,  225 

Instrumental  Cause 211 

Intellect,  not  an  Organic  Power 103 

Intellect,  Adequate  or  Connatural  Object  of 104 

Intelligence  a  Virtue  or  Perfection  of  the  Intellect. .  138,  190 

Intend,  Intention 225 

Intensity,  Greater  or  Less,  Objects  Capable  of 193,  195 

Intention,  First  and  Second,  Terms  of. 20 

Intuition  of  the  Absolute,  not  Natural 214 

Judgment 30,  109 

Known  Per  se,  What  it  Signifies 220 

Life 187,  188 

Material  Cause 206 

Matter  and  Form 206 

Meditation,  What  Constitutes  it 127 

Memory,  Sensile,  Intellectual 125 

Mental  Term,  Verbiim  Me?ifis 16 

Metaphysical,  the 149 

Metaphysical  Truth 61,  164 

Method,  Scientific 48 

Mind,  Powers  of 35 

Mixed  Perfection 212 

Motion,  of  Self,  is  Life 187 

Mutation 155 

Natural  Agent 168 

Nature,  Essence 22,  153 

Necessary,  Necessity 222 

Nominalists,  Realists 115 


ALPHABETICAL   INDEX.  233 

PAGE. 

Objects,  how  they  Specify  Acts 71 

Ontological,  Psychological 51 

Opinion 54.,  66 

Opposition ;^-^ 

Order 224 

Organ,  Organic  Power 85,  95 

Parity 22 

Particular  and  Universal 19 

Passion  Specified 72 

Perfection,  Simple  and  Mixed 212 

J^er  se,  has  Different  Meanings  [no^e] 178 

Fer  se  Known,  or  Self-Evident 220 

Philosophical  Knowledge 138,  140 

Possibility 160 

Potential  Existence 207 

Powers  Pertain  to  Essential  Quality 154,  186 

Premises,  of  Argument 37 

Probability , .  53 

Probability,  in  Cognition  only 53 

Probability  Essentially  different  from  Certainty 53?  ^7 

Property  or  Attribute -  •  25,  181 

Property  an  Accident 181 

Proportion,  Analogy  of 21,  162 

Proportion  Essential  to  Beauty 174 

Proposition 31 

Psychological,  Ontological 51 

Quality,  as  a  Category iS6 

Quality  Follows  the  Forin^  Quantity  the  Matter 184 

Quantity 184 

Reasoning,  Specific  Act  of 35,  iii,  213,  {fiote) 

RedupHcation,  Reduplicative,  Effect  of. 2>Zi  ^53 

Realists 115 

Reflexion 19 

Reflex  Act,  Organic  Power  Incapable  of 88 

Relation 197 

Science,  Scientific  Knowledge 132,  140 

Senses,  Internal  and  External 85,  95 


234  ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Sensible,  the 95 

Sequence 36 

Similarity 162 

Singular ig 

Soul,  Immaterial 91 

Species 22 

Species,  "Genesis  of" 122,  195 

Spontaneous  Act,  Spontaneity 168 

Subcontrary 34 

Sublime 179 

Subsist 208 

Substance 178 

Substance,  Complete,  Incomplete 179,  208 

Supposition  of  Terms 21 

Suspicion. 66 

Syllogism,  Canons  of ^6 

Syllogism,  Expository  the 42 

Synthesis 48 

Testimony  of  Witnesses 129 

Transcendentals 20,  119 

Transubstantiation 157 

Truth,  Metaphysical,  Logical,  Moral 61,  164 

Truths,  the  Primitive 80 

Unity,  One 161 

Univocal 21 

Universal 19 

Universal  Ideas,  How  Less  Perfect 121 

Will,  the  Rational  Appetite ' 166 

Will  is  Free 166 

Will  not  Free  to  Wish  Evil,  as  such 167,  205 

Will,  its  Act  Less  Evident  than  that  of  Intellect 84,  194 

Wisdom 138 

Witness 129 


JTuly,  1878 

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hitherto  extended  to  it,  they  hav  •,  with  the  valuable  assistance  of  tlie  late  Dr. 
Fredet's  reverend  collaboiators,  added  several  Chapters  embracing  the  Hi.-.tori- 
cai  Events  t'lat  have  taken  place  in  thi-;  and  other  countries  from  i8.54  to  18C7. 

The  Modern  History  has  been  thoroughly  revise  1  and  considerably  enlargea. 
The  additional  matter,  carefully  prepared,  will  be  found  worthy  of  the  distin- 
enished  Historian's  original  work.  The  history  of  the  Recent  Civil  War  i;i  the 
Uni:ed  States,  particularly,  has  been  compiled  \viih  a  truthful  impartiali(y  which 
makes  it  the  best  Synopsis  of  this  Memorable  Event  yet  published  for  the  use 
of  Educational  Institutions.  It  is  a  correct  record  of  facts,  faithfully  told  with- 
out political  comment. 

The  student  will  therefore  find  in  Dr.  Fredet's  two  books,  the  "Ancient"  and 
"  Blodern  "  Histories,  the  most  Complete,  Authentic,  and  reliable  History  of  the 
World,  from  its  Creation  to  the  Year  of  our  Lord,  18G7. 

^^Pro-n  a  large  number  of  Ccmviendatorr/  Notices  of  Professor  PredeCs  Ancient  and 
Modern  Histories,  we  select  the  following,  as  embodying  the  spirit  of  all. 

College  of  William  k  Mart,  Williainxhurg,  Va.,  October,  1867. 
Gentlemen:— The  demand  for  Fredet  s  Ancient  and  Jlodern  Histories  and  Kerney's  Com- 
pendium of  History,  showi  tliat  these  most  excellent  books  are  appreciaied  as  thev  ought  to  be. 
'I'hu  imMrovements  and  uddi  ions  to  tlie  editions  of  1867  just  issued  from  vour  press,  make  them 
all  that  could  be  reasonably  desired.  Immediately  a'ter  the  reopening  ofthe  College  ot  Willi. >m 
and  Mary,  in  186.5,  Fr-  defs  Histories  were,  after  a  carelul  examination  ofthe  Text  Books  (  f  the 
day.  adopted  in  ihe  Institution.  A  more  intimate  acquaintance  soon  justified  the  wisdom  of  the 
selection.  They  evidently  were  written  in  a  conscientious  ami  Chri^ti.-.n  spirit,  with  a  manifest 
intent  lo  teach  historical  truths.  They  constitute  an  honorable  monument  to  the  memory  of  the 
late  Reverend  Author, 

Kerney's  Compendium  was  subsequently  introduced  into  the  College  Grammar  School;  and 
gave  entire  satisfaction.  In  style  and  system  and  the  intere-t  it  excites,  it  is  a  imirablv  adapted, 
to  beginners  and  junior  s  udents,  while  it  wax  be  read  and  cousulted  with  profit  bv  the  more  ad- 
vanced. Trustina:  that  jovr  public  spirit  an'd  tnterprise  in  putting  su  h  standard  works  withia 
reach  may  meet  with  a  liberal  encouragement.  I  remain  yours,  very  respeetlully, 

aiessrs.  J.  MURPHT  k  Co.  "'  Benj   S.  Ewell,  President,  College  W.  dc  Mary. 

The  Metropolian  says:— "The  style  Is  veritablv  charming  by  its  simplicity,  and  by  the  quiet 
love  of  his  subject  which  the  author  displays.  It  is  the  language  of  a  talented  and  successful 
teacher,  who  relates  to  his  class  the  great'evenis  of  time,  sm^einctly  but  graphically,  yet  in  a. 
lively  and  picturesque  manner.    It  is  thiis  that  history  should  be  written  for  youth." 

The  London  Standard  says:—"  Th^SQ  two  excellent  manuals  of  History  have  a  wide  and  in- 
creasing circulation  in  America,  and  are  everywhere  held  in  tiie  highe  t  esteem.  The  compiler, 
Dr  Fredet,  has  achis;7ed  a  task  of  no  ordinary  difBeulty,  in  compressing  so  much  recondite  mat- 
ter into  so  small  a  spa^e;  in  leaving  u^itohi  nothing  that  was  of  note  of  the  iu.mense  and  varied 
annals  of  the  world.    No  college,  school,  or  library  ought  to  be  w  ithout  these  excellent  works." 

The  Dublin  Telegraph  says:— "  Fredet's  Histories  have  been  adopted,  as  a  class  book,  by  the 
Irish  University;  and  we  entertain  no  doubt,  that  they  will  supersede,  even  in  other  establish- 
ments, those  miserable  compi  ations  which  wilful  perverters  of  truth  have  long  palmed  upon  th« 
publij  as  histories  and  abridgments  of  histories." 

The  Dublin  Tablet  8:iys:— "These  two  volumes  are  plain,  copious,  and  useful  eummaries  of 
histcrj-,  and  the  number  of  editions  through  which  they  have  passed  attest  their  popularity." 

The  Philadelphia  Instructor  says :— "  We  hope  these  histories  will  find  their  way  into  literary 
Institutions  in  order  that  the  young  may  learn  the  past  from  pure  and  uncorrupted  sources." 

Murphy  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  Booksellers,  BaUimm'e. 
1  ' 


School  Edition  Lingard's  England. 

JLinff'TrfVs  TJisfory  of  Jiiiff^and,  By  Johx  Linqard,  D.  D. 
With  ft  Continuation  from  1G88,  to  the  rci<rn  of  Queen  Victoria. 
Abridged  by  James  Buuke,  Esq  ,  A.  B.  With  an  Appendix  to 
1873.  li)/  ike  Editor  of  the  First  Ciass  Book  of  llUtory.  To  which 
ore  added,  ^rarginal  Notes  and  Questions,  adapted  the  use  of 
Schools.     17th  Edition 1  CO 

The  Student  will  find  that  the  ipsissima  verba  of  the  great  Historian 
of  England  has  been  religiously  preserved  in  the  Abridgment. 
The  Continuation  has  been  witten  by  an  auihor  who  has  been  long  and 

favorably  known  in  literature. 

NOTICES  OF  THE   PRESS. 

Tlit  ifetropolitan,  in  noticing  this  work,  says:—"  We  are  glad  to  see  this  excellent  abridgment 
adapted  to  the  use  of  Bchools.  It  will  do  much  to  remove  tliose  many  false  impressions,  which 
English  historians  have  hitherto  made  \ipon  the  readers  of  history  by  their  word-painting  of 
imaginary  events.  In  no  nation  perhaps  was  history  more  '  a  conspiracy  asainst  truth,'  than  in 
that  of  England,  and  in  none  did  the  mind  of  American  youth  need  a  more  particular  antidote  to 
its  poisoning  influence.  It  was  a  good  thought  then  to  give  a  sound,  reliable  first  book  to  the 
youthful  student,  and  we  are  happy  to  find  that  Mr.  Burke  and  his  able  American  collaborator, 
have  succeeded  in  producing  a  te.'it-book  which  we  can  with  the  utmost  confidence  commend  to 
the  favorable  consideration  of  the  instructors  of  youth. 

The  Cambridge  (Mass.)  Chronicle  says;—"  We  have  often  called  the  attention  of  our  readers 
to  the  great  value  of  Lingard's  History.  The  learning,  ability,  and  general  impartiality  of  tha 
author  are  well  known  An  abridgment  of  the  work  was  very  desirable,  and  it  appears  to  have 
been  very  well  done  by  the  present  editor.  No  person  can  be  said  to  be  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  English  History  who  is  not  familiar  with  Lingard.  The  volume  is  well  printed,  in  a  clear 
type,  and  convenient  form,  and  furnishes  a  valuable  contribution  to  the  h'storical  literature  of 
the  country 

The  London  Critic  says: — "  The  author  has  carefully  and  successfully  produced  a  volume  that 
must  be  very  acceptable  to  those  for  whose  use  it  was  designed." 

The  Dtiblin  Revieio  says:— "Mr.  Burke's  Abridgment  is  completely  successful.  Wo  do  not 
hesitate  to  pronounce  the  work,  as  a  whole,  one  of  tiie  most  Taluable  additions  to  our  scanty 
school  literature  which  we  have  met  with  for  many  years.' 

The  London  edition  oi Broicnson' s  Reviete  says:  -"Mr.  Burke  appears  to  have  entered  on  his 
task  with  an  enthusiasm  equal  to  the  ability  which  he  has  displayed  in  executing  it.  He  has 
formed  a  Manual  of  British  History,  not  merely  the  best  for  the  object  aimed  at — the  instruction 
of  youth— but  a  volume  of  safe  reference  to  those  of  riper  years." 

The  Dublin  F-eemnn's  Journal  says:— "Mr.  Burke  has  performed  his  la' orions  task  well, 
compressing  into  a  comparatively  small  space  the  substance  of  such  a  large  work  in  the  autlior's 
own  language,  adding  a  clear  and  rapid  abstract  of  the  national  history  down  to  the  present 
J  ear." 

.A  Sistorjl  of  the  Catholic  Cliurchffrom  the  Cjmmencement 
of  the  Christian  Era  to  the  Ecumenical  Council  of  the  Vatican.  Compiled  and 
Translated  from  the  best  Authors.  By  Rev.  Tueodore  Noethen.  With  Ques- 
tions, adapted  to  the  use  of  Schools...4th  Edition  ...Re(;ently  Published,        1.25 

The  utility  and  importance  of  a  Compendium  of  Church  History  for  the  use 
of  College.",  Academies  and  Schools,  are  so  great  and  so  evident,  that  the  Com- 
piler of  the  present  volume  deems  it  unnecessary  to  make  more  than  a  pasting 
allusion  to  this  subject.  The  knowledge  of  the  History  of  the  Catholic  Church 
is  essential  to  every  Catholic.  As  the  age  we  live  in  demands  the  greatest  w.itoh- 
fulness  on  the  part  of  parents,  teachers  and  pastors,  in  regard  to  the  moral  and 
religious  culture  of  youth,  we  have  omitted  nothing  that  can  make  thi.s  History 
a  most  complete  and  perfect  text-book  tor  students,  trusting  thereby  to  etfect  a 
great  and  lasting  good  lor  the  present  and  future  time.  In  order  to  facilitate  the 
use  of  this  work  for  both  teachers  and  scholars,  Questions  have  been  added  at 
the  end  of  the  book. 

Opinions  op  the  Press. 

"This  Compendium  has  long  been  needed.  We  call  the  attention  of  all  instructors  to  the 
work,  and  recommend  its  introduction  into  the  Catholic  schools.  Besides  being  a  good  text-book 
for  the  class,  it  will  bo  found  to  conta.n  verj'  ins'.ructing  reading  for  the  family  circle.  The  facts 
are  racorded  succinctly,  and  the  few  reflections  made  are  to  the  point."  Av«  ilaria. 

**Tli«j  book  is  very  praiseworthy." — Cath.  World.        "  Just  the  book  wo  wanted." — N.  Y.  Tablet. 

MuRPHT  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  BooksellerSf  Baltimore. 
.2. 


KlUITEY'S  COMPENDIUM  OF  HISTOI^Y. 

A  Coinpendiiim  of  Ancient  and  3Iodern  History ,  from 

the  Creation  to  tJio  year  18G7,  with  Questions  adapted  to  the  use  of  Schools; 
also  an  Appendix,  containing  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  U.  S.,  a  Biographical  Sketch  of  Eminent  Personages,  with  a  Chro- 
nological Table  of  Remarkable  Events.  Discoveries,  Improvements,  etc.  By 
M.  J.  K:.n,XET,  A.  M.   46th  Revised  and  Enlarged  Edition,  continued  up  to  1867. 

12o.,  half  arabesque.  1.23 
In  presenting  a  Revised  and  Enlarged  Edition  of  this  Popular  History  to  the 
public,  the  publishers  deem  it  unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  its  merits.  Exten- 
Bively  introduced  into  tlie  Schools  of  this  (Jountry,  and  in  many  Institutions  of 
Learning  in  England  and  Ireland,  and  even  in  the  East  Indies,  it  has  met  every- 
where with  the  greatest  Civor,  and  thirty-one  editions  rapidly  exhausted  are 
evidence  of  the  liberal  patronage  extended  to  this  sterling  work. 

The  Compendium  has  been  brought  down  to  the  Present  Time,  and  this  Edi- 
tion eomorises  all  the  Important  Events  that  have  transpired  in  Europe  since 
the  Crimean  War,  including  the  Recent  War  between  Austria  and  Prussia;  the 
History  of  the  Ephemeral  l':mpire  of  Mexico;  and  a  Graphic  Sketch  of  the  Ame- 
rican Civil  War,  written  loithout  partiality  or  bias.  The  data  for  this  Last  and 
Important  Chapter  have  been  carefully  compiled  from  the  most  authentie 
sources,  and  from  the  best  Narrative  of  the  Principal  Events  of  the  War,  that  can 
be  put  in  the  hands  of  the  young. 

These  additions  have  been  carefully  Prepared,  and  written  in  conformity  with 
the  spirit  of  impartiality  which  has  made  Mr.  Kerney's  books  so  popular. 

Recommendations,  Notices,  &c. 

Uiis  Book,  has  been  Introduced  into  the  Female  High  Schools  of  Baltimore, 

by  the  following  Resolutions,  January  10, 1871. 

Resolved,  That  the  Committee  ou  Female  High  Schools  be  authorized  to  purchase  for,  and  in- 
troduce into  said  Schools  as  a  Text-book  on  general  History,  Kerney's  Compendium  of  History. 

Resoloed,  That  from  and  after  this  the  use  of  all  other  Histories  as  Text-books  in  said  Female 
High  Schools  shall  be  forbidden  and  the  book  adopted  under  the  authority  of  the  foregoing  reso- 
lutions shall  be  substituted  in  the  place  of  those  now  used  and  taught  in  said  Schools. 

Baltimore  City  College,  Baltimore,  May  Zlst,  1871. 

Messrs.  Mukpht  &  Co.  In  accordance  with  your  request,  I  have  carefully  examined  Ker- 
ney's Compendium  of  History.  As  the  result  of  this  examination,  I  can  unhesitatingly  affirm 
that  t;.e  work  is  uniformly  pervaded  by  a  clear,  candid,  and  discriminating  narration  of  leading 
historical  events,  which  admirably  adapts  it  to  the  purposes  of  instruct  on  in  our  Schools  and 
Academies.  A  second  and  a  more  diligent  perusal  of  the  book,  has  only  served  to  confirm  my 
first  impressions  of  its  excellence,  and  I  commend  it  to  all  who  are  interested  in  elevating  the 
standard  of  instruction  in  this  most  important  department  of  our  educational  system. 

Hexry  E.  Shepherd,  Pro/.  Histonj  and  Literature. 
Eastern  Female  High  School,  Baltimore,  June2<i,  1871. 

Gkntle.me:!! :  I  have  r.o  cause  to  change  the  favorable  opinion  I  expressed  of  "Kerney's  Com- 
pendium of  Aneient  and  Modern  History"  ou  its  introduction  into  this  School.  In  the  hand  of 
the  true  educator  it  has,  I  think,  no  superior.  Nath.  H.  Thayer. 

Kerney's  Co  .  pendium  has  been  introduced  into  the  College  Grammar  School,  and  gives  entire 
satisfaction.  In  st-le  and  sjstem,  and  the  interest  it  excites,  it  is  admirably  adapted  to  begin- 
ners and  junior  students,  while  it  may  be  read  and  consulted  with  profit  by  the  more  advanced. 

Benj.  S  Ewell,  President. 

Williamsburg,  Va.,  October,  1SG7.  Colkge  William  and  Jfory. 

The  Compendium  of  History,  by  M.  J.  Kerney,  has  been  in  my  possession  several  months,  and, 
after  a  careful  reading,  I  believe  it  to  be  a  very  useful  book  in  the  department  of  study  to  whieb 
it  belongs.    I  take  pleasure  ia  recommending  it  to  teachers. 

J.  N.  M'JiLTOX,  Chairman  Central  High  School  of  Bait. 

"We  have  looked  through  it  w'th  some  attention,  and  must  confess  that  we  have  been  favora- 
bly impressed  with  its  merits.  Ia  the  History,  more  especially,  where  it  is  imoossille  to  avoid 
the  relation  of  facts  touching  various  religious  creeds,  the  compiler  seems  to  h:ive  scrupulously 
refrain  d  from  any  remark  that  could  arouse  sectarian  prejudice — a  fault  in  which  too  many  of 
those  who  have  given  their  labors  to  the  compilation  of  school  histories  have  been  prone  to  itt- 
dulge."  Nutiotial  InttlUgencer. 

"  As  an  elementary  treatise,  this  work  will,  we  should  suppose  be,  and  deservedly  so,  a  favorite 
in  onr  sciools.  T  le  appendix  of  biographical  notices  of  prominent  individuals,  is  an  original 
aud  desirable  addition  to  ilie  book."  Lutheran  Observer. 

"It  is  a  work  containing  much  useful  information,  and,  as  a  school  book,  and  for  general  hi»- 
torical  reference,  it  will  he  found  invaluable."  Baltimore  America^ 

Murphy  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  Booksellers^  Baltimore. 
S 


ITpivards  of  80,000  Copies  Iiave  been  Sold. 

Kernel/*^  First  Class  BooJc  of  History,  Designed  for  Tupils 

commencin;^  the  Study  of  History,  with    Qucsiitna,  adapted  to  the  use  of 

Schools.    By  M.  J.  Kernet,  A.  M.,  Author  of  Compendium  of  History,  &e.,  &c. 

Revised  and  Enlarged  Edition.    {8Uh  Thousand.) 60 

jjLg-  It  is  Clear,  Comprohensive,  Tru'.hful  and  Impartial,  and  can  bo  recommended  with  confi- 
dence, as  tlio  best  and  most  reliable  School  Ilistorj  Published. 

The  appearance  of  thirty-two  large  editions  of  Kerney's  First  Class  Book  of 
History  within  Iwadij  years,  is  a  sufficient  evidence  of  its  popularity  as  an  ele- 
mentary class  book.  As  a  book  for  study,  and  a  book  for  reading,  in  place  of  the 
disjointed  matter  found  in  ordinary  "Readers,"  the  publishers  have  endeavored 
to  make  it  every  way  worthy  of  continued  patronage. 

The  importance  of  the  particular  changes  introduced  in  this  edition,  renders 
it  desirable  to  call  the  attention  of  teachers  and  parents  to  its  e  ihanced  value. 
Errors  and  inaccuracies  of  whatever  kind  have  been  carefully  rectified.  If  any 
have  found  in  it  heretofore  defects  worthy  of  notice,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
emendations  supplied, —  suggested  as  they  have  been,  by  teachers  of  experi- 
ence,— will  recommend  this  new  edition  to  their  hearty  approval. 

In  order  to  make  this  book  correspond  in  character  with  the  Author's  larger 
work,  the  "Compendium  of  Ancient  and  Modern  History,"  the  last  edition  was 
enlarged  by  the  introduction  of  a  short  synopsis  of  Sacred  and  Ancient  History. 
In  Modern  History,  several  chapters  were  added,  embracing  the  most  important 
recent  events  that  had  transpired  in  the  civilized  countries  of  the  world,  includ- 
ing the  late  "  American  Civil  War." 

The  form  of  "  Questions  "  at  the  foot  of  each  page  has  been  improved.  Super- 
fluities have  been  retrenched,  and  facts  equally  as  important  to  be  known  as 
those  already  stated,  introduced.  Where  the  narrative  embraces  events,  which, 
from  their  religious  or  political  bearing,  gives  rise  to  a  diversity  of  opinion' 
among  men,  care  has  been  taken  to  avoid  a  method  of  statement  likely  to  prove 
offensive  to  either  extreme.  Truth  is  the  object  aimed  at,  not  partizunship:  in 
the  interests  of  which  it  is  notorious  that  the  most  of  what  is  called  History,  is 
written.  The  publishers  trust  that  this  little  book  will  now  find  its  way  into  a 
still  wider  circle  of  institutions,  than  those  in  which  it  has  been  heretofore 
known  and  appreciated. 

No  pains  have  been  spared  in  the  revision  and  preparation  of  this  Edition, 
with  the  hope  of  rendering  it  worthy,  in  every  respect,  of  the  high  commenda- 
tion and  liberal  patronage  enjoyed  by  Mr.  Kerney's  Popular  Class  Books. 

From  a  large  number  of  Recommendations,  we  select  the  following : 

From  Professor  Joynks,  o/  n^ashington  and  Lee  University,  Va. 

Messrs.  Joay  Murphy  k  Co  ,  Dear  Sirs :— I  have  used  K-mey'a  First  Lessons  in  History  tor 
some  time  past,  in  teaching  my  own  children,  and  have  had  occasion  at  the  same  time  to  compare 
it  with  other  books  for  the  first  study  of  History.  I  consider  Kern)  y's  much  the  best  book  for  this 
purpose  that  I  have  seen.  It  is  the  most  comprehensive,  and  at  the  same  time  the  simplest  in  its 
style— while  it  is  fuU  of  facts,  it  is  :ilso  suiaciently  enlivened  by  anecdote  and  incident,  to  keep 
up  the  interest  of  children.  It  seems  moreo  er  to  be  just  and  truthful,  and  contains  nothing 
that  cou  d  be  offensive  to  any  portion  of  our  people— a  quality  that  in  these  da)S,  when  school 
books  seem  to  be  regarded  as  proper  instruments  for  political  teaching,  should  commend  it  es- 
peci-illy  to  the  peo  le  of  the  South.  I  trust  it  may  have  a  wide  circulation  in  our  Southern 
Schools.  Very  truly.  EDWARD  S.  JOYxVES. 

Easterx  Female  IIigh  School,  Baltimore,  June  25,  1371. 

Gentlemen':— The  true  province  of  the  Uistorian  is  to  givo  facts  without  comment.  This  is  a 
distingaislu:.g  quality  of  Kerney's  "  First  Book  of  History,"  which  renders  it  not  only  a  model 
for  all  compilers,  but  an  unobjeotional  work  for  all  schools.  Nathaniel  H.  Thayer, 

Board  School  Com.missionkr3  of  Talbot  Co.,  Boston,  April  29, 1878. 
J  MORPHT  k  Co.,  .Sr»>8:— We  find  no  books  so  well  adaiit?d  to  the  wants  of  our  Public  School* 
as  "Kerney's  First  Class  Book  of  History"  and  "Kerney's  Compendium  of  History."    The 
Sotjool  Board  of  Talbot  county  adopted  the^e  books  unanimously.  A.  CBArLAiN,  Sec  y. 

Murphy  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  Booksellers,  Baltimore, 
4 


ONDERDONK'S  HISTORY  OF  MARYLAND, 

From  Its  Settlement,  to  1 8  7  7.  With  the  Constitution  of  the  State,  for  the  Use  of  Schools. 

Fifth  Revised  and  Enlarged  Edition,  with  Fine  Engravings,  376  pages,  75  cts. 

Adopted  as  a  Text-Book  in  the  Public  Schools  of  Baltimore, 

AND  SEVERAL  COUNTIES  OF  THE  StATK. 

From  the  Preface.— The  former  editions  of  this  History  having  met  with  such 
favor  from  the  public  that  a  new  edition  is  demanded,  opportunity  has  been 
given  to  make  further  additions.  Biographical  sketches  of  some  of  Maryland's 
prominent  men  have  been  added.  New  illustrations  have  been  made,  and  it 
has  been  more  thoroughly  adapted  to  the  use  of  the  class  room.  The  portion 
that  relates  to  the  period  of  the  civil  war  has  been  re-written,  and  care  has  been 
taken  to  make  it  a  History  of  the  State  during  that  war.  No  attempt  has  been 
made,  and  it  would  be  out  of  place  if  it  were  made,  to  give  a  history  of  the  war; 
Viat  belongs  to  the  History  of  the  United  States.  ^ 

The  History  of  the  Proprietary  government,  under  which  Maryland  was  es- 
tablished and  grew,  is  full,  for  it  is  in  that  government  that  we  find  the  germs 
of  those  principles  of  popular  liberty  that  resulted  In  the  Revolution ;  and  it  is 
in  the  free  institutions  founded  under  it  that  we  recognize  the  school  in  which 
our  fathers  learned  both  the  true  objects  of  government,  and  their  own  rights 
as  individuals. 

There  is  perhaps  no  stimulus  to  worthy  deeds,  or  at  least  to  the  preservation 
of  self-respect,  equal  to  that  which  is  furnished  in  the  legacy  of  a  good  name. 
That  our  youth  should  know  how  rich  the  History  of  Maryland  is  in  all  that  can 
inspire  noble  emulation,  is  not  only  desirable  in  itself,  but  is  the  surest  pledge 
that  they  will  be  animated  to  deeds  worthy  of  their  sires,  and  that,  by  "imitat- 
ing the  virtue,  the  valor,  and  the  liberality  of  their  forefathers,"  they  will  hand 
down  the  State  to  posterity  with  untarnished  lustre. 

In  the  former  editions,  the  hope  was  expressed  that  this  little  book  might  be 
instrumental  in  promoting  this  knowledge  among  the  rising  generation  of  the 
State.  TTie  ad-option  of  this  History  as  a  text-hook  by  the  Public  Schools  of  the  eity  of 
Baltimore,  and  the  subsequent  adoption  by  the  State  Board  of  Education,  and  their 
recommendation  of  its  use  by  all  the  Schools  of  the  State,  justify  the  hope  expressed, 
and  give  assurance  that  it  supplies  the  want  so  long  felt. 

With  the  view  of  meeting  the  requirements  of  the  School  Law  of  1S7S,  the  Constituttoh 
of  the  State  has  been  added.  The  importance  of  making  this  a  subject  of  study 
in  the  common  schools  cannot  be  over  estimated.  As  it  is  the  duty  of  every 
man  to  take  a  part  in  the  political  movements  ot  the  day,  we  trust,  that  our 
youth,  will  be  thoroughly  instructed  therein,  so  that  when  they  come  to  act 
their  part  on  the  stage  of  life,  they  may  be  amply  prepared  to  discharge  the 
high  and  holy  duties  that  necessarily  devolve  upon  every  freeman. 

The  authorities  consulted  in  this  work  are  McMahon,  McSherry,  Irving,  Ban- 
croft, Bozman,  and  papers  of  Maryland  Historical  Society. 

College  St.  James,  Sept.  1877.  HENRY  ONDERDONK. 

OrncE  SuPEBiirrENDEiiT  or  Pfblio  Insteuction, 

Baltimore,  April  3Qth,  1877. 
This  13  to  certify  that  the  Third  Revised  Edition  of  Onderdonk's  History  of  Maryland,  pub- 
lished by  John  Murphy  &  Co.,  Baltimore,  vras  on  the  24th  of  April,  in  accordance  with  a  unani- 
mous resolution  of  the  Committee  on  Books,  adopted  by  the  Board  of  School  Commissioners  of 
Baltimore,  for  use  in  the  Grammar  Schools.  HENRY  E.  SHEPHERD, 

Superintendent  of  Public  Schoola, 

4®"  At  a  meeting  of  the  State  Boarp  of  Education,  held  on  the  29th  of  May,  1872,  Onder- 
donk's School  History  of  Maryland,  with  the  Constitution  of  the  State  Appended,  was  unani- 
moQsly  recommenaed  for  adoption  in  all  the  Public  Schools  of  the  State. 

Murphy  &  Co.  Publishers  arid  Booksellers,  Baltimore. 
5 


Kerney*s  Aritlinietics. 

The  Columhian  Arithmetic,  designed  for  the  Use  of  Acade- 
mies and  Schools.    By  M.  J.  KtRNKr,  A.  M 2Glh  Edition.    50 

The  oim  has  been,  ia  the  compilation  and  arrangement  of  this  work,  to  make  it  a  book  of 
prnriirnl  inHtruclion ;  ono  in  ■vvhuh  the  pcienco  of  figures  is  thorouprlily  explained  and  clearly 
elucidated.  The  examples  for  practice  are  generally  euch  as  the  pupil  Trill  meet  in  the  various 
busincs<  transactions  of  life.  The  arrangement  is  progressive,  all  questions  being  solved  by 
rule  j  previously  explained.  This  le  w  editi^iu  has  been  carefully  revised  and  enlarged.  Several 
useful  tables  oa  the  subject  of  Ii>iere<,l  have  been  introOuced,  and  numerous  miacellHueous 
examples  added.  The  e  improvements  reader  the  'work  still  more  deserving  of  the  extensive 
patiouageit  has  heretufore  enj<iyed. 

Krj/  to  Kft^rifiys  Columbian  Arithmetic,  containing  the 

Solution  of  tho  principal  Questions 40 

Introduction  to  the  Columhian  Arithmetic,  for  the  Use  of 

Schools.    By  M.  J.  Kerney,  A.  M 30th  Revised  Edition.    20 

This  little  work  is  designed  aa  an  introduction  to  the  former,  and  is  intended  for  children 
abo\it  to  commence  the  study  of  Arithmetic.  The  first  principles  of  the  science  are  familiarly 
explained  in  the  form  of  question  and  answer,  and  the  pupils  are  conducted  in  the  study  as  far 
as  the  end  of  compound  numbers.  It  is  roplete  wiih  practical  example",  adaped  to  the  capacity 
of  that  class  of  learners  for  which  it  is  designed,  and  it  also  contains  all  the  Tablef.  a. 

Mr.  Kerney's  Arithmetics  have  already  acquired  a  wide-spread  popularity,  as  attested  oy  th« 
■ale  of  large  editions  in  a  few  years.  They  are  books  of  practical  instruction,  arranged  by  a 
practical  teacher  of  many  years'  experience.  The  present  editions  have  been  carefully  revised, 
and  neither  pains  nor  expense  will  be  spared  to  render  them  at  all  times  worthy  the  high 
reputaiiua  already  acquired. 

The  Publishers  have  the  pleasure  of  announcing  that  this  Series  of  Arithmetics  havennder- 
gono  a  carffal  and  thorough,  rtrision,  by  a  Brother  or  the  SociEir  or  the  Holy  Ckoss,  an 
experienced  practical  teacher  and  arithmetician. 

Kerney's  Murray's  Grammar* — An  Abridgment  of  Murray^ s 

Grammar  and  Exercises,  designed  for  the  Use  of  Academies  and  Schoola;  with 

an  Appendix,  containing  Rules  for  Writing  with  Perspicuity  and  Accuracy; 

also  a  Treatise  on  Epistolary  Composition.    By  M.  J.  Kerney,  A.  .M. 

46th  Edition.    18o.  half  bound,    25 

This  Grammar  is  used  in  the  Public  fichools  of  Baltimore;  in  the  Schools  of  the  Christian 
Brothers;  and  in  many  of  the  principal  Schools  and  Academies  throughout  the  country. 

In  point  of  arrangement,  this  work  is  superior  to  any  other  Abridgment  of  Murray's  Gram- 
mar that  has  yet  appeared  before  the  public.  It  combines  the  Grammar  and  Exercise,  by  adapt- 
ing Exercises  to  every  chapter  and  section  throughout  the  work,  so  that  the  pupil  may  have,  at 
every  stage  of  his  progress,  a  practical  illustration  of  the  portion  under  his  immediate  study. 
The  present  edition  has  been  carefully  revised  by  the  author,  and  many  valuable  improvements 
made  in  the  work,  A  Treatise  on  Epistolary  Composition  has  b>.en  added,  containing  direc- 
tions for  writing  Letters,  Notes,  Cards,  Ac,  with  a  variety  of  examples  of  the  same. 

A  Catechism  of  Scripture  History ,  compiled  by  the  Sisters 

of  Mercy  for  the  children  attending  their  schools.    Revised  by  M.  J.  Kernby, 

A.  M ., 31st  Edition.    75 

"This  excellent  work  is  extensively  tised  in  nearly  all  Catholic  Institutions  throughout 
England,  Ireland,  Canada,  and  the  United  States. 

"  The. object  of  the  Catechism,  *  is  to  render  children  early  acquainted  with  the  truthful  and 
interesting  events  recorded  in  the  Sacred  Scriptures;  to  familiarize  them  with  the  prophecies 
relating  to  tbe  coming  of  the  .Messiah,  and  lead  them  to  rega;  d  the  Old  Testament  as  a  figure 
and  a  forshadowing  ot  the  New.' 

"The  present  edition  has  been  much  improved,  the  questions  to  the  answers  being  made 
more  concise,  so  as  to  admit  of  their  being  easily  committed  to  memory.  An  Appendix  has  also 
been  add.-d,  containing  extracts  from  the  Prophets,  Scripture  texts,  and  short  sketches  of  the 
lives  of  the  Apostles  and  Evangelists.  The  Chronological  Table,  which  has  been  carefully  re- 
vised and  considerably  enlarged,  fixes  the  dates  rf  the  most  remarkable  events  recorded  in  the 
Sacred  Writings." 

Catechism  of  Ecclesiastcal  History,     Abridged  for  the  Use 
of  Schools.    By  a  Friend  of  Youth.    Enlarged  Edition.    IGo.  flexible  cloth,  .30 
This  little  work  has  been  carefully  revised  and  enlarged,  the  text  being  brought  down  to  the 
present  time.    Ttieso  improvements  it  is  hoped  will  render  it  still  more  popular  with  tlifi  in- 
structors of  youth. 

Muri  ay\s  English  Gramtnar,  adapted  to  the  different  classes 

o!  learneVs;  with  an  Appendix,  containing  rules  and  observations  for  assis-ting 
the  more  advanced  students  to  write  with  perspicuity  and  accuracy.    By 

LlNDLUY  MUURW 12o.    40 

In  presenting  a  new  edition  of  Mt'-rray's  Gnaromar,  which  is  wnivetaally  considered  the  best 
extant,  we  deem  ic  8uffl..ient  to  state,  th.it  die  present  edition  is  printed  from  an  entirely  new 
set  of  plates,  and  that  it  has  been  c.irefully  revised,  and  free  from  many  of  the  inaccuracies  and 
iilemishes  which  are  to  be  found  in  other  oaitious,  printed  from  old  stereotype  plates.  This^ 
together  with  the  very  low  price  affixed  to  it,  are  thi  only  claims  urged  in  favor  of  this  edition] 

Murray's  English  Reader 18o.     35 

Murphy  &  Co.  Publishers  and  Booksellers,  Baltimore 
G 


HILL'S    PHILOSOPHY. 
HILL'S  rniLOSOrST,  comprising   Ethics  and 
Moral  Philosophy,    By  Kev.  Walter  H.  Hill,  S.  J.,  Pro- 
fessor  of  Philosophy  in  the  St.  Louis  University ^  Mo.   Just  PuhlisJieil, 

in  1  vol.  12o.  342  pages,  half  arabesque $1  60 

We  have  the  pleasure  of  announcing  the  second  volume  of  Hill's  Philosophy, 
comprising  the  very  important  subject  of  Ethics,  or  Moral  Philosophy.  The 
Author  has  taken  time  to  perfect  his  work  by  reflection,  revision  and  frequent 
correction,  so  that  his  Readers  will  be  repaid  for  their  long  waiting  by  tho  ex- 
cellence of  the  work. 

Ethics  is  a  subject  on  which  we  have  thus  far  had  no  safe  text-book  in  our 
language;  and  yet  its  importance  is  such,  that  no  other  subject, besides  those 
intimately  connected  with  faith  and  religion,  needs  more  wise  and  discrimi- 
nating treatment. 

,  In  a  country  like  ours,  where  every  citizen  wields  power  for  the  weal  or  woe 
of  his  fellow-citizens  and  his  country,  what  can  be  of  more  vital  consequence 
than  that  every  citizen  should  have  true  and  sound  notions  and  principles 
about  the  great  questions  of  which  Moral  Philosophy  treats,  such  as  the  nature 
and  origin  of  authority,  dominion  and  government;  the  relation  of  man.  to 
himself,  to  society  and  to  his  Maker;  the  family,  education,  Ac? 

The  volume  here  presented  is  one  in  which  all  may  read  with  profit,  and  whose 
doctrine  they  can  safely  adopt  and  follow  in  practice.  To  the  student  and  pro- 
fessional man  it  is  simply  indispensable.  It  advances  nothing  that  is  not  war- 
ranted by  the  greatest  and  wisest  of  the  men  of  past  ages,  St.  Thomas,  St. 
Augustine,  Suarez,  Becanus,  &c  ,  whose  authority  is  quoted  on  every  page.  The 
Author's  own  long  experience  in  teaching  this  branch  of  science,  in  one  of  the 
principal  colleges  of  the  Society  of  Jesus  in  this  country,  is  another  motive  for 
confidence  in  the  fruit  of  the  patient  labor  he  has  bestowed  on  his  work. 

We  send  it  forth  on  its  mission,  in  the  assured  hope  that  it  will  be  received 
with  at  least  as  much  favor  as  was  shown  to  the  volume  on  Logic  and  General 
Metaphysics  from  the  same  pen. 

ELEMENTS  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  Comprising  Logic 

and  General  Principles  of  JtTetaphi/sics.     By  Rev.  Walter  H.  Hill,  S.J., 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  St.  Louis  University,  Mo.    Uth  Revised  Edition,  $1  60 
From  the  Publishers'  Preface  to  the  Second  Revised  Edition. — It  is  not  yet 
one  month  since  we  issued  the  First  Edition  of  Hill's  Philosophy,  and  such 
has  been  the  demand  for  the  work,  that  a  second  Editon  is  required.    Very 
favorable  notices  have  already  been  given  of  the  work  by  several  periodicals, 
and  able  judges,  whose  verdict  we  know  to  be  of  the  highest  authority,  have  pro- 
nounced the  book  a  true  and  trusty  guide  through  the  intricacies  of  philosophy. 
•'  We  rejoice  at  this  success,  because  it  ensures  the  completion  of  the  whole 
work,  including  Ethics,  and  gives  us  every  reason  to  believe  that  we  shall  soon 
have,  in  our  language,  a  Manual  of  Philosophy,  for  students  and  for  the  general 
reader,  equal  to  the  admirable  Latin  works,  which  have  hitherto  been  almost 
the  only  pure  sources  of  Philosophical  knowledge.' 

"The  Author  has  taken  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offerpd  by  the  prepara- 
tion of  this  Edition,  to  revise  his  work  and  tlius  render  it  more  acceptable  to 
the  student." 

This  Work  is  from  the  pen  of  one  who  has  devoted  many  years  to  the  f5tady 
and  teaching  of  philosophy.  Th-xt  it  is  sound  in  principle,  is  guaranteed  by  the 
well  known  character  of  the  studies  in  the  Society  to  which  the  author  belongs, 
whilst  his  experience  as  a  Teacher  leaves  no  room  for  doubt  that  his  book  ha« 
been  written  in  clear  and  correct  language.  It  is  elementary  and  must  be  con- 
cise; yet  it  treats  the  important  points  of  philosophy  so  clearljs  and  contains  so 
many  principles  of  wide  application,  that  it  cannot  fail  to  be  especially  useful  in 
a  country  where  sound  philosophical  doctrine  is  perhaps  more  needed  than 
in  any  other. 

i*^Specimen  copies  of  either  Work,  will  be  sent  by  Mail  prepaid,  to  Teachers 
and  others,  with  a  view  to  Introduction,  only  on  receipt  of  one-half  the  retail 
price,  iS^These  two  volumes  arc  ipeciaL 

Murphy  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  Booksellers,  Baltimore. 

I 


Sestini's  Mathematical  Works. 

Elementary  Afgebra*  By  B.  Sestint,  S  J.,  Author  of  Analyti- 
cal Geometry,  &c,,  &c.  Professor  of  Natural  Philosophy  and 
Astronomy  in  Georgetown  College.  12o.  half  arabesque,  75 

The  main  object  of  this  treatise  is  to  render  the  science  of  Algebra  intelligi- 
ble to  pupils  whose  minds  are  yet  unaccustomed  to  such  studies.  Tlic  beginner 
will  here  be  ftuni<hed  with  sue  h  proofs  as  are  suited  to  his  capacity;  examples 
will  afford  new  light  to  what  might  be  otherwise  obscured  with  regaid  to  the 
operations  founded  on  higher  principles;  he  will,  for  the  present,  content  him- 
self with  merely  practical  rules,  exemplified  in  the  same  manner.  Wiih  a  mind 
thus  gradually  led  on  to  strict  mathematical  discussion,  he  may  then  resume 
his  course  with  ]>rofit,  by  the  aid  of  a  treatise  now  in  preparation,  which  is  in- 
tendt  d  as  a  sequel  to  this,  and,  by  more  exact  and  thorough  investigatiop,  com- 
plete his  Ltudy  of  Algebra. 

A  Treaiiso  on  Algebra.  By  B.  Sestini,  S.  J.,  Author  of 
"  Elementary  Algebra,"  "Analytical  Geometry,  &c.  12o.  1  00 
The  treatise  is  divided  into  two  p-^rts,  the  first  of  which  contains  Algebraical 
operations,  with  several  questions  and  doctrines  connected  with  them,  so  that 
each  section  may  prove  complete  in  its  own  subject,  and  the  inconvenience  of 
turning  elsewhere  to  speak  of  matter  left  unfinished  before,  may  be  avoided. . . . 
The  second  contains  the  most  indispensable  theories  of  equations,  proportions, 
and  progressions,  logarithms,  and  some,  few  principles  on  the  series.  The  doe- 
trine  of  equations  has  been  treated  more  copiously  than  the  others,  not  so  much 
on  account  of  its  importance  as  because  it  is  well  adapted  to  give  an  idea  of 
algebraic  analysis,  and  thus  prepare  the  mind  of  the  student,  who  would  after- 
wards apply  himself  to  higher  studies.  It  is  as  clear  and  concise  as  the  nature 
of  such  works  permits,  and  seems  to  embrace  everything  necessary  to  a  full 
knowledge  of  Algebra. 

Elements  of  Geometry  and  Trigonometry,  by  B.  Sestini, 

S.J.,  Author  of  "Analytical  Geometry,"  "  Elementary  Algebra,"  &c.  8o.  half  cl.  $2 
•'The  author  has  succeeded  in  combining  two  qua'ities  rarely  united,— great 
perspicuity  and  extreme  conciseness.  It  has  evidently  been  the  result  of  great 
thought  and  long  experience  in  teaching.  The  student  passes  gradually  from 
the  .simpler  to  the  more  complex  truths  of  the  science.  The  work  cannot  be  too 
warmly  commended  as  an  admirable  introduction  to  the  science  it  professes  to 
teach,  and  we  would  advise  teachers  and  parents  not  to  select  a  text-book  until 
they  have  given  this  volume  a  careful  and  candid  examination." — Metropolitan, 

Manual  of  Geometrical  and  Infinitesimal  Analysis,  by 

B.  Sestini,  S.  J.     8o.,  half  roan (Recently  Published,)     1  60 

Extract  from  the  Preface. — "This  manual,  prepared  with  the  view  of  its  serving 
as  an  introduction  to  the  study  of  Physical  Science,  was  onlv  intended  f<^r  a 
class  of  students  intrusted  to  the  care  of  the  compiler.  The  suggestion  of 
friends  that  the  work  might  prove  advantageous  to  others  induces  liim  to  oflPer 
it  to  t!ie  public. 

"Works  of  analysis — some  of  theiA  voluminous — are  not  wanting;  nor  does 
our  little  book  pretend  to  give  a  complete  development  of  its  subject.  For  this 
reason  we  call  it  a  manual,  which  excludes  all  discussions  the  results  of  which 
are  seldom  or  never  called  into  use  in  the  applications.  It  is  hoped,  however, 
thrt  it  will  sufficiently  serve  the  purpose  intended." 

The  North  American  Spelling  Book,  Designed  for 
Elementary  Introduction  in  Schools.  A  New  Enlarged  Edition. 
Being  an  improvement  upon  all  others 20 

The  aim  in  this  compilation  has  been  to  present  a  gradation  of  leesonB  necoesary  to 
impart  a  knowledge  of  the  spelling,  division,  pronunciation,  and  accentuation  of  the 
Tarious  sounds  and  syllables  that  compose  the  English  language.  In  pronouncing 
and  accenting  words,  good  usage  and  the  best  lexicographers  have  been  followed. 
The  rules  laid  down  are  few,  but  simple  and  concise;  and  the  progress  from  what  is 
easy  to  what  is  diflScult,  is  gentle  and  gradual.  It  is  universally  conceded  to  be  on« 
of  the  4iBBT,  as  it  is  nnquestionably  the  Cheapeit  Spelling  Book  published. 

MuRPHT  &  Co,  Publishers  and  Bookfiellers,  Baliimoi-e. 
8 


^^^  THE  BEST  AND  CHEAPEST 

"Wilson's   Progressive   Speller. 

Wilson's  Progressive  Speller,  containing  upwards  of  Twelve 

Thousand  Words,  with  Reading  and  Dictation  Exercises  annexed  to  each  Les- 
son, arranged  so  as  to  be  best  adapted  to  Aid  the  Memory,  and  obviate  the 
difficulties  in  this  Branch  of  Elementary  Education.    Compiled  by  William  J. 

Wilson,  of  North  Carolina Fifth  Revised  Edition,  190  pages,  ISo.    25 

This  booK  has  been  prepared  with  great  care  by  a  gentleman  eminently  quali- 
fied, both  by  education  and  experience.  Its  characteristic  is  the  simplicity  of 
its  arrangement.  Being  strictly  a  Spelling  Book,  no  attempt  is  made  to  combine 
with  it  subjects  of  study  coming,  properly,  after  the  child  has  learned  to  spell 
and  read.  Each  lesson  is  accompanied  by  a  Reading  and  Dictation  Exercise, 
designed  to  cultivate  the  eye,  the  eir,  and  the  hand.  The  object  of  a  Speller 
being  to  teach  the  mechanica'  structure  and  pronunciation  of  words,  the  lessons 
and  exercises  are  arranged  primarily  and  solely  to  this  end.  The  orthography 
and  orthcBpy  are  according  to  the  standards  recognized  as  highest  authorities  in 
this  country.  Especial  care  has  been  taken  to  keep  it  free  from  provincialisms^ 
and  it  is,  therefore,  recommended  as  a  Text-Book  suitable  alike  for  all  sections 
of  the  country.  The  completeness  of  its  vocabulary  may  be  known  from  tha 
feet  of  its  containing  upwards  of  twelve  Thousand  English  words. 

Recommendations,  Notices,  &o. 
State  or  North  Carolina,  OrncE  Superintendent  of  Public  iNSTRuurioif, 

Raleigh,  May  20th,  1871. 
Messrs.  John  Murphy  &  Co.,  Gents— 1  have  the  houor  to  inform  you  that,  by  viitue  of  a  vot« 
passed  by  the  Board  of  Education  of  this  State,  on  the  25th  of  March  last,  "  Wilson's  Progres- 
Bive  Speller"  is  recommended  for  use  in  ihe  Public  Schools  of  this  State. 

Yours  truly  S.  S.  ASULE  Y,  Sec'y  of  Board. 

From  R  E  v.  C.  H.  W  I  l  E  Y,  Superintendent  of  Common  Schools  of  N.  Carolina. 
Mr.W.  J.  Wilson  :  Dear  Sir — I  have  examined  with  care  your  Spelling  Book,  and  regard  it  ai 
ft  book  of  decided  merit.    You  have  manifested  in  its  preparation  taste,  judgment  and  learning, 
and  I  consider  it  worthy  of  iatroduction  into  our  schools.      I  am  truly  yours,      C.  II.  WILEY. 

From  Rev.  B.  Craven,  D.  D.,  President  of  Trinity  College,  N.  C. 
Mr.  Wilson:  Dear  Sir — I  have  examined  your  Spelling  Book,  and  believe  it  in  many  respect* 
•uperior  to  any  with  which  I  am  acquainted.    It  is  full  of  important  improvements.    I  should  b« 
glad  to  Bee  it  introduced  into  all  our  schools.  B.  CRAVEN. 

From  Rev.  Dr.  Deems,  of  N.  Carolina. 

Dear  Sir — The  pressure  of  my  engagements  has  not  allowed  time  for  a  very  careful  examina- 
tion of  the  MS  of  yonr  Spelling  Book,  the  many  good  points  of  which  have  made  themselves  ap- 
parent to  the  Rev.  Dr.  Craven  and  the  Rev.  Mr.  Wiley,  whose  judgment  of  such  a  work  I  am  free 
to  endorse.    I  hope  it  will  meet  with  deserved  success.  Very  respectfully  yours, 

W.J.Wilson,  Esq.  CUARLES  F.  DEEMS. 

From  Professor  Joynes,  o/  Washington  and  Lee  Unioersity,  Va. 

Messrs.  John  Murphy  &  Co.,  Dear  Sirs— I  regard  Wilson's  Progressive  Speller,  published  by 
yoR,  as  the  best  Spelling  Book  that  I  have  ever  seen.  In  simplicity,  in  fullness,  in  well  dis- 
tributed and  well  graded  classification,  and  in  practical  convenience  for  use,  I  think  it  supeWor 
toother  books.  The  Dictation  Exercises  that  aceompany  the  spelling  lessons,  afford  a  useful 
praxis  lor  the  pupil.  I  like  the  book  most  of  all  on  account  of  its  simplicity  and  easy  progrtS' 
aioeness.  It  recognizes  the  old  truth — almost  forgitten  now-a-daj's— that  spelling  is  something 
not  only  worth  learning,  but  very  hard  to  learn,  and  therefore  needed  to  be  taught  by  systematic, 
constant,  and  well-graded  practice;  :.nd  of  this,  it  furnishes  more,  and  furnishes  it  more  judi- 
ciously, than  any  other  book  that  I  have  seen.    I  wish  it  may  obtain  a  very  wide  use. 

EDWARD  S.  JOYNES. 

"  The  work  is  systematic,  devoid  of  provincialisms,  arranged  with  strict  regard  to  gradation 
with  a  uniformity  of  all  the  leading  vowel  sounds  in  all  the  words  of  each  lesson.  The  classifi- 
cation is  admirable,  and  we  believe  the  work  will  be  approved  by  teachers  everywhere." 

Memphis  Public  Ledytr. 

Murphy  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  Booksellerst  Baltimore, 
9 


To  Catholic  Educational  Institutions, 

In  soliciting  attention  to  the  following,  the  Publishers  have  the 
pleasure  of  announcing  that  most  of  these  Works  have  been  intro- 
duced, and  are  extensively  used  in  tnany  of  the  leading  Colleges^ 
Academies,  and  Schools  in  the   U.  S.,   Canada,  ^c. 

Prom  a  large  number  of  Recommendations,  Sec,  we  select  the  following : 
Professor  Jonx  O  Kane  Murray,  B.  S.,  of  Brooklyn,  N.  T.,  in  his  Literary  Correspond- 
ence to  the  Toronto  Tribune,  under  the  head  of  "American  Literary  Notes,"  says: 
A.  lELlslory  of  the  Catholic  Church  —  "how  many  who  think  themselves 
very  intelligent,  never  read  one,  in  fact,  never  saw  any  such  work?  Without 
wishing  to  press  the  point  too  closely,  how  many,  even  of  our  Catholic  College 
graduates,  know  quite  as  much  about  the  history  of  Mohametanism  as  they  do 
about  the  history  of  Catholicity— perhaps  more?  And  is  this  something  to  be 
proud  of— something  concerning  which  every  one  who  is  not  a  college  president, 
or  a  Cardinal,  should  be  silent?  But  why  write  a  catechism?  The  plain,  blunt 
truth  is,  this  is  a  matter  of  shame  in  many  of  our  higher  institutions.  Algebra, 
mythology  — the  tag-ends  of  nearly  every  'ology'  and  'ometry,'  are  freely 
thrown  to  students  while  they  are  left  to  hunger  for  even  a  glance  at  any  book 
containing  the  history  of  what  is  dearest  to  us  on  earth  —  our  sublime  Old 
Church]  Who  hears  of  a  student's  getting  a  prize  for  excellence  in  Church 
Eistory?  Frankly,  I  have  not.  We  talk  about  religious  instruction;  with  clarion 
voice,  we  urge  the  necessity  of  making  our  Catholic  youth  familiar  with  the 
Church  and  her  doctrines.  This  is  well.  But  let  every  Catholic  College  hang 
its  head  in  shame,  'as  a  traitor  to  its  high  mission,'  if  it  neglects  placing 
Church  History  on  its  programme  of  necessary  studies. 

"On  this  subject  we  have  now  some  excellent  text-books,  about  one  of  the 
very  best  of  which,  I  desire  to  make  a  few  remarks.  The  'History  of  the  Catho- 
lic Church,'  by  Rev.  Father  Noethen,  is  a  handsomely  bound  volume  of  650 
pages.  It  is  published  at  a  very  low  price  by  the  enterprising  house  of  John 
Murphy  &  Co.,  Baltimore.  As  a  well  written  and  meritorious  text-book  on 
Church  History,  it  has  no  rival  in  our  language.  'Full  without  overflowing,' 
it  strikes  the  golden  mean  between  too  much  and  too  little.  The  arrangement, 
the  skillful  presentation  of  salient  points,  the  omission  of  trivialities  commands 
hearty  praise— in  short,  the  whole  book  bears  the  impress  of  a  master  hand. 
This  is  just  the  volume  for  our  students— not  to  be  ignorant  of,  but  to  master. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  know  how  many  of  oi:r  Catholic  Colleges  in  the 
United  States  and  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  use  a  text-book  on  Church  History. 
Nov/,  I  desire  it  to  be  well  understood,  that  this  is  written  with  all  due  respect 
to  everybody,  by  one  who  does  not  wish  to  be  numbered  with  the  croakers,  and 
who  is  neither  indifferent  to  the  good  name  of  our  Catholic  Colleges,  nor  ignor- 
ant of  the  grand  work  they  are  doing  for  the  sound  education,  true  progress, 
and  civilization  in  America." 

JLingard's  England,  by  Burke,  (720  pagt^s.)  is  a  most  felicitous  and  success- 
ful attempt  at  giving  the  world  an  abridgment  of  the  greutef-t  history  of  Eng- 
land ever  written.  The  fifteenth  revised  and  enlarged  edition  lies  before  me. 
It  brings  the  story  of  England,  down  to  1873.  As  an  excellent  treatise  for  the 
etudeiA,  or  general  reader,  it  is  unequalled  in  beauty  of  style,  treatment  of  sub- 
ject, Catholic  tone,  and  richness  of  illustration.  The  "make  up"  of  the  book 
is  also  highly  creditable  to  the  publishers. 

"The  rapid  progress  made  by  American  Catholic  literature,  during  the  last 
few  years,  is  a  subject  ixit  by  any  means  as  well  known  as  it  should  be.  This 
is  especially  noticeable  in  the  line  of  sound,  suitable  text-books  for  Catholic 
schools  and  colleges.   Among  the  enterprising  publishing  houses  that  have 

Murphy  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  Booksellers^  Baltimore, 
10 


Recommendations,  &c Continued. 

been  conspicuous  in  bringing  about  this  laudable  improvement,  stands  the  well 
known  firm  of  John  Murphy  &  Co.,  of  Baltimore.  In  the  department  of  general 
history  they  publish  the  best  text-books  in  the  English  language.  This  may 
sound  like  hyperbole;  but  it  is  not  said  at  random,  nor  without  knowing  that 
•whereof  we  speak.* 

FredeVs  Ancient  and  Modem  Histary,  in  two  volumes,  are  used  in  the 
best  Catholic  Colleges  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

As  an  excellent  general  history  in  one  volume,  JK^emej/^s  Compendium  of 
Ancient  and  Modern  JSintori/  stands  alone,  while  his 

First  Class  Book  of  History  is  an  inimitable  little  volume  to  familiarize 
youth  with  the  great  story  of  the  past. 

Besides  the  foregoing,  the  following  are  a  few  of  the  excellent  text-books 
which  can  bo  warmly  commended  to  Catholic  educators  and  Catholic  parents. 
They  are  published  by  Messrs.  Murphy  &  Co.,  to  whose  courtesy  we  are  in- 
debted for  copies  of  the  latest  revised  editions : 

Hill's  Philosophy.  — The  Elements  of  Philosophy,  by  Father  Hill,  S.  J.,  is 
another  new  work,  which  will  prove  of  rare  value  to  our  Catholic  students.  It 
is  a  well  bound  volume  of  some  234  pages,  and  contains  a  thorough  discussion 
of  Logic  and  General  Metaphysics.  In  our  language,  we  know  of  but  one  other 
such  work,  (Louage's)  written  from  a  Catholic  stand  point,  and  of  the  two  we 
much  prefer  Father  Hill's  book.  Sound  in  doctrine,  and  written  in  a  clear,  terse 
stylo,  this  is  a  much  needed  and  truly  welcome  text-book. 

A  glance  at  another  work,  and  w^  must  finish. 

WettenhalVs  Greek  Grammar.— Rudiments  of  the  Greek  Language,*  by  a 
learned  Jesuit  Father,  is  an  admirable  little  grammar  of  that  classic  tongue 
which  was  immortalized  by  Homer,  Pindar  and  Sophocles.  In  112  pages  are 
condensed,  simplified  and  arranged  with  a  niasterhand,  the  principal  points  of 
Greek  grammar.  For  accuracy,  clearness,  brevity  and  neatness,  we  have  seen 
nothing  to  surpass  this  small  volume." 


School  and  Classical  Books,  Paper,  Stationery,  &c. 

Their  stock  of  School  Books  embraces,  in  addition  to  their  own, 
nearly  all  the  Publications  of  the  leading  Publishers  in  the  United 
States,  comprising  every  variety  of  Primers,  Spellers,  Readers, 
Grammars,  Arithmetics,  Geographies,  Histories,  Dictionaries,  etc.; 
also,  Works  on  Elocution,  Afgebra,  Geometry,  Trigonometry,  As- 
tronomy, Botany,  Chemistry,  Geology,  and  Mineralogy,  Philoso- 
phy, Rhetoric,  and  Logic,  Book-Kecping,  Penmanship,  etc.,  etc., 
together  with  all  the  leading  Text-Books  in  Latin,  Greek,  French, 
Spanish  and  German — nearly  all  of  which  they  are  prepared  to 
supply  at  Fuhlishers^  wholesale  prices. 

TheirStockofPaper,  Stationery,  and  School  Requisites  generally, 
comprises  every  variety,  all  of  which  they  are  prepared  to  sell  at  the 
lowest  current  rates 

Jl^^Orders,  which  will  receive  the  same  careful  and  prompt  atten- 
tion, as  if  selected  in  person,  are  respectfully  solicited. 

JI^^The  various  Railroad,  Transportation,  Express  and  Steamship 
Companies  running  from  our  city,  afford  every  facility  for  trans- 
portation at  the  Loive-^t  Rates,  to  all  parts  of  the  country — North 
and  South,  East  and  West. 

Murphy  &  Co.,  Publishers  and  Booksellers,  Baltimore. 
11 


Jenkins'  English  Literature. 

JosT  PcBUSHED,  in  a  handsome  volume  of  56U  pages,  12o.  price  in  doth,  $2. 
Library  style,  half  morocco,  $3. 

The  Student's  Handbook  of  British   and   American   Literature, 

Containing  JSketchks  iiiooRAPHiCAL  and  Ckitical  of  the  Most 
Distinguished  English  Authors,  from  the  Earliest  Times  to  the 
Present  Day,  with  Selections  from  their  Writings,  and  Questions 
adapted  to  the  Use  of  Schools.  By  Rev.  O.  L.  Jenkins,  A.  M., 
Late  President  of  St.  Charles,  and  formerly  President  of  St.  Mary^s 
College,  Baltimore.      (Special.) 

-Tnis  is  an  Elemehtaiit  History  of  the  English  Language  and  Literature,  espe- 
cially intended  for  Schools,  Academies  and  Colleges.  'J  he  period  which  it 
embraces,  d  ites  back  as  early  as  the  time  when  the  Saxons  under  Hengist  and 
Horsa  landed  in  Britain,  and  reaches  to  our  own  day  through  the  following 
Ptages:  the  Anglo-Saxon  Period,  549-1005;  the  Semi-Saxon  Ptrwd,  10')5-1250;  the 
Old  English  Period,  1250-1350;  the  Middle  English  Period,  i:i50-1580;  and  tlie  Modern 
Period,  from  1580  to  our  time.  Each  of  these  periods  is  a  point  of  departure  in 
the  history  of  English  Literature,  and  each  c<instiiutes  in  itself  a  well-defined 
epoch  in  the  growth  of  the  language.  In  the  fifth,  or  last  period,  falls  tlie  Liter- 
art  HiSTORT  OP  America.  This  is  divided  inio  three  parts;  the  Culonial  Era, 
the  Revolutionary  Period,  and  the  Present  Century. 

The  EXTRACTS  have  been  carefully  selected,  with  a  view  to  serve  not  only  as 
fair  specimens  of  the  style  of  the  writers,  but  also  as  an  illustrative  history  in 
themselves  of  English  ijiterature.  Various  Tables  chronological  and  linguistte, 
as  well  as  a  copious  Index,  accompany  the  work  In  fine,  Questioxs  have  beea 
introduced,  for  the  special  convenience  of  teachers  and  siudeuts. 

Brief  Extracts  from  n>rotices  of  tlio  I*ross,«fcc. 

Brooklyn,  N.  Y.,  March  6,  1876. 
John  Murphy,  Esq.,  Publisher,  Baltimore, 

Dear  Sir: — "  I  beg  of  you  to  excuse  my  delay 
in  giving  what  you  so  kiudly  ask— Day  humblo 
opinion  of  Rev.  Father  Jenkins'  text-book  ou 
onr  language  and  literature.  I  liave  given  it  a 
few  hours  examination,  and  my  impressions 
are:  The  plan  is  good,  the  execution  is  excel- 
lent. The  learned  author  handles  his  subject 
with  ability,  clearness,  wisdom,  and  a  calm 
impartiality,  as  rare  as  it  is  admirable.  The 
critical  remarks,  both  original  and  borrowed, 
are  happy  and  to  the  point.  Much  good  tasto 
and  8ound,  cultivated  Judgment  are  exhibited 
in  the  selection  of  the  specimens.  As  a  wholf, 
the  work  has  so  many  merits,  that  it  will — it 
must  take  its  place  as  the  text-book  in  Euglisii 
literature  in  all  our  high  Catholic  instit  tious 
Of  learning."  J.  O'KaNE  MURRAY. 

Baltimore,  Jaly  VJth,  1876. 
Mr.  John  MtrRPHv, 

/)«;»r  *■;> ;— Be  pleased  to  accept  my  grateful 
anknowlndgments  for  a  copy  of  Dr.  Jenkins* 
Handbook  of  British  and  Aiierican  Literature. 
I  road  the  work  wifi  great  interest  and  plea- 
Bure.  It  impressed  me  as  a  sound  and  scholarly 
book,  carefully  constructed,  and  containing 
much  valuable  information  in  regard  to  many 
authors,  whose  works  and  whose  history,  are 
little  known  to  the  American  pnhlio.  I  trust 
th.at  its  success  may  be  commensurate  with  its 
merits.  I  am,  dear  sir,  yours  very  trulv, 
IlKNRY  E.  SHEPnERD, 
Sup't  Public  Instruction,  Baltimore 

''ThftTTistory  of  the  English  language  i^  well 
and  ii.sefiilly  illustrated  iu  ttie  work  beftire  us  I 
hy  niimerons  extracts  from  Saxon  and  Anglo-  ] 
Saxon  writers  of  various  periods,  accompanied 
hy  trinslations  into  modern  English.  The 
stndy  of  this  book  alone  would  go  far  towards 
enabling  any  one  to  understand  and  enjoy  the 
Anglo  Saxon  writers."  London  Tablet. 

"It  is  without  exception,  the  best  student's 
handbook  we  have  yet  had  under  perusal." 
Nevoark  Daily  Journal. 


"  The  author  shows  himsel  f  thoroughly  versed 
in  his  subject.  He  writes  w'th  elegance,  occa- 
sionally with  force,  ns  in  tne  remarks  on  th* 
influence  of  the  Prot'j^stant  Reformation  on  lit- 
erature. His  taste  is  true  and  his  judgment 
sound."  (.alhuUc  World. 

"We  find  much  in  it  to  praise ;  the  biographi- 
cal sketches  are  ex  client,  and  the  selections 
have  been  made  with  good  taste.  Wo  like  the 
arrangement  of  the  work,  which  is  clear  and 
methodical."  Aoe  Maria. 

"It  embraces  specimens  of  the  styles  of 
writers,  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  period  to  the 
present  time.  These  extracts  are  preceded  by 
ample  biographical  and  critical  sketches  of 
their  authors,  with  interesting  historical  de- 
tails relative  to  thepr  "gress  of  leitera  during 
the  different  periods.  Various  tables,  chronolo- 
gical and  linguistic,  as  well  as  a  copious  index, 
accompany  the  work."       PabUshem'  Weekly. 

"  The  work  is  well  written,  and  to  CaCholio 
students  of  Eaijli-ih  literature,  we  cordially 
recommend  it.  The  style  is  excellent;  it  is 
the  safest  and  most  appreciative  text-book 
that  has  so  far  appeared  in  America." 

The  Salehianum. 

"The  present  volume  is  very  full,  compre- 
hensive and  complete,  oraiting  no  literary  name 
of  any  note."  St.  Louis  Globe  Democrat. 

"We  think  that  it  cannot  be  excelled,  and 
cnnnot  fail  to  become  one  of  the  most  accep- 
table text-books  thit  has  yt't  been  presented  to 
our  educational  institutions."— Pi<t»6urj/  Cath. 

"This  book  is  not  only  adapted  to  literary 
classes  in  schools,  but  well  adapted  to  home 
reading  by  all  who  wish  to  be  posted  on  the 
growth  and  cultivators  of  our  veinaciilar." 
N.braxkt  W<ttchnian. 

"  No  student  or  professional  man  should  be 
without  this  excellent  work,  as  to  many  it  will 
prove  exceedingly  useful,  and  to  all  a  most  in- 
structive and  interesting  acquisition.  It  is  a 
condensed  library,  and  is  worth  ten  times  its 
price."  Baltimore  Sunday  N«vn. 


MuRrHY  &  Co.  Publishers  and  Booksellers,  Baltimore. 
12 


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